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ABSTRACT 
In 2000, the European Union adopted a Directive against discrimination on the grounds 
of racial or ethnic origin. This Directive was one of the first legislative measures taken 
by the EU in the fight against racism and racial discrimination. The Thesis examines 
whether the Directive improves the protection against discrimination on the grounds of 
racial or ethnic origin for people within the EU by an in-depth analysis and evaluation 
of the Directive as a whole in relation to the theoretical concepts of race and racism and 
of models of anti discrimination law. This analysis includes a discussion of the need for 
and the effectiveness of legislation in general and of legislation at EU level in the fight 
against racism and racial discrimination and an evaluation of the anti discrimination 
clauses of the international and European human rights instruments. The Directive is 
studied in these wider contexts because they have all been influential upon its 
development and because they provide both the framework and a set of standards for 
the examination and evaluation of the Race Directive and its effectiveness in protecting 
people within the EU against racial or ethnic origin discrimination. The Thesis 
concludes with an assessment of how far the EU has come on the road to equality with 
the adoption of the Directive and the subsequent developments; or, in other words, how 
far the EU has progressed towards achieving equality for all people in Europe. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2000, the EU adopted a Directive against discrimination on the grounds of racial or 
ethnic origin. ' This Directive was one of the first legislative measures taken by the EU 
in the fight against racism and racial discrimination. This fight had been part of the 
discussions within the EU since the mid 1980s, but no legislative action was taken until 
the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 established the Community competence to do so by 
inserting Article 13 into the EC Treaty. However, once it was given the competence, the 
EU adopted the Race Directive in record time. 
This Thesis aims to identify whether the Race Directive improves the protection 
against discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin for people within the EU 
by an in-depth analysis and evaluation of the Directive as a whole in relation to the 
theoretical concepts of race and racism and models of anti discrimination law. This 
analysis will include a discussion of the need for and the effectiveness of legislation in 
general and of legislation at EU level in the fight against racism and an evaluation of the 
anti discrimination clauses of the international and European human rights instruments. 
Through this analysis, the Thesis establishes where the protection given by the Directive 
is lacking and why this is so. 
The Thesis starts from the assumption that anti discrimination legislation needs 
to be studied within the wider conceptual, historical and societal context. For a proper 
understanding of the Directive it is important to study it against the backgrounds 
mentioned because they have all been influential on the development of the provisions 
of the Directive. They help explain why the Directive was adopted, why it covers 
particular grounds and areas and ultimately why and where its effectiveness is limited. 
The literature on the Directive suggests, on the one hand, that overall the 
Directive is considered to be a very positive development in the fight against racial and 
Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29/06/2000 implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between 
Persons irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin [2000] OJ L 180/22. In the following, any reference to 
the `Directive' or the `Race Directive' will be to this Directive. 
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ethnic origin discrimination within the EU and its Member States. On the other hand, 
many writers are also highly critical of a number of its provisions because they are 
falling short of providing comprehensive protection for all. However, this literature has 
often looked at one or more separate issues or provisions of the Race Directive in 
isolation, without giving enough detailed attention to the historical, social and political 
backgrounds which have made the Directive into what it is today. The Thesis, on the 
other hand, analyses and critiques the Directive using the contexts mentioned to explain 
its strengths and weaknesses 
In order to do this, the research for this Thesis has concentrated on an analysis of 
the literature about theories on race, racism, racial discrimination and equality, about 
whether law is the right tool to tackle racism and racial discrimination and about the 
arguments for and against legal measures. A number of international human rights 
instruments and the interpretation given to them in the case law and the literature have 
also been studied. These studies provide both the framework and a set of standards for 
the examination and evaluation of the Race Directive and its effectiveness in protecting 
people within the EU against racial or ethnic origin discrimination. 
The first of the contexts that have influenced the Race Directive relates to 
theories on race, racism and racial discrimination. Racism and racial discrimination are 
by no means recent problems, but at the international level, the fight against these came 
to the fore after World War II. In the war, theories about the existence of different races 
and the superiority of some over others had led to genocide and persecution. The feeling 
was that states should work together to avoid a repetition of the war. To further this aim 
the United Nations was formed in 1945 and the Council of Europe in 1949. 
Fundamental human rights were seen as vitally important to achieve greater unity 
between nations and, therefore, the United Nations agreed the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 and the Council of Europe adopted the European 
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Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms (ECHR) in 1950. Both 
include a prohibition of discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights protected in the 
instrument on a large number of grounds, including race, colour, religion and national 
origin. Thus, after World War II, the fight against racism and racial discrimination 
developed at the international and the wider European level, both of which affected the 
European states. 2 
Many of these states already had a plural society, made up of people of different 
descent, ancestry or culture, even before the large-scale immigration that took place 
after World War II. Some of these States were colonial powers and had people of their 
former colonies, often with citizenship rights, living within their territory. Others had 
taken in people fleeing persecution on the grounds of their religion, race or ethnic origin 
and economic migrants who came to work in the industries in these countries and then 
settled there. Most European States, therefore, have had a very mixed, plural society for 
a long time. 3 However, the numbers of people from other states have risen sharply since 
1945. All countries were building up their economies again after the war and many new 
industries were established. For these, large numbers of workers were needed and many 
countries could not fill this need from the people already living within their borders, so 
most looked further afield and brought in people from elsewhere. The present situation 
in most EU countries is that these people who came to work there and who, originally, 
may have had no intention to stay, did in the end settle and brought their families to the 
2 See further: Banton, Michael, International Action against Racial Discrimination (1996 Oxford: 
Clarendon Press); Boven, Theo van, "Discrimination and Human Rights Law: Combating Racism" in: 
Fredman, Sandra, (ed. ), Discrimination and Human Rights The Case of Racism (2001 Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 111-34, at 127-9; Boyle, Kevin and Baldaccini, Anneliese, "International Human 
Rights Approaches to Racism" in: Fredman, ibid. 135-91; Banton, Michael, The International Politics 
of Race (2002 Cambridge: Polity Press); Niessen, Jan and Chopin, Isabelle, (eds. ), The Development 
of Legal Instruments to Combat Racism in a Diverse Europe (2004 Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers). 
3 MacEwen, Martin, Tackling Racism in Europe: An Examination of Anti-Discrimination Law in 
Practice (1995 Oxford/Washington: Berg), at 1-8 and 176-9; Spencer, Michael, States of Injustice. A 
Guide to Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the European Union (1995 London/Boulder Colorado: 
Pluto Press), at 137-40; Duncan, William, "Racism and Xenophobia in Europe", in Barrett, Gavin, 
(ed. ), Justice Cooperation in the European Union (1997 Dublin: Institute of European Affairs) 183- 
94, at 183-5; Martiniello, Marco, How to combine Integration and Diversities: The Challenge of an 
EU Multicultural Citizenship (2004 Vienna: EUMC). 
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new country as well. 4 Once the economic situation deteriorated, their presence started 
to lead to resentment in the people who were already in the country as they saw these 
new settlers as taking their jobs, housing, benefits, etc. All this had an effect on racial 
and ethnic relations, because the newcomers were often of a different race, ethnic origin 
and/or religion, and hatred and distrust of these people took on the form of 
discrimination on these grounds and of racism. Many States looked to control the 
situation through their immigration and asylum policies. Alongside these policies, anti 
race discrimination laws were often developed as well. The latter were enacted to 
lighten or soften the impact of harsh immigration and asylum rules and to show that 
something was done about racism and racial discrimination. States wanted to restrict 
immigration, but, on the other hand, they did not want to be seen to be racist, either at 
home or on the international scenes 
The September 11th 2001 attacks on New York and the Madrid and London 
bombings have escalated the antagonism towards people perceived to be of certain races 
and religions, who are linked to terrorism. Almost all European States are now 
considering tightening up their entry requirements for immigrants and asylum seekers 
and their conditions for acquiring citizenship or have already done so. 
The Member States joining the EU in 2004 and in 2007 have brought their own 
problems in this area. They might not all have as many economic migrants as the old 
Member States, but many of the Eastern European States have national minority 
° MacEwen, supra note 3, at 3-6; Duncan, supra note 3; Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin, "Race Relations in 
New Britain" in: Anwar, Muhammad, Roach, Patrick and Sondhi, Ranjit, (eds. ), From Legislation to 
Integration? Race Relations in Britain (2000 Basingstoke: Macmillan Press) 178-95; Bell, Mark, 
Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (2002 Oxford: Oxford University Press), at 55-9; 
Niessen and Chopin, supra note 2, at vii-viii. 
King, John, "Ethnic Minorities and Multilateral European Institutions" in: Hargreaves, Alec and 
Leaman, Jeremy, (eds. ), Racism, Ethnicity and Politics in Contemporary Europe (1995 Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar) 179-91; MacEwen, supra note 3,67-70; Gearty, Conor, "The Internal and External 
`Other' in the Union Legal Order: Racism, Religious Intolerance and Xenophobia in Europe" in: 
Alston, Philip, (ed. ), The EU and Human Rights (1999 Oxford: Oxford University Press) 327-58; 
Hervey, Tamara, "Putting Europe's House in Order: Racism, Race Discrimination and Xenophobia 
after the Treaty of Amsterdam" in: O'Keeffe, David and Twomey, Patrick, (eds. ), Legal Issues of the 
Amsterdam Treaty (1999 Oxford: Hart Publishing) 329-50; Dummett, Ann, "Tackling Racism: Britain 
in Europe" in: Anwar, Roach and Sondhi, supra note 4, at 107-23. 
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populations and a considerable number of people of Roma origin, both of which have 
been discriminated against for many years and on a large scale. 
Because all the EU Member States have faced similar problems, cooperation and 
policy coordination in immigration appeared on the EU Agenda in the early 1990s, and 
this was one of the factors that led to the development of measures against racism and 
discrimination. As Be116 mentions, `the restrictive trend of EU immigration policy acted 
as a catalyst for EU policy to combat racism'. Civil society was galvanised into 
transnational action for anti racism measures at EU level, `so as to ameliorate the effects 
of immigration policies'. There was pressure `to improve the image of EU immigration 
policies'. 7 
The above provides the backdrop for the analysis of the Race Directive. In this 
analysis, a number of concepts are used - race, racism, (racial) discrimination, ethnic 
and ethnicity, xenophobia and equality - and it is important to make clear at the start 
what is to be understood by these concepts in the Thesis, and especially in the context of 
legislation. In Chapter 1, we define these key concepts and point out possible pitfalls 
that should be avoided. All these concepts can be, and have been, defined in very 
different ways, and it is, therefore, easy to get confused about what exactly is meant by 
these terms. Thinking about these terms has also changed over time and thus their 
development in history needs to be examined to get an idea of their current meaning. 
The latter is especially true of the terms race and racism. Furthermore, the terms racism 
and (racial) discrimination have, over time, acquired a negative connotation and are 
linked to a moral judgment that they are `bad'. 
There is also confusion about the meaning of the concept of equality, which 
appears to be used to indicate any of the following four notions: formal equality or 
equality of treatment, equality of opportunity, equality of results and pluralism. In the 
6 Supra note 4, at 67. 
7 Ibid. at 69. 
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last part of Chapter 1, we examine these four types of equality and, in Chapter 2, we 
develop these concepts of equality into four models of anti discrimination law: the 
formal equality model; the equality of opportunity model; the equality of results model 
and the pluralist model, which each aim to achieve the corresponding type of equality. 
We also identify some existing examples of legislation that fit in each of these models. 
The models are developed to assist in our analysis of the Race Directive in later 
Chapters. 
In Chapter 3, we raise the question whether legislation is the right weapon to 
tackle the problem of (racial) discrimination. Are anti discrimination laws effective and 
useful? Are they necessary in the fight against discrimination? Are there other, non- 
legal means that could be used together with or instead of legislation with the same or 
better effect? Opinions about the effectiveness of legislation to combat discrimination 
are strongly divided and we examine the arguments both for and against such 
legislation. We will also look at some research findings on the effects of anti 
discrimination laws. 
We explore the international context of the Race Directive in Chapter 4. A 
number of international measures, most of which are signed and ratified by all EU 
Member States, contain equality guarantees and anti discrimination clauses. These 
instruments set minimum standards of human rights at international level and these 
minimum standards are recognised by the EU, as the EU treaties and other legislative 
measures refer to the international human rights instruments. Moreover, the European 
Institutions have, from the very first discussions on the fight against racism, placed the 
right to equality and the right not to be discriminated against firmly within a wider 
human rights context. This right is also recognised by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) as a fundamental principle of Community law. The Race Directive places itself 
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within this wider human rights context by referring to a number of international 
instruments in Recital 3 of its Preamble. 
In Chapter 5, we undertake a detailed analysis of the Race Directive in relation 
to the theories of race, racism and racial discrimination discussed in the first chapter. 
The Directive itself does not define many of the key terms and, therefore, there are a 
number of questions as to how these will be interpreted. In Chapter 5, we examine the 
possible problems this may cause and in what ways this weakens the Directive and we 
suggest examples of definitions or interpretations that the Member States and the ECJ 
could follow. The reason for the omission of these definitions is discussed, as is the 
question whether the Directive should cover more than racial or ethnic origin. The 
history of the fight against racism and racial discrimination within the EU and the 
developments that led up to the adoption of the Directive will be referred to where this 
is useful to explain the provisions of the Race Directive. 
Chapter 6 is devoted to a second detailed analysis of the Race Directive, this 
time using the models of anti discrimination law developed in the earlier part of the 
Thesis. We discuss which of these models can be detected in the Directive and whether 
the EU legislation against racial or ethnic origin discrimination goes beyond a formal 
concept of equality to promote equality of opportunity, equality of results and pluralism. 
We also discuss developments within the EU since the Directive was adopted and the 
likelihood of legislative or other changes in the near future. 
In the final Chapter, we discuss what the results of the analysis have revealed 
about the Race Directive and apply these results to answer the question whether it 
provides increased protection against racial or ethnic origin discrimination for people 
within the EU. From the preceding analysis it will be clear that the Race Directive 
should not be seen in a vacuum, but should be placed within the many different contexts 
which have all played a role in its development and its drafting process and which will, 
16 
no doubt, play a further role in its interpretation and in the future of anti race 
discrimination measures in the EU. 
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CHAPTER 1- DEFINITIONS OF KEY CONCEPTS 
1 Introduction 
A number of key terms and concepts are used throughout the Thesis, including race and 
racism, discrimination on racial or other grounds and equality. In this first Chapter, 
these concepts are briefly explored and defined for the purposes of the Thesis. Their 
possible pitfalls need to be kept in mind and these are also highlighted. In the following 
Chapters of the Thesis, we build upon the concepts defined in this first Chapter, and use 
them in analysing and evaluating the EU legislation against racial discrimination. 
The first concept to be explored is race and this is followed by racism. In some 
ways, which will be touched upon in the discussion, it is difficult to define race without 
also mentioning racism. However, the opposite, defining racism without touching on 
race would be even more difficult. The two concepts are linked in many ways, although 
they can also be seen, as Benedict does, as being `poles apart'. ' 
After the discussion of race and racism, the concept of discrimination, and 
especially racial discrimination, is explored. Although the emphasis is on racial 
discrimination, other forms of discrimination will also be mentioned. It is difficult to 
discuss racial discrimination without looking at discrimination in a wider context, as the 
demarcation between the different grounds for discrimination is not always clear and 
people are often discriminated against on more than one ground. 
The final concept explored in this Chapter is equality. Equality is a key concept 
in any study on discrimination because it can be seen as the `flip-side' of 
discrimination: the right not to be discriminated against or the right to protection against 
discrimination is seen as a human right based on the principle of equality of all humans. 
The right to non-discrimination is often used interchangeably with the right to equality. 
But there are different types of equality and different uses of the term, which will be 
Benedict, Ruth, Race and Racism (1983 London: Routhledge & Kegan Paul), preface. What Benedict 
means by this is discussed later. 
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examined. In this context, the terms difference and diversity are often used and their 
relationship with equality will also be touched upon. 
2 Race 
2.1 Historically Specific 
Perhaps the simplest way to find a definition of race or a good first step would be to 
look up the term in the dictionary. The Collins Concise Dictionary2 defines race as: `A 
group of people of common ancestry, distinguished from others by physical 
characteristics such as hair-type, colour of skin, stature etc. ... ' But does this definition 
help us in explaining what race is, how it has been understood in the past and how it is 
understood now? 
The literature on the subject suggests that it is not as simple as the dictionary 
definition, that defining race is much more complicated because the term appears to be 
changing over time; it is not a static concept with a single meaning. It has had different 
meanings in different historical settings and we will therefore have to trace the meaning 
of the term over time. Goldberg suggests looking at race `as a fluid, transforming, 
historically specific concept parasitic on theoretic and social discourses for the meaning 
it assumes at given historical moments ... 
'3 Race, in other words, is a fluid concept that 
takes its meaning in a historically specific context. We therefore have to look briefly at 
this history. 4 
The term race was hardly used before the eighteenth century, but when it was 
used it denoted nothing more than lineage or line of descent; therefore, race was a group 
of people with a common line of descent, a common ancestry. When people came into 
2 The Collins Concise Dictionary, 1990. 
3 Goldberg, David, "The Semantics of Race" in: Bulmer, Martin and Solomos, John, (eds. ), Racism 
(1999 Oxford: Oxford University Press) 362-77, at 371. 
° Because we are only defining race and racism for the purpose and in the context of this Thesis, this 
look at the history is necessarily short and does not go into details. For more information on the 
history of these two terms the reader is referred to Benedict, supra note 1; Miles, Robert, Racism 
(1989 London/New York: Routhledge); Furedi, Frank, The Silent War: Imperialism and the Changing 
Perception of Race (1998 London: Pluto Press); Bulmer and Solomos, supra note 3; Banton, Michael, 
The International Politics of Race (2002 Cambridge: Polity Press). 
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contact with other people, race was used as a term to relate to these other people and to 
define themselves in relation to these other people. Race denoted observed variations 
between people, what Banton describes as `phenotypical variations', for example 
variations in complexion, hair type, and physique. 5 
Not until the eighteenth century did race become a biological term, a subject of 
the biological sciences. The world was seen as populated by distinct races, each with 
different biological and cultural characteristics. This biological distinction became 
linked to a hierarchy between the races, with some races being considered superior to 
others. This inferiority/superiority was used to justify exclusion, subordination and even 
extermination of certain groups considered to be inferior. Many people argue that race 
was used or `reinvented' with this ranking attached to it to explain events in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries like white domination, colonisation, slavery and 
other forms of exploitation. 6 Even in the twentieth century, race is used for political 
goals. The International Council on Human Rights Policy states that: `in many cases 
race is made use of, or even invented, to justify discrimination. Race or a myth of race 
serves political ends'. 7 
Scientists in the 1930s disproved the theories about biological differences and 
most writers, writing after World War II, now acknowledge that there is no scientific 
evidence to support any theory that there are different, separate, biological races. 
However, biological notions of race do still appear to be present in political discourse 
and popular thinking. The term is still used in everyday language to label differences 
between people, especially differences in skin colour. 8 
s Banton, Michael, Racial and Ethnic Competition (1983 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), at 
34-8. 
6 See for example: Miles and Furedi, both supra note 4. 
International Council on Human Rights Policy, The Persistence and Mutation of Racism (1999), at 4< 
www. ichry. org/paper files/l 12p 01. ndf 
See for example: Miles, supra note 4, at 37-8; Banton, Michael, "The Nature and Causes of Racism 
and Racial Discrimination" 17,1, International Sociology 69-84 (1992), at 78; Solomos, John, Race 
and Racism in Britain (2°d ed. 1993 Basingstoke: MacMillan), at 8; Mason, David, Race and Ethnicity 
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2.2 Hierarchy of Races 
Race, therefore, has been and still is connected to the idea of a hierarchy between races. 
The hierarchy meant that some races were considered to be inferior and this has led to 
inferior treatment of people of certain races. This is where race and racism are so 
closely linked that one cannot describe one without touching on the other. Because the 
term race has this `negative' link, some writers suggest that it should be dropped 
altogether. See for example, the quote from Montagu that `it were better that the term 
"race", being so weighed down with false meaning, be dropped altogether from the 
vocabulary'. 9 Other writers clearly state that they reject any link. Benedict, writing in 
1942, expresses emphatically in her preface that using the category race does not entail 
supporting or authorising racism. According to her, race is a matter of scientific study, 
while racism is an unproven assumption of the biological and perpetual superiority of 
one human group over another. Race and racism are therefore `poles apart'. '0 
That theories of the superiority of some races over others still exert their 
influence and that the negative connotation of the term race still exists, can be seen in 
the Third UNESCO Statement on Race of 1964,11 which declared that `all men living 
today belong to a single species, homo sapiens, and are derived from common stock'. 12 
Further on it states that `it is not possible from the biological point of view to speak in 
any way whatsoever of a general inferiority or superiority of this or that race'. 13 
Another example can be found in the Preamble of the United Nations 
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
1966,14 where the conviction is stated that: 
in Modern Britain (1995 Oxford: Oxford University Press), at 7; Guillaumin, Collette, "The Changing 
Face of Race" in: Bulmer and Solomos, supra note 3,355-62. 9 This quote can be found in Miles, supra note 4, at 45. 
10 Supra note 1. 
II UNESCO Four Statements on the Race Question (1969 Paris: UNESCO), at 44-9, < 
http: //unesdoc. unesco. orc/images/0012/001229/ 122962eo. ndf 12 Point 1. 
13 Point 6. 
14 Hereafter referred to as the ICERD. 
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any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is scientifically false, morally 
condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous, and that there is no justification for racial 
discrimination, in theory or in practice, anywhere. 
Even at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the link between the use of the term 
race and support for racist theories is still present, as is clear from Tyson's15 article on 
the negotiations of the Race Directive which took place in the EU in 1999-2000. During 
these negotiations there was controversy about using race or racial origin as, for some 
Member States, this denoted accepting racist theories that alleged the existence of 
separate human races. Other Member States wanted to use the word race, rather than 
solely relying on ethnic origin, in order to make clear that the Directive was combating 
racism. The compromise that was reached was the addition of a Recital16 which states: 
The European Union rejects theories which attempt to determine the existence of separate 
human races. The use of the term `racial origin' in this Directive does not imply an 
acceptance of such theories. 
2.3 Social Construct 
Connected to the fact that race is historically specific and should therefore be studied 
within the society in which it is used, is the view, often expressed by modem writers, 
that race is a social relationship and a social construct. Race is created in a particular 
society to justify differences in treatment or in position. Miles writes that people have 
continued to use race to label difference and as a result certain types of social relations 
are defined as race relations, as relations between people of different races. Further on in 
his book, Miles writes that the use of the word race to label groups is `an aspect of the 
social construction of reality: races are socially imagined rather than biological 
realities'. '7 
15 Tyson, Adam, "The Negotiation of the European Community Directive on Racial Discrimination" 3, 
European Journal of Migration and Law 199-229 (2001), at 201-2. 
16 Preamble to the Race Directive, Recital 6. 
17 Supra note 4, at 72. 
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Mason'8 starts his book with the assumption that there are no races in the 
biological sense of distinct divisions of the human species. Rather there are sociological 
interactions which are constituted by their participants as a particular kind of social 
relationship: race. In his words, race `was always more than just a way of thinking about 
and describing human differences. It was a social relationship characterized by an 
unequal distribution of power and resources'. 19 Mason therefore sees race as: 
a social relationship in which structural positions and social actions are ordered, justified, 
and explained by reference to systems of symbols and beliefs which emphasise the social 
and cultural relevance of biologically rooted characteristics. In other words, the social 
relationship race presumes the existence of racism. 20 
Fredman21 argues that `race is itself a social construct, reflecting ideological attempts to 
legitimate domination, and heavily based on social and historical context'. 
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
Summarising, it will be clear that there is little agreement about what the concept of 
race means, especially when looking at the use of the term at different points in history. 
What needs to be kept in mind is that it is a fluid concept, changing over time and 
indeed, changing with the use a person makes of it. It is suggested that there are no 
superior or inferior races, but that large numbers of people behave as if there are. In this 
sense, it is not relevant whether races exist or not, but it is important to observe that 
social actors treat races as real and organise their lives and exclusionary practices by 
reference to this. When studying race as a ground for discrimination, the perception in 
the minds of people is important; they discriminate against another person because they 
perceive him or her to be different and therefore inferior or threatening. 
18 Supra note 8, at 1. 
19 Ibid. at 8. 
20 Ibid. at 9. 
21 Fredman, Sandra, "Introduction" and "Combating Racism with Human Rights: The Right to Equality" 
in: Fredman, Sandra, (ed. ), Discrimination and Human Rights The Case of Racism (2001 Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) 1-44, at 2 and 9-10. 
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Race in everyday meaning is still often based on a difference between races, 
although not necessarily based on biological differences. It is also, and sometimes 
exclusively, based on cultural differences. It must also be kept in mind that the term 
race has been and is often used in political contexts, to support all kinds of policies, 
from right wing to left wing. 
One more point needs discussing under this heading. The terms ethnicity or 
ethnic origin are often used together with, 22 or as an alternative to, race or racial origin. 
How closely the two concepts are related can be seen from the description of ethnic 
(with the noun ethnicity) in the Collins Concise Dictionary (my italics): 
1. of or relating to a human group having racial, linguistic and other traits in common. 
2. relating to the classification of mankind in groups especially on the basis of racial 
characteristics. 
3. denoting or deriving from the cultural traditions of a group of people. 
4. characteristics of another culture. 
From this dictionary definition it will be clear that it is difficult to draw a boundary 
between the concepts of ethnicity and race, as they overlap in many aspects. It is 
suggested that the terms ethnic and ethnicity, when coupled with race, are used to 
clarify that cultural traits are also included. When used instead of race, it is often as a 
euphemism, to avoid the negative implications that the word race has. Ethnic and 
ethnicity are less negatively loaded. Ethnic minority is also an often-encountered term. 
In this Thesis it will be understood as meaning a group differentiated by racial origin or 
cultural background. 
22 As in the title of the Race Directive. 
24 
3 Racism 
3.1 Ideology/Actions 
The concept of racism is, just like race, a contested concept. Starting from the same 
basis as race, we find the following definition of racism in the Collins Dictionary: 
1. The belief that races have distinctive cultural characteristics determined by hereditary 
factors and that this endows some races with intrinsic superiority. 
2. Abusive or aggressive behaviour towards members of another race on the basis of such a 
belief. 
This definition uses the term race, like most definitions of racism do. This shows the 
strong link between the two concepts, and also the reason why race was defined first. 
The definition includes in the concept of racism not only beliefs, but also 
behaviour. Not all definitions given in the literature include both views and behaviour. 
Some writers define racism as beliefs, doctrines, views or ideologies and specifically 
exclude the actions or behaviour based on those doctrines. The reasons they give for this 
exclusion is that an inclusive definition is too wide, covers too much and is therefore of 
limited analytical use. Such a concept often obscures more than it reveals23 Miles 
especially is very clear on this; he rejects what he calls `an inflated concept of racism' 
and uses racism to denote only ideologies and beliefs. 24 
Banton25 writes that, at the United Nations, the word racism is taken to mean 
almost the same as racial discrimination. The two terms are often coupled together in 
the same sentence, because some people do not regard the two terms as synonymous. 
Many writers use medical metaphors when writing about racism, it is seen as something 
pathological like an illness or a cancer. Racial discrimination is seen as something more 
normal and general, in the sense that crime is a normal feature of any human society. 
23 Mason, supra note 8, at 11. 
24 Miles, supra note 4, at 41-61. 
25 Supra note 8, at 69-72. 
25 
Banton writes that on a general level the two terms offer distinct and possibly 
competing conceptions, but that their differences often dissolve when it comes to 
practical applications. For some then, racism is a doctrine while racial discrimination is 
a practice. 26 In that view, racism only covers ideologies and doctrines, while actions 
based on those views are called racial discrimination. 
3.2 Historically Specific 
An aspect that the concept of racism has in common with the concept of race is that 
racism is not a static phenomenon but is historically specific: it has to be studied in its 
historical and geographical setting. Banton writes that racism is usually assumed as 
`historically specific, something that originated in a particular time to rationalise an 
economic interest'. 27 And Solomos writes that debates about racism `do not make sense 
outside particular social, political and economic contexts'28 
Although the history of notions about race can be traced back to ancient times, 
most writers place the emergence of what we now call racism at the end of the 
eighteenth century. That is when racial doctrines and ideologies began to develop. Most 
writers link this emergence to processes of European expansion, slavery, colonisation 
and domination, which could all be seen as institutions of white supremacy. Racist 
theories, doctrines that some races - i. e. the white race - were superior, were used to 
rationalise why white people should exploit black people or why black people should be 
slaves. The development of racism was linked with processes of economic expansion 
and capitalist development, which were happening at the same time. 
29 
Although racism emerged at the end of the eighteenth century, the term itself did 
not gain common currency until much later. The usage of the term racism is linked to 
26 Solomos, supra note 8, at 79. Furedi also mentions `racism as a theory and racial discrimination as a 
practice', Furedi, supra note 4, at 14. 
27 Banton, supra note 8, at 70. 
28 Supra note 8, at 4. 
29 See for example: Benedict, supra note 1; Miles and Furedi, both supra note 4; Bulmer and Solomos, 
supra note 3, especially chapter 2. 
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the rise of Nazism in the 1930s. Prior to that decade the concept of racism was not used 
to identify theories about the superiority of certain races and the inferiority of others. 
3.3 Hierarchy of Races 
Racism, whether used to denote only ideologies or also actions, is grounded in a 
hierarchy of races, is based on the belief that some races are superior to others. If it can 
be said that race has a negative link to such a hierarchy, it will be clear that this link is 
very much stronger with racism. The concept is, in Miles' words `heavily negatively 
loaded. To claim someone has expressed a racist opinion is to denounce them as 
immoral or unworthy'. 30 Banton writes: 
By 1971 the word `racism' had become a sufficiently accepted designation for indefensible 
attitudes and practices. It had enormous rhetorical power. ... To join in the condemnation 
of racism was one way a person, or a state, could assert it was not racist 31 
Furedi also points out that after the Second World War `racism as a theory and 
discrimination as a practice acquired negative connotations'. 32 Racism, therefore, has a 
strong negative connotation, and is often seen as socially unacceptable. In today's 
language: racism is not `politically correct'. 
3.4 Social Construct 
Connected with its historically specific character is the fact that racism, just like race, 
has been described as a social construct, as something that has been created within a 
society to justify inequality and to protect the political and economic interests of those 
who discriminate. The International Council on Human Rights Policy expresses it 
thus: 33 
30 Supra note 4, at 1. 
31 Banton, supra note 8, at 71-2. 
32 Supra note 4, at 14. 
33 See the Report, supra note 7, at 4. 
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Racism created and sustained the relevant distinctions of race on which social and 
economic discrimination in these societies depend. It is a social construct that created and 
then justified patterns of inequality and discrimination. 
Because of the fact that racism can be seen as historically specific and as constructed in 
different ways within the societies within which it appears, some writers are of the 
opinion that it is more correct to speak about multiple racisms. Miles, for example, 
writes that there have been many significantly different racisms, although they are not 
necessarily independent of each other: one form of racism will take on some new 
elements and so develop into a new form. 34 Bulmer and Solomos write, `there is no 
single monolithic racism ... Rather there are quite 
distinct racisms that are constructed 
and reconstructed through time and space by social action'. 
35 Fredman also writes about 
multiple racisms, and continues: `colour racism must be examined together with cultural 
racism, which include ethnicity, religion, and language'. 
36 
Sometimes the term `new racism' is used to refer to racism in modern times, 
which is based on cultural and social differences rather than on biological differences. 
But if racism is seen as historically specific, a term like new racism is not needed, 
because it is racism in its specific present day form. Mason even argues that the term is 
actually just a `rhetorical smokescreen behind which lurk old beliefs about race'. 
37 
Social and cultural differences are used to differentiate between people because 
biological differences have been rejected by science. But ideas about biological 
differences are still widespread and are often at the basis of ideas about cultural and 
social differences. 
34 Miles, supra note 4, at 82-3. 
35 Bulmer and Solomos, supra note 3, at 15. 
36 Fredman, supra note 21, at 2. 
37 Mason, supra note 8, at 10. 
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3.5 Acknowledgement and Denial 
Some writers have pointed out that, to combat racism effectively, we first have to 
acknowledge that it exists. Denial of racism occurs frequently and is seen as an obstacle 
to any progress in addressing it effectively. Petrova38 sums this up in four assumptions: 
firstly, all societies are racist to some degree; secondly, racism is ubiquitous; thirdly, the 
existence of racism is widely denied; and, fourthly, the acknowledgement of racism is a 
prerequisite (but not at all a guarantee) to overcoming it. 
Petrova concludes that the discussion of denial of racism should be accompanied 
by a discussion of acknowledgement. Van Boven39 writes that the denial of the 
existence of racism, racial discrimination and related phenomena is still widespread, 
although awareness is slowly growing that no society is free from racism. 
Acknowledgement that these phenomena exist is needed if a strategy to combat racism 
and racial discrimination is to be effective. 
3.6 Institutional Racism 
The term `institutional racism' is used regularly in Britain since it was defined in the 
MacPherson Report. 40 This report was the conclusion of an inquiry into the death, in 
1993, of black teenager Stephen Lawrence. The Report gave the following definition of 
institutional racism: 
the collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service 
to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in 
processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting 
prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority 
ethnic people. 
38 Petrova, Dimitrina, "Racial Discrimination and the Rights of Minority Cultures" in: Fredman, supra 
note 21,45-76, at 45. Petrova discusses denial in its various meanings and illustrates this using the 
position of the Roma people in Eastern Europe. 
39 Boven, Theo van, "Discrimination and Human Rights Law: Combating Racism" in: Fredman, supra 
note 21,111-33, at 111-5. 
40 The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report of an Inquiry by Sir William MacPherson of Cluny (Cmnd 
4262-I, 1999), para 6.34. 
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The Report contained a harsh verdict of institutional racism within the London 
Metropolitan Police. Three points need to be made; firstly, the use of the term 
`unwitting' indicates that the people within the organisation (the police in the Lawrence 
case) are not aware of the prejudices and the racist stereotyping, they do not 
disadvantage minority ethnic people intentionally. They do so because it is the normal 
thing to do, because it is the `culture' of the organisation. It is seen like normal to act 
like that within the organisation. 
Secondly, this definition uses racism as including both attitudes and behaviour. 
And, thirdly, since the report, the term institutional racism has become common 
currency in Britain and both the Crown Prosecution Service and the Prison Service have 
been accused of institutional racism. The term has also been mentioned in relation to 
other services, including the NHS and the mental health service. However, the term 
does not appear to have played a role in discussions on anti discrimination law within 
the EU at the time the Race Directive was negotiated. 
3.7Xenophobia 
The term xenophobia is often used coupled together with racism, especially within the 
EU. 41 The dictionary definition of xenophobia is a dislike or fear of foreigners and all 
things foreign. The term xenophobia is also often used as a euphemism for racism, 
because of the negative connotation of racism and the links between racism and fascism 
and the holocaust. As Spencer writes: 
42 
Xenophobia ... 
implies an irrational but more excusable sentiment, capable of being 
expressed as much by jokes about foreigners as by violent expressions of hatred. ... In 
practice the two words express aspects of the same thing: a mistrust and fear of any person 
41 See for example: Joint Declaration of the Institutions against Racism and Xenophobia [1986] OJ C 
158/1; COM (1988) 318, Proposal for a Council Resolution on the Fight against Racism and 
Xenophobia; Declaration by the Council of 16/12/1997 on Respecting Diversity and Combating 
Racism and Xenophobia [1998] OJ C 1/1; European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia 
(EUMC), the European Institution set up to monitor racism. 
42 Spencer, Michael, States of Injustice. A Guide to Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the European 
Union (1995 London/Boulder Colorado: Pluto Press), at 127. 
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whose language, culture or appearance is different to that of the majority, allied with a 
conviction that one's own `race', nation or culture is superior to any other. 
3.8 Concluding Remarks 
Racism thus appears to be an even more contested concept than race. Because it is 
closely related to the concept of race, the problems with the latter are equally 
problematic in relation to the concept of racism. First of all, racism is used in two 
distinct ways, either to denote beliefs and ideologies or to denote these ideologies and 
the attitudes and actions based on these views. What has to be kept in mind when 
studying racism is that the term is used by some for both ideologies and attitudes and 
that others distinguish the two, often calling the ideologies, theories, views, beliefs or 
doctrines racism and the practices, attitudes, behaviour or actions based on them racial 
discrimination. 
Just like race, the concept of racism must be seen as a fluid concept that should 
be studied in its historic, geographical, economic, political and social context. And, 
again just like race, but to a much greater degree, racism has a negative connotation, 
although its history suggests that this connotation is a product of the post World War II 
era. This negative connotation has led to widespread denial of the existence of racism 
and racial discrimination and the need for acknowledgement before these can be 
overcome effectively. 
In this Thesis, the concept of racism will be used to indicate the belief that races 
have distinctive hereditary characteristics, which can be biological or cultural, and that 
this endows some races with intrinsic superiority, while the term racial discrimination is 
used for the behaviour based on such a belief. However, the concepts are often used in 
the same way or will run over into one another when it comes to their practical 
applications. Therefore, the following must be kept in mind. Firstly, it is often difficult 
to distinguish between beliefs and views on the one hand and attitudes and behaviour on 
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the other. When talking about an ideology or doctrine of racism, one usually visualises a 
clear, well-formulated theory, but in practice, in most people's minds the racist feelings 
will not be so clearly formulated and separated from racist attitudes and behaviour. 
Secondly, racist views and beliefs often only show themselves or become manifest 
through racist behaviour or action. And, thirdly, legislation will prohibit the practical 
occurrences of racism, such as (incitement to) racist violence, racist hate speech and 
discrimination in employment and other areas of life, rather than views and ideas. 
It is submitted that racism is negative and that it is a phenomenon that needs to 
be combated. This raises the central question: can racism ever be fully overcome; can 
there be a world without racism? On the one hand, it is suggested that much has already 
been achieved in the last two centuries, in the sense that slavery, Nazism and apartheid 
have been prohibited and firmly condemned in international law and in many national 
laws. Banton remarks on the rapid development of international human rights law and 
states that: 
jurists can now confidently testify that freedom from slavery, from genocide, from racial 
discrimination, and from torture, are protected by international law. These developments 
force the view that moral progress in human affairs is possible, and furnish a standard 
against which other changes may be judged. 43 
On the other hand, as Bulmer and Solomos summarise: 
... there 
is clear evidence that existing initiatives are severely limited in their impact, given 
the socially entrenched character of much racist behaviour. A number of commentators 
have pointed to the limitations of legislation and public policy interventions in bringing 
about a major improvement in the socio-political position of minorities . 
44 
Therefore, can racism be eradicated or is it a natural part of any society? It is natural for 
people to identify themselves by reference to the group to which they belong. This 
might be any group, large or small, like a family, a social or sports club, a political 
43 Banton, supra note 8, at 83. 
44 Bulmer and Solomos, supra note 3, at 17. 
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party, a religious, ethnic or linguistic community or a region or nation. In this sense, 
humans have a natural tendency to see themselves as part of a group, as `us' and others 
outside their group as `them'. Thus, in any society groups will be formed which identify 
themselves because of differences with others. In this sense, people will always look at 
differences between themselves and others and treat the others differently because they 
are different. The `us' and `them' division can therefore be seen as a natural condition 
of every society. Race is just one of many differences that people use to set themselves 
apart from others. Race is often a clearly observable difference (in skin colour or other 
physical characteristics). But will race as a criterion for difference become less 
important in future, because races appear to become increasingly mixed? Bulmer and 
Solomos write: 
What are treated as socially defined racial groups are likely to become less sharply 
delineated in future, and an increasing number of people will identify with more than one 
racial group or some kind of mixed group 45 
So the line between races, often referred to as the colour line, will become more blurred 
but will it ever be completely erased? It is suggested that complete eradication of racism 
is unlikely to be achieved in the near future, as it is a phenomenon that is deeply 
entrenched in every society. It might well never be fully eliminated. But, in the words of 
Winant, 46 `nor can we expect that it [i. e. racism] will ever be fully overcome. That does 
not mean, however, that we are free to desist from trying'. Chapter 3 will suggest that 
legislation is one of the tools that can be used in the fight against racism. 
45 Ibid. at 389. 
Winant, Howard, "Racism Today: Continuity and Change in the Post Civil Rights Era" 21,4, Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 755-66 (1998), at 765. 
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4 Racial Discrimination 
4.1 Negative Connotations 
Racial discrimination is, especially where legislative texts are concerned, a different 
concept from race and racism. The latter two are usually not defined at all and racism is 
seldom mentioned, while legislation often provides a definition of discrimination. 
However, as already mentioned, racism and racial discrimination are sometimes taken 
to be almost synonymous and the possible differences between the two often dissolve 
when it comes to practical applications. Solomos writes that the two concepts - racism 
and racial discrimination - become merged in practice, so that they have little apparent 
difference. 47 If a difference is to be made, then racism is more often seen as an ideology 
or doctrine, as a theory about the existence of different races and a hierarchy between 
these races, while racial discrimination is more often seen as a practice, as behaviour or 
acts. 
The Collins Concise Dictionary defines discrimination as: 
1 Unfair treatment of a person, racial group, minority etc.; action based on prejudice; 
2 Subtle appreciation in matters of taste; 
3 The ability to see fine distinctions and differences. 
The descriptions under point two and three are referring to discrimination as 
discriminating between people or things, as making a distinction, while the description 
under point one refers to discrimination as discriminating against. The latter has a 
negative connotation. 
Feldman48 writes that `discrimination, when it consists of the ability to 
differentiate right from wrong and good from bad, is an everyday part of life'. He 
continues that it `becomes morally unacceptable only when it takes a particular form, 
47 Supra note 8, at 79. 
48 Feldman, David, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2nd ed., 2002 Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), at 135. 
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namely treating a person less favourably than others on account of a consideration that 
is morally irrelevant'. So, according to Feldman, differentiating between people is not 
wrong as long as the criteria used for the different treatment are morally acceptable. 
Discrimination can mean discernment or differentiation but in everyday use the 
negative meaning of the term appears to have gained ground over the other meaning and 
the term discrimination is thus more often tied up with a moral judgment that 
discriminating is unfair or bad. Sunstein provides an example of the use of the term in 
this negative sense where he writes that discrimination includes any decision to treat a 
black person, a woman or a disabled person less favourably than a white, able-bodied 
male; and that `the term tends to connote irrational differentiation'. 9 Townshend- 
Smith5° also mentions that a stigma is implied in the term discrimination. 
In his book on discrimination, Banton51 distinguishes between the objective 
definition of discrimination as differential treatment of people supposed to belong to a 
particular class of persons and the moral judgment about whether the differential 
treatment is morally justified and lawful. He suggests splitting these two up because 
discrimination is more difficult to define if it is coupled with a moral judgment, as 
morality is a difficult concept. As suggested above, in practice this split is not often 
made and the term discrimination is usually used with the judgment that it is bad or 
immoral implicit in the term. 
4.2 Discrimination: A Normal Part of Society 
It was contended above that it is natural for people to form groups. Groups exist 
because they maintain criteria of membership and because they distinguish between 
members and non-members. Non-members do not receive the benefits of group 
membership; they are treated less favourably and thus one could say that they are 
49 Sunstein, Cass, "Three Civil Rights Fallacies" 79,1-3, California Law Review 751-74 (1991), at 753 
and 770. 
so Townshend-Smith, Richard, Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (1998 London: 
Cavendish Publishing), at 65. 
51 Banton, Michael, Discrimination (1994 Buckingham/Philadelphia: Open University Press), at 1. 
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discriminated against. As Goldschmidt writes, `awareness of one's specific position as a 
group, identification with that specific group, involves a certain urge to distinguish that 
group, to exclude outsiders'. 52 In this sense, everyone discriminates and discrimination 
is therefore socially normal and a characteristic of every society. People identify with 
those with whom they have shared experiences and define others as outsiders, which is 
a normal process of human socialisation. But not all discrimination is unlawful. Anti 
discrimination laws do not prohibit discrimination in protected spheres of private life. If 
a person wants to marry only someone from his/her own race, religion or culture, anti 
discrimination laws will not prohibit this. They will only prohibit discrimination in the 
sphere of public life. As Banton writes: `Anti-discrimination legislation is designed, 
among other things, to restrain the tendency to extend such patterns of behaviour from 
the private to the public sphere'. 53 However, the difference between the two spheres is 
not always clear-cut and in the economic sphere (in employment and in access to goods 
and services) anti discrimination legislation is spreading from the public sphere to the 
private sphere. We will mention this in more detail later. 
So it is natural for people to discriminate against people who are different from 
them, who are not part of their group. The motivation for this can be manifold: 
prejudice, hostility, (economic) self-interest, taste, habit or custom, stereotyping, fear of 
the unknown, ignorance etc. It will not always be clear, even for the discriminator, 
which motive is behind the decision. Often more than one motive will be present. 
According to Banton `motives are often mixed and people may be unaware of some of 
the forces that stimulate their behaviours'. 54 
52 Goldschmidt, Jenny, "Back to the Future - An Agenda for a More Equal Future" in: Loenen, Titia and 
Rodrigues, Peter, (eds. ), Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives (1999 The Hague: 
Kluwer) 437-49, at 441. 
53 Banton, supra note 8, at 79. 
54 Supra note 51, at 8. 
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Both Sunstein55 and Townshend-Smith56 point out that the most obvious 
meaning of discrimination puts emphasis on hostility and prejudice, and both writers 
criticise this. They do this, firstly, because disadvantageous differential treatment 
frequently occurs in the absence of prejudice and hostility, and, secondly, because 
hostility or prejudice is not always easy to define or prove. 
4.3 The Right to Non-Discrimination as a Fundamental Human Right 
Many see the right to non-discrimination or to equality as a basic human right and 
(racial) discrimination as a violation of such a right. Boyle and Baldaccini point out that 
`it was largely the search for an effective international response to racism that produced 
the main components of the United Nations human rights regime'. 57 
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 declares in 
Article 1 that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Article 2 
then states that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms of the Declaration 
without distinction of any kind. 58 Article 7 declares that all are equal before the law and 
entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law, to equal protection 
against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to 
such discrimination. 
The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination59 states clearly that the UN Charter `is based on the principles of dignity 
and equality of all human beings'. Article 1 of the Declaration then states that: 
Discrimination between human beings on the ground of race, colour or ethnic origin is an 
offence to human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial of the principles of the 
55 Supra note 49, at 752-3. Sunstein argues that civil rights law has often identified discrimination with 
prejudice, irrationality and hostility and that this is a fallacy. 
36 Supra note 50, at 63. 
57 Boyle, Kevin and Badaccini, Anneliese, "A Critical Evaluation of International Human Rights 
Approaches to Racism" in: Fredman, supra note 21,135-91, at 141. 
5s The article gives the following distinctions: race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
59 This Declaration was made in 1963 and preceded the ICERD. 
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Charter of the United Nations, as a violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms 
proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ... 
Article 1 ICERD defines racial discrimination as a practice `which has the purpose or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms'. 
So, within international law, the principle of equality and non-discrimination is 
firmly anchored within human rights, and `racial discrimination is understood in human 
rights law as a violation of human rights'. 60 Boyle and Baldaccini61 express this even 
stronger where they write: 
It is now established in international law that the prohibition of racial discrimination exists 
independently of the general obligation to respect human rights and is part of ius cogens. 
O'Hare62 also writes that `it is now widely accepted that the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination form part of customary international law'. 
The four EU Directives on Equal Treatment adopted on the basis of Article 13 
EC all mention in their Preambles that the right of all persons to equality before the law 
and protection against discrimination constitutes a universal human right. 3 This is in 
line with a number of cases in which the ECJ has recognised a general principle of 
equality as one of the fundamental principles of Community law. 64 
60 Petrova, supra note 38, at 61. 
61 Supra note 57, at 144. 
62 O'Hare, Ursula, "Equality and Affirmative Action in International Human Rights Law and its 
Relevance to the European Union" 4, International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 3-45 
(2000), at 10. 
63 Recital 3 Race Directive; Recital 4 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27/11/2000 establishing a 
General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16; Recital 
2 Council Directive 2002/73/EC of 23/09/2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the 
Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment for Men and Women as Regards Access to 
Employment, Vocational Training and Promotion, and Working Conditions [2002] OJ L 269/15; 
Recital 2 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13/12/2004 implementing the Principle of Equal 
Treatment between Men and Women in the Access to and the Supply of Goods and Services [2004] 
OJ L 373/37. Hereafter these Directives will be referred to respectively as the Framework Directive 
(Directive 2000/78/EC); the Equal Treatment (Amendment) Directive (Directive 2002/73/EC); the 
Equal Treatment (Goods) Directive (Directive 2004/113/EC). 
64 This will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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All this suggests that the right to equality, to non-discrimination, exists as a 
fundamental human right. 
4.4 Points for Analysis and Evaluation ofAnti Discrimination Law 
As mentioned, discrimination is not always bad or unlawful. It is not wrong when the 
criteria used to justify differential treatment are morally acceptable or when it takes 
place in certain spheres. And even if distinctions between people are made on grounds 
that are unacceptable or in prohibited areas, exceptions or justifications to the 
prohibition could mean that the distinctions are not considered unlawful. The following 
qualifications are used in the analysis and evaluation of anti discrimination provisions in 
later Chapters of the Thesis. 
4.4.1 Grounds for Discrimination 
Just like the motives for discrimination can be many and varied, there are also many 
grounds for discriminatory behaviour. This Thesis is mainly concerned with race as a 
ground for discrimination. But legal instruments prohibiting race discrimination often 
mention race with a number of other grounds or as including other grounds. For 
example, Article 1 of the ICERD - which contains a definition of racial discrimination - 
mentions race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, while the British Race 
Relations Act 1976 prohibits discrimination on racial grounds, which means `any of the 
following grounds, namely, colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins'. 65 
However, these can all be seen as being connected with race, as is clear from the first 
part of this Chapter. 
There are numerous other grounds for discrimination. Article 14 of the ECHR 
mentions discrimination on any such grounds as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
65 Section 3(1) RRAct 1976. 
39 
property, birth or other status. Article 13 EC gives the following grounds: sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 
There are two problems that can occur in relation to the grounds of 
discrimination: firstly, it will not always be easy to distinguish between the different 
grounds, because some of them are very close to each other or even overlap. For 
example, if a person is discriminated against because he/she is Jewish, is this on racial 
or ethnic or religious grounds? If gypsies are treated less favourably is this on the 
ground of their race or ethnicity, their national or social origin, or their association with 
a national minority? 66 Secondly, there is the problem of multiple discrimination: a 
person could be discriminated against on more than one ground. For example a black 
woman could be discriminated against because she is black and because she is a 
woman. 67 These problems arise especially where protection against discrimination is 
provided in different ways for different grounds. 68 
4.4.2 Protected Fields of Discrimination 
Legislative provisions against discrimination describe the areas in which they are 
applicable. Sometimes these descriptions are in broad terms, but they can also be more 
specific. For example, Article 1(1) of the ICERD gives its field of application in broad 
terms; it is applicable `in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of 
public life'. The Race Directive is much more specific: Article 3 (1) determines that it is 
applicable as regards both public and private sectors in relation to employment, self- 
employment and occupation; education and vocational training; social protection 
including social security and healthcare; social advantages; and access to and supply of 
goods and services available to the public, including housing. Because most anti 
Schiek discusses these cross-relations: Schiek, Dagmar, "A New Framework on Equal Treatment of 
Persons in EC Law? " 8,2, European Law Journal 290-314 (2002), at 311-2. 
67 Fredman, Sandra and Szyszczak, Erika, "The Interaction of Race and Gender" in: Hepple, Bob and 
Szyszczak, Erika, (eds. ), Discrimination: The Limits of Law (1992 London: Mansell) 214-26, at 221- 
2. 
68 The problems with multiple discrimination will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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discrimination legislation determines its own field of application, the problems 
encountered here are mainly with interpretation. However, what has to be kept in mind 
is, as Banton69 points out: `The failure to appreciate that anti-discrimination provisions 
are restricted to particular fields has been one of the prime sources of opposition to 
legislation against discrimination'. 
4.4.3 Exceptions and Justification 
Most laws against discrimination allow certain exceptions to the prohibition of 
discrimination. International instruments often exclude distinctions made between 
citizens and non-citizens and decisions on nationality and naturalisation. 70 
Another exception to be found in both national and international laws is the 
exception based on inherent requirements of a particular job. This is usually subject to a 
proportionality test, either via the legislation itself or via the case law of the appropriate 
court. This requires that the means used to achieve the given end must be no more than 
that which is appropriate and necessary to achieve that end. For example, Article 4 of 
the Race Directive determines that a difference in treatment shall not constitute 
discrimination where there is a genuine and determining occupational requirement 
providing that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate. 
A third exception found in both national and international legislation against 
discrimination is the possibility to take positive measures to correct or redress factual 
inequalities. Positive measures can include special protection of or assistance to 
disadvantaged groups and are based on the principle that action needs to be taken to 
overcome the effects of past discrimination. 71 
Frequently, anti discrimination laws will allow for justification of 
discrimination. In other words, discrimination is not considered to be against the law if 
69 Supra note 51, at 40. 
70 See for example: Articles 1(2) and (3) ICERD, discussed in Chapter 4; Article 3(2) of the Race 
Directive, discussed in Chapter 5. 
" See for example: Article 5 International Labour Organisation's Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention C111,1958; Article 5 Race Directive. 
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it can be objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim 
are appropriate and necessary. 72 So, here again, a proportionality test must be fulfilled. 
The reasons for mentioning exceptions and justifications in anti discrimination 
law is, that these have to be studied carefully, because they could severely limit the 
effect of such laws as instruments against discrimination. Therefore, exceptions should 
be clearly specified and be able to be challenged in a court. 
4.4.4 Direct and Indirect Discrimination 
The distinction between direct and indirect discrimination needs to be mentioned here 
as well. Banton73 describes direct discrimination as disparate treatment and indirect 
discrimination as disparate impact. Indirect racial discrimination takes place when 
someone imposes a condition which has a disparate and unfavourable impact on a racial 
group and which cannot be shown to be justifiable on other grounds. In other words, 
direct discrimination consists of difference in treatment, of treating a person less 
favourably because of his or her race, while indirect discrimination consists of 
apparently equal treatment which has an unequal impact on persons of a certain racial 
group. 74 The concepts are here described for racial discrimination but can be used for 
discrimination on other grounds as well. 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
Summarising, it can be seen that the term discrimination is more often than not used 
with a negative connotation, with the implication that it is morally wrong, although the 
term is still also used as a synonym for the words distinction and differentiation, without 
any negative connotation at all. Discrimination in both these meanings is part of 
everyday life and a normal process in any society. Discrimination does not have to be 
motivated by prejudice or hostility and there can be many and mixed motives. 
72 See: Article 2(2)(b) Race Directive, which allows for objective justification of indirect discrimination. 
7' Supra note 51, at 45. 
74 Article 2(2)(b) Race Directive gives a definition of indirect discrimination. 
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The right not to be discriminated against appears to be firmly established in 
human rights law as a fundamental human right and racial or other forms of 
discrimination are widely considered to be a violation of a person's fundamental right to 
equality and dignity. 
When studying anti discrimination measures in the following Chapters, a 
number of questions will be asked: what are the grounds on which discrimination is 
prohibited? In what fields is the legislation applicable? Does the provision allow for 
exceptions and can these be challenged in law? Does the measure prohibit both direct 
and indirect discrimination? 
Finally, some writers have made the point that discrimination should be 
distinguished from disadvantage. These writers argue that some groups in society are 
disadvantaged because of past and present discrimination and the transmission of these 
disadvantages from one generation to the next. As Banton writes: 
It is essential to distinguish discrimination from the larger phenomenon of disadvantage, as 
this can be seen in patterns of gender and racial inequality. These patterns are the products 
of a great variety of causes, of which discrimination is but one. 75 
Sunstein writes that the problem is not discrimination, but `second-class citizenship' 
and that legal and social structures should not turn differences between groups that are 
morally irrelevant into social disadvantage, especially not when the disadvantage is 
systemic. 76 
5 Equality 
5.1 Equality as a Fundamental Human Right 
What is the meaning of equality in the context of laws against discrimination? The 
terms equality and discrimination are closely linked" because the prohibition of 
'S Banton, supra note 51, at 19. 
76 Sunstein, supra note 49, at 770. 
77 See this chapter, under 4.3. 
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discrimination is based on the fact that people are equal. People should not be 
differentiated or distinguished from other people in a negative way, because all persons 
are equal. The right to non-discrimination is seen as a human right based on the 
principle of equality, and discrimination is a violation of such a fundamental right. The 
right to non-discrimination and the right to equality are therefore often used 
interchangeably. O'Donovan and Szyszczak78 call the idea of equality `the mainspring 
of anti-discrimination legislation', but write that this idea lacks precision. They discern 
two uses of the term in political discussions. One is the use in a descriptive way, 
representing a statement of fact: all persons are equal. The second use is in a 
prescriptive way, representing a statement of aim: all persons should be equal. 
According to these authors, the latter, which appears to underlie the objectives of much 
anti discrimination legislation, is aspirational and is based on an idea of the fundamental 
equality of all human beings. 
Dworkin makes an interesting distinction in his discussion of an individual's 
right to equality. 79 He discerns two sorts of rights an individual may be said to have. 
Firstly, the right to equal treatment, which is the right to an equal distribution of some 
opportunity or resource or burden. Secondly, the right to treatment as an equal, which is 
the right to be treated with the same respect and concern as anyone else. The right to 
treatment as an equal is a fundamental right, while the right to equal treatment is 
derivative, according to Dworkin. In certain circumstances the right to treatment as an 
equal will entail a right to equal treatment, but not, by any means, in all circumstances. 
Dworkin's right to be treated as an equal appears to correspond with Feldman's `moral 
equality', which he describes as meaning that people should be `equally entitled to 
respect for their moral status by virtue of being human beings' 8° . 
78 O'Donovan, Katherine and Szyszczak, Erika, Equality and Sex Discrimination Law (1988 Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell), at 1-2. 
79 Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (1978 London: Duckworth), at 227. 
80 Feldman, supra note 48, at 136. 
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It will be clear, that the term equality can have different meanings. Dworkin's 
right to equal treatment falls within the first type of equality distinguished in this 
Thesis: formal equality or equal treatment. The fundamental right to be treated as an 
equal, to respect for one's moral status, goes beyond formal equality and suggests that 
differences between people should be recognised and diversity should be respected. The 
second and third type of equality distinguished in this Thesis, equality of opportunity 
and equality of results, recognise difference between people, while the fourth type, the 
pluralist approach to equality, not only recognises difference but also respects diversity. 
5.2 Formal Equality 
Formal equality is based on the idea that every person has a right to be treated in an 
equal way to any other person in the same situation. This is based on the premise that 
like should be treated alike, which goes back to Aristotle. In this view, equality lies in 
consistency. It is sometimes referred to as equality in law, or equality before the law. 
This approach has been criticised on a number of grounds. 81 Firstly, the concept 
of formal equality, that like should be treated alike, raises the question: who is like 
who? The concept thus relies on a comparator: is a person treated unequally compared 
to another person in the same situation? But to whom should he/she be compared? The 
choice of a comparator can influence the outcome. Should a black person always be 
compared with a white person? To avoid this problem, Barnard, 
82 in her discussion on 
Article 13 EC, suggests: 
81 See for example: Lacey, Nicola, "Legislation Against Sex Discrimination: Questions from a Feminist 
Perspective" 14,4, Journal of Law and Society 411-21 (1987); Gregory, Jeanne, Sex, Race and the 
Law. Legislating for Equality (1987 London: Sage); Barnard, Catherine, "The Principle of Equality in 
the Community Context: P, Grant, Kalanke and Marschall: Four Uneasy Bedfellows? " 57,2, 
Cambridge Law Journal 352-73 (1998); ibid. "Article 13: Through the Looking Glass of Union 
Citizenship" in: O'Keeffe, David and Twomey, Patrick, (eds. ), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty 
(1999 Oxford: Hart Publishing) 375-95; Barnard, Catherine and Hepple, Bob, "Substantive Equality" 
59,3, Cambridge Law Journal 562-85 (2000); Fredman, supra note 21; ibid. "Equality: A New 
Generation? " 30,2, Industrial Law Journal 145-68 (2001); ibid. Discrimination Law (2002 Oxford: 
Oxford University Press); Schiek, supra note 66. 
82 Barnard (1999), supra note 81, at 386. 
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These ideas need to penetrate any interpretation of non-discrimination in legislation 
adopted under Article 13: that the comparator must not always be a male, white, European, 
able-bodied, straight man. 
The second point of criticism against the notion that like should be treated alike, is that 
it creates strong conformist and assimilationist pressures. The concept negates the value 
of difference and assumes sameness. Schiek83 writes: 
As regards ethnic discrimination, the tendency of formal equality principles to further 
assimilation instead of recognition has been stressed. Here, the counter-model to the society 
based on the assumption of sameness is the society striving to integrate differences, the 
inclusive society. 
Thirdly, in this approach, everyone is treated in identical fashion. It is a symmetrical 
approach that does not look at existing inequalities or social disadvantages. In fact, this 
approach can even reinforce the inequalities that exist in reality. As Fredman84 writes: 
an apparently neutral criterion, applied equally to two individuals, can, in fact, 
exacerbate inequality, because its neutrality disguises a bias towards the social or group 
attributes of one of them. 
Because formal equality is symmetrical, there is no room for positive action measures, 
as these would give preferential, and thus unequal treatment, to certain people. 
The fourth criticism raised against the notion of formal equality is that it is a 
relative concept, that it does not guarantee a particular outcome. The principle is 
satisfied as long as likes are treated equally, no matter whether this is equally well or 
equally badly. The concept allows for levelling down (where both people compared are 
deprived of a benefit) as well as levelling up (where the benefit is conferred on both of 
them). 85 
83 Supra note 66, at 304-5. 
84 Fredman (2001), supra note 81, at 155. 
85 Barnard and Hepple, supra note 81, at 563. 
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5.3 Substantive Equality 
In attempts to overcome the problems associated with the notion of formal equality, 
other concepts of equality have been suggested. Because formal equality is perceived as 
not touching the substantive inequalities that exist in most societies, or even as 
reinforcing these, a more substantive equality, which is sensitive to the effects of past 
and ongoing discrimination, is put forward. Substantive equality aims to compensate for 
the social disadvantages suffered by certain groups. The focus is on the material reality 
of people's life. The concept can be in direct conflict with the idea of formal equality 
because it may require unequal treatment. Bacik86 writes that the concept of substantive 
equality is `based upon difference'. This means that `in order to create equality, persons 
must be treated differently according to their needs'. This again comes close to 
Dworkin's right to be treated as an equal. 
Substantive equality is also referred to as equality in fact, as opposed to formal 
equality, which is equality in law. The concept of substantive equality suggests that 
equality laws should be sensitive to the practical results of equal or unequal treatment. 
Whereas formal equality can be seen as symmetrical, substantive equality is 
asymmetrical, in that it allows unequal treatment in order to rectify social disadvantages 
and so achieve the goal of equality in fact. 
McInerney87 writes that `equality demands, at minimum, formal equal 
treatment'. She continues: 
Equality can take a more substantive and "effect-centred" form, demanding that group 
perspectives be considered, that historical and contextual dimensions of discrimination be 
accommodated and that remedial action be permitted to redress past discrimination. 
86 Bacik, Ivana, "Combating Discrimination: The Affirmative Action Approach" in: Byrne, Rosemary 
and Duncan, William, (eds. ), Developments in Discrimination Law in Ireland and Europe (1997 
Dublin: Irish Centre for European Law) 119-30, at 119-20. 
87 McInerney, Siobhan, "Bases for Action against Race Discrimination in EU Law" 27, European Law 
Review 72-9 (2002), at 76. 
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Within the concept of substantive equality two types can be distinguished: equality of 
opportunity and equality of results. 
5.3.1 Equality of Opportunity 
This form of equality concentrates on equalising the starting point for all, on giving 
everyone the same opportunities. This approach may well involve unequal treatment 
and unequal finishing points, because it is not concerned with the end result, but only 
aims to make the starting point equal for all. Equality of opportunity recognises that the 
effects of past discrimination can make it very difficult for members of particular 
groups to even reach a situation of `being alike' so that the right to like treatment 
becomes applicable. 
The concept of equality of opportunity as a basis for anti discrimination laws has 
been criticised for the following reasons. Firstly, it appears to go against the principle of 
equality and non-discrimination, as it requires preferential treatment of, for example, a 
black person or a woman, which would discriminate against white people or men. 
Secondly, once the starting point has been equalised for all, the competition from then 
on will be based on merit. O'Donovan and Szyszczak88 write that the role of the state 
here is to equalise the rules of entry and thereafter `to hold the ring for free 
competition'. The question with this competition on merit is, what is merit and who 
determines this? Townshend-Smith writes that the notion of merit is deep-rooted in our 
society, and that `merit has historically been determined in [white] male terms'. 89 
Feldman points out that `the opportunities which systematically disadvantaged groups 
seek might not be those which are traditionally favoured by the dominant set of values'. 
This group might not want to be like the dominant group, but might prefer the freedom 
to pursue their own values in their own ways. 90 
88 Supra note 78, at 3-4. 
S9 Townshend-Smith, Richard, Sex Discrimination in Employment Law, Practice and Policy (1989 
London: Sweet and Maxwell), at 25-6, as quoted in Townshend-Smith, supra note 50, at 77. 90 Feldman, supra note 48, at 138-9. 
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Lacey91 calls the notion of equality of opportunity a `manipulable notion'. She 
advocates abandoning equality of opportunity as an underlying principle of equality 
law: 
The opportunity ideal's presupposition of a world of autonomous individuals starting a race 
or making free choices has no cutting edge against the argument that men and women are 
simply running different races. 2 
The above suggests that the disadvantaged group, in the terminology of Lacey, is not 
running the same race and might well not want to run the same race, and that therefore 
equalising the starting point for all will not lead to a more equal society. 
Fredman describes the two views of equality of opportunity as distinguished by 
Williams. 93 On a procedural view, it would require `the removal of obstacles to the 
advancement of women and minorities', but this would not `guarantee greater 
substantive fairness in the result'. A substantive view of equality of opportunity would 
require `measures to be taken to ensure that persons from all sections of society have a 
genuinely equal chance of satisfying the criteria for access to a particular social good'. 
This would require a `reconsideration of existing criteria of merit'. It is submitted that 
equality of opportunity on a substantive view would go some way towards remedying 
the criticism against the notion described above. It would also get closer to a notion of 
equality of results. 
5.3.2 Equality of Results 
This concept is also referred to as equality of outcome or impact. It is based on a system 
of justice which concentrates on correcting maldistribution and takes account of past or 
91 Supra note 81, at 420. 
92 Although Lacey is writing about legislation against sex discrimination, it is suggested that her 
argument is equally valid for legislation against racial discrimination. 
93 Supra note 21, at 21. This distinction is based on Williams, Bernhard, "The Idea of Equality" in: 
Laslett, Peter and Runciman, Walter, (eds. ), Philosophy, Politics and Society (2nd Serie 1965 Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell) 110-31, at 125-6, although Williams himself does not use the terms procedural' or 
`substantive' as such. aýw 
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present discrimination. Its aim is thus redistributive. Townshend-Smith94 describes 
equality of outcome as `a notion which pays at least some regard to the distribution of 
outcomes between the various different groups'. Later on he writes that `equality of 
outcome implies an equitable division of the economic cake between different groups in 
society'. 
95 
According to Fredman, 96 equality of results can be used in three different ways. 
The first focuses on the impact on the individual, with the aim of obtaining a remedy for 
that individual, rather than achieving equality of results. This would not touch the 
discriminating structure. The second use focuses on the results to the group. However, 
this aims to demonstrate the existence of obstacles to entry rather than prescribing an 
outcome pattern. The third and strongest meaning of equality of results is a demand for 
an equal outcome. This is a more obviously redistributive aim, although even here, as 
Fredman points out, the notion of equality is not fully in focus: often `it is not equality, 
but proportionality, fairness or balance which is required'. 97 
Equality of outcome or results can thus be used in different ways. In the first two 
uses the aim of redistribution, of an `equitable division of the economic cake' will not 
be reached. Even if the concept is used in the third sense, full equality of outcome might 
not be the result. 
Therefore, it will be clear that equality of results is not without its problems. The 
following objections have been made against it. Firstly, like equality of opportunity, it 
requires preferential treatment of some people and thus involves unequal treatment. 
Townshend-Smith points out a second problem with equality of results. Its aim of 
redistribution of wealth is intertwined with the relief of poverty. But why then should 
only certain victims of poverty (black people, women) and not others be entitled to such 
94 Supra note 50, at 61. 
95 Ibid. at 73. 
96 Supra note 21, at 19. 
97 Ibid. 
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relief? 98 A third problem with equality of outcome is that it might only partially lead to 
redistribution, depending on the way in which it is used. As Fredman writes `monitoring 
of results does not necessitate any fundamental re-examination of the structures that 
perpetuate discrimination'. 99 And lastly, O'Donovan and Szyszczakloo point out that `it 
is evident that the creation of outcome equality would require a major social 
revolution'. This poses the question whether anti discrimination legislation could ever 
fully reach the aim of equality of results. This question will be discussed in the next 
Chapter. 
5.4 Pluralist Approach to Equality 
Some writers suggest a more pluralist approach to equality. Such an approach would 
aim to create a society where differences and diversity between groups and individuals 
are considered an asset and everyone is treated with the same respect. Townshend- 
Smith writes that an approach based on pluralistic political philosophies is far more 
appropriate. In such an approach `the law must take account of the differences between 
groups which affects their capacity for equal competition in the market place'. '°' 
Fredman suggests that a central challenge is to fashion a concept of substantive equality 
that can encompass positive diversity. ' 02 Bacik appears to support this pluralist view, 
when she writes that substantive equality is based on difference and that people should 
be treated differently according to their needs. 103 And Schiek's `inclusive society' 
striving to integrate differences can also be seen as supporting this approach. ' 04 
It is suggested that this pluralism can be related to Dworkin's right to treatment 
as an equal, the right to be treated with the same respect and concern as anyone else. 
O'Donovan and Szyszczak write about the distinction made by Dworkin: 
" Townshend-Smith, supra note 50, at 80. 
99 Supra note 21, at 20. 
10° Supra note 78, at 6. 
101 Townshend-Smith, supra note 50, at 80-1. 
102 Supra note 21, at 3. 
103 Supra note 86, at 119-20. 
104 Supra note 66, at 304-5. 
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If this passage is taken as suggesting that people and their needs are different, then it seems 
to follow that rights to equality do not mean treating people in the same way. This is an 
argument for pluralism. ... It is an argument against the assimilationist ideal. 
'°5 
Further on they write: 
If treatment as an equal implies respect for others, avoidance of stereotypes and viewing the 
world from another's point of view, than pluralism goes further than equal treatment. 106 
Feldman's concept of moral equality also appears to favour pluralism and to reject 
assimilationist ideas. He writes that treating people as moral equals is `seen as 
demanding respect for (even celebration of) difference, rather than its elimination'. And 
the `willingness to treat someone as an equal only if he or she adopts one's own system 
of beliefs and values is a denial of moral equality rather than an expression of it'. 107 
Mason108 writes about the distinction between difference, which is often seen as 
a problem and has assimilationist assumptions, and diversity, which is a positive 
perspective. He concludes that the choice between fearing difference and embracing 
diversity is a major challenge for the future. To choose to embrace diversity would fit in 
a pluralist approach. 
The above suggests that, in a pluralist view, equality laws should be based on 
respect for difference and diversity and should prescribe that everyone is treated with 
equal respect and concern. But is it possible to put this down in legislation? As 
O'Donovan and Szyszczak write, `in terms of legislative policy pluralism may be 
impossible to implement'. I09 This will be discussed in Chapter two. 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
It will be clear that the concept of equality, just like the other concepts discussed in this 
Chapter, has been given different interpretations. Anti discrimination laws, sometimes 
105 O'Donovan and Szyszczak, supra note 78, at 6. 
106 Ibid. at 7. 
107 Feldman, supra note 48, at 139. 
108 Supra note 8, at 2 and 127. 
109 Supra note 78, at 7. 
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referred to as equality laws because they prohibit discrimination or prescribe equality, 
are often promoting a notion of formal equality, or equality of treatment: like people 
should be treated alike. However, they can also aim for a more substantive equality, 
which is sensitive to existing inequalities produced by past and on-going discrimination. 
This substantive equality can take the shape of equality of opportunity or equality of 
results. The first aims to give everyone the same opportunities, and therefore aims to 
equalise the starting point. This can involve unequal treatment and unequal outcomes. 
Equality of results is aiming to equalise the end results and therefore has a more 
distributive aim. The lines between the two forms of substantive equality are not clearly 
drawn. If one takes a more substantive view of equality of opportunity one comes close 
to equality of results, especially as that can be used in a less or more redistributive way. 
Pluralism is another possible approach to equality, which sees diversity as a positive 
attribute of society and which accords equal respect and concern to every person and to 
his/her values and way of life. Pluralism rejects assimilationist ideals. 
6. Conclusion 
None of the terms discussed in this Chapter are easy to define or uncontested in their 
meaning. For the purpose of this Thesis the term race will mean a group of people with 
a common descent or common ancestry and the term will be used without any link with 
biological or cultural ideas of inferiority and superiority. The term racism will be 
understood as indicating ideologies and doctrines that races have distinctive hereditary 
characteristics and that this endows some races with intrinsic superiority, while the term 
racial discrimination will be used for the behaviour and attitudes based on these 
ideologies. Racism will also be considered as a negative phenomenon which is part of 
society and which needs to be fought, although it can probably never be fully 
eradicated. Discrimination shall be taken to mean distinguishing or differentiating in a 
negative way between people because they are assigned to a certain group. We have 
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distinguished four concepts of equality: equal treatment, equality of opportunity, 
equality of results and pluralism. 
54 
CHAPTER 2- MODELS OF ANTI DISCRIMINATION LAW 
1 Introduction 
For a proper evaluation of anti discrimination legislation, it is necessary to ascertain 
what the legislation is trying to achieve. The aim(s) pursued will likely influence not 
only the measures laid down, but also the enforcement procedures and remedies made 
available. In other words, different aims call for different provisions, remedies and 
enforcement strategies. 
In Chapter 1, we defined the key concepts that are used throughout the Thesis, 
one of which was equality. Four types of equality were distinguished: formal equality or 
equality in law; two types of substantive equality: equality of opportunity and equality 
of results; and pluralism. In this Chapter, we build on these different types of equality 
and develop them into models of anti discrimination law. These models are applicable 
to laws against discrimination on any ground, but in this Thesis they are used 
specifically to aid our analysis and evaluation of measures against racial and ethnic 
origin discrimination at the EU level. 
All anti discrimination legislation is, as the term itself implies, aimed at fighting 
discrimination. Laws against racial discrimination, therefore, aim to combat racism and 
racial discrimination. Fredmanl distinguishes three functions that are required of 
equality if it is to combat racism: 
"A means of redressing racist stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence - this 
could be said to correspond to formal equality: equal treatment without 
differentiating on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin; 
Fredman, Sandra, "Introduction" and "Combating Racism with Human Rights: The Right to Equality" 
in: Fredman, Sandra, (ed. ), Discrimination and Human Rights The Case of Racism (2001 Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) 1-44, at 15. 
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" The redistributive aim of breaking the cycle of disadvantage associated with 
groups defined by race or ethnicity - this corresponds to substantive equality in 
both its forms: equality of opportunity and equality of outcome or results; and, 
" The positive affirmation and accommodation of difference as a part of the right to 
equal concern and respect - which corresponds to the pluralist approach to 
equality. 
This suggests that equality in all its types is needed to fight racism and racial 
discrimination. Does this mean that anti discrimination legislation should protect 
equality in all these forms? Can these types be laid down in law, and if so, how can this 
be done? This Chapter attempts to answer these questions by developing the four 
concepts of equality into four models of anti discrimination legislation: the equal 
treatment model; the equality of opportunity model; the equality of results model; and, 
the pluralist model. The names used to refer to each model have been chosen 
deliberately to indicate that each model is based on one of the four concepts of equality 
defined before. One can say that each model developed here aims to establish the type 
of equality it corresponds with. Therefore, legislation based on the equal treatment 
model prohibits differential treatment of persons who are in the same situation. Laws 
based on the equality of opportunity model try to equalise the starting point for 
everyone by prescribing or permitting preferential treatment of historically 
disadvantaged groups to bring them in a position where they can compete on an equal 
footing with people who did not suffer such disadvantage. Anti discrimination measures 
based on the equality of results model aim to achieve a fairer distribution, or, as 
Townshend-Smith expresses it, `an equitable division of the economic cake between 
different groups in society'. 2 Legislation based on the pluralist model aims to create a 
society that welcomes diversity as a positive attribute and in which each person is 
2 Townshend-Smith, Richard, Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (1998 London: 
Cavendish Publishing) 61-86, at 73. 
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respected equally. In the following, examples of anti discrimination legislation from all 
over the world will be given as illustrations. These examples show that many of the 
concepts employed in EU anti discrimination measures are used in many different 
countries, including EU Member States. 
2 Equal Treatment Model of Anti Discrimination Legislation 
Anti discrimination legislation based on this model prohibits different treatment of 
people in the same situation. This is grounded in the principle that like should be treated 
alike. Everyone has a right to be treated like anyone else in the same circumstances. As 
we have seen in Chapter 1, equal treatment or formal equality is also referred to as 
equality in law or before the law. This is often expressed in international treaties and in 
the constitution in many countries in a statement similar to Article 7 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948): `All are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law'. 3 As in this statement, 
proclaiming the right to equal protection against discrimination often follows the right 
to equality before the law. 
At European level, the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the European 
Union also proclaims, in Article 11-80, that `everyone is equal before the law', which is 
followed in Article 11-81 by a prohibition of discrimination. Recital 3 of the Preamble to 
the Race Directive declares that `the right to equality before the law and protection 
against discrimination for all persons constitutes a universal right' as recognised by a 
number of international human rights instruments. 
3 See for example the following international instruments: Article 26 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966); Article 24 American Convention on Human Rights (1969); 
Article 3 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981). For some constitutional examples 
see Section 15(1) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; Article 14 Constitution of India; Section 
6(1) Finnish Constitution. It should be noted that these three countries accord equality before the law 
to any person, while some other countries restrict this to citizens only. Examples of the latter are: 
Article 40(1) Irish Constitution, Article 3 Italian Constitution and Article 13(1) Portuguese 
Constitution (all three refer to `citizens'); Article 4(1) Greek Constitution ('all Greeks'); Article 14 
Spanish Constitution ('Spaniards'). 
' Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2000] OJ C 364/1. In 2004 the Charter 
became part of the Draft Constitution for Europe, see Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
[2004] OJ C 310/1. 
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However, more detailed protection is usually not provided in international or 
constitutional instruments, rather it is left to other legislation to do this. These other 
laws follow the equal treatment model if they prescribe equal treatment or prohibit 
differential treatment of people in the same or very similar situations. A good example 
of a law prescribing equal treatment is Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution, 5 which 
provides that: 
All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally, in equal circumstances. 
Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race, or sex or any 
ground whatsoever, shall not be permitted. 
Another example of legislation prohibiting differential treatment is the definition of 
direct discrimination in Article 2(a) of the Race Directive: 
direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably 
than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on grounds of racial 
or ethnic origin. 
Therefore, this model is expressed most often in either of two ways: a positive duty to 
treat people equally, or a negative duty not to discriminate, not to treat people unequally 
or differently. It is suggested that this model of anti discrimination legislation is based 
on the basic meaning of discrimination, which is, as we have seen in Chapter 1,6 making 
a distinction or differentiating in some way. The legislation only prohibits making such 
a distinction if it is based on grounds that are mentioned in the legislation, like `racial or 
ethnic origin' in the Race Directive. 
The strength of this model, and one of its main attractions, lies in the fact that it 
appeals to people's feeling of fairness, of being just and equitable. O'Donovan and 
In a sense, this is an exception, because it is a constitutional provision. More often this is provided for 
in other legislation. 
6 Point 4.1. 
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Szyszczak7 write that `the idea of equality under the law is a major justification for the 
rule of law itself. If formal barriers exist for certain citizens, then these citizens are not 
equal under the law. If these barriers are upheld by law, then inequality is sanctioned by 
law. This undermines the rule of law which fails to deliver its promise of equality, and 
this would call the legitimacy of the law into question. Those subjected to legal barriers 
will deny the law's claim to fairness. Thus, according to O'Donovan and Szyszczak, 
unequal treatment based on law is seen as unfair. Treating people equally is seen as fair, 
while unequal treatment is not, because it treats one person better and thus another one 
worse. This feeling of fairness appears to be a very strong human feeling. How often do 
you hear someone (and not only children! ) say: `It's not fair'? As we have seen, the 
principle that things that are alike should be treated alike goes back to Aristotle. The 
sense of unequal treatment as being unfair or unjust can be seen in a quote from him: 
`Equality and justice are synonymous: to be just is to be equal, to be unjust is to be 
unequal'. 8 Fredman writes that the power of this most basic concept of equality `derives 
from the even more elementary notion, that fairness requires consistent treatment'. 9 
Therefore, the strong point of this model of anti discrimination law is its focus on 
fairness and consistency of treatment. 
However, there are also problems with this model. Many of the problems raised 
in Chapter 1 in relation to the concept of equality as equal treatment can also be applied 
to legislation aiming to achieve equal treatment. Firstly, there is the question: when are 
people alike? To establish if a person is treated differently on racial grounds we need to 
find a similarly situated person of a different racial group to compare him/her with. As 
7 O'Donovan, Katherine and Szyszczak, Erika, Equality and Sex Discrimination Law (1988 Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell), at 1. 
8 Quoted in Barnard, Catherine, "The Principle of Equality in the Community Context: P, Grant, 
Kalanke and Marschall: Four Uneasy Bedfellows? " 57,2, Cambridge Law Journal 352-73 (1998), at 
363. 
9 Fredman, Sandra, Discrimination Law (2002 Oxford: Oxford University Press), at 7. 
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we have seen, the choice of comparator can influence the result. 1° There is also the 
problem, as Barnard" writes, that `it is a moral judgment as to who is alike'. In a sense, 
it is different or less favourable treatment from a norm, a standard of what is seen as 
proper treatment. But this standard or norm is decided by the dominant culture and is 
often biased towards social or group attributes of the dominant group. Should a black 
person always be compared with a white person? Should he/she aspire to a white 
person's life pattern? This ignores that: 
what at least some members of the underprivileged group (women or ethnic minorities) 
really desire is not the opportunity to be like the previously dominant group (men, whites, 
Christians etc. ) but rather the freedom to pursue their own values in their own ways. 12 
This point was already touched upon in Chapter 1, but there it was mentioned in relation 
to equality of opportunity. The problem attaches to both the equal treatment and the 
equality of opportunity models. 
This critique is connected to the next problem with the equal treatment model of 
anti discrimination legislation: that it creates strong conformist and assimilationist 
pressures; pressures to conform to the dominant norms and values of the society. Boyle 
and Baldaccini write that the formal equality concept `assumes conformity with the 
dominant culture'. 13 This model assumes and promotes sameness and aims at the 
elimination of difference. If you aspire to be the same, to assimilate into society and to 
conform to the standard norm, then you have a right to equal treatment with everyone 
else. Parekh14 expresses this, in his description of assimilation, as follows: 
10 For a more extensive discussion of the problems with the comparator concept see Fredman, supra note 
9, at 95-102. 
11 Barnard, supra note 8, at 363. 
12 Feldman, David, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2nd ed. 2002 Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), at 139. 
13 Boyle, Kevin and Baldaccini, Anneliese, "A Critical Evaluation of International Human Rights 
Approaches to Racism" in: Fredman, supra note 1,135-91, at 157. 
14 Parekh, Bhikhu, "Integrating Minorities" in: Blackstone, Tessa, Parekh, Bhikhu and Sanders, Peter, 
(eds. ), Race Relations in Britain: A Developing Agenda (1998 London/NewYork: Routledge) 1-21, at 
2. 
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The choice before the minorities is simple. If they wish to become part of and be treated 
like the rest of the community, they should think and live like the latter; if instead they 
insist on retaining their separate cultures, they should not complain if they are treated 
differently. 
Because of its focus on sameness, `the notion that likes should be treated alike therefore 
necessarily negates the value of difference'. 15 Fredman sums this up: 
Thus equality in its most familiar sense, that like should be treated alike, could well have 
the effect of collapsing the principle of equality into one of sameness, devaluing difference 
and endorsing assimilation and conformity. 16 
This model, therefore, leaves no room for any recognition of the positive aspects of 
difference or for a requirement that people should be treated appropriately according to 
their differences. 
The approach has been described as symmetrical, because it treats everyone in 
the same way. The effect of this is that the same right not to be discriminated against, 
not to be treated differently, is applicable to everyone, black or white, male or female. 
Black people have the right to be treated equally to white people, but white people also 
have the right to be treated equally to black people. This makes any positive action 
programmes that give preferential treatment to some groups to make up for past 
discrimination and disadvantage difficult, as that would constitute more favourable 
treatment of some and thus less favourable treatment of others. 
The third problem with this model of anti discrimination legislation is that, by 
prescribing identical treatment for everyone, it ignores any existing inequalities and 
social disadvantages. It does not look at any imbalances that have been created by past 
discrimination. Lacey'7 writes: 
15 Fredman, Sandra, "Equality: A New Generation? " 30,2, Industrial Law Journal 145-68 (2001), at 
155. 
16 Fredman, supra note 1, at 3. " Lacey, Nicola, "From Individual to Group? " in: Hepple, Bob and Szyszczak, Erika, (eds. ), 
Discrimination: The Limits of Law (1992 London: Mansell) 99-123, at 101. 
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It is widely recognised that a legal commitment to formal equality is insufficient to 
guarantee the fair treatment of groups which have suffered a history of prejudice and 
discrimination. 
The equal treatment approach will only work if everyone can start from the same 
starting point. However, cumulative disadvantage may make it difficult for members of 
some groups to attain the prerequisite merit criteria to compete on the same level. The 
law may determine that all applicants for a job must be treated equally, but this ignores 
the fact that some people, because of their race or sex or another ground, have never had 
the opportunity to acquire the required skills for the job in the first place. In the words 
of Hepple: 18 
One is not supplying equality of opportunity if one applies this criterion to people who are 
unequal because they have been deprived of the opportunity to acquire merit. 
The approach could even perpetuate and reinforce existing inequalities because, as we 
have seen, it is biased towards the dominant culture. 
19 The law prescribing equal 
treatment does nothing to give the disadvantaged groups the chance to catch up with the 
dominant group and so to become able to compete at the same level. Therefore, this 
model ignores the fact that some groups cannot compete at the same level as others 
because of past discrimination and that they might not even want to so. 
A fourth criticism raised against both the notion and the model of formal 
equality is that it is a relative principle which does not guarantee any particular 
outcome. The law is complied with as long as two like persons are treated equally, and 
it does not make any difference if they are treated equally well or equally badly. 
Barnard and Hepple20 express this as follows: 
18 Hepple, Bob, "Have Twenty-Five Years of the Race Relations Acts in Britain been a Failure? " in: 
Hepple and Szyszczak, supra note 17,19-34, at 26. 
19 For a discussion of this effect of perpetuating inequalities, see: Barnard, Catherine, "Article 13: 
Through the Looking Glass of Union Citizenship" in: O'Keeffe, David and Twomey, Patrick, (eds. ), 
Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (1999 Oxford: Hart Publishing) 375-95, at 385-86. 
20 Barnard, Catherine and Hepple, Bob, "Substantive Equality" 59,3, Cambridge Law Journal 562-85 
(2000), at 563. 
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A claim to equal treatment can be satisfied by depriving both the persons compared of a 
particular benefit (levelling down) as well as by conferring the benefit on them both 
(levelling up) 2' 
A fifth problem with legislation prescribing equal treatment or prohibiting unequal 
treatment is its focus on an individual model of justice: the individual is central in the 
enforcement procedures and remedies. The model relies on an individual to complain 
about differential or unfavourable treatment by another individual. The remedies made 
available by such laws are usually (financial) compensation for the wrong done. The 
perpetrator of the discrimination is held responsible for the wrong he/she has done to 
the victim, and, therefore, has to compensate the victim for the loss suffered. Some legal 
systems allow courts to make certain orders against the discriminator, for example, to 
reinstate the victim in case of discriminatory dismissal or to reserve the next available 
post for the victim in case of discriminatory recruitment policies. However, the more 
usual remedy is compensation. Fredman 
22 points out: 
the correlative of treating a person only on the basis of her `merit' is the principle that an 
individual should only be liable for damage for which he or she is responsible. 
In other words, this approach ignores that, often, racial discrimination and prejudice 
cannot be attributed to any one person. It must be noted that this problem is not 
exclusively linked to the equal treatment model, but can be a problem for other models 
as well. It is more likely to occur with this model, but this does depend on what the 
legislation itself determines and what remedies are available in general. 
This suggests that this model of equality law is useful as a minimum 
requirement, addressing the first function of equality (law) as formulated by Fredman: 
23 
it can help to redress racist stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence. It makes it 
21 A good example of levelling down can be found in Case C-408/92 Smith v Avdel Systems Ltd [ 1994] 
ECR I-4435, at para. 21. In this case there was a difference in pension ages for men (65) and women 
(60). The Court held that raising the pension age for women to 65 satisfied the principle of equal 
treatment. 
22 Fredman, supra note 1, at 17. 
23 See the introduction to this Chapter. 
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clear that differential treatment on the grounds of skin colour or race is prohibited, that 
racial prejudice will not be tolerated. But it is a minimum requirement only or, as 
Mclnerney24 writes, `equality demands, at minimum, formal equal treatment: that likes 
should be treated alike, and that deviations from that proportionality be justified'. 
Fredman's conclusion sums up the role and the limits of the formal equality 
model accurately: 
While formal equality or equality of treatment has a role to play, particularly in eradicating 
personal prejudice, it is clear from the above that it needs to be allied to a more substantive 
approach. 25 
3 Substantive Equality Models of Anti Discrimination Legislation 
There are two substantive models of anti discrimination legislation: the equality of 
opportunity model and the equality of results model. Law based on the first model aims 
to equalise the starting point for everyone but is not concerned about the eventual 
outcome, while law based on the second model aims to equalise the result. 
Both models aim to establish a more substantive equality which takes account of 
the social inequalities and disadvantages which some groups suffer because of past 
discrimination. Substantive equality models are thus more sensitive to group aspects of 
discrimination and recognise that persons are discriminated against as members of a 
particular group (like ethnic minorities, religious groups, women, disabled persons). 
There are extra burdens and barriers to achieving equality for members of 
disadvantaged groups. Schiek26 writes: 
A substantive, asymmetric notion of equality is ... based on a group-sensitive model of 
justice, ... 
The group-sensitive approach purports that discrimination on any of the 
forbidden grounds is group related. Persons are grouped into a collective and disadvantaged 
24 McInerney, Siobhan, "Bases for Action against Race Discrimination in EU Law" 27, European Law 
Review 72-9 (2002), at 76. 
25 Fredman, supra note 9, at 11. 
26 Schiek, Dagmar, "A New Framework on Equal Treatment of Persons in EC Law? " 8,2, European 
Law Journal 290-314 (2002), at 304. 
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as a `member' of such a collective. Thus non-discrimination law needs to be sensitive to 
this group dimension, while avoiding to support forced group membership. 
The models could, therefore, allow for actions taken by or on behalf of groups. 
The laws based on both these models try to compensate for these inequalities 
and will allow unequal treatment of disadvantaged groups where that is necessary to 
achieve equality in fact. This unequal treatment or preferential treatment has been 
referred to as: special measures (often used in international instruments); affirmative 
action (more often used in the US); or, positive action (more commonly used in (the 
literature in) Europe). The three terms can be seen as interchangeable. Article 1(4) 
ICERD is an example of an international measure: 
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain 
racial and ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in 
order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, ... 
Z' 
Section 9(2) of the South African Constitution reads as follows: 
Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
And Article 5 of the Race Directive, which is headed `Positive action' determines: 
With a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the principle of equal treatment shall not 
prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or 
compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin. 
This Thesis will use the term positive action in the sense given by Fottrell: 28 
27 See also Article 2(2) ICERD: `special and concrete measures'. 
28 Fottrell, Deirdre, "Ever Decreasing Circles: Affirmative Action and Special Measures under 
International Law" in: Fottrell, Deirdre and Bowring, Bill, (eds. ), Minority and Group Rights in the 
New Millennium (1999 The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 183-203, at 183-4. 
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Special measures or affirmative action, in their simplest possible form, involve legalised 
differential treatment of individuals based on their membership of an historically 
disadvantaged minority group. 
The terms positive or reverse discrimination are also sometimes used but, because of the 
use of the word discrimination and its negative connotations, this term is not very 
popular. Sometimes it is used as a synonym for positive action, at other times it is 
distinguished from the term positive action, in that positive discrimination indicates 
preferential treatment that goes further than positive action, like, for example, the 
imposition of quotas or goals. Bacik29 writes: 
Generally, policies which seek to achieve equality of opportunity may be described as 
"positive action", while those which seek to achieve equality of result are described as 
"positive discrimination". 
In this sense, the difference between the models can be said to be one of degree only. 
We will come back to this when discussing the two substantive models. Because of the 
confusion as to its meaning, the terms positive or reverse discrimination will not be used 
here. 
Therefore, both models will allow for preferential treatment of historically 
disadvantaged groups, for positive action measures. However, the main problem with 
positive action measures is - and it is submitted that this is also one of the reasons why 
the teens reverse or positive discrimination are unpopular - that they are going against 
the principle of equal treatment, that they themselves constitute discrimination: 
preferential treatment of some is worse treatment of others and this is seen as unfair. As 
Barnard writes, `equality comes with a price tag attached. ... improving the position of 
one group is often to the detriment of another'. 
30 And, according to Feldman, such 
29 Bacik, Ivana, "Combating Discrimination: The Affirmative Action Approach Developments in 
Affirmative Action Law in Ireland and Europe" in: Byrne, Rosemary and Duncan, William, (eds. ), 
Developments in Discrimination Law in Ireland and Europe (1997 Dublin: Irish Centre for European 
Law) 119-30, at 120. 
30 Barnard, supra note 8, at 373. 
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action `will be seen by the disadvantaged members of previously advantaged groups as 
a straightforward form of discrimination'. 31 Poulter32 gives as one of the arguments in 
favour of varying degrees of assimilation, that the vital principle of equality before the 
law will be jeopardised if minorities are given special exemptions and privileges. He 
also states that such equality can be seen as part of the rule of law. Nevertheless, 
advocates of positive action see it as justified because of the inequalities suffered 
through historical discrimination. 
Anti discrimination legislation providing for positive action can, therefore, 
follow either of the two substantive models and it is not always clear from the texts 
which type of equality is aimed for. The reason is that the laws do not often give any 
further details of the measures that can be taken (see the examples given) and thus what 
is allowed depends on the interpretation in secondary legislation or in case law. As 
mentioned, the models can be distinguished because law based on the equality of 
opportunity model aims to make the starting point equal for everyone without being 
concerned with the results, while law based on the equality of results model aims to 
equalise the outcome. Positive measures may only attempt to create fair procedures in 
job applications without giving a person a right to a job. Or they may go further and 
actively encourage people from disadvantaged groups to apply without guaranteeing 
any specific outcome in their favour. Both these type of measures would fit in the 
equality of opportunity model. On the other hand, positive measures could not only 
encourage applications from certain groups, but could also determine that a set number 
of jobs should be given to people of that group. In this case, the measure fits in the 
equality of results model. We will now look at each model in turn. 
31 Feldman, supra note 12, at 152. 
32 Poulter, Sebastian, Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The English Experience (1998 Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), at 13-4. 
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3.1 Equality of Opportunity Model ofAnti Discrimination Law 
Anti discrimination legislation based on this model is sensitive to the position of 
disadvantage and inequality which some groups of people are in because of the 
discrimination they have been or are subjected to, and attempts to make up for this past 
inequality by making the starting point equal for everybody. This approach accepts that 
treating everyone equally, according to merit, cannot be successful if not everyone has 
been able to, or had the opportunity to, acquire merit. Feldman33 expresses this well: 
Inequality of opportunity is particularly likely to result where one group suffers from the 
effects of a history of systematic discrimination which has limited the educational and 
economic opportunities open to them. 
Thus, this model of anti discrimination law tries to make up for these missed 
opportunities. Because they have suffered disadvantage, some groups cannot compete 
on the same level. They are not at the same starting point. The model aims to equalise 
this starting point so everyone has `the opportunity to compete on equal terms for the 
goods which society has to offer'. 
34 Once this is achieved, once the starting point is 
equalised, the competition from then on will be on merit only. The model is thus not 
concerned with the end results of the race as long as anyone can compete at the same 
level. 
Section 14 of Ireland's Equal Status Act 200035 can be seen as an example of an 
anti discrimination measure aimed at equal opportunity. It reads as follows: 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as prohibiting- 
(a) 
(b) preferential treatment or the taking of positive measures which are bona fide intended 
to- 
33 Feldman, supra note 12, at 152. 
34 Townshend-Smith, supra note 2, at 73. 
35 < www. iri shstatutebook. ie/ZZAgY2000S 14. html 
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(i) promote equality of opportunity for persons who are, in relation to other 
persons, disadvantaged or who have been or are likely to be unable to 
avail themselves of the same opportunities as those other persons, or ... 
Article 5 of the Race Directive, quoted above, permits EU Member States to take 
positive action. The Article itself does not give any indication as to what sort of action 
is allowed and how far this action can go. However, if the ECJ interprets this article in 
the same way as it has interpreted Article 2(4) of the Equal Treatment Directive36 and 
Article 141(4) EC which both allow for positive action measures in relation to women, 
then the Court will exclude programmes which involve automatic preferential treatment 
at the point of selection for employment. The ECJ has also held that positive measures 
should be limited to the period necessary to overcome the disadvantage. 37 If this 
interpretation is indeed followed, then Article 5 of the Race Directive can be seen as 
aiming for equality of opportunity. However, Schiek38 points out that the Race and 
Framework Directives both allow for positive measures `with a view to ensuring full 
equality in practice' and do not use the terminology of the Equal Treatment Directive, 
which appears to indicate that these directives are aiming for equality of results. So 
Schiek argues for a different interpretation of the Race and Framework Directives 
because their text differs from the older Equal Treatment Directive's text. The new text 
points, according to her, to a result-oriented approach. We will come back to this in 
Chapter 6 when we discuss the provisions for positive action in the Race Directive. 
The concept of indirect discrimination is, according to some writers, an example 
of a legislative measure that aims at equality of opportunity, although others refer to it 
36 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the Implementation of the Principle of Equal 
Treatment for Men and Women as regards Access to Employment, Vocational Training and 
Promotion, and Working Conditions [1976] OJ L3 9/40. (Hereafter referred to as the Equal Treatment 
Directive). Article 2(4) is now replaced by Article 2(8) of the Equal Treatment (Amendment) 
Directive. 
31 See for example: Cases C-450/93 Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] ECR 1-3051; C-409/95 
Marschall v Land Nordrhein- Westfalen [1997] ECR I-6363; C-158/97 Badeck's Application [2000] 
ECR 1-1875; C-407/98 Abrahamsson and Anderson v Fogelqvist [2000] ECR 1-5539. For a detailed 
discussion of positive action and the different concepts of equality, including the cases mentioned, see 
Fredman, supra note 9, at 125-60. 
38 Schiek, supra note 26, at 299. 
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as promoting substantive equality without specifying whether its aim is equality of 
opportunity or equality of results. Yet others see it as promoting equality of results only. 
Indirect discrimination occurs, according to Article 2(2)(b) of the Race Directive: 39 
... where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial 
or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons ... 
The Belgian law combating discrimination40 states: 
Indirect discrimination occurs when a seemingly neutral provision, measure or practice has 
harmful repercussions on persons on which one of the grounds for discrimination set out in 
para 1 applies, ... 
And Section 9 of the Swedish Act on Measures to Counteract Ethnic Discrimination in 
Working Life 41 determines: 
An employer may not disfavour a job applicant or an employee by applying a provision, a 
criterion or a method of procedure that appears to be neutral but which in practice 
disfavours persons with a particular ethnic background. 
From these definitions it will be clear that indirect discrimination takes account of 
differences. In cases of indirect discrimination, people are treated equally, the same 
provision is applied equally to everyone, but some people will find it more difficult or 
impossible to comply. Therefore, the concept of indirect discrimination recognises that 
equal treatment can have a discriminatory effect on some as a result of historical and 
structural impediments to equality. For example, requiring applicants for jobs to pass 
literacy tests, even if this is not necessary for doing the job, can be discriminatory 
against those who did not have the educational opportunities to become literate. The 
concept does, therefore, aim to compensate for past or current inequality and 
disadvantage. By defining as prohibited discrimination apparently neutral provisions, 
39 The same definition is used in the other Article 13 EC Directives. 
40 Article 2(2) Act of 25/02/2003 Pertaining to the Combat of Discrimination and to the Amendment of 
the Act of 15/02/1993 Pertaining to the Foundation of a Centre For Equal Opportunities and 
Opposition to Racism, < www. diversiteit. be 
41 See: www. sweden. izov. se/content/l/c6/01/99/57ib98945ab. pdf 
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criteria and practices that have a disparate effect, and therefore by taking these barriers 
away as irrelevant, laws against indirect discrimination make the starting point more 
equal for everybody and make it easier for everyone to compete on the same level. In 
this sense, such legislation can be seen as aiming at equality of opportunity. However, 
not all barriers are against the law. The reason for this is that legislation against indirect 
discrimination allows for justification: there is no discrimination if the provision, 
criterion or practice is `objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of 
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary' (Article 2(2)(b) of the Race 
Directive). Such justification clauses are a feature of many legislative measures against 
indirect discrimination. 42 So even if there is a disadvantage or a barrier, this might not 
be unlawful if business or administrative interests objectively justify it. 
The definitions show that indirect discrimination takes account of the impact, 
the results of seemingly neutral provisions or measures applied to all persons equally. It 
focuses on the practical result of a measure: if it has `harmful repercussions' it may be 
considered discrimination. In this sense, indirect discrimination takes differences into 
account and is result-oriented. Does this mean that it aims at equality of results? 
Fredman43 writes, `this focus on impact may be used in different ways, the aim not 
necessarily being equality of results'. As we saw in Chapter 1, she discerns three ways 
in which the notion of equality of results can be used: the first focuses on the effect of 
the equal treatment on the individual. In this sense, the concept of indirect 
discrimination involves equality of results, because the focus is on the `particular 
disadvantage' or the `harmful repercussions' for the individual. The second sense 
42 See for example: Section 1(1)(b)(ii) of the British Race Relations Act 1976, and Article 2(1) of the 
Dutch Equal Treatment Act 1994, < www. c bg nl/legislation. php The Belgian and Swedish laws 
quoted contain similar clauses. 
43 Fredman, supra note 15, at 161. 
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focuses on the results to the group. In this sense too, the concept can be said to involve 
outcome equality. As Barnard and Hepple write: 44 
The essential characteristic of indirect discrimination is that an apparently neutral practice 
or criterion has an unjustifiable adverse disparate impact upon the group to which the 
individual belongs. 
The third sense of equality of results assumes that the end result should be equal, 
proportional and fair, that the outcome is equal. In this last sense, the concept of indirect 
discrimination is not redistributive, because the end result may remain unequal. For 
example, a finding of indirect discrimination against an employer requiring literacy tests 
for jobs when this is not necessary to do the job might not result in the person who was 
discriminated against getting the job. And, even if this were the result, it would not 
change the fact that some people never had the opportunity to become literate because 
of past or ongoing discrimination in education. Requiring literacy tests might in other 
cases be justified for the interest of the business. With Fredman45 we can conclude that: 
The aims of the concept of indirect discrimination are ambiguous. ... 
its goals are not 
necessarily the achievement of equality of results. ... If 
indirect discrimination is only 
partially about equality of results, is it instead about equality of opportunity in that it aims 
to equalise the starting point? Again, this is only partially true. 
We can add to this, however, that indirect discrimination `has been characterised as an 
important step away form a formal equality approach towards a substantive notion' 
46 
A last point that needs to be discussed in relation to the equality of opportunity 
model is the sort of remedies this model could permit or prescribe. These remedies 
could include: compensation; orders to change policies; and, contract compliance or 
withholding of licences - where a public body has the authority not to make contracts 
with or give licences to companies unless they have an equality of opportunity policy in 
44 Barnard and Hepple, supra note 20, at 564. 
45 Fredman, supra note 9, at 115. 
46 Schiek, supra note 26, at 305. 
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place or to end contracts with and withdraw licences from companies who do not 
respect equality principles. However, whether these sorts of remedies are available, 
depends on the legislation itself and the legal system it is part of. Sometimes, neither the 
anti discrimination law itself nor the legal system will allow for anything but 
compensation. 
It will be clear that the equality of opportunity model of anti discrimination 
legislation remedies some of the problems that we have distinguished in relation to the 
equal treatment model. It does not ignore existing inequalities and social disadvantages 
but recognises these and allows for preferential treatment to overcome these. It is also 
asymmetrical, in that it takes account of difference and disadvantage and permits 
unequal treatment. But, the latter goes, as we have already mentioned above, against the 
feeling of fairness and justice that was the strong point of the equal treatment model. 
However, this model still leaves the competition to be on merit only, once the 
starting line has been equalised. Therefore, the problems with regards to merit as it is 
defined by the dominant culture, are not solved. This model does little to change the 
focus on assimilation and on conforming to the dominant norms and values. In a sense, 
it leaves these norms and values in place and aims to bring disadvantaged groups to a 
position where they can also aspire to them, without recognising that they might not 
want to do this. 
This model also does not guarantee a particular result. It is not concerned with 
the outcome of the competition: different finishing points are not seen as a problem, as 
long as everyone can compete equally on merit. This is the reason why this model 
rejects the setting of quotas and targets to correct imbalances in the workforce or in the 
allocation of housing which aim at equalising the results. It aims at the removal of 
barriers, but does ignore that this might not necessarily equip the disadvantaged group 
to move forward. Equalising the starting point may not necessarily lead to a more equal 
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society. Townshend-Smith47 describes equal opportunity as giving everyone `the 
opportunity to compete on equal terms for the goods which society has to offer'. He 
continues: 
The problem, though, is that reliance on equal opportunity alone provides no guarantee that, 
in practice, those goods will not remain disproportionately in the hands of white males. 
This model focuses more on groups and could lead to a more group sensitive model of 
justice, but whether it allows for more than just compensation as remedy depends, as 
was mentioned, on the legislation and the legal system. If this solely focuses on an 
individual model of justice, than the same objections that applied to the equal treatment 
model also apply here. 
3.2 Equality of Results Model ofAnti Discrimination Law 
Legislation against discrimination based on this model takes into account existing 
inequalities and disadvantages caused by past and ongoing discrimination and aims to 
remedy these by equalising the outcome or result; the laws aim to establish a fairer 
distribution of goods and resources in society. It would aim to correct maldistribution 
and to achieve a more representative participation of all groups in public life. This 
model `looks to the results of competition and then raise questions about the rules of 
entry'. 48 The Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 199849 clearly 
aims at fair participation in employment of both Protestants and Catholics. It determines 
under the heading `Affirmative Action' in Section 4(1): 
In this Order "affirmative action" means action designed to secure fair participation in 
employment by members of the Protestant, or members of the Roman Catholic, community 
in Northern Ireland by means including: 
(a) the adoption of practices encouraging such participation; and 
47 Townshend-Smith, supra note 2, at 73. 
" O'Donovan and Szyszczak, supra note 7, at 4. 
49 SI 1998 No. 3162 (N. I. 21), <www. legislation. hmso. gov. uk/si/si1998/98316202. htm 
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(b) the modification or abandonment of practices that have or may have the effect of 
restricting or discouraging such participation. 
This involves redressing imbalances and under-representation between the two 
communities in Northern Ireland. The aims are `to secure greater fairness in the 
distribution of jobs and opportunities'. so 
The equality of results model of anti discrimination legislation would, as would 
the previous model, allow for positive action measures, but, in this model, they would 
go further and include the setting of targets and quotas. An example of such a law aimed 
at equality of results is Section 46 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 which 
contains a quota system for the recruitment of police trainees and support staff. Its aim 
is to reverse the under-representation of Catholics in the police force. Section 46(1) 
requires the appointment of one Catholic person for every person of another religion 
who is awarded a post. According to Section 47(1), these provisions are temporary for 
three years. The Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 (Renewal of Temporary Provisions) 
Order 2004 extended this period for another three years. However, the other paragraphs 
of Section 46 empower the Secretary of State to amend the above requirements if not 
enough people can be appointed. 
Another example is the Canadian Employment Equity Act of 1995.51 According 
to Article 2 on the purpose of the Act, `employment equity means more than treating 
persons in the same way but also requires special measures and the accommodation of 
differences'. Article 5 of this Act puts the following obligation on employers: 
Every employer shall implement employment equity by 
(a) 
..; and 
(b) instituting such positive policies and practices and making such reasonable 
accommodations as will ensure that persons in designated groups achieve a 
s0 See Barnard and Hepple, supra note 20, at 565. 
51 < htm: //Iaws. justice. yc. ca/en/e-5.401/index. htmi 
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degree of representation in each occupational group in the employer's 
workforce that reflects their representation in 
(i) the Canadian workforce, or 
(ii) those segments of the Canadian workforce that are identifiable by 
qualification, eligibility or geography and from which the employer may 
reasonably be expected to draw employees. 
In other words, employers must use positive policies and practices and make 
accommodations to ensure that women, aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities and 
members of visible minorities - Article 3 gives this as the meaning of `designated 
group' - are represented in their workforce in the same numbers as they are represented 
in the Canadian workforce as a whole or in those segments of the workforce that the 
employer may reasonably be expected to recruit employees from, looking at 
qualifications, eligibility and geography. Therefore, if 5% of the Canadian workforce as 
a whole or of that segment is of a visible minority, then the workforce should also have 
about 5% of visible minority people, and not just the workforce of the employer as a 
whole but also each occupational group. This can be seen as a clear target: 5% should 
be of visible minorities. However, is this duty on employers as results-oriented as it first 
appears from Article 5? This is indeed questionable; firstly, part (b)(ii) could mitigate 
the duty on the employer, depending on how it is interpreted. Secondly, even if part 
(b)(ii) does not do so, Article 6 certainly does. It contains the following exceptions: 
The obligation to implement employment equity does not require an employer 
(a) to take a particular measure to implement employment equity where the taking of that 
measure would cause undue hardship to the employer; 
(b) to hire or promote unqualified persons; 
(c) with respect to the public sector, to hire or promote persons without basing the hiring 
or promotion on selection according to merit in cases where the Public Service 
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Employment Act requires that hiring or promotion be based on selection according to 
merit; or 
(d) to create new positions in its workforce. 
So, Article 5, as it is aiming to achieve fair participation in the workforce for minority 
groups, can be seen as an example of a results-oriented measure. However, its effect 
could be mitigated by the interpretation of its part (b)(ii), and is definitely mitigated by 
the exceptions of Article 6. Therefore, both the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 and 
the Canadian Employment Equity Act 1995 allow for exceptions. 
It appears that many national legislative measures that allow for positive action, 
will permit, or are interpreted as permitting, some preferential treatment but this usually 
stops short of allowing targets and quota setting. This is, as we have seen, also the 
interpretation by the ECJ of the EU legislation allowing positive action measures for 
women. That this is the same for the British Race Relations Act 1976 is illustrated by an 
article in the Guardian newspaper about plans by the Metropolitan Police (the Met) to 
fast track black recruits. 52 The article reports that `Britain's biggest police force is 
urging positive discrimination in favour of black recruits' by fast tracking `ethnic 
minority people into its training schools ahead of some white candidates to make its 
force more representative of London's racial mix'. At present, people have to wait for 
about a year for a training place. The plan would give the Met the right to select ethnic 
minority candidates to start training straight away, while others would have to wait. The 
Met stresses that the same selection criteria would apply to both white and ethnic 
minority recruits. It believes that the plan would be illegal under the Race Relations 
Act, but does not think that, without it, it can meet the target set by the Government: 
25% of its officers should be from ethnic minorities by 2009, reflecting that a quarter of 
Londoners are from ethnic minorities. It is interesting that the article mentions that `the 
52 Dodd, Vikram, "Met Plan to Fast Track Black Recruits" The Guardian 17/04/2004, < 
www. guardian. co. uk/uk news/story/0 3604 1193861 00. htm1 
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law allows for positive action, such as encouraging applications from disadvantaged 
groups, but positive discrimination is unlawful'. This suggests that positive action 
measures aiming at equality of opportunity are allowed under the British Race Relations 
Act 1976, but that positive discrimination, aiming at reaching specific targets, are not. 53 
The article therefore uses, like Bacik did, the terms positive action for measures aiming 
at equality of opportunity and positive discrimination for those aiming at equality of 
results. 
This model of anti discrimination legislation remedies the objection made 
against the equality of opportunity model in that it is focused on the outcome, but there 
are also, like with the other models, some problems. Firstly, the model goes, as does any 
model that allows for preferential treatment, against the principle of equal treatment and 
thus against people's feeling of fairness and justice. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is also the problem, pointed out by 
Townshend-Smith, that the redistributive aim is intertwined with the relief of poverty. 
This poses the question: why should only certain victims of poverty (black people, 
women) and not others be entitled to such relief? 54 
The third problem is that, despite the fact that this model aims at redistribution, 
this might not necessarily be the result because the outcome depends on the way the 
model is used. This can be seen in the paper by Menski55 on the policy of protective 
discrimination of traditionally disadvantaged groups that was laid down in the 
Constitution of India in 1950. Articles 14-16 of the Constitution of India explicitly 
53 See also Bowcott, Owen and Dodd, Vikram, "Police halt Jobs Diversity Scheme after Discrimination 
Claims" The Guardian 08/03/2006, < www. guardian. co. uk/gender/story/O., 1725899,00. htmi These 
two articles are used as illustrations of the difference between equality of opportunity and equality of 
results. A discussion on positive action measures under the British Race Relations Act 1976 would go 
beyond the subject of this Thesis. For more information, see McColgan, Aileen, Discrimination Law: 
Text, Cases and Materials (2nd ed. 2005 Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing), at 132-57, the 
case law referred to there and Lambeth London Borough Council v CRE [1990] IRLR 230, Balcombe 
LJ at 234. 
54 Townshend-Smith, Chapter 1,5.3.2 and supra note 2, at 80. 
55 Menski, Werner, "The Indian Experience and its Lessons for Britain" in: Hepple, and Szyszczak, 
supra note 17, at 300-43. 
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allow preferential treatment for certain groups and Article 16(4) allows the reservation 
of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens. The constitutional 
provisions aimed to accelerate the process of building an egalitarian social order. 
However, the Constitution does not give any indication as to how these policies of 
protective discrimination are to be implemented56 and `the implementation of the 
policies is apparently far from perfect'. 57 And, as Menski writes, `the social reformer's 
dream of an egalitarian society as the result of `equalizing policies' ... has clearly not 
been achieved in modem India'. 58 Fredman59 writes about equality of results that the 
`underlying redistributive aims may only be partially achieved'. She gives two reasons 
for this: firstly, `monitoring of results does not necessitate any fundamental re- 
examination of the structures that perpetuate discrimination'; and, secondly, 
there is a danger that a focus on equality of results pays too little attention to the equally 
important notion of equality of diversity; or the duty to accommodate diversity by adapting 
existing structures. 
A fourth problem is that there are disadvantages linked to the setting of quotas. 
Gregory60 mentions: 
Although a system of quotas produces rapid and dramatic results, its application in the job 
market would tend to accentuate rather than dissipate racial hostility. If it entailed the 
selection of people with inferior qualifications merely because they were black or female 
(or both), those selected might feel patronized and those not selected might see themselves 
as a new class of victim. 
Menski calls this the `efficiency argument': the public perception in India is `that the 
effect of reservation policies has been to bring about lower standards and to encourage 
inefficiency'. 61 
56 Ibid. at 310-11. 
51 Ibid. at 313. 
58 Ibid. at 307. For more information on how the policies were implemented and why they did not have 
the desired effects, see the paper. 
59 Fredman, supra note 1, at 20. 
60 Gregory, Jeanne, Sex, Race and the Law: Legislating for Equality (1987 London: Sage), at 64-5. 
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MacEwen62 criticises quotas thus: 
In particular the results may involve the less well-qualified, and potentially less deserving, 
getting a job, a house or a promotion to make up the numbers, and in doing so 
discriminating against better qualified white applicants who feel no great need to shoulder 
the burden of rectifying historical disadvantage. Such reverse discrimination is often 
unlawful, but perhaps more importantly it is seen to be unfair; it denies everyone a fair 
chance and is in breach of the concept of natural justice. 
Thus, again, the importance of treatment being seen to be fair and just is stressed. 
The last problem, also already touched upon in Chapter 1, is whether it is really 
possible to achieve equality of results through legislation. O'Donovan and Szyszczak 
write that `the creation of outcome equality would require a major social revolution.... 
Liberals object that equality of outcomes could be maintained only at a substantial cost 
to liberty'. This is because `the maintenance of strict equality would require continuous 
coercive interference to maintain an egalitarian distribution pattern'. 
63 A second 
question is whether legislation can be of a pure equality of results model We can put 
this question in a different way: can we have legislation of this model that uses the 
notion of equality of results as defined in Fredman's third way above, as requiring a 
redistributive outcome, an `equal outcome, that is that the spread of women and 
minorities in a category should reflect their proportions in the workforce or the 
population as whole'? 
M 
It is suggested that we can have such a legislative aim, that we can have laws 
that aim at a more equal distribution and a fairer participation, but that legislation alone 
can never reach full equality of results. Section 46(1) of the Police (Northern Ireland) 
Act 2000, Section 4(1) of the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 
61 Supra note 55, at 324-5. 
62 MacEwen, Martin, Tackling Racism in Europe, An Examination of Anti-Discrimination Law in 
Practice (1995 Oxford and Washington: Berg), at 24. 
63 See Chapter 1,5.3.2 and supra note 7, at 6. 
64 Fredman, supra note 9, at 12-3. 
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1998, and Article 5 of the Canadian Employment Equity Act, cited above, can be seen 
as examples of legislation with such an aim. However, as we have seen, the Police 
(Northern Ireland) Act 2000 provides for exceptions when not enough people are 
available and Article 5 of the Canadian Act is mitigated by Article 6. The Fair 
Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 defines affirmative action as 
action designed to secure fair participation by means of adopting practices that 
encourage it and abandoning practices that discourage or restrict it. Therefore, this 
Order focuses more on encouraging fair participation, rather than setting strict rules and 
quotas as to how to achieve this. The reason that anti discrimination legislation alone 
cannot establish full equality of results is that there are always conflicting interests at 
work. Firstly, there is the conflict between the different groups that should be given 
preferential treatment: why some groups (like, for example, black people or women) 
and not others (like, for example, religious groups)? And even within the groups 
selected, preferential treatment often goes to the more privileged people within that 
group. 65 To be truly redistributive, all disadvantaged people should be given such 
treatment, irrespective of the group they belong to or even if they don't belong to any 
group at all. 
Secondly, there is the conflict, already mentioned, between preferential 
treatment and the feeling of fairness and justice. Positive action is seen to be unfair and 
to go against the principle of equal treatment of every person. 
Thirdly, there is also the conflict between the redistribution of goods and 
resources and the business interests of an employer. This is clear in Article 6 of the 
Canadian Employment Equity Act, where an employer does not have to take an 
employment equity measure if it `would cause undue hardship to the employer' or if it 
61 See on this: Menski, supra note 55, at 331; Pitt, Gwyneth, "Can Reverse Discrimination be Justified? " 
in: Hepple and Szyszczak, supra note 17,281-99, at 284; Fredman, supra note 9, at 152; Costello, 
Cathryn, "Positive Action", in: Costello Cathryn and Barry, Ellis (eds. ), Equality in Diversity: The 
New Equality Directives (2003 Dublin: Irish Centre for European Law/Irish Equality 
Authority/Ashfield Publishing) 177-212, at 210. 
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meant hiring or promoting unqualified persons. The problem can be illustrated by an 
example: in a country, ten percent of the population is from a racial or ethnic minority 
origin. Because this group of people is involved in employment in only a very small 
percentage, a law determines that every employer must make sure that ten percent of his 
workforce and of each category in his workforce is from such a minority origin. How 
quickly should an employer comply (the law could give a time scale)? Should an 
employer make some people redundant and replace them with people of the racial or 
ethnic minority if financial restraints will not make it possible for the employer to create 
new jobs? What if there are not enough people of the racial or ethnic minority who are 
qualified and suitable to do the job? 66 
This suggests that legislation can be based on the equality of results model in 
that it can aim at a more equitable distribution and a fairer participation, but that these 
legislative measures need to be supported by measures in a number of other areas, such 
as the social, political and educational field. In Chapter 3, we will discuss the capacity 
and effectiveness of law in tackling discrimination and the possible other measures that 
could be used with the same or more effect. 
As for remedies, the same range would apply here as was discussed for laws in 
the equality of opportunity model: compensation; orders to change policies; and, 
contract compliance or the withholding or withdrawing of licences. It could also allow 
orders to reach certain targets or quotas before the expiry of a certain time. 67 But, again, 
which remedies are allowed depends on the legislation and the legal system it is part of. 
It can be concluded that both substantive models of anti discrimination law go 
some way towards remedying the problems that occur with the equal treatment model, 
66 For a discussion of the business case for equality see Fredman, Sandra, The Future of Equality in 
Britain, Manchester, EOC Working Paper Series 5, (2002), at 7-17, < 
www. eoc. org. uk/r)df/a future of equality in britain. pdf 
67 For a way of dealing with non-compliance see Part II of the Canadian Employment Equity Law, 
Articles 22-34. Part III (Articles 35-40) determines monetary penalties for employers who do not 
comply. 
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but that they are not without problems themselves. It will also be clear that it is not 
always possible to draw a sharp line between the equality of opportunity and the 
equality of results models because measures can contain aspects of both. Where the 
models differ is that the equality of opportunity model focuses on equalising the starting 
point for everyone without being concerned about the outcome, while the equality of 
results model concerns itself with an equal outcome. 
4 The Pluralist Model of Anti Discrimination Legislation 
Legislation based on this model of anti discrimination law aims to establish a society 
where difference and diversity are celebrated as positive assets and where every 
individual is treated with equal respect. In such a society, there would be acceptance of 
distinctive cultures and identities and people would be treated in accordance with their 
own requirements and aspirations. Society would be based on respect for and tolerance 
of differences and diversity and strive to integrate minority communities rather than 
assimilate them. The idea is not new: in a speech in 1966 Roy Jenkins (then Home 
Secretary) described integration thus: 
I do not regard it as meaning the loss, by immigrants, of their own national characteristics 
and culture. ... I 
define integration therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but 
as equal opportunity, coupled with cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual 
tolerance. 8 
Dine and Watt69 discuss Dworkin's distinction between `equal treatment' and `treatment 
as an equal 9.70 They ask what it means to treat people as equals and write: 
... all that is needed is a recognition that 
individuals have different incommensurable 
abilities, goals and aspirations, and that `treating people as equals' means giving equal 
weight to each person's own `plan of life', i. e. treating people as equals means recognizing 
their autonomy. 
Jenkins, Roy, Essays and Speeches (1967 London: Collins), at 267. 
Dine, Janet and Watt, Bob, (eds. ), Discrimination Law: Concepts, Limitations and Justifications 
(1996 London: Longman), at 5. 
70 See Chapter 1,5.1. 
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So, according to this, treating people as equal means respecting their goals and 
aspirations, their `plan of life', whatever people choose this to be. However, what this is 
should never be decided by an outside official body. 
Law based on this model would aim to create `an atmosphere of mutual 
tolerance' between people of different groups. One way of doing this is by prohibiting 
intolerance and its manifestations, like discrimination. In this sense all laws against 
discrimination aim to promote tolerance. But legislation based on this model would go 
further. It could contain a government statement that cultural diversity is to be respected 
or put a positive duty on authorities and employers to eliminate discrimination and to 
respect diversity. It could also lay down a policy of mainstreaming equality and 
diversity: 7' a duty to take combating discrimination and promoting equality and respect 
for diversity into account in every policy and executive decision, thus making equality 
and diversity factors that always need to be considered. 
An example of legislation following this model is the Canadian Multiculturalism 
Act 1985.72 The Preamble states that: 
the Government of Canada recognizes the diversity of Canadians as regards race, national 
or ethnic origin, colour and religion as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society and 
is committed to a policy of multiculturalism designed to preserve and enhance the 
multicultural heritage of Canadians while working to achieve the equality of all Canadians 
in the economic, social, cultural and political life of Canada. 
Article 3(l)(a) and (e) and 3(2)(a), under the heading `Multicultural Policy of Canada' 
are the most relevant for our discussion. These declare that it will be the policy of the 
Government of Canada: 
" To `recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the 
cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of 
" Mainstreaming could fit in the other models of anti discrimination law, but this depends on what is 
mainstreamed. We will discuss this in Chapter 6. The term mainstreaming is used extensively in 
relation to gender discrimination within the EU, see Fredman, supra note 1, at 27. 
72 <http: //lois. ius tice. gc. ca/en/c-18.7/ 
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all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural 
heritage' (Article 3(1)(a)); 
" To `ensure that all individuals receive equal treatment and equal protection under 
the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity' (Article 3(1)(e)); 
" that all federal institutions shall `ensure that Canadians of all origins have an 
equal opportunity to obtain employment and advancement in those institutions' 
(Article 3(2)(a)). 
Here, the aim of a multicultural society in which everyone, whatever their cultural 
heritage, has a right to equal treatment and equal protection under the law as well as a 
right to respect for their diversity, is laid down in law as a government policy. The Act 
does not define what a multicultural society is. Parekh73 describes a multicultural 
society as `a society which includes several distinct cultural, ethnic and religious 
communities'. According to Watson, 74 a multicultural society denotes a society in 
which there exist several cultures; and culture refers to a common language, a shared 
history, a shared set of religious beliefs and moral values, a shared geographical origin, 
all of which taken together define a sense of belonging to a specific group. Watson 
writes that other terms have been used to describe such a society: plural, cosmopolitan, 
multi-ethnic, poly-ethnic or multi-racial. 
The Preamble to the Canadian Multiculturalism Act mentions that `the Canadian 
Human Rights Act provides that every individual should have an equal opportunity with 
other individuals to make the life that the individual is able and wishes to have (my 
italics), 
... '. The words `wishes to have' indicate that the 
decision of what life a person 
wants to make should not be made by the government or by the majority. 
73 Parekh, supra note 14, at 1. 
74 Watson, C, Multiculturalism (2000 Buckingham/Philadelphia: Open University Press), at 1. 
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The Dutch system of `verzuiling' (pillarisation)75 is often mentioned as an 
example of a democratic, pluralist society where tolerance for others was laid down in 
law. The system was based on the existence of four pillars, a Roman-Catholic, a 
Protestant, a Socialist and a Liberal or neutral one, where members of each pillar 
accorded rights and deference to members of other pillars. The pillars had their own 
organisations at all levels of life: politics, unions, education, health, youth, media and 
sports. The system was a result of the Pacificatie (peaceful settlement) of 1917, which 
established a politics of accommodation. In that year, the Dutch Constitution was 
changed in three respects: firstly, all public and all denominational schools were given 
the same financial status (in other words, they were all financed by the Government in 
the same way) (Article 23); secondly, universal (male) suffrage was introduced 
(followed in 1919 by universal female suffrage) (Article 54); and, thirdly, the electoral 
system was changed to a system of proportional representation (Article 53). The seven 
main rules that taken together describe how this system worked were: 76 
1. The business of politics: practical politics aimed at achieving results; 
2. The agreement to disagree: acceptance of the spiritual disunity of society; the 
fundamental convictions of other pillars must be tolerated if not respected; 
3. Summit diplomacy: top-level discussion, especially to solve crises; 
75 See "Verzuiling", < www. parlement. com/9291000/modules/z72bd2vo The above is only a very short 
summary. For more extensive information, including on the depillarisation or deconfessionalisation 
that took place in the 1960s, see Bagley, Christopher, The Dutch Plural Society: A Comparative Study 
in Race Relations (1973 London/Oxford: Institute of Race Relations/Oxford University Press); 
Bryant, Christopher, "Depillarisation in the Netherlands" 32,1, British Journal of Sociology 56-74 
(1981); Lijphart, Arend, "Self-Determination versus Pre-Determination of Ethnic Minorities in 
Power-Sharing Systems" in Kymlicka, Will, (ed. ), The Rights of Minority Cultures (1995 Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) 275-87; Bryant, Christopher, "Citizenship, National Identity and the 
Accommodation of Difference: Reflections on the German, French, Dutch and British Cases" 23,2, 
New Community 157-72 (1997); Pennings, Paul, "The Evolution of Dutch Consociationalism, 1917- 
1997" 33,1, The Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences 9-26 (1997); Rooy, Piet de, "Farewell to 
Pillarisation" 33,1, The Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences 27-41 (1997); Wintle, Michael, 
"Pillarisation, Consociation and Vertical Pluralism in the Netherlands Revisited: A European View" 
23,3, West European Politics 139-52 (2000); Blom, J, "Pillarisation in Perspective" 23,3, West 
European Politics 153-64 (2000); Toonen, Theo, "Governing a Consensus Democracy: The Interplay 
of Pillarisation and Administration" 23,3, West European Politics 165-78 (2000). 
76 Lijphart summarised these seven points in his book in 1968: Lijphart, Arend, The Politics of 
Accomodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (2°d ed 1975 Berkeley: University of 
California Press), at 122-38. See also Bagley, supra note 75, at 17-9; Blom, id. at 154. 
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4. Proportionality as the principle for solving crises (distributional equity); 
5. Depoliticisation of issues that are loaded ideologically or in terms of political 
principles, thus turning them into practical technical issues; 
6. Secrecy when seeking solutions, to enable compromises to be reached; 
7. The Government's right to govern: the Government is elected to get a job done, 
in the business-like traditions of Dutch politics. It has the power and the duty 
actually to apply solutions. To do this it needs a lot of room for manoeuvre. 
The above is a very short and simplified description of the Dutch system of pillarisation, 
mentioned as an example of a plural society where sections of the population live 
together and tolerate and respect the differences between them. The term `living apart 
together' has been used frequently in this context. 
However, there are some problems with pluralism and the pluralist model of anti 
discrimination law. We can discuss these by using Poulter's77 arguments for 
assimilation, which can be seen as arguments against minorities retaining their separate 
customs and traditional practices, as they would do in a pluralist society. 
One of his arguments, that the principle of equality before the law will be 
jeopardised, if minorities get special treatment by the legal system, has already been 
mentioned when we discussed positive action measures. This argument goes back to the 
feelings of unfairness and injustice about unequal treatment in whatever form. 
Another of Poulter's arguments is that members of minority groups may not so 
easily be able to attain economic advancement and break free of the cycle of 
disadvantage and discrimination if they insist upon retaining their separate customs. 
This is mainly because employers will not employ them out of fear that they will make 
cultural or religious demands or will not fit in with other employees. Is this an argument 
against a pluralist society? It is submitted that this is not as such a society is all about 
77 Poulter, supra note 32, at 13-4. 
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tolerating and respecting diversity, about accommodating and making room for 
differences. The problem would not exist in a truly pluralist society. Anti discrimination 
legislation based on this model would aim to establish tolerance and respect, so would 
aim to remedy the problem Poulter points at here. 
This leaves us with Poulter's other two arguments: one is the concern that failure 
to assimilate to certain important shared values will mean a departure from minimum 
standards of acceptable behaviour. This is connected with the other argument, that `the 
active promotion of separate identities may foster divisiveness and be incompatible with 
the degree of social cohesion required for the maintenance of a sense of national unity'. 
These arguments both suggest that there are limits to cultural diversity. The 1985 
Swann Committee Report expressed this as follows: 
We would ... regard a democratic pluralist society as seeking to achieve a 
balance between, 
on the one hand, the maintenance and active support of the essential elements of the 
cultures and lifestyles of all the ethnic groups within it, and, on the other, the acceptance by 
all groups of a set of shared values distinctive of the society as a whole. This then is our 
view of a genuinely pluralist society, as both socially cohesive and culturally diverse. 78 
Rex79 writes about the `secular civic culture as a common and necessary component of 
all cultures in advanced industrial societies. ... The possibility of different cultures 
coexisting depends upon them all accepting this shared set of common ideals'. And 
Verma8° concludes, in relation to Britain, that `the type of pluralist society for which we 
must strive is one that stresses core values but allows for diversity within an agreed 
framework'. But what are these shared values, core values or shared set of common 
ideals? Parekh8' considers that minority values and practices `should be tolerated 
78 Swann Committee Report Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups (Cmnd 9453,1985), at 
5-6. 
" Rex, John, Race and Ethnicity (1986 Milton Keynes: Open University Press), at 133. 
80 Verma, Gajendra, "Pluralism: Some Theoretical and Practical Considerations" in: Commission for 
Racial Equality, Britain: A Plural Society (1990 London: Commission for Racial Equality) 44-57, at 
56. 
81 Parekh, supra note 14, at 11. 
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subject to such collectively agreed minimum principles as respect for human life and 
dignity'. Other writers have mentioned human rights norms - like freedom of expression 
and religion and the legal and moral equality of all persons - and democracy and the 
rule of law as minimum standards to be maintained. Poulter82 advocates the use of 
human rights and suggests that two questions of principle should be asked. Firstly, does 
a particular ethnic practice demand legal recognition because to refuse it would be 
tantamount to a denial of human rights? This question sees it as a human right to have 
one's culture and traditions respected if one so wishes, and sees a denial of such 
recognition and respect as a breach of fundamental human rights. Human rights are thus 
used as an argument for respecting diversity. Secondly, does an ethnic tradition require 
automatic non-recognition because the practice itself constitutes a violation of human 
rights? Poulter gives as examples here slavery, female circumcision and barbarous 
punishments. 
All this suggests, therefore, that human rights values can provide a limit on 
diversity in a society. However, it must be kept in mind that these values, the core 
values of society, must not automatically be the values of the dominant group in that 
society. As Poulter83 writes: `the relationship between `shared values' ... and minority 
cultures ... should be seen as a reciprocal one. ... 
These values are not immutable'. In 
other words, these two influence each other constantly and both are always developing. 
As Rex84 points out, `the creation of a multicultural society must involve an 
element of voluntarism'. This means that those who want to assimilate should be 
allowed to do so, while those who prefer to keep their own culture should also be 
allowed to do just that. The important point is `to create the kind of society in which all 
people may choose their cultural affiliations'. Every person and every group should be 
82 Poulter, Sebastian, "Cultural Pluralism and its Limits: A Legal Perspective" in: Commission for 
Racial Equality, supra note 80,3-28, at 16-7. 
83 Poulter, supra note 32, at 24-5. 
s' Supra note 79, at 134. 
89 
respected in the choices they make about their culture. People should not be labelled by 
outside agencies as belonging to a group and therefore as having a certain culture. 
Schiek, quoted above, 85 also mentions `avoiding to support forced group membership'. 
Therefore, a person's cultural affiliation should not be defined or decided by an outside 
body, because that would mean imposing certain values on that person and the group or 
community he/she belongs to. In all this it should be noted, that it is often not a clear-cut 
choice between following either the minority culture or the majority culture. Ethnic 
minorities follow strategies of adaptation and often follow a hybrid of their own culture 
and the dominant culture. 86 
The last point to be raised is whether legislation can promote pluralism and 
achieve the aim of establishing a plural society. It is suggested that legislation can aim 
to create acceptance of and respect for whatever culture or mixture of cultures people 
would want to follow, it can aim to promote tolerance and participation and it can aim 
to establish the circumstances in which a plural society can blossom. However, 
legislation alone cannot establish such a society. As with legislation based on the other 
models of anti discrimination law, legislation based on the pluralist model needs to be 
supported by measures in other areas. 
It can be concluded that the pluralist model of anti discrimination law, although 
it remedies some of the objections made against the other models, also raises some 
problems of its own. 
gs Supra note 26. 
Menski and Ballard have written extensively on this process of adaptation and the creation of a hybrid 
culture. See: Ballard, Roger, (ed. ), Desh Pardesh The South East Asian Presence in Britain (1994 
London: Burst and Company); and "Negotiating Race and Ethnicity: Exploring the Implications of the 
1991 Census" 30,3, Patterns of Prejudice 3-33 (1996); Menski, Werner, "Asians in Britain and the 
Question of the Adaptation to a New Legal Order: Asian Law in Britain? " in: Israel, Milton and 
Wagle, Narendra, (eds. ), Ethnicity, Identity, Migration: The South Asian Context (1993 Toronto: 
University of Toronto) 238-68; "Muslim Law in Britain" 62, Journal of Asian and African Studies 
127-63 (2001); "Chameleons and Dodgy Lawyers: Reflections on Asians in Britain and their Legal 
Reconstruction of the Universe" in: Britain, India and the Diaspora: Changing Social and 
Historiographical Perceptions XXVIII, Indo-British Review (Millennium Issue) 89-103 (2002); and 
"Immigration and Multiculturalism in Britain: New Issues in Research and Policy" 12, KIAPS Bulletin 
ofAsia-Pacific Studies 43-66 (2002). 
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5 Conclusion 
We have distinguished four models of anti discrimination law, based on the four types 
of equality distinguished in the first Chapter. Firstly, there is the equal treatment model, 
in which the law prescribes that like cases should be treated alike. This seems to be the 
most common formulation found in anti discrimination laws. The reason for this is most 
likely that this is fairly easy to lay down in law and that the principle has popular appeal 
because it fits in with people's feelings of fairness and justice. Then there are two 
substantive models, the equality of opportunity model and the equality of results model. 
Both models aim to take account of disadvantages suffered by some groups because of 
past discrimination. The equality of opportunity model aims to equalise the starting 
point in order to enable everyone to compete at the same level. The equality of results 
model aims to equalise the outcome, to establish a fairer distribution of goods and 
resources in society. Legislation based on these models allows for preferential treatment 
of the groups that have been disadvantaged. Laws based on the pluralist model of anti 
discrimination legislation aim to create a society which not only tolerates, but also 
respects and celebrates difference and diversity. 
Lustgarten87 discusses the question where anti race discrimination law in Britain 
should be going and approaches this question by asking: what are the goals of racial 
equality policy? It is submitted that these goals are not limited to Britain, but can be 
applied to (racial) equality policies in general. Lustgarten describes three aims: the first 
aim should be the just treatment of individuals, in other words no unfavourable 
treatment on grounds such as race or ethnicity. This should involve more than formal 
equality and go towards a conception of substantive equality. The equality of all 
humans is the bedrock here. The reason for fair treatment is, according to Lustgarten, 
that `the value of fairness in the sense of formal equality is one that is deeply rooted in 
87 Lustgarten, Laurence, "Racial Inequality, Public Policy and the Law: Where are we Going? " in: 
Neppte and Szyszczak, supra note 17,455-71, at 455-7. 
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British culture' and has been the driving force behind efforts to counter discrimination. 
Again this does not appear to be limited to British culture and can be applied more 
widely. 
The second aim should be group distributional equality: the income distribution 
of each racial or ethnic group of significant size should be proportionally equivalent to 
whites and the rates of unemployment of people in these groups should be roughly 
equal. 
The third aim is `the acceptance in principle of the equality of cultural norms 
and beliefs, which means adjustment and accommodation to customs and practices of 
significant minority groups'. Lustgarten makes this subject to two provisos: firstly, that 
human rights norms are paramount; and, secondly, that there operates some notion of 
proportionality, `which will balance the seriousness of the minority's interest against the 
degree of disruption the accommodation will cause'. Lustgarten adds that he `would 
equally insist on the principle that each individual retains the right of self-definition 
about group membership or identity'. 
The above aims of equality policies correspond with the models of anti 
discrimination law which we have described and can be seen as a good summary 
thereof. The first aim covers the formal equality model and goes some way towards the 
equality of opportunity model. The second aim covers the equality of results model, 
while the third aim corresponds with the pluralist model. The provisos show that 
Lustgarten also accepts limits on cultural diversity. 
The British Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 warrants a mention because 
it appears to have elements of each of our models. The Act was the result of the 
recommendations made in the MacPherson Report, 88 which, as mentioned in Chapter 1, 
found the Metropolitan Police institutionally racist. The Report led to a large number of 
88 The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Report of an Inquiry by Sir William MacPherson of Cluny, (Cmnd 
4262-I, 1999). 
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recommendations, aimed not only at the police, but also the legal system, public 
administration, the NHS and schools. The aim was to develop a zero tolerance policy 
against racism. This can be seen as a plea for a more culture sensitive service provision 
by these institutions. 
The 2000 Act places a general duty on public authorities, in performing their 
public functions, to `have due regard to the need- (a) to eliminate unlawful racial 
discrimination; and (b) to promote equality of opportunity and good relations between 
persons of different racial groups'. 89 The Act contains a very wide list of public 
authorities caught by the duty. The elimination of racial discrimination includes fighting 
discrimination and unequal treatment, as in the equal treatment model. The promotion 
of equality of opportunity hints at a more substantive equality model, while the 
promotion of `good relations between different racial groups' can be seen as a duty to 
work towards promoting tolerance and respect, as in the pluralist model. The duty also 
means a move away from an individual model of justice which depends on individual 
complaints and can be seen as a move towards mainstreaming equality of opportunity 
and good relations. However, the way the Act is worded: `to have due regard to the 
need to' is a rather weak interpretation of the recommendations of the MacPherson 
Report. 
In this Chapter we have shown that all four models have advantages and 
disadvantages and that all models have been used in some form of legislation. It will be 
clear that the models overlap and that one cannot always draw a clear dividing line 
between them. Anti discrimination legislation can also contain elements from more than 
one model. Which model(s) of anti discrimination law is chosen is ultimately a political 
choice. If this is kept in mind, the models will be useful tools in analysing and 
evaluating measures against racial discrimination in the following Chapters. 
89 See new Section 71 of the Race Relations Act 1976. 
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CHAPTER 3- EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI DISCRIMINATION LAW 
1 Introduction 
In the previous Chapter we distinguished four models of anti discrimination legislation 
based on the type of equality these laws aim to establish and saw that anti 
discrimination legislation based on all four types exists. In fact, there are numerous 
national and international legal provisions against discrimination on a varied number of 
grounds, following any one or more of the four models. ' International instruments at 
European level2 and world level3 contain duties for states to take legislative measures in 
their national law. The European Equality Directives, for example, have to be 
implemented into the national law of the EU Member States. Article 4 of the ICERD 
prescribes criminal law measures, while Article 6 puts a duty on state parties to provide 
effective remedies through tribunals. Article 2(1)(d) ICERD and Articles 2(a), (b) and 
(c), 3 and 6 CEDAW require states to take `all appropriate measures, including 
legislation'. And Article 26 ICCPR determines that `... the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination ... '. 
Behind all these measures there must be a presumption that legislative rules 
against discrimination are useful, effective and/or necessary in the fight against 
discrimination; if they were not, for one reason or another, legislators would obviously 
not enact such measures. But is it really the case that states can reduce or eliminate 
discrimination through legal measures? Some people argue that anti discrimination 
laws, for a number of reasons, are of no use at all and do, in fact, more harm than good 
1 Examples of laws at national level: the Dutch General Equal Treatment Act, the Constitution of India, 
the British Sex Discrimination Act and Race Relations Act, the South African Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act and the US Civil Rights Act. 
2 At the European Union level, there are the Equal Treatment, Race, Framework, Equal Treatment 
(Amendment) and Equal Treatment (Goods) Directives. The term 'European Equality Directives' will 
be used to refer to these Directives together. 
3 For example: the ICERD, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) and the ICCPR. 
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and that, therefore, these laws should be abolished. In this Chapter we examine the 
arguments, both for and against legislation, brought forward in the literature and we 
attempt to answer the question whether law is a useful tool to combat discrimination. A 
related question that will be discussed for each argument is whether, looking at the 
models developed in the previous Chapter, the argument is stronger in relation to 
legislation applying one model than in relation to legislation applying another model. A 
third point of discussion relates to research into the need for and the effectiveness of 
anti discrimination legislation in general or of legislation seeking to pursue any one of 
the models distinguished. 
Before we go over to a discussion of the arguments for and against legislation, 
two points need to be made. Firstly, legislation against race discrimination seeks to 
make considerations based on race irrelevant, but by doing so, it necessarily puts people 
into racial groups, and thus it reinforces and entrenches the very characteristic it seeks 
to eliminate. It also raises the question of how one can legislate against discrimination 
on the ground of race, when different races do not exist. The Race Directive, the ICERD 
and ECRI General Policy Recommendation 7 have solved this problem by including a 
statement rejecting theories based on the existence of different human races. 
And, secondly, the term legislation against discrimination has so far been used 
in general, without distinguishing between different types of law. But a prohibition on 
discrimination can be laid down in a state's constitution, its civil law or its criminal law. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, many national Constitutions state that everyone is equal 
before the law and has the right to equal protection of the law without discrimination. 
An example of a Constitutional provision can be found in Article 15 of the Constitution 
of India which prohibits discrimination in public areas on grounds of religion, race, 
4 Recital 6 Race Directive, Preamble ICERD and European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance, General Policy Recommendation 7, On National Legislation to Combat Racism and 
Racial Discrimination CRI (2003) 8 (2003 Strasbourg: Council of Europe), footnote to para 1, 
Definitions. We will come back to these statements in Chapters 4 and 5. 
95 
caste, sex or place of birth. Section 201(a) of the American Civil Rights Act 1964 is an 
example of a civil law prohibition. It determines that: 
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, and privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the 
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. 
Another example is Section 1 of the British Race Relations Act 1976, which declares 
that a person discriminates against another person when he/she treats him/her less 
favourably than another person on racial grounds. 
Many countries have chosen to prohibit discrimination by making it a criminal 
offence in their criminal code. For example, both the Penal Codes of Luxembourg 
(Article 455) and Finland (Chapter 47, Section 3) make employment discrimination on a 
wide range of grounds a criminal offence. It must be noted that constitutional, civil and 
criminal law provisions against discrimination can, and often do, exist at the same time. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to using either criminal or civil law. 
Using criminal law has a very strong symbolic effect (see below), as it raises the 
awareness of society as to the seriousness of discrimination. Penal sanctions can have 
strong dissuasive powers. On the other hand, victims of discrimination might not be 
satisfied or compensated by a criminal prosecution of the perpetrator. Instead, civil 
proceedings may facilitate the victim's recourse to legal action, as they are usually more 
flexible and as he/she can instigate such proceedings him/herself. It is also easier to 
prove discrimination in civil proceedings as the level of proof needed is lighter than it is 
in criminal proceedings and the latter require proof of intent to discriminate. 
The EU Race Directive does not specify which type of law - civil or criminal - 
the Member States should use to implement its provisions. However, it can be argued 
that criminal law is not suited to deal with indirect discrimination, as intent to 
discriminate needs to be proven in criminal proceedings. For a criminal conviction, 
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`mens rea' -a guilty mind - of the perpetrator is required, while indirect discrimination 
is, by its nature, more often than not unintentional. It is suggested that a combination of 
both civil and criminal laws, possibly backed up by a constitutional guarantee, might 
well be most effective in the fight against racism and racial discrimination, with civil 
laws prohibiting direct and indirect discrimination in a number of areas and criminal 
laws penalising acts like incitement to racial hatred, public insults and threats for racist 
purposes, public disseminating of racist material or supporting of or taking part in racist 
or xenophobic groups and/or providing for enhancement of penalties for crimes 
committed with racist motives. 5 It must be kept in mind, that the Race Directive does 
not prescribe criminal law measures like the ones mentioned above. The Race Directive 
was adopted under Article 13 EC, and this Article does not give the EU the competence 
to do so. 6 
In the following discussion, differentiation between the different types of law 
will be made where necessary. Where no differentiation has been made, the argument 
can be seen as valid for laws of any type. 
2 Arguments for and against Anti Discrimination Legislation 
The following arguments for/against anti discrimination laws are most often 
encountered. It should be pointed out that these arguments apply to discrimination on all 
kinds of different grounds, although some arguments will be stronger in relation to 
some forms of discrimination than in relation to others. The quotes used may relate to 
discrimination in general or to one or more specific forms. A second point to be noted is 
that the arguments overlap and are related to each other and that one cannot always 
$ For example: in Britain, the (civil) Race Relations Act 1976 (Section 1(1)) prohibits direct and 
indirect discrimination; while the Public Order Act 1986 (Sections 18-23) makes incitement to racial 
hatred a criminal offence and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Sections 28-33) provides for higher 
penalties for `racially motivated' crimes. 
6 The fight against racism in criminal law falls under Article 29 TEU. On the basis of this Article, the 
EU Commission presented, in 2001, a Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating 
Racism and Xenophobia (COM (2001) 644) which has yet to be adopted. This proposal will be 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
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make a clear distinction between them. A third point is that some of the arguments 
might be stronger for legislation based on one model of anti discrimination legislation 
than on another, and, where this is the case, it will be discussed. 
2.1 Clear Statement of Public Policy 
Anti discrimination measures make a clear statement of public policy, of commitment to 
curb discrimination. In the words of the British Race Relations Board, `a law is an 
unequivocal declaration of public policy'. 7 These laws have, therefore, a declaratory 
function, making a declaration of firm opposition to discriminatory behaviour and of the 
intention of the state to act against this. A Council of Europe Report similarly stated that 
`the very existence of a law has a declaratory effect whose importance should not be 
minimised'. 8 This function of anti discrimination law has also been described as its 
symbolic function. By enacting anti discrimination legislation, the state `makes a legal 
statement prohibiting discrimination as wrong'. 9 Through the law, a state sets standards 
to be observed by everyone. It sends clear signals about what is regarded as acceptable 
or unacceptable, to both its citizens and the outside world. The European Commission 
wrote: 10 
The adoption of Community law in this field [discrimination on the grounds of racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation] will constitute an 
unequivocal statement of public policy leaving no doubts as to the stance which European 
society has adopted towards discriminatory practices. 
The symbolic value of criminal legislation against discrimination may be even stronger 
than that of civil law because, by making discrimination a criminal offence, a state 
emphasises that discrimination is wrong and will be penalised. 
Report of the Race Relations Board 1966-1967 (1967 London: HMSO), para 65. This is the first of 
five principles summarising the role of anti discrimination law. The Race Relations Board was created 
by the British Race Relations Act 1965 and was later replaced by the Commission for Racial Equality. 
8 Council of Europe, Final report of the Community Relations Project "Community and Ethnic 
Relations in Europe" MG-CR (91) 1 Final E (1991 Strasbourg: Council of Europe), para 120. 
9 O'Donovan, Katherine and Szyszczak, Erika, Equality and Sex Discrimination Law (1988 Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell), at 12. 
10 COM (1999) 565, Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for the Framework Directive at 5. 
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However, it has been argued that the statement might be a hollow statement, 
which a state uses to show it is willing to combat discrimination without actually doing 
anything. It can be used to hide behind and to avoid making other commitments. 
Lustgarten" concludes his article, in which he discusses the effects of the Race 
Relations Acts in Britain, as follows: 
It is impossible to say whether the preference for a legal approach was based upon an 
exaggerated faith in the efficacy of the law; or the need, for political reasons, to be seen to 
do something highly visible, such as enacting a statute; or was a conscious alternative to 
taking on a wider long-term expensive and controversial commitment. It does seem 
tolerably clear, however, that continued reliance on the legal approach in the future will 
signal a decision that racial equality has been accorded low priority, and perhaps also that 
greater importance has been accorded to being seen to be doing something rather than 
actually doing it. 
MacEwen12 writes that states may provide anti discrimination legislation because they 
may want to `look good'. States are frequently concerned about their own public image and 
will go to some lengths to avoid being categorised as racist, xenophobic or exploitative.... 
but the legislation will often lack the necessary teeth to secure compliance. 
This public image is important at both national and international level. Alibhai-Brown13 
writes that many black and Asian people in Britain feel: 
that the lame law [Race Relations Act 1976] simply piles up promises and expectations, 
that it is failing to deliver and - worse - that it gives the Government a convenient exit 
when it is called upon to show that it is committed to the eradication of racism in Britain. 
Anti discrimination legislation can, therefore, be a symbol and make a statement of 
intent, but this might be all it is, a hollow statement, made to be seen to be doing 
Lustgarten, Laurence, "Racial Inequality and the Limits of Law" 49, Modern Law Review 68-85 
(1986), at 84-5. 
'Z MacEwen, Martin, Tackling Racism in Europe: An Examination of Anti-Discrimination Law in 
Practice (1995 Oxford and Washington: Berg), at 26. 
13 Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin, "Race Relations in New Britain" in: Anwar, Muhammad, Roach, Patrick and 
Sondhi, Ranjit, (eds. ), From Legislation to Integration? Race Relations in Britain (2000 
Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press) 178-95, at 188. 
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something rather than actually doing anything to turn this intent into action. Either way, 
this symbolic function exists: whether it is as a symbol of a genuine commitment or as a 
hollow statement made for political reasons, such legislation makes a declaration. Anti 
discrimination legislation based on any of the four models can make a statement of 
intent, whether this is hollow or not. '4 
This symbolic value should not be underestimated: the fact that so many laws 
against discrimination exist at national and international level indicates that 
discrimination is widely considered to be wrong, otherwise there need not be a law 
against it. This can be further illustrated by looking at the symbolic effect that 
abolishing such laws would have. Would repealing existing laws against discrimination, 
even if this would not actually be a breach of a state's obligations under international or 
European law, not send out a dangerous message: that it is all right to discriminate 
against women, ethnic, racial, national or religious groups, minorities, disabled people, 
homosexuals, old or young people and people who hold different (political) opinions? 
2.2 Protection of Victims 
Anti discrimination legislation protects people who suffer discrimination and provides 
them with a form of redress. However, we must make a distinction between criminal 
and civil measures here. Both protect people who suffer discrimination, because they 
provide sanctions against discriminators. But the redress for victims is different. Civil 
laws usually provide that victims can start court proceedings against the discriminator 
and ask for compensation (in whatever form) for the wrong done. Criminal proceedings 
are usually instigated by the state and the offender is punished for breaking the law. 
Victims are not always able to claim compensation, although sometimes, depending on 
the legal system, victims can join criminal proceedings and request compensation. If the 
14 On the symbolic value of the Race Directive see Howard, Erica, "The EU Race Directive: Its 
Symbolic Value - Its Only Value? " 6,2, International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 141-63 
(2004). 
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state does not prosecute the discriminator, victims might not have a way of getting 
satisfaction. So, criminal laws do not always provide remedies or a form of redress for 
victims. On the other hand, criminal laws might have a stronger dissuasive effect: a 
person might be more reluctant to discriminate if he/she faces a criminal conviction and 
criminal sanctions than if he/she faces civil sanctions. Therefore, both civil and criminal 
laws against discrimination provide protection for victims, but in different ways. As 
criminal laws do not always provide for redress or remedies for victims, the following 
arguments, where they relate to these, are stronger in relation to civil laws against 
discrimination. 
By giving protection and redress, the legislation provides a way of settling 
grievances. Such laws make people of minority groups more self-confident and 
assertive by reassuring them that discrimination is taken seriously and by giving them a 
means to fight back. They give sufferers recourse to legal action against discrimination. 
In the words of the Race Relations Board, `a law gives protection and redress to 
minority groups; a law thus provides for the peaceful and orderly adjustment of 
grievances and the release of tensions'. 15 The Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Proposal for the Race Directive stresses both this and the previous point where it states: 
The law not only protects victims and gives them a remedy, but also demonstrates society's 
firm opposition to racism and the genuine commitment of the authorities to curb 
discrimination. 16 
However, the argument that law protects people against discrimination and provides 
them with a form of redress will only be true if the law has `the necessary teeth to 
ensure compliance' and the redress is sufficiently and easily available. Victims of 
discrimination should have easy recourse to the courts and remedies should be adequate, 
otherwise `peaceful and orderly adjustment of grievances' will not take place. Sanctions 
15 Supra note 7. The Race Relations Board mentions this as two principles, but, as they are closely 
connected, I will discuss them as part of the same argument. 
16 COM (1999) 566, at 1. 
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should be `effective, proportionate and dissuasive'. 17 This is not always the case. The 
legislation against discrimination in many countries has been criticised for providing 
insufficient access to courts and/or inadequate remedies or sanctions, in other words, for 
not having `the necessary teeth'. If the legislation does not give victims easy and 
adequate access to courts or tribunals, if it is not followed up by action to ensure proper 
implementation and enforcement, then, in this sense too, it is a hollow statement, which 
only appears to give protection to victims. The same can be argued in relation to 
criminal laws against discrimination: if the state does not prosecute people who 
discriminate or if the penalties handed out in such prosecutions are too lenient, then the 
law will not be effective in protecting victims, because it does not deter people from 
discriminating. Such (civil or criminal) legislation makes it look as if the state is doing 
something for victims, but it is not actually doing anything. The state could thus, as we 
have seen, use the legislation as an excuse for not making further commitments. And 
not only the state could use this excuse, as is clear from the following quote from 
Lacey: 18 
... many 
feminists see the `equality' legislation as a sop intended to promote false 
consciousness; it makes women feel that things are getting better or enables men to resist 
women's further claims, while actually making no real contribution to the dismantling of 
sexism in our society. 
On top of that, a major point of criticism against much existing anti discrimination 
legislation is that the legal system is not suited to fight discrimination because of its 
often complicated and very individual-oriented character. For example, the anti 
discrimination laws in Britain have been criticised because of their incoherence and 
complexity, the weak and limited remedies they provide, the gaps they leave and their 
17 Articles 15 Race, 17 Framework, 8d Equal Treatment (Amendment) and 14 Equal Treatment (Goods) 
Directives. 
18 Lacey, Nicola, "Legislation Against Sex Discrimination: Questions from a Feminist Perspective" 14, 
4, Journal of Law and Society 411-21 (1987), at 418. 
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ineffective enforcement. 19 The individual-oriented character of law is also seen as 
limiting the effectiveness of legislation against discrimination. This character can be 
seen in the fact that many laws prohibiting discriminatory behaviour need an individual 
victim of the behaviour to bring a complaint against an individual perpetrator. If there is 
no victim, who should complain? If there is no perpetrator, who should be held 
responsible and thus be liable for the damage done? The focus on the individual plays a 
role in the available remedies and sanctions as well: the individual victim is 
compensated by the perpetrator (the wrong-doer) for the wrong done. This does not 
necessarily stop the perpetrator from doing the wrong again, to the same victim or to 
another person. It also does not change the disadvantaged position that a minority group 
occupies in society. So, in the end, it does not make the position of potential victims any 
better, it just provides one victim with some compensation. As Lustgarten20 writes, 
`racial disadvantage in the fullest sense is outside the law entirely. ... The reason the 
law cannot extend to racial disadvantage is that nj one-is-formally responsible'. 
Townshend-Smith21 sums up the `unfortunate consequences' of the view that the law's 
function is to compensate victims of wrongdoing: 
First, the political association of anti-discrimination law with wrongdoing is so strong that 
defendants resist all efforts to have them classified in this way, and this may hinder the 
promotion of out-of-court settlements with the potential to improve the position of 
disadvantaged groups. Secondly, the levels of compensation awarded are unlikely in most 
cases to be sufficient to act as a deterrent against repetition of such behaviour. Thirdly, ... 
the assumption is that there is no entitlement to a remedy unless the claimant can prove that 
measurable financial loss has been suffered. 
A legal system based on the principle of `compensatory justice', where the question is 
whether `an identifiable actor has harmed an identifiable person in an identifiable way' 
19 Hepple, Bob, Lester, Lord Anthony, Ellis, Evelyn, Rose, Dinah and Singh, Rabinder, Improving 
Equality Law: The Options (1997 London: JUSTICE), at 6-10. 
20 Supra note 11, at 72. 
2t Townshend-Smith, Richard, Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (1998 London: 
Cavendish Publishing), at 78-9. 
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is `ill-suited to the problem of discrimination ... '22 Therefore, individual based 
legislation, with an individual victim and an individual wrong-doer, who can be held 
responsible for his wrongdoing and thus has to pay the victim for the financial loss the 
latter has suffered, is seen as unsuited to fight discrimination and thus as not giving 
appropriate protection to victims, because, as Lustgarten23 writes: 
By definition, discrimination is the antithesis of individualised decision. A person is ill- 
treated, or shares some social circumstances, because of his involuntary membership of a 
group. There is therefore a collective dimension to every discrimination case which it is 
difficult to fit within the traditional processes of law. 
In criminal law, an individual wrongdoer needs to be identified and proof is required of 
the wrongdoing and of the intent of the perpetrator. Without these, a criminal 
prosecution would not succeed. 
This poses the question whether anti discrimination legislation per se cannot 
provide protection and redress to victims, or whether individual-based legislation is not 
able to do so effectively? Could the law be adapted and/or improved to deal with 
discrimination in a better way? The individual focus could just be a defect of much 
existing anti discrimination legislation or of the fact that the legal system in which they 
are enacted is an individual-oriented system, rather than an inherent flaw of all such 
legislation. 
In Chapter 2, the focus on an individual model of justice, where the individual is 
central within enforcement procedures and remedies, was mentioned as one of the 
problems with anti discrimination legislation within the equal treatment model. Both 
substantive models and the pluralist model are more sensitive to the group aspects of 
discrimination and the disadvantages groups have suffered because of past 
discrimination. Therefore, legislation in the substantive and pluralist models might not 
ZZ Sunstein, Cass, "Three Civil Rights Fallacies" 79,1-3, California Law Review 751-74 (1991), at 762- 
3. 
23 Supra note 11, at 73. 
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be so individual-based, and could focus more on a group-sensitive model of justice. 
However, this depends on what the legislation itself provides for and on the legal 
system in which it operates. 
The focus of anti discrimination legislation could be shifted away from the 
individual claimant by allowing group claims to be made. This could be done in 
different ways. The law could allow representative actions, where people with a 
common grievance can be represented by one or more of their number. These 
representatives bring proceedings on behalf of the whole group. Another way is 
providing for class actions, like the law in the United States does. This is an action on 
behalf of a number of plaintiffs, against a common defendant. The advantage of this is 
that the burden is shared and if the action is successful, all will benefit. But, these 
actions are binding on all members of the class, who are therefore banned from bringing 
an individual claim. The US Supreme Court has therefore determined that plaintiffs 
should take steps to notify other members of the class of the action. Court and tribunal 
rules might have to be changed to accommodate such actions and to provide for 
remedies for all people shown to be affected. The latter is important, because it makes 
discriminatory behaviour expensive: an employer has to pay compensation to all those 
within the group or class rather than just to an individual or a few individuals who have 
brought the case. 24 
Another way of moving the focus away from the individual claimant would be 
to allow for public interest litigation. Such litigation is allowed in India for the 
protection of the public interest, and can be used in case of, for example, violations of 
religious or other basic human rights. Any person can file a case against the state or a 
local authority on behalf of a group of persons whose rights are affected. 
24 See on this Lustgarten, supra note 11, at 73-4. 
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Allowing for group or class actions or for public interest litigation would fit in 
the more group-focused substantive and pluralist models of anti discrimination law, but 
could also fit in the equal treatment model. A whole group could complain or one 
person could complain on behalf of a whole group that each of them has been treated 
less favourably than another person or group of persons. 
The problem of the focus on wrongdoing by an individual, on the need for an 
individual perpetrator, could be solved by legislation which imposes positive action 
measures and positive duties to promote equality. However, firstly, this would not be 
possible in criminal law, as this needs an individual wrongdoer, who can be penalised; 
and, secondly, this would not fit in a pure equal treatment model of anti discrimination 
law because, as we saw in Chapter 2 the prohibition of unequal treatment needs an 
individual perpetrator and because preferential treatment involves unequal treatment. 
Positive action measures fit in the other three models, as they take account of the 
disadvantage suffered by some groups because of past discrimination. Positive duties 
are described by Fredman25 as being proactive rather than reactive. She mentions a 
number of such positive duties: the policy of mainstreaming gender equality adopted by 
the EU, which means that equality `is one of the factors taken into account in every 
policy and executive decision'; the `duty on employers to take measures to achieve fair 
participation of Protestants and Roman Catholic employees in their workforces', that 
exists in Northern Ireland; 
26 and, duties on public bodies, like the duty on public 
authorities in Northern Ireland to have `due regard to the need to promote equality of 
opportunity' in carrying out all their functions27 and the general statutory duty on public 
authorities to `have due regard to the need- (a) to eliminate unlawful discrimination; and 
25 Fredman, Sandra, Discrimination Law (2002 Oxford: Oxford University Press), at 176-7. 
26 Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, Section 4. 
27 Northern Ireland Act 1998, Section 75. 
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(b) to promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different 
racial groups', introduced by the British Race Relations (Amendment) Act 200028 
Legislation based on the two substantive models and on the pluralist model 
could prescribe positive duties and positive action and provide for sanctions if these 
obligations are not fulfilled. Legislation prohibiting unequal treatment could be 
combined with legislation prescribing a policy of mainstreaming and/or with legislation 
imposing a positive duty or all these could be provided for in one law. All this illustrates 
clearly, firstly, that an anti discrimination law can, and often does, contain aspects of 
more than one model; and, secondly, that civil or criminal laws prohibiting 
discrimination can be combined with laws providing for positive duties. 
The focus on compensation as remedy could be solved by providing other 
remedies in the anti discrimination legislation itself, especially forward looking ones, 
like orders to change discriminatory policies or practices or to draw up equality 
schemes; contract compliance or withholding of licences; and, the setting of quotas or 
targets. It must be noted, that anti discrimination measures themselves often do not 
mention the remedies or sanctions that can be imposed when the law is broken. When 
this is left out, the normal sanctions and remedies made available in the legal system in 
which the legislation exists can be assumed to apply. Legislation based on all four 
models, but especially legislation based on the equal treatment model, could provide for 
compensation (for damages and for injury to feelings) and orders to stop the 
discriminatory practice. Contract compliance measures would fit better in the 
substantive and pluralist models. Legislation setting quotas and targets would be based 
on the equality of results or the pluralist model. In some cases, criminal sanctions might 
also be applicable via the general criminal law system. 
28 Race Relations Act 1976, Section 71(1) (as amended). See also the conclusion of Chapter 2. This Act 
gives the Home Secretary the power to impose specific duties on listed public authorities. The Race 
Relations Act 1976 (Statutory Duties) Order 2001 imposes duties on public bodies to prepare and 
publish a race equality scheme or race equality policy, which includes monitoring its policies for any 
adverse impact on the promotion of race equality. 
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2.3 Reduction of Prejudice and Change of Attitudes 
Legislation against discrimination can reduce prejudice by prohibiting behaviour in 
which prejudice is expressed; it can have an important educational and persuasive 
function, teaching people that discrimination is wrong. It can thus help create conditions 
in society which favour the growth of tolerance. Again, in the words of the Race 
Relations Board: `a law reduces prejudice by discouraging the behaviour in which 
prejudice finds expression'. 29 The 1967 UNESCO Statement on Race and Racial 
Prejudice states: 
Law is among the most important means of ensuring equality between individuals and one 
of the most effective means of fighting racism. ... 
It is not claimed that legislation can 
immediately eliminate prejudice. Nevertheless, by being a means of protecting the victims 
of acts based upon prejudice, and by setting a moral example backed by the dignity of the 
courts, it can, in the long run, even change attitudes. 
30 
Anti discrimination legislation can also act as a deterrent. As already mentioned, 
criminal laws could have a stronger deterrent or dissuasive effect than civil laws, but 
both will act in this way. Lord Lester writes that `no law can restrain the determined 
law breaker, ' but that `it is aimed at the great majority of the community who are 
ordinarily law-abiding'. He quotes from Allport, that the law: 
will not deter the compulsive bigot or demagogue. But neither do laws against arson deter 
the pyromaniac. Laws ... restrain the middle range of mortals as a mentor 
in moulding their 
habits. 31 
This view - that laws can help to reduce prejudice and change attitudes and behaviour - 
has been expressed within Europe as well. The European Commission considers that the 
experience of the Community in combating gender discrimination has shown that 
29 Supra note 7. 
30 UNESCO Four Statements on the Race Question (1969 Paris: UNESCO), at 54-5 < 
http: //unesdoc. une sco. oryJimaaes/0012/001229/ 122962eo. ndf 
31 Lester of Herne Hill, Lord Anthony, "Equality and United Kingdom Law: Past Present and Future" 
Public Law 77-96 (2001), at 84. 
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`legislation to outlaw discrimination is an essential part of an effective strategy to 
change attitudes and behaviour ... '. 
32 And the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Proposal for the Race Directive states that `the enforcement of anti-racist laws can have 
a significant effect on the shaping of attitudes'. 33 The European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), a Council of Europe body monitoring racism and racial 
discrimination, states its conviction that: 
the action of the State legislator against racism and racial discrimination also plays an 
educative function within society, transmitting the powerful message that no attempts to 
legitimise racism or racial discrimination will be tolerated in a society ruled by law. 34 
The argument that legislation against discrimination can influence behaviour and 
change attitudes is probably the most contested of the arguments given. The opposite 
opinion, that laws cannot change attitudes at all, that they cannot change the way people 
think, has been voiced as well. It can be argued that anti discrimination laws ultimately 
aim to transform society; because their aim is to stop people discriminating, this aim is, 
by its nature, to change behaviour and attitudes and ultimately to transform society into 
a discrimination free society. However, many writers are doubtful about such laws 
being able to do so. They consider anti discrimination legislation of limited impact, 
because law is not suited to change attitudes and reduce or remove prejudice. Hepple 
discusses the lack of social change that the British Race Relations Acts have brought. 35 
He writes that law is more likely to be effective in facilitating action which people want 
to take than in creating new rights to protect weaker parties. That is why law, especially 
where the long-term aim is to alter entrenched attitudes and behaviour, is not often 
effective as an instrument of social change. Hepple gives two reasons for this: firstly, 
32 COM (1999) 564, Communication from the Commission on Certain Community Measures to Combat 
Discrimination, at 7. 33 Supra note 16, at 1. 
34 ECRI, General Policy Recommendation 7, supra note 4, at 8. 35 Hepple, Bob, "Have Twenty Five Years of the Race Relations Acts in Britain been a Failure? " in: 
Hepple, Bob and Szyszczak, Erika, (eds. ), Discrimination: The Limits of Law (1992 London: Mansell) 
19-34, at 19-21. 
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the `cycle of disadvantage' in which second and later generations of ethnic minorities 
are trapped cannot itself be brought within the scope of the law. This is a similar 
argument to that of Lustgarten: that `racial disadvantage in the fullest sense is outside 
the law entirely'. 36 Secondly, the law is directed at only one element in the many causes 
of disadvantage, namely `discrimination'; in other words, the focus of the law is too 
narrow. 
But are Hepple and Lustgarten writing about legislation based on a specific 
model? Could it be that they only look at legislation based on the equal treatment 
model? The substantive models aim to take the `cycle of disadvantage' into account and 
try to make up for this disadvantage by providing for positive action measures or 
preferential treatment of the previously disadvantaged group. Are laws based on both 
the substantive models perhaps better suited to change attitudes and behaviour? We will 
come back to this later. 
Another writer who argues that laws, including anti discrimination laws, cannot 
change inner attitudes or transform society is Allott 37 He writes that the legislator 
becomes a social engineer who tries to bring about an immediate and major change in 
human relationships. The problem is that the legislator cannot change the inner man; he 
must direct his action to external behaviour. According to Allott, social transformation 
through law contains the seeds of resistance against itself. The social transformer has no 
time, is unwilling to resort to persuasion, displays no responsiveness to people's 
feelings and desires and is not prepared to make any accommodations. All of these are 
essential ingredients of a successful attempt to cause people to change voluntarily and 
effectively. Because of this, such laws can actually create strong resentment, especially 
if they are using criminal sanctions. Such legislation can only touch on the exterior 
behaviour, but repression of undesired action by (criminal) law does not necessarily 
36 Supra note 11, at 73. 
37 Allott, Antony, Limits of Law (1980 London: Butterworth), 161-237. 
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change the inner attitude. The resentment that such laws can create could even harden 
people's feelings against certain groups. 
Therefore, laws against discrimination can have a deterrent effect in that they 
can stop people discriminating or behaving in a discriminatory way, but they might not 
touch people's inner feelings and prejudices. They could actually make these prejudices 
go `underground' and strengthen them. It appears that Allott argues that laws that aim to 
transform society try to push this change through too quickly and with too much force. 
To persuade people to comply with such laws, strong sanctions are needed. But if the 
legislator tries to change attitudes and prejudices in society too quickly by heavy- 
handed measures, people will react against this. Resentment and bad feelings against 
certain groups which the law is trying to protect would result. 
However, Allott38 does admit that there can be change over time, but suggests 
that in such cases `it is not the law which changes attitudes so much as the 
accompanying education and persuasion'. He also expresses as his personal view `that 
the elaborate structure of anti discrimination legislation is misconceived and self- 
defeating. Much simpler and less ambitious laws would in the long run stand a greater 
chance of success'. This does suggest that Allott does not rule out the possibility that 
law could be effective. 
It is submitted, that anti discrimination laws based on all four models can help in 
changing people's attitudes, but this cannot and will not be done overnight. It is a slow 
and long-term process. Laws may, in the short term, change people's behaviour. In the 
longer term, however, this changed behaviour may become a habit and may be seen as 
the normal behaviour in society. This will then lead to changes in the attitudes behind 
the behaviour. As the quote from the UNESCO Statement on Race and Racial 
Prejudice, states, `it is not claimed that legislation can immediately eliminate prejudice. 
38 Ibid. at 236. 
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Nevertheless ... 
it can, in the long run, even change attitudes'. 39 Banton4° expresses the 
same: 
It is sometimes said that the suppression of discrimination does not eradicate sentiments of 
prejudice in the minds of the discriminators, but there is good reason to believe that much 
expressed prejudice is to be understood as stemming from the pressure individuals feel to 
conform to what they believe to be the social norms prevailing in the groups to which they 
belong or seek to belong. If actual patterns of behaviour are changed by legal regulation, 
this gradually changes group norms and the pressures of conformity then operate so as to 
induce people to conform to the new norms. 
Laws, including anti discrimination laws, can also create resentment. Legislation based 
on the equal treatment model might, on the one hand, appeal to people's feelings of 
justice and fairness, but on the other hand, it might create resentment because it 
influences their choice of who to do business with or who to employ. Legislation which 
allows for positive action measures, as the two substantive models do, can create 
resentment, because people who do not receive the preferential treatment feel aggrieved. 
Quota setting especially is seen as unfair and could `accentuate rather than dissipate 
racial hostility', 41 as we have seen in Chapter 2. Laws based on the pluralist model 
would specifically aim at creating tolerance, mutual respect and good relations between 
different groups in society, and thus aim for changes in attitudes and thinking. However, 
they could create resentment if some groups were given special treatment. They could 
also lead to divisiveness and a diminishing of social cohesion, which might be blamed 
on certain (minority) groups. 
The fact that laws can create resentment should not be overlooked and neither 
should the fact that sometimes there will be initial resentment, but that this will dissipate 
over time. As Cohen writes: `The experience in countries like the UK or the USA is 
39 Supra note 30. 
40 Banton, Michael, Promoting Racial Harmony (1985 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), at 130. 
41 Gregory, Jeanne, Sex, Race and the Law: Legislating for Equality (1987 London: Sage), at 64-5. 
112 
that, over time, even unwelcome laws begin to change behaviour'. 2 Ultimately, though, 
it will be a political decision: how much does the legislator want to change attitudes and 
how much (initial) resentment is he/she able and willing to put up with to reach that 
goal? 
Even if laws against discrimination cannot change attitudes and reduce prejudice 
overnight, they can have a more immediate effect by prohibiting the behaviour in which 
prejudice finds its expression. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr replied to the argument that 
laws cannot make people love each other and treat each other with dignity and respect: 
`Law can not make a man love me, but it can keep him from lynching me, and I think 
that is pretty important'. 3 By doing so, these laws might, in the longer term, reduce the 
prejudices that lie behind the behaviour. 
One more point needs to be made: it is important that any legislation - based on 
whatever model - is sufficiently funded and underpinned by enforcement mechanisms. 
If this is missing, if the legislation lacks the `necessary teeth' and is just a hollow 
statement, then the measures will be ineffective in practice and an ineffective measure 
might convince people that the object of the measure itself is not desirable. 
2.4 Reducing Barriers to Employment Participation 
By prohibiting employers to discriminate on certain grounds, laws can take away 
barriers to the participation in employment and so open up more employment 
opportunities for people who were previously disadvantaged because of discrimination. 
For example, anti race discrimination legislation prohibits employers to use racial 
stereotypes in their decisions on hiring, firing and promoting people. As Deakin44 
argues, `the non-discrimination principle has an important role to play in opening up 
42 Cohen, Barbara, "Positive Obligations: Shifting the Burden in Order to Achieve Equality" 1 Roma 
Rights Quarterly (2005), at 1. 
a' Quoted in the Wall Street Journal, 13/11/1962. 
44 Deakin, Simon, "Equality, Non-Discrimination and the Labour Market" in: Epstein, Richard, Equal 
Opportunity or More Opportunity? The Good Thing about Discrimination (2002 London: Civitas) 41- 
56, at 56. In this book, Epstein argues that anti discrimination laws do more harm than good, but 
Deakin does not agree with this 
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labour markets to disadvantaged groups'. He also writes that `legal intervention based 
on equality principles is necessary to destabilise institutionalised forms of 
discrimination which would otherwise remain well entrenched'. 5 In other words, 
without legislative intervention to stop discrimination, certain disadvantaged groups 
will not have the opportunity to participate in the labour market and thus will not have 
the opportunity to change their social position and end the `cycle of disadvantage'. 
Deakin writes this in a commentary on Epstein's argument that legislation prohibiting 
discrimination does more harm than good because it creates rather than dismantles 
barriers to fair participation in employment. Epstein46 suggests that all anti 
discrimination legislation should be scrapped and that all equality commissions 
entrusted with their enforcement should be abolished. His argument is that 
discrimination is best dealt with by the market, because legislation which interferes with 
freedom of contract in the name of equality will simply end up blocking market forces 
and making things worse. In Epstein's view, anti discrimination legislation `will make it 
harder in some cases for members of protected classes to be hired, because it is harder 
to fire them once on the job". 7 Epstein believes that, even if it takes some time before 
individual firms respond to competitive pressures, ultimately a firm's prejudices will 
rebound to harm the firm more than the people it refuses to hire. Once firms appreciate 
that not hiring blacks or women on the basis of some irrational dislike is simply not 
good business, prejudices will not last very long. 
48 It is thus better to leave the market to 
regulate itself. In other words, according to Epstein, reduction in discrimination in 
employment will happen voluntarily and legislative intervention will not be necessary 
and can even be harmful in this process. 
45 Ibid. at 52. 
46 Epstein's opinion can be found in the same book, supra note 44, at 1-41, with a short reply to Deakin 
at 57-64. 
47 Ibid. at 39. 
48 Ibid. at 20-1. 
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However, many writers do not agree that changes in discriminatory practices 
will be brought about voluntarily and, therefore, they argue that legislation is needed to 
back up voluntary activities. McCrudden49 wrote in 1983 that a decisive reason for 
taking the legislative route is that: 
there is little in the experience of the past two decades of attempting to bring about a 
reduction in discriminatory practices which gives confidence that either government, 
administrators or private businessmen will seek to bring about changes voluntarily. 
The fact that anti discrimination measures exist in many national laws, in European 
Directives and in international Treaties appears to indicate that legislators at all levels 
are also of the opinion that changes will not happen voluntarily. This can be illustrated 
with the following example: the EU did not have the competence to legislate against 
discrimination, apart from gender discrimination, until the Treaty of Amsterdam came 
into force, which established, in Article 13 EC, the EU competence to enact legislation 
against discrimination on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation. According to Duncan, 50 `the absence of a clear 
competence within the community has inhibited even those initiatives which do not 
involve legal sanctions'. 
2.5 Support for People who want to Combat Discrimination 
Anti discrimination law - both criminal and civil law - can provide support for those 
people who want to fight discrimination. It can make it easier for them not to succumb 
to social pressure to discriminate and it can strengthen them in their resolve to work 
towards the elimination of discrimination. In the words of the Race Relations Board: `a 
law gives support to those who do not wish to discriminate, but feel compelled to do so 
49 McCrudden, Christopher, "Anti-Discrimination Goals and the Legal Process" in: Glazer, Nathan and 
Young, Ken, (eds. ), Ethnic Pluralism and Public Policy (1983, Lexington, Mass/London: Lexington 
Books/Heinemann Educational) 55-74, at 58. 
50 Duncan, William, "Racism, Discrimination and Amendment of the European Community Treaty and 
the Treaty on European Union" in: Byrne, Rosemary and Duncan, William, (eds. ), Developments in 
Discrimination Law in Ireland and Europe (1997 Dublin: Irish Centre for European Law) 43-54, at 
46. 
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by social pressure' . 
51 This argument is related to the arguments that the law makes a 
declaration that discrimination and behaviour based on prejudice are wrong and gives 
victims a means of redressing that wrong. Laying down this message in law will 
encourage people who want to fight discrimination. 
In a sense, this appears to be more often a side effect of anti discrimination 
legislation than an effect that is deliberately sought, although some anti discrimination 
laws do provide support for other people than victims as well. For example, the EU 
Equality Directives provide that an instruction to discriminate against a person shall be 
deemed to be discrimination. 52 They also provide against victimisation: they put a duty 
on Member States to introduce measures `necessary to protect individuals from adverse 
treatment or adverse consequence as a reaction to a complaint or to proceedings aimed 
at enforcing compliance with the principle of equal treatment'. 53 This protects not only 
victims of discrimination, but also others who may support victims by reporting an act 
of discrimination or by acting as a witness. 54 
It can be argued that legislative measures to combat discrimination based on any 
of the four models might be useful here, as they would all provide support in one way or 
another. Another point is that this argument is based on the fact that there are social 
pressures on people to discriminate, even if they do not wish to do so. Therefore, if law 
could take away these social pressures by changing the attitudes of others in society, 
then these people would not feel under pressure. Whether laws can do so has been 
discussed above. 
51 Supra note 7. This argument can also be found in the Council of Europe Report, supra note 8, para. 
120. 
52 Articles 2(4) Race, Framework and Equal Treatment (Amendment) Directives and 4(4) Equal 
Treatment (Goods) Directive. 
53 Articles 9 Race, 11 Framework, 7 Equal Treatment (Amendment), and 10 Equal Treatment (Goods) 
Directives. 
sa See Tyson, Adam, "The Negotiation of the European Community Directive on Racial Discrimination" 
3, European Journal of Migration and Law 199-229 (2001), at 214. 
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2.6 Underpinning of other Activities 
Both civil and criminal legislation against discrimination can strengthen and underpin 
other activities; they can create a framework encouraging other developments. In their 
turn, these developments can influence and promote further legal elaboration and 
expansion. Therefore, legislative and other measures should support and complement 
each other. This argument will only be valid, however, if one accepts that anti 
discrimination legislation can be useful/effective and necessary in the fight against 
discrimination. If one rejects legislative measures in this field, then one also rejects the 
possibility that these laws support and complement other activities. 
MacEwen writes that `it is generally accepted that law alone will be inadequate 
to effect change; legislation must be integrated with complimentary policy measures'. 55 
In the proposal for the Community Action Programme, the European Commission 
considers that: 
to combat discrimination, the Community needs to use all the instruments at its disposal, in 
a co-ordinated and integrated strategy. Legislation is a key component of such a strategy, 
but it is only one component. 56 
The existence of this Action Programme, which accompanied the Race and Framework 
Directives, is recognition that legislation is only one component of action to combat 
discrimination, as a European Commission Green Paper of 200457 points out. This paper 
goes on to state that `support for a range of positive measures is also necessary in order 
to challenge discriminatory behaviour and promote a change of attitude over time'. And 
Niessen58 writes: 
55 Supra note 12, at 23. 
56 COM (1999) 567, Proposal for a Council Decision establishing a Community Action Programme to 
combat Discrimination (2001-2006), at 1. 
57 COM (2004) 379, Green Paper on Equality and Non-discrimination in an Enlarged European Union, 
at 7. 
58 Niessen, Jan, "The Further Development of European Anti-Discrimination Policies" in: Chopin, 
Isabelle and Niessen, Jan, (eds. ), The Starting Line and the Incorporation of the Racial Equality 
Directive into the National Laws of the EU Member States and Accession States (2001 
Brussels/London: Migration Policy Group/Commission for Racial Equality) 7-21, at 15. 
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Legislation is important, but it is only one of the instruments available to combat racial 
discrimination. Legislation should be embedded in a comprehensive approach that includes 
other policy measures against discrimination, the promotion of equal treatment and the 
valuing of diversity. 
A 2003 paper from the European Network against Racism59 concludes: 
Therefore, as it is recognised that using legal tools alone would be insufficient, these need 
to be complemented by a range of policies and practical strategies which can lead to more 
effective practices and satisfactory outcomes. 
Despite the fact that some writers60 express doubts about the effectiveness of anti 
discrimination legislation, many of them are also part of a wider group of writers who 
advocate a combination of legal and other measures that complement and strengthen 
each other. The following quote from MacEwen61 appears to sum up this opinion: 
... 
it is clearly optimistic to expect that an anti-discrimination law, in itself, will have 
anything other than a marginally ameliorative impact on improving the real life chances of 
black and ethnic minority communities. ... at 
best, anti-discrimination laws may provide 
protection against the worst abuses and facilitate a remedy where wrong has been 
identified. Unless they are accompanied by government policies and strategies which imbed 
the legislative provisions in a more holistic approach to discrimination, substantial change 
is unlikely to be effective. 
In other words, legislation is useful to put pressure on people not to discriminate and to 
give victims a remedy, but it is only one part of a broader strategy to combat 
discrimination and to counter inequality. It is submitted that legislation in this field - 
and this applies to legislation based on any of the four models distinguished - can 
facilitate the implementation of other policies, which, in their turn can influence 
changes and additions to the legislation. Law - be it civil or criminal or both - is thus 
59 Nickel, Rainer, Coomber, Andrea, Bell, Marc, Hutchinson, Tansy and Zahi, Karima, European 
Strategies to Combat Racism and Xenophobia as a Crime (2003 Brussels: ENAR), at 41. 
60 See, for example: Hepple, supra note 35; Lacey, supra note 18; Lustgarten, supra note 11; 
Townshend-Smith, supra note 21. 
61 MacEwen, Martin, (ed. ), Anti-Discrimination Law Enforcement: A Comparative Perspective (1997 
Aldershot: Avebury), at 10. 
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not to be seen as the only way of tackling the problem of discrimination, but as one of a 
number of different, mutually interacting strategies. 
The view that legislative measures should be taken together with other measures 
appears to be quite widespread and lies behind both the ICERD and the CEDAW. 
Article 2(1)(d) ICERD puts a duty on States to `prohibit and bring to an end, by all 
appropriate means, including legislation, as required by circumstances, racial 
discrimination by any persons, groups or organisation'. Article 2(2) mentions measures 
in the `economic, cultural and other fields'. Article 7 is interesting as well. It states: 
States Parties undertake to adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly in the field 
of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices which 
lead to racial discrimination and to promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship 
among nations and racial or ethnical groups ... 
Article 3 CEDAW prescribes that `State Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in 
the political, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including 
legislation ... ' 
Measures to combat discrimination could be taken, as Article 7 ICERD suggests, 
in the field of education, where school children could be taught about human rights and 
understanding, respect and tolerance for others; or, in the field of information and the 
media, which can be used to inform and to raise awareness about other nations and 
racial groups. In the economic and social fields, policies to attack poverty, social 
exclusion and economic and social disadvantage can be taken to help in reducing 
discrimination. 
There are, therefore, a wide range of measures in many different areas that can 
be taken to further the fight against discrimination and many different actors, such as 
politicians and political parties, educational institutions, the media, trade unions, the 
judiciary, law enforcement officials and NGOs all have a role to play. In my view, these 
measures will be more effective if underpinned by (civil and/or criminal) anti 
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discrimination legislation - based on any one or more of the four models - and such 
legislation will, in its turn, be more effective if it is supported by other measures. To 
combat discrimination and to fight against prejudice, both are equally necessary. 
3 Measuring the Effect of Anti Discrimination Law 
So far, we have discussed arguments for and against the need for and the 
usefulness/effectiveness of (civil or criminal) anti discrimination legislation. This raises 
an important question: how do we measure if such legislation is effective? Has any 
research been done into this? It should be noted that it is very difficult to measure the 
effects of legislation against discrimination, because many other factors play a role as 
well. Laws are seldom the only measures taken, and indeed should not be the only 
measures taken as we have argued, so it is difficult to determine if any improvement 
that might take place is the effect of legislation, of other measures or of both. National 
and international political, economic and social circumstances can be of influence too. 
As long as we keep this in mind, we can discuss some of the available research results. 
The research discussed is mainly based on some of the anti discrimination legislation 
used in Chapter 2 to illustrate the different models of such legislation. 
3.1 Legislation against Discrimination in General 
First of all, there are some writers who remark on the (in)effectiveness of anti 
discrimination legislation without referring to any specific research. Banton, 62 writing 
about the educational value of laws against discrimination, writes: 
In Britain, Western Europe and North-America over the past generation the movement 
against racial and sex discrimination has recorded both successes and disappointments. ... 
The mass media and the schools have taught these lessons to new generations so that now 
there is less racial prejudice amongst the young than the elderly, and less among the better 
educated. 
62 Banton, Michael, Discrimination (1994 Buckingham/Philadelphia: Open University Press), at 71. 
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The finding that young people and higher educated people appear to be more likely to 
oppose discrimination has also been found across Europe, 63 but there is no indication of 
why this is so. As the survey was done in 2002, it is highly unlikely that this is (mainly) 
due to the fact that there are now legislative measures against discrimination within the 
EU, as this legislation was adopted in 2000 and had to be implemented by the Member 
States by July 2003. It could mean, as Banton indicates, that educational and 
information campaigns are having some effect. But national legislation, where this has 
been in existence for a number of years, and international measures like the ICERD, in 
force since 1969, and the CEDAW, in force since 1981, could also have had some 
influence. 
The Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain writes in its Report: 64 
We are convinced that the Race Relations Act 1976 has had a positive effect. Together with 
the Sex Discrimination Act of the previous year ... 
it has helped to curb the worst kinds of 
discrimination in employment and the provision of services. It has also had an invaluable 
impact on the general climate of opinion. 
There are also writers who discuss research findings in relation to anti discrimination 
law, without specifying the exact laws that are researched or the precise content of these 
laws. It is therefore difficult to determine which models of anti discrimination 
legislation these laws are based on. 
Appendix 1 to the Hepple Report65 contains some findings from employer case 
studies, done in 1999, in the UK, the US and Northern Ireland. One of them is that the 
anti discrimination legislation has been the starting point for changes in practices in 
63 Eurobarometer 57.0, Special Survey, Discrimination in Europe, May 2003, at 13, < 
http"//ec europa. eu/nublic opinion/index en. htm 
`'' Parekh, Bhikhu, The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, Report of the Runnymede Trust Commission on 
the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000 London: Profile Books), at 264. 
65 Appendix 1, Hepple, Bob, Coussey, Mary and Choudbury, Tufyal, Equality: A New Framework, 
Report of the Independent Review of the Enforcement of UK Anti-Discrimination Legislation (2000 
Oxford: Hart Publishing), 115-26. 
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employment. 66 `There was general agreement by all those interviewed that the equality 
legislation had a significant effect on human resource and other practices, and, 
gradually, on attitudes', while no employer argued that the equality legislation was no 
longer necessary. 67 Everyone felt that the voluntary code of practice on age 
discrimination would be ineffective without legislation. 68 Employers in Northern 
Ireland `agreed unanimously that the Fair Employment legislation had made a 
fundamental difference to equal opportunities'. 69 The latter is, as we saw in Chapter 2, 
an example of legislation based on the equality of results model. This legislation will 
also be mentioned further below. 
Hornstein7° reports on foreign lessons about outlawing age discrimination. The 
study identified legislation against age discrimination in employment in thirteen 
countries, and looked in detail at Australia, Canada and the USA, where such legislation 
has been established for some time. The study found that `the evidence from Australia, 
Canada and the United States, though limited and uneven, shows that legislation has 
indeed made an impact on discrimination in these countries'. Evidence from the US 
shows that: 
" Age discrimination laws significantly increase employment rates of older workers. 
This is mostly due to them leaving jobs at a later age, rather than to more of them 
being hired. 
" There is some evidence that employers may be a little less likely to hire older 
workers because they are not allowed to set mandatory retirement ages. 
66 In 2.1. 
67 In 2.9. 
68 In 5.4. 
69 In 10.1. 
70 Hornstein, Zmira, (ed. ), Outlawing Age Discrimination: Foreign Lessons, UK Choices (2001 
Cambridge: Polity Press). For a summary see JRF (Joseph Rowntree Foundation) Findings, July 2001, 
Ref 711 < www. irfora. uk/ 
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* The legislation has strengthened the relationship between employees and 
employers. 71 
Evidence from Australia, Canada and the US suggests: 
" Legislation has had a marked effect on some forms of direct discrimination, for 
example in advertising vacancies or in the selection for promotion. 
" Employer behaviour has changed in countries with legislation, to the extent that 
explicit discrimination, especially in recruitment, has been reduced. However, 
society's and employers' attitudes do not yet appear to have shifted as much as 
towards groups such as women and people from minority ethnic communities, 
where legislative protection has, generally, operated for longer. [sic] Changing 
attitudes is likely to be a long-term process. 
Coussey72 has researched international comparisons in tackling inequality. She 
mentions the difficulties in making such comparisons and evaluating legislation in some 
countries because of the lack of data, but concludes that countries with comprehensive 
legal approaches and reasonable data such as the USA, Britain and the Netherlands can 
show some signs of improvement in the position of ethnic minorities. 
3.2 Legislation based on the Equal Treatment Model of Anti Discrimination Law 
Hepple writes specifically about the Race Relations Acts in Britain, which are mainly 
based on the equal treatment model. He discusses some early research findings and 
concludes: 73 
Even the severest critics of the Acts would concede that they have broken down some 
barriers for individuals in their quests for jobs, housing and services and that they have 
71 Epstein expresses the view that legislation against age discrimination has had only negative effects. 
See Epstein, supra note 44, at 18-33. 
72 Coussey, Mary, Tackling Racial Equality: International Comparisons, Home Office Research Study 
238 (2002, London: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate), at ix and 42, < 
www homeoffice. gov. uk/rds/hors2002. html 
73 Supra note 35, at 20. There have been three Race Relations Acts in Britain, in 1965,1968 and 1976. 
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driven underground those overt expressions of discrimination which were current twenty 
years ago. 
In 1999, the Equal Treatment Commission in the Netherlands evaluated the first five 
years of the Equal Treatment Act and concluded that the Act works quite well and that 
it fulfils the aim of the legislator. 74 This aim was to promote equal participation in 
society by prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political 
opinion, race, sex, nationality, sexual orientation or civil status. This Act prescribes 
equal treatment and as such is clearly based on the equal treatment model, although it 
contains some element of the substantive models, in that it allows for positive action. Its 
stated aim could be said to go some way towards the pluralist model, in that it aims to 
promote equal participation. The Report does conclude that the equal treatment process 
is far from complete: more than 25 years of the Equal Pay Act have not led to the 
elimination of all unjustified differences in pay; people of foreign origin are still less 
able to get work; and homophobic attacks still happen. Deep-seated prejudices are hard 
to eradicate and in this sense one cannot expect too much from five years of the Equal 
Treatment Act. 
The report on improving the equality laws in Britain75 considers the following: 
The problem is that despite over two decades of sex equality legislation, the majority of 
low-paid workers are still women, there is still a significant earnings gap between men and 
women, and there is a glass ceiling which keeps women out of top jobs. Twenty years after 
the Race Relations Act 1976, there is a continued gap in unemployment rates, job levels, 
earnings, household income and quality of housing between white and black citizens. While 
the situation could have been even worse had there been no legislation, the complexity and 
weak remedies of British anti discrimination have undoubtedly blunted the impact of this 
legislation. One may compare with this, the remarkable elimination of Catholic 
74 Commissie Gelijke Behandeling (Equal Treatment Commission), Gelyke Behandeling in Beweging 
Evaluatie van VyfJaarAlgemene Wet Gerke Behandeling 1994-1999 (Equal Treatment on the Move 
Evaluation of Five Years of the Equal Treatment Act 1994-1999), at 58-9. Available in Dutch < 
www. cgb. nl 
75 Supra note 19, at 5. 
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underrepresentation in the top two standard occupational classifications in Northern Ireland 
since the passage of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1989, which is much 
stronger than the Sex Discrimination and Race Relations Acts. 
This indicates that the authors of the report view the Fair Employment legislation in 
Northern Ireland, which is legislation based on the equality of results model, as more 
successful than the British equality legislation, which is mainly based on the equal 
treatment model. The report continues that `the UK needs effective legislation to 
promote genuine equality of opportunity on the basis of individual merit'. Such 
legislation would fit with the equality of opportunity model. 
3.3 Legislation based on the Equality of Opportunity Model ofAnti Discrimination 
Law 
Research from the British Equal Opportunities Commission showed that overall, most 
senior decision makers - defined as MPs, MEPs, Life Peers and Political Advisers - felt 
that it is better to rely on legislation than on voluntary codes of practice in terms of 
equal opportunities. 76 
It should be noted that some of the laws mentioned under the previous headings, 
like the legislation discussed in the 2000 Hepple Report and the Dutch Equal Treatment 
Act, contain elements of the equality of opportunity model. The same can probably be 
said for the legislation Hornstein and Coussey discuss. The legislation discussed under 
the following heading might also fall partly into the equality of opportunity model; as 
we have seen, the distinction between the two substantive models is not always clear cut 
and obvious. 
76 Equal Opportunities Commission, Senior Decision Makers and Awareness of Gender Equality, EOC 
Research Findings, 1999, < www. eoc. org. uk/rdf/senior decision makers findings pdf 
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3.4 Legislation based on the Equality of Results Model ofAnti Discrimination Law 
Leck and Saunders77 write about the effects of Canada's Employment Equity Act on the 
hiring of women. The Act is designed to increase the presence of four traditionally 
underrepresented groups: women, aboriginal peoples, disabled persons, and visible 
minorities. They conclude that `the current study suggests that EEPs [Employment 
Equity Plans] do have an impact on the hiring of women, and that without these 
programs, employment equity would be less likely'. 
In Chapter 2, we mentioned the Constitution of India. Article 15(3) and (4) 
provide that positive measures can be taken for women and children and for the 
advancement of backward classes or Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. Article 
16(4) provides: 
Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation 
of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens, which, in the opinion 
of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. 
This is clearly a measure based on the equality of results model. Menski writes that, 
despite this policy, `significant inequalities, strengthened by discriminatory practices of 
all kinds, continue to be perpetuated in modern India'. 78 Further on he writes that 
`instead of reducing caste differences, the reservation policies have evidently 
contributed to an increased awareness of differential statuses and caste and class 
competition in India today'. 79 
Like India, Malaysia has constitutionally entrenched provisions on positive 
action. Article 8(5) declares that: 
this Article does not invalidate or prohibit- ... (c) any provision for the protection, 
wellbeing or advancement of the aboriginal peoples of the Malay Peninsula (including the 
" Leck, Joanne and Saunders, David, "Hiring Women: The Effects of Canada's Employment Equity 
Act" XVIII, 2, Canadian Public Policy 203-20 (1992), at 218. 
78 Menski, Werner, "The Indian Experience and its Lessons for Britain" in: Hepple and Szyszczak, supra 
note 35,300-43, at 304. 
79 Ibid. at 307. 
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reservation of land) or the reservation to aborigines of a reasonable proportion of suitable 
positions in the public service. 
Phillips writes: 
Ironically, the attempt to create a more egalitarian society through this means 
[constitutionally entrenched provisions on positive discrimination] has resulted in a society 
which, quite apart from the view of external commentators, perceives itself to be 
fragmented along racial lines. 80 
He concludes that the experience in Malaysia shows that positive discrimination does 
not work and he submits that the same is true for India. `Positive discrimination is 
counter productive as it, in effect, devalues real ability'. Successful people of the 
disadvantaged group are successful because of differential treatment rather than because 
of their ability. 81 
The House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee assessed the 
effectiveness of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1989.82 This Act aims at 
an active practice of fair employment by employers and the use of affirmative action to 
remedy under-representation, backed up by strong enforcement agencies and the use of 
penalties and economic sanctions. The report concluded: 
" The general view from all the witnesses heard was that unlawful employment 
discrimination on grounds of religious belief and political opinion appears to have 
declined. Despite the fact that there is no direct evidence which can be said to 
support this general view, the unanimity of the views that discrimination is in 
decline is good news. 
Phillips, Edward, "Positive Discrimination in Malaysia: A Cautionary Tale for the United Kingdom" 
in: Hepple and Szyszczak, supra note 35,344-56, at 344. 
81 Ibid. at 353-5. 
12 House of Commons, Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, 4`h Report (1998/1999 session), Para 37-55, 
< www. 12arliament. the-stationery-office. co. uk/pa/cmi 99899/cmselect/cmniaV95/9515. htm 
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" Significant improvement appears to have occurred in reducing segregation of 
predominantly Catholic firms and predominantly Protestant firms. Occupational 
segregation also appears to have declined. 
" The picture appears to be mixed as regards reduction in under-representation in 
employment. On the positive side, appointments from the two designated religious 
communities now roughly reflect applications for jobs from these communities. 
However, a gap still remains between the percentage of Roman Catholics in 
employment and the percentage of Roman Catholics who are classed as 
economically active. 
" The extent to which employers have complied with the regulatory requirements of 
the legislation, such as monitoring and periodic review requirements, appears 
impressive. The Fair Employment Commission (FEC) reported considerable 
improvements in equality-based employment practices in recent years. The FEC 
also considered that `the major achievement which has been gained has been the 
transformation in employers' attitudes in terms of employment practices'. The 
Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights (SACHR) considered that 
employers had now `accepted the need for fair employment and equality'. The 
FEC reported generally a `sea-change in the attitude of both communities, 
particularly the Protestant community; greater recognition that fair employment is 
something which we have to get right as part of getting Northern Ireland right'. 
83 
" There was little success in gaining an insight into the costs of legislation to 
employers, although the existence of fair employment legislation does not appear 
to have operated as a deterrent to inward investment. 
Paragraph 54 asks how far these employment shifts are the result of fair employment 
legislation. Sir Robert Cooper, chairperson of the FEC, expressed the belief that `a 
83 As quoted in the report, para 48-9. 
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considerable part of the changes has been as a result of the legislation but I would by no 
means argue ... that the changes have been exclusively because of that'. Others shared 
that basic viewpoint, arguing that the legislation `has created an environment within 
which the values that legislation encapsulate have been accepted by employers'. 84 
3.5 Legislation based on the Pluralist Model of Anti Discrimination Law 
In Chapter 2, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1985 was given as an example of 
legislation based on the pluralist model. This Act laid down in law the Canadian 
Government's commitment to the policy of multiculturalism adopted in 1971. A paper 
by Kymlicka85 discusses that the Canadian multicultural policies have been criticised 
because they promote a form of ethnic separatism amongst immigrants. However, he 
does not agree with the critics and, after looking at naturalisation, political participation, 
official language competence and inter-marriage rates, concludes that there is no 
evidence to support the claim that multiculturalism has decreased the rate of integration 
of immigrants, or increased the separatism or mutual hostility of ethnic groups. He is 
obviously of the opinion that the multicultural policy is successful as, after comparing 
Canada with other countries, he concludes that: 
the two countries which are head and shoulders above the rest of the world in the successful 
integration of immigrants are the two countries with official multiculturalism policies 
[Canada and Australia]. They are much more successful than any country which has 
rejected multiculturalism. ... 
Along with our fellow multiculturalists in Australia, Canada 
does a better job of respecting ethnic diversity while promoting societal integration than 
any other country. 
According to Kymlicka, the critics of multiculturalism view the policy in isolation 
rather than as a modest part of a larger package of policies which include citizenship, 
education and employment policies. Kymlicka thus paints a very rosy picture of 
84 Ibid. para 54. 
85 Kymlicka, Will, Immigrants, Multiculturalism and Canadian Citizenship, Paper presented at the 
Symposium on "Social Cohesion Through Social Justice", Canadian Jewish Congress, Ottawa, 
2/11/1997, <www. nearson-shoyama. ca/Hot Button/immigran. htm 
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multiculturalism policies in Canada, but it is clear from his paper that these policies are 
not without opponents either. 
In Chapter 2, we also mentioned the Dutch system of `verzuiling' (pillarisation) 
as an example of a democratic, pluralist society where tolerance for others was laid 
down in law. However, this system was often referred to as `living apart together', 
which already indicates that it was based on a form of segregation. The pillars were 
separated but there was cooperation and consultation, especially in the political arena. 
The system worked for the Netherlands at that time - the system was at its strongest 
from 1917 until the mid-1960s - because it managed to create a very stable society, 
despite the fragmented nature of that society. Bagley, 86 who did research in the 
Netherlands in the mid-1960s, writes that, `despite the extreme segmentation of so 
many aspects of Dutch life, social conflict is notably absent' and `Dutch society itself is 
segmented and it is also socially harmonious and democratic'. Pennings87 writes of the 
system: `a socially and ideologically fragmented system was also very stable and based 
on consensus-building and cooperation'. And Wintle88 writes `what is more it worked: 
the Dutch democracy was one of the most stable in the world'. Therefore, this 
legislation based on the pluralist model of law has worked for the Netherlands. 
Pillarisation came to an end in the 1960s when Dutch society became much less 
segmented, 89 although the laws that were adopted to make the system of pillarisation 
possible stayed in place. Dwyer and Meyer" wrote in 1995: 
Dutch legislation is characterised by religious pluriformity. There is no established church 
and all religious groups should be treated equally. This principle of equality is anchored in 
86 Bagley, Christopher, The Dutch Plural Society: A Comparative Study in Race Relations (1973 
London/Oxford: Institute of Race Relations/Oxford University Press), at 16 and 119. 
87 Pennings, Paul, "The Evolution of Dutch Consociationalism, 1917-1997" 33,1, The Netherlands 
Journal of Social Sciences 9-26 (1997), at 9. 
88 Wintle, Michael, "Pillarisation, Consociation and Vertical Pluralism in the Netherlands Revisited: A 
European View" 23,3, West European Politics 139-52 (2000), at 142. 
89 For more information on this process see: Bryant, Christopher, "Depillarisation in the Netherlands" 
British Journal of Sociology 56-74 (1981); Pennings supra note 87. 
90 Dwyer, Claire and Meyer, Astrid, "The Institutionalisation of Islam in the Netherlands and in the UK: 
the Case of Islamic Schools" 21,1, New Community 37-54 (1995), at 39. 
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article 1 of the Constitution and has important consequences for religious minorities as it 
implies that facilities which are offered to Christian denominations cannot be denied to 
other religious groups. 
They continued that Article 23 of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of education 
and that, since 1988, a number of Islamic state-funded schools were established in the 
Netherlands on the basis of this article. Despite local opposition and debates about 
integration at both local and national level, applications for such schools could not be 
rejected if they met the conditions, and it appears that, until recently, most Dutch people 
accepted such schools. However, towards the end of the 1990s, the political climate 
slowly changed and resentment against foreign communities, and especially Muslim 
communities, started to grow. The attacks on New York on 11 September 2001 and the 
Madrid and London Bombings, but more especially the murder of controversial film- 
maker Theo van Gogh in November 2004 by a Muslim with both Dutch and Moroccan 
nationality, have led to strong criticism of the Dutch tradition of tolerance and its policy 
of multiculturalism-91 Of course, the Netherlands is not the only country where 
multiculturalism is debated and criticised, but it is discussed here because its system of 
pillarisation was described in Chapter 2 as an example of a pluralist society where 
tolerance for others was laid down in law. Similar debates on multiculturalism have 
taken place and are taking place in many other countries. 92 
91 See, for example: Henley, Jon, "I feel terribly guilty" The Guardian 04/11/2004, < 
http: //fiilm. guardian. co. uk/features/featurepaees/0I342899.00. html Sindelar, Daisy, Netherlands: 
Week of Violence Leaves People Questioning Tradition of Tolerance 10/11/2004, < 
www. rferl. orr. /featuresarticleyrint/2004/11/4cf75cb4-c2fa-4aI5-b977-dl42d89acf89 html; Baker, 
Mark, Netherlands: Dutch Immigration I- The Death of Multiculturalism 23/11/2004, < 
http: //www. rferl. orR/featuresarticle/2004/1 1 /92294 1 AB-4DF5-47EF-87DA-ID726D9FIDB0 html 
and 2- Paying the Price for Political Correctness 24/11/2004, < 
http: //www. rferl. orý, /featuresarticle/2004/11 /e9f6a663-11 f3-48de-b47d-c4756bd849e0 html" 
Linklater, Alexander, "Danger Woman" The Guardian 17/05/2005, < 
hqp: //film. %zuardian. co. uk/interview/intervieMMalzes/0,. 00 html 
92 For a discussion on multiculturalism in Britain see, for example: Parekh, supra note 64; Menski, 
Werner, "Immigration and Multiculturalism in Britain: New Issues in Research and Policy" 12, 
KIAPS Bulletin of Asia-Pacific Studies 43-66 (2002); Phillips, Trevor, After 7/7: Sleepwalking to 
Segregation, Speech given at Manchester Council for Community Relations, 22/09/2005, < 
httn: //www. cre. jzov. uk/Default. asnx. LocID-OhenewO7r. RefLocID-Oh200900c008 htm; 
For a discussion on multiculturalism and the problems this has led to for a number of countries, see: 
Watson, C, Multiculturalism (2000 Buckingham/Philadelphia: Open University Press); Parekh, 
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4 Conclusion 
In this Chapter we have discussed arguments for and against legislation against 
discrimination. The main arguments against anti discrimination legislation and for 
abolishing such legislation where it exists can be summarised as follows: firstly, anti 
discrimination laws usually set minimum standards of acceptable behaviour. However, 
the existence of law in this field might lead to complacency that something has been 
done and no further action is needed. It might also lead to a narrow focus on achieving 
what is required without any attention for other, possibly more effective measures in 
other fields. This argument could be applicable to legislation based on each of the four 
models. 
Secondly, anti discrimination laws do not touch the underlying problem of 
existing inequalities and social disadvantage that some groups experience because of 
historic prejudice and discrimination. These laws do not look at any imbalances that 
have been created by past discrimination. They cannot cover the `cycle of 
disadvantage', and, therefore, do nothing about real inequalities in society. This 
argument would be stronger against legislation based on the equal treatment model than 
based on the other three models. The following quote from Townshend-Smith touches 
on both the first and the second points: 
Some would argue that it is misconceived to rely on the law to bring about improvements in 
the social position of women and minority ethnic groups. Passing legislation may create the 
false impression that the problem of discrimination and disadvantage has been tackled and 
perhaps even solved, as ordinary people often assume that laws necessarily achieve their 
purpose. 3 
Thirdly, laws are considered harmful, because they create resentment, which in its turn 
leads to hardening of attitudes and the going underground of prejudices, thereby 
Bhikhu, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (2000 Basingstoke/New 
York: Palgrave); McGoldrick, Dominic, Human Rights and Religion: the Islamic Headscarf Debate in 
Europe (2006 Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing). 
93 Townshend-Smith, supra note 21, at 82. 
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strengthening rather than reducing them. This would mean that the laws would need to 
be stricter and have more punitive enforcement, which then causes even stronger 
feelings against the law and its objectives. The law will be resented and disregarded as 
much as possible. Prohibiting certain behaviour backed up by sanctions might not be the 
most effective way to change attitudes. Laws based on all four models can lead to 
resentment. 
Fourthly, legislation prohibiting discrimination does more harm than good 
because it creates rather than dismantles barriers to fair participation in employment. 
Discrimination is best dealt with by the market, because legislation against 
discrimination will simply end up blocking market forces and making things worse. If 
the market is left to regulate itself, a reduction in discrimination in employment will 
happen voluntarily. 
Measuring the effectiveness of anti discrimination laws is not an easy task, 
because so many different factors play a role. On top of this, there is the fact that such 
measures usually only have effects in the longer term. The effects of legislation based 
on some of the models are simpler to measure than that based on other models. If 
monitoring takes place and statistics are recorded, than fair and equal participation, for 
example, can be measured fairly easily. We looked at a very limited number of findings 
about the effectiveness of anti discrimination legislation, not all of them underpinned by 
research. The outcomes are by no means conclusive, but some points can be made: 
" laws in general appear to have some impact on discriminatory behaviour; 
although in some instances they can be seen as creating extra barriers to 
employment of the protected group(s); 
" laws in general are seen to influence opinions and attitudes, although this is said 
to be only in the (very) long term; 
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" voluntary measures on their own, without legislative measures (of whatever 
model) to support them, are mostly considered to be insufficient; 
" laws aiming at fair participation of previously under-represented groups appear to 
have some impact; 
" some of the laws prescribing a policy of quotas or reservations do not appear to 
have been very successful; and, 
" laws based on the pluralist model have been successful in some places and at 
some times, but they are also seen as creating segregation between communities. 
There is, thus, some indication in all this that anti discrimination laws based on all four 
models can be useful in the fight against discrimination. Therefore, it is suggested that, 
rather than abandoning the law as a tool to fight discrimination, it might be better to 
extend the laws to include more proactive duties and remedies, to improve enforcement 
as well as introduce measures in other fields. In other words, to adopt legislation against 
discrimination that has elements of all four models. Such legislation could start with the 
prohibition of unequal treatment, of discrimination, as a minimum requirement to fight 
discrimination and behaviour based in prejudice in its most explicit forms. This 
requirement complies with people's feeling of fairness and justice. Then such 
legislation could allow for positive action measures and prescribe fair and equal 
participation of all people in all aspects of life to make up for disadvantage suffered in 
the past. Finally, such legislation could promote a policy of respect for diversity and 
tolerance and impose a duty on all public and private bodies to promote equality and 
diversity in all their functions. These measures and the different models of anti 
discrimination law are not mutually exclusive and can be combined in the same 
legislative measure. 
It is submitted that anti discrimination legislation, at both national and 
international level, is useful and can be effective, and is necessary in the fight against 
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discrimination, even though much of the existing legislation in different countries has 
been shown to have an, as yet, fairly modest effect. But law should never be seen as the 
only way to tackle discrimination, it should be one of a number of tools that each 
complement and strengthen each other. Voluntary measures alone will not be enough, 
they need to be underpinned by legislation and by efforts in other areas, such as 
education, the media and information, and economic and social policies to reduce 
poverty and social exclusion. The reduction of prejudice and the changing of attitudes is 
a long-term process which needs a concerted effort from a number of different social 
actors over a large number of years. 
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CHAPTER 4- INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS TO 
COMBAT RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
1 Introduction 
In the previous Chapter, we discussed the capacity and effectiveness of legislation in the 
fight against (racial) discrimination, without further specifying at what level such 
measures were to be taken. Legal measures can be taken at international, regional or 
national level. In the international and regional sphere, there are a number of human 
rights treaties and conventions that contain rights to equality and non-discrimination. In 
this Chapter, we study global measures and measures taken at the level of greater 
Europe. ' For a proper analysis and evaluation of the anti race discrimination legislation 
in the EU, we need to place these measures within this wider European and international 
context. 
First we discuss why the international context is important and then give an 
overview of equality and/or anti discrimination clauses in the main global human rights 
instruments. This will be followed by a more extensive discussion of the ICERD, which 
is a United Nations Convention; and two instruments of the Council of Europe: the anti 
discrimination article (Article 14) of the ECHR and Additional Protocol 12 to the 
ECHR. As we shall see, these three are especially important for this Thesis. 
In the discussion of the international measures, particular attention will be given 
to the question what model of anti discrimination legislation the instrument in question 
is aiming at, using the four models developed in Chapter 2: the equal treatment model, 
the equality of opportunity model, the equality of result model and the pluralist model. 
As we have seen, a number of aspects could help us in this analysis: whether a measure 
prohibits indirect discrimination as well as direct discrimination; whether it is more 
sensitive to group aspects of discrimination and allows for actions by groups as well as 
1 This term indicates a wider concept of Europe rather than just the EU Member States. 
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by individuals; whether it allows for positive measures or even quota and target setting; 
whether it puts a positive duty on authorities to eliminate discrimination and respect 
diversity; and whether it would prescribe a policy of mainstreaming equality and/or 
diversity. These aspects will therefore be looked at for each of the instruments. 
2 Why International Instruments are Important 
It is important to place the EU measures against racial and ethnic discrimination in their 
international context because this context has been, and still is, influencing the EU 
instruments for a number of reasons: firstly, all Member States of the EU have signed 
and ratified most of the international conventions and treaties, and, by doing so, have 
accepted certain obligations. But, even if they have not signed and/or ratified some of 
the Conventions, there is still the fact that `it is now established in international law that 
the prohibition of racial discrimination ... is part of ius cogens'2 which means that it is 
part of the peremptory norms or overriding principles of international law. 
3 
Secondly, from the very first discussions on the fight against racism and racial 
discrimination, the EU institutions have placed the right to equality and non- 
discrimination firmly within the wider human rights context. In their earliest 
coordinated joint declaration against racism and xenophobia, 
4 the European Institutions 
stressed the importance of respect for fundamental rights and considered that `respect 
for human dignity and the elimination of forms of racial discrimination were part of the 
common cultural and legal heritage of all the Member States'. The Race Directive also 
places the right to equality and non-discrimination clearly on a human rights basis. 
Recital 2 to the Directive mentions Article 6 TEU, which determines that the Union 
2 Boyle, Kevin and Baldaccini, Anneliese, "International Human Rights Approaches to Racism" in: 
Fredman, Sandra, (ed. ), Discrimination and Human Rights The Case of Racism (2001 Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 135-91, at 144. See also: Goldston, James, "Race Discrimination in Europe: 
Problems and Prospects" 5, European Human Rights Law Review 462-83 (1999), at 480; O'Hare, 
Ursula, "Equality and Affirmative Action in International Human Rights Law and its Relevance to the 
European Union" 4, International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 3-45 (2000), at 10. 
3 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties gives a definition of ius cogens in Article 53, < 
httr): embers. yline. com/-walterRehr/trea/wvkenal. html 
4 Joint Declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, against Racism and 
Xenophobia [19861 OJ C 158/1. 
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shall respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of 
Community law. Recital 3 then continues: 
The right to equality before the law and protection against discrimination for all persons 
constitutes a universal right recognised by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination and the United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and by the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to which all Member States are signatories. 
Therefore, the Race Directive itself refers to most of the international instruments 
discussed in this Chapter. 
Thirdly, the ECJ has also considered the principle of equality to be a 
fundamental principle of Community law. See, for example, the Frilli v Belgium case, 
in which the ECJ stated that equality of treatment is `one of the fundamental principles 
of Community law'. 5 In the Ruckdeschel case6 the ECJ held that the prohibition of 
discrimination was `merely a specific enunciation of the general principle of equality 
which is one of the fundamental principles of Community law'. In the case of Defrenne 
v Sabena No. 37 the ECJ repeated what it had said in earlier cases `that respect for 
fundamental personal human rights is one of the principles of Community law, the 
observance of which it has a duty to ensure'. It concluded that `the elimination of 
discrimination based on sex forms part of those fundamental rights'. In the Karlsson 
case 8 the ECJ held that the fundamental rights in the Community legal order `include a 
general principle of equality and the obligation not to discriminate'. The general 
principles of Community law are binding on the Community institutions and the 
s Case C-1/72 Rita Frilli v Belgium [1972] ECR 457, para 19. 
6 Joined Cases C-117/76 Ruckdeschel and Another v HZA Hamburg-St. Annen and C-16/77 Diamalt 
AG v HZA Itzehoe [1977] ECR 1753, para 7. 
7 Case C-149/77 Defrenne v Sabena No. 3 [1978] ECR 1365, paras 26 and 27. 
8 Case C-292/97 Kjell Karlsson and Others [2000] ECR I-2737, paras 37-39. 
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primary source of guidance on which principles are to be considered as general 
principles of Community law is Article 6 TEU, mentioned above. The ECJ also uses as 
guidelines `international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the 
Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories'. 9 The ECJ `has 
consistently held that all sources of fundamental rights support the existence of a strong 
principle of equality and non-discrimination'. 
b0 
The fourth reason why the international human rights instruments are important 
for the EU anti discrimination measures is that the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights refers to the ECHR and its case law and other international human 
rights instruments. This Charter was approved by the European Council in October 
2000, but it was not incorporated in the Treaty of Nice of December 2000. It then 
became part of the Draft Constitution of the European Union, adopted in 2004. It is at 
present unclear if and when the Draft Constitution will come into force" and, therefore, 
neither the Constitution, nor the Charter are legally binding, although the Charter is 
already influential in the EU. The Charter forms Part II of the Draft Constitution and 
contains a Title III, headed `Equality'. In the Preamble, the Charter reaffirms: 
the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and international 
obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty on European Union, the Community 
9 Case C-4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491, at para 13. 
10 Bell, Mark, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (2002 Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), at 20. For more information on the development of equality as a fundamental principle of 
Community law see also: Bernard, Nicolas, "What are the Purposes of EC Discrimination Law" in: 
Dine, Janet and Watt, Bob, (eds. ), Discrimination Law: Concepts, Limitations and Justifications 
(1996 London: Longman) 77-99; Burca, Grainne de, "The Role of Equality in Community Law" in: 
Dashwood, Alan and O'Leary, Siofra, (eds. ), The Principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law (1997 
London: Sweet and Maxwell) 13-34; Barnard, Catherine, "The Principle of Equality in the 
Community Context: P, Grant, Kalanke and Marschall: Four Uneasy Bedfellows? " 57,2, Cambridge 
Law Journal 352-73 (1998); More, Gillian, "The Principle of Equal Treatment: From Market Unifier 
to Fundamental Right? " in: Craig, Paul and Burca, Grainne de (eds. ), The Evolution of EU Law (1999 
Oxford: Oxford University Press) 517-52; O'Hare, supra note 2; McCrudden, Christopher, "The New 
Concept of Equality", paper for the Academy of European Law Congress: "Fight against 
Discrimination: The Race and Framework Employment Directives" (Trier, 2003), < 
www era int/web/en/resources/5 234 6679 
file en. 796. pdf at 2-4; Waddington, Lisa, The Expanding 
Role of the Equality Principle in European Union Law, Policy Paper, European University Institute, 
Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies, 2003, < www. iue. it/RSCAS/e-texts/CR2003-04. ndf 
The German Presidency for the first half of 2007 has put the Constitution back on the Agenda, see: 
"Europe - Succeeding Together" 
Presidency Programme I January to 30 June 2007, at 4 and 5, < 
www auswaertiý, es-amt. de/diplo/de/EU-P/Programm-EU-P-en. pd 
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Treaties, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Community and by the Council of Europe 
and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and of the European 
Court of Human Rights. 
The text of the Charter itself also refers to the ECHR, in Article II-112(3), where it 
states that where the Charter contains rights that correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
ECHR `the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by 
the said Convention'. This is followed by Article IM 13, which determines that: 
Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, as recognised ... by Union law and international law and 
by international agreements to which the Union, the Community and all the Member States 
are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States' Constitutions. 
The Updated Explanatory Memorandum12 to Article 11-113 states that `owing to its 
importance, mention is made of the ECHR'. Therefore, the Charter stresses the 
importance of the ECHR within the EU legal order. 
The influence of international and regional human rights instruments, especially 
the ECHR, in the EU is, for all these reasons, considerable. Accession of the EU as a 
Contracting Party to the ECHR has also been suggested and Article 1-9(2) of the Draft 
Constitution for Europe determines that the Union shall do so. Article 1-9(3) declares 
that fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from the 
Constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general 
principles of Union law. This again shows the importance of the ECHR and the Council 
'2 CONV 828/1/03, Updated Explanations Relating to the complete Text of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (as amended by the European Convention and incorporated as Part II of 
the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe), Brussels, 18/06/03, at 52. 
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of Europe within the EU. Accession to the ECHR would bring the EU Institutions under 
the scrutiny of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. 13 
3 International Equality and Anti Discrimination Clauses, an Overview 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations in 
1948, starts in Article 1 with `all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights'. This is followed by Article 2 which declares that: 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
Article 7 then proclaims that `all are equal before the law and entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law'. The latter formulation is, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the way formal equality is frequently laid down in law. It can be found in 
many constitutions, and then often forms the basis for equality and anti discrimination 
measures in other laws. The UDHR thus declares everyone's equality before the law as 
a basic human right. 
Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), which are both UN instruments, determine that States parties 
undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be 
exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
13 Discussion of this falls outside the subject of this Thesis. For more information, the reader is referred 
to Kruger, Hans and Polakiewicz, Jorg, "Proposals for a Coherent Human Rights Protection System in 
Europe" 22,1-4 Human Rights Law Journal 1-13 (2001); Drzemczewski, Pierre, "The Council of 
Europe's Position with Respect to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights" 22,1-4 Human Rights Law 
Journal 14-31 (2001); Jacobs, F, "The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights", in: Arnull, Anthony and 
Wincott, Daniel, (eds. ), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (2002 Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 275-90, at 289-90; Mahoney, Paul, "The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights from the Perspective of the 
European Convention" 23,8-12, Human Rights Law Journal 300-3 (2002). See also Opinion 2/94 
[1996] ECJ 1-1759, paras 20-2, in which the ECJ held that, as Community law then stood, the 
Community had no competence to accede to the ECHR. In other words, Treaty amendment was 
needed before the Community could accede. If and when the Constitution comes into force, this 
competence is established by Article 1-9(2). 
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The ICCPR, however, also declares in Article 26: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and 
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status. 
Article 26 ICCPR gives a much broader right to non-discrimination than Article 2 
UDHR, Article 2(1) ICCPR or Article 2(2) ICESCR. While the latter provisions only 
prohibit discrimination in relation to the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Declaration/Covenants, Article 26 ICCPR gives a freestanding right to non- 
discrimination. The Human Rights Committee (HRC) 14 discusses in paragraph 12 of its 
General Comment No. 1815 that Article 26 provides an autonomous right. And, Liegl, 
Perching and Weyss16 write that: 
Article 26 of the Covenant provides one of the strongest antidiscrimination rights that can 
be found in legally binding international treaties. ... 
Article 26 does not only prohibit 
discrimination in regard to the rights guaranteed by the Covenant itself but includes a 
freestanding prohibition of discrimination. This means that in whatever case a signatory 
state guarantees rights it has to do so without discrimination on the grounds of ... 
All three instruments contain the same, non-exhaustive list of grounds for 
discrimination: `or other status' indicates that other grounds can be recognised by the 
courts as a prohibited ground. 
These instruments are very important because together they make up the 
International Bill of Human Rights. As Boyle and Baldaccini'7 write: 
14 Established under Article 28 ICCPR. 
's Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination, 10/11/1989, para 12 < 
www ohchr. or english/bodies/hrc/comments. htm. 
16 Liegl, Barbara, Perching, Bernhard and Weyss, Birgit, Combating Religious and Ethnic 
Discrimination in Employment from the EU and International Perspective (2004 Brussels: ENAR), at 
21-2. 
17 Supra note 2, at 139-40. 
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It was on these foundations, entrenching the norms of equality and non-discrimination, that 
all other international human rights instruments created through the United Nations and the 
regional systems have been built. 
All Member States of the EU are members of the United Nations and all have signed 
and ratified or acceded to the two Covenants, and are, therefore, bound by the 
obligations imposed. But what model of equality do the Covenants follow? They 
certainly have elements of the equal treatment model, in that they proclaim the equality 
of every person before the law. But do they go beyond this model? 
As we have seen, providing against indirect discrimination and for positive 
action point to a more substantive model of equality. It is submitted that both Covenants 
do include protection against indirect discrimination. General Comment No. 18 gave the 
following definition of discrimination - taking into account the ICERD and the 
CEDAW: 
the Committee believes that the term `discrimination' as used in the Covenant should be 
understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on 
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect (my 
italics) of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on 
an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. 
18 
The use of the words `purpose or effect' indicates that both direct and indirect 
discrimination are included. We will discuss this in more detail when we discuss the 
ICERD, as this definition, given by the HRC, is the same as that of Article 2 ICERD, 
apart from the grounds mentioned. The ICESCR also appears to include indirect 
discrimination in its prohibitions. 19 
18 Supra note 15, at para 7. 
19 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on Romania, 
30/05/1994, E/C. 12/12/1994/4, para 12, where the Committee mentions that direct and indirect 
discrimination of gypsies appears to continue; Id. Concluding Observations on Belgium, 01/12/2000, 
E/C. 12/1/Add. 54, para 22, where the Committee mentions that a rule has `indirectly discriminatory 
impact on women'; both < www. unhchr. ch/tbs/doc. nsf 
143 
Another indication that these Covenants go some way towards a more 
substantive model is that they both allow for - temporary - positive measures to be 
taken in order to eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination 
prohibited by the Covenant. However, these measures are seen as exceptions from the 
equal treatment model and are limited in time. 20 
Any law that provides against indirect discrimination and/or allows for positive 
action measures is more sensitive to group aspects of discrimination, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, so both Covenants can be said to recognise this group aspect. As far as action 
by groups is concerned, the ICESCR has no individual or state complaints procedure. 
Optional Protocol No. 1 of the ICCPR provides that individuals can complain to the 
HRC. All EU Member states, except the UK, have ratified the Protocol. The Rules of 
Procedure for the HRC state (Rule 96) as one of the conditions for admissibility, that it 
emanates from an `individual or individuals' (my italics), which indicates that more 
than one individual victim can complain. 21 It is thus arguable that the ICCPR allows for 
group actions. 
Do these instruments impose positive duties on states and public authorities to 
eliminate discrimination and/or to promote tolerance and respect for diversity? Do they 
allow for recognition of rights of minority groups? First of all, international treaties bind 
the contracting parties, the States that sign up to it. It is the States Parties that are under 
an obligation to do what they agree to by signing. An international instrument could 
impose a duty on States Parties to eliminate discrimination and to promote diversity and 
tolerance. If it did so, it could be said to fit in the pluralist model of anti discrimination 
law, because it would aim at a more tolerant, diverse and thus plural society. However 
such a duty would be different from the duty under the British Race Relations 
20 For the ICCPR see supra note 15, at para 10; for the ICESCR, see CESCR General Comment, No. 13, 
1999, at para 32, < www. ohchr. oriz/enqlish/bodies/cescr/comments. htm 
21 Human Rights Committee, Rules of Procedure, 04/08/2004, CCPR/C/3/Rev. 7, < 
www ohchr. org/english/bodies. 
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(Amendment) Act mentioned in previous Chapters, which is imposed - by the 
state/legislature - on all public authorities. International measures could put an 
obligation on States Parties to provide for such a duty on all public (and/or private) 
authorities. However, these authorities could only be obliged to do so by an act of the 
State Party, not by the international measure itself. Similarly, international treaties could 
impose a duty on States to follow a policy of mainstreaming equality and diversity in all 
its actions and to impose such a duty on other (public and/or private) bodies. But only 
the States Parties can be bound by the treaty/convention. 
There are, however, two problems with international treaties imposing duties. 
Firstly, international treaties are usually not easy to enforce, even if they do contain 
some enforcement mechanisms, and sanctions for non-compliance are not particularly 
effective. It is submitted that most international treaties are not strictly legally 
enforceable but have a more political and persuasive force. States Parties might sign and 
ratify them because not doing so would make them look `bad', would harm their public 
image, both at home and at the international stage. If an international measure contains 
a reporting procedure and the body receiving the report can remark on or criticise the 
failure of a State Party to follow and implement the measure, then this could have 
persuasive influence, especially if these comments are made public, because a 
Government would not like to be publicly `named and shamed'. A report criticising a 
government could also assist organisations lobbying for implementing legislation. In 
this way, international measures can exert influence on a State Party. The problem with 
enforcement is made worse by the fact that States Parties can, and often do, make 
reservations to some of the articles, i. e. opt out of some of the duties imposed by the 
Convention, or do not recognise the enforcement procedures provided. Secondly, 
international treaties are limited in the obligations they can impose because they have to 
respect the States Parties sovereignty and independence. For these two reasons, 
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international instruments will not often impose duties that would fit in the pluralist 
model of anti discrimination law apart from making more general statements about the 
goals of tolerance, solidarity and respect for other people. 
The UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR do not appear to impose a positive duty 
on States to eliminate discrimination or promote tolerance and diversity. They only 
prohibit discrimination in guaranteeing rights and freedoms. However, both the UDHR 
and the ICCPR state that `all are equal before the law and are entitled to equal 
protection of the law'. According to Liegl et al, this involves a two-fold obligation: 
`states must refrain from adopting discriminatory laws and ... public authorities have to 
apply laws in a non-discriminatory way'. They continue: `furthermore, Article 26 
obliges Member States to prohibit discrimination by enacting special laws and to afford 
effective protection against discrimination'. 2 This suggests that the ICCPR and the 
UDHR contain a positive duty on states to eliminate discrimination. But do these 
instruments also impose a positive duty to promote tolerance and diversity? There 
appears to be no explicit mention of such a duty in the instruments itself. But we should 
keep in mind why the UN was formed. According to the Preamble to the Charter of the 
United Nations of 1945, the peoples of the UN were determined `to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war' and, `to reaffirm faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small'; and, for these ends `to practice tolerance and 
live together in peace with one another as good neighbours'. Article 1(2) of the Charter 
gives as one of the purposes of the UN: `to develop friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and 
to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace'. The Preamble to the 
UDHR contains similar expressions, and Article 1 mentions that all human beings 
22 Supra note 16, at 22. 
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`should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood'. Article 26(2) UDHR states 
that education `shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, 
racial or religious groups'. This suggests that these UN instruments do implicitly aim to 
promote tolerance and understanding between people of different groups. However, the 
UDHR and the ICESCR do not go beyond this and do not contain any specific articles 
prescribing recognition of the rights of groups. Article 27 ICCPR has a more specific 
element of the pluralist notion in that it recognises rights of groups. It determines: 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to 
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their 
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their 
own language. 
Two other UN instruments can be said to recognise rights of groups: the Declaration on 
the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities (1992) and the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(1994). 23 However, the fact that neither has led to a Convention shows that most nations 
are not ready to go very far along the road to such rights. It can be said, therefore, that 
the UN instruments guarantee mostly individual rights and only contain some general 
statements that would fit in a pluralist idea, in that they aim at promoting tolerance and 
good relations between nations, racial and religious groups. 
24 
The last instrument to discuss is the International Labour Organisation's 
Convention CI 11 on Equality in Employment and Occupation of 1958, signed and 
ratified by all EU Member States. This Convention prohibits discrimination in the field 
of employment. Article 1 defines discrimination as: 
23 For more information, see these instruments themselves, < www. ohehr. org/english/law/index. htm 
24 On minority rights see for example: Poulter, Sebastian, "Minority Rights", in: McCrudden, 
Christopher and Chambers, Gerald, (eds. ), Individual Rights and the Law in Britain (1994 Oxford: 
Clarendon Press) 457-89; Kymlicka, Will, (ed. ), The Rights of Minority Cultures (1995 Oxford: 
Oxford University Press); Banton, Michael, International Action against Racial Discrimination (1996 
Oxford: Clarendon Press), at 34-39 (on Article 27 ICCPR); Poulter, Sebastian, Ethnicity, Law and 
Human Rights: The English Experience (1998 Oxford: Clarendon Press) 68-119; Petrova, Dimitrina, 
"Racial Discrimination and the Rights of Minority Cultures" in: Fredman, supra note 2,45-76. 
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... any 
distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, 
political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or 
impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation. 
Cox25 writes that this: 
... requires that each ratifying 
State must adhere to the basic goal of promoting equality of 
opportunity and treatment by means of a national policy which aims to end all forms of 
discrimination. 
C111 thus imposes an obligation on States to eliminate discrimination and to promote 
equal opportunity and in this sense it goes beyond the formal equality model towards an 
equal opportunity model of anti discrimination law. Other indications that this 
convention goes further than just promoting equal treatment are that the definition 
covers both direct and indirect discrimination; 26 and that the Convention `requires 
special measures to be taken by state parties where necessary to eliminate 
discrimination in employment'. 27 In this, C111 goes further than most national and 
international anti discrimination laws, which usually only permit, but do not require 
positive action. This Convention has, therefore, some elements of the substantive 
equality model as well as some of the equal treatment model of anti discrimination 
legislation. Its scope is, however, confined to the area of employment and occupation. 
4 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
This Convention was adopted in 1966 with a unanimous vote and deals, as its name 
suggests, specifically with racial discrimination and will therefore be discussed in more 
25 Cox, Laura, "The Fight against Discrimination and the International Labour Organisation" 16,238, 
Discrimination Law Association Briefings 3-8 (2002), at 5. 
26 International Labour Organisation Report of the Committee of Experts, Equality in Employment and 
Occupation, International Labour Conference, 75`x' Session, 1988, Report III, Part 4B, at 23, para 28; 
International Labour Conference, 83th Session, 1996, Report III, Part, 4B, at 12, para 25; Cox, supra 
note 24, at 6. 
27 MacEwen, Martin, Tackling Racism in Europe, An Examination of Anti-Discrimination Law in 
Practice (1995 Oxford and Washington: Berg), at 55; Cox also stresses that positive action is 
specifically required, supra note 25, at 6 
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detail. Its adoption was considered necessary, because of the `manifestations of racial 
discrimination still in evidence in some areas of the world' and the existence of 
`government policies based on racial superiority or hatred, such as policies of apartheid, 
segregation or separation'. 28 The Convention was in part a reaction against the 
devastating effect of Nazism, but it was also a reaction against colonialism and all the 
practices of segregation and discrimination associated with it. Furedi29 argues that, after 
World War II, public attitudes to racism changed quickly and the principle of racial 
equality was rapidly accepted. This was a defensive and pragmatic reaction of the 
Western world which feared revenge of non-white people for the domination by the 
West. World War II brought out the inconsistency and the conflict between the 
denouncing of the prevailing Nazi ethos and the practice of discrimination and feelings 
of racial superiority. Therefore, Furedi concludes, the principle of race equality had to 
be conceded to ensure a stable world order. World War II had helped to discredit racism 
and to make the question of race an international issue. 
Banton30 mentions the rise of fascism and the revulsion felt against apartheid as 
spurs for international action which led, among others, to the ICERD. He argues that the 
Convention obtained the support of the international community and was adopted 
unanimously because it was based on a `lie': that racial discrimination as defined by 
Article 1(1) ICERD could be eliminated by political action. 31 Banton discerns two ways 
to view racial discrimination: it can be viewed either as a pathological illness or as a 
normal part of everyday society. Without the political myth that it was a social sickness 
that could be eliminated, and be eliminated quickly, states would surely not have 
28 See the Preamble to the ICERD. 
29 Furedi, Frank, The Silent War: Imperialism and the Changing Perception of Race (1998 London: 
Pluto Press). This book provides a good overview of the development of and the reasons behind race 
relations policies. 
30 Banton, supra note 24, and, ibid. The International Politics of Race (2002 Cambridge: Polity Press). 
31 Banton, supra note 24, at 50 and note 30, at 42. 
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invested so much energy in the Convention. 32 The title of the Convention confirms that 
the view that racial discrimination could be eliminated was the prevailing one, as does 
the Preamble, which: 
solemnly affirms the necessity of speedily eliminating racial discrimination throughout the 
world, in all its forms and manifestations and of securing understanding of and respect for 
the dignity of the human person. 
Banton concludes that this dubious assumption served a noble purpose: the axiom that 
racial discrimination as defined by the Convention can be eliminated is a lie, but 
because it made possible agreement on a Treaty that now restrains racial discrimination 
in most of the world's states, it was a `noble lie'. 33 
Banton also mentions that states regarded racial discrimination as a social 
pathology which afflicted other states than their own and was thus a matter for foreign 
policy. Therefore, signing the Convention brought a state credit on the international 
stage without many domestic demands. 34 
The ICERD came into force in 1969 after it had been ratified by 27 states and is 
now one of the most widely ratified UN human rights treaties. However, many states 
have made reservations, especially to Article 4 and to the enforcement mechanism 
adopted. 35 All Member States of the EU have signed and ratified this Convention, 
although some of them have made reservations. 
In its Preamble, the Convention expresses the conviction: 
that any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is scientifically false, morally 
condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous, and that there is no justification for racial 
discrimination, in theory or in practice, anywhere. 
32 Banton, supra note 24, at 67-74 and note 30, at 42-6 and 65-7. 
33 Banton, supra note 30, at 44-5. 
34 Banton, supra note 24, at 305. The notion that racism and racial discrimination were seen as an issue 
of foreign policy and foreign relations is also mentioned by Boven, Theo van, "Discrimination and 
Human Rights Law: Combating Racism" in Fredman, supra note 2,111-34, at 111-3. 
35 See McColgan, Aileen, "Principles of Equality and Protection from Discrimination in International 
Human Rights Law" 2, European Human Rights Law Review 157-75 (2003), at 165. 
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The Preamble also mentions that racial discrimination `is an obstacle to friendly and 
peaceful relations among nations' and can disturb peace and security and the harmony 
of persons living side by side even within one and the same state. 
Article 1(1) ICERD defines `racial discrimination' as: 
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or 
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life. 
A number of observations can be made about this definition. Firstly, it covers race, 
colour, descent, or national and ethnic origin. This is wider than, for example, the EU 
Race Directive, which only covers racial and ethnic origin. However, it does not cover 
religious discrimination. This could be problematic as religion is often closely related to 
race or ethnic origin and it can be difficult to draw a distinction between the two. 
Secondly, it covers a wide range of protected fields (see Article 5): those of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including equality before the law, the right to 
security, political and civil rights and economic, social and cultural rights. 36 This 
corresponds with the rights guaranteed in the International Bill of Rights. 
Thirdly, according to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), the words `purpose or effect' indicate that both direct and 
indirect discrimination are covered. The Committee has stated: 
In seeking to determine whether an action has an effect contrary to the Convention, it will 
look to see whether that action has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group 
distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin. 37 
`Disparate impact' is a term often used, especially in the US, instead of `indirect 
discrimination' but denoting the same. On the other hand, MacEwen expresses doubt 
36 See Banton, supra note 24, at 64. 
37 CERD is established under Article 8 ICERD. See CERD General Recommendation 14, Definition of 
Discrimination (Art 1(1)), 22/03/93, <www. ohchr. ore/enplish/bodies/cerd/comments. htm 
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whether the definition covers indirect discrimination, although he writes that `a number 
of international lawyers are of the view that the Convention does cover indirect 
discrimination'. 
Fourthly, the definition refers to `public life'. Does this mean that the ICERD is 
not applicable where non-governmental or private actors are involved? According to 
Boyle and Baldaccini, 38 there are two opinions; the first one holds that private acts are 
excluded from the scope of the Convention. The second opinion interprets `public life' 
as being opposed to private life rather than just referring to government actions. The 
latter is supported by provisions such as those laid down in Article 5(e) and (f) ICERD. 
Authors point out that the distinction between the public sphere which is subject to 
government regulation and the private sphere, which is not, is becoming more blurred 
with the extension by many governments of programs of privatisation and with the ever 
more prominent role of private actors on global level. The issue is important because the 
scope of the ICERD would be wider, and thus it would be preferable, if the second 
opinion was followed, because it would put a duty on States Parties to prohibit, for 
example, a private employer or landlord discriminating against a person on the grounds 
of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin. National legislation prohibiting 
discrimination often covers parts of the private sphere: purely private relationships, like 
who a person wants to marry, fall outside the scope of the legislation - although many 
States do intervene when a party is subject to immigration contro139 - but relationships 
between, for example, a private landlord and tenant or a private employer and employee 
are covered by the prohibition. The EU anti discrimination legislation explicitly 
mentions that it covers both the public and private sectors, including public bodies 
40 
38 Supra note 2, at 159-60. 
39 See for example: Sections 19-25 of the British Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, 
etc. ) Act 2004. 
40 See Articles 3(1) of the Race, Framework, Equal Treatment (Amendment) and Equal Treatment 
(Goods) Directives. 
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The ICERD provides expressly for positive action measures: Article 1(4) 
determines that: 
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain 
racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order 
to ensure such groups equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures 
do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial 
groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken 
have been achieved. 
Article 2(2) is even stronger in its formulation, in that it actually prescribes that States 
Parties shall take `special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate development 
and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them ... ' Here again, 
the measures should not lead to the maintenance of unequal or separate rights and 
should not be continued after their objective has been achieved. Like Convention CI II 
above, the ICERD thus imposes a duty on States Parties to take positive measures, but 
these measures should be for a limited time only. 
Article 14 ICERD provides for an individual right to petition to the CERD, if the 
State Party makes a declaration 
that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider 
communications from individuals or groups of individuals (my italics) within its 
jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set 
forth in this Convention. 
This Convention thus allows for actions by groups of individuals as well. Of the EU 
Member States, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and the UK have not made such a 
declaration, the others have all recognised the individual right to petition. 
But what model of anti discrimination law is this Convention aiming at? It is 
based on the equal treatment model in that it prohibits direct discrimination. The 
153 
provisions against indirect discrimination and for positive measures for `certain racial or 
ethnic groups or individuals' and the possibility for `groups of individuals' to take 
action all fit in a more substantive model, aiming at equality of opportunity or equality 
of results. Boyle and Baldaccini41 are of the view that: 
The special feature of the Convention is that it promotes not only equality in law but also 
equality in fact, in order to allow different ethnic, racial, and national groups the same 
social development. The goal of de facto equality is reflected in several provisions of the 
Convention, calling for 'special measures' (Article 2(2)), allowing distinctions for the 
purpose of affirmative action (Article 1(4)), and prohibiting distinctions which have the 
purpose or effect of impairing the recognition, enjoyment, and exercise, `on an equal 
footing', of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Article 1). 
They conclude: 
The Convention thus advocates a notion of equality of outcome, which is sensitive to the 
starting point of people, to past disadvantages which have created systematic patterns of 
discrimination in many societies, the effect of which may be continued or even exacerbated 
by facially neutral policies. The Convention's purpose of achieving substantive equality ... 
rather recognizes the need to accommodate diversity and to redress disadvantage ... 
This suggests that the Convention goes some way towards an equality of results model 
of anti discrimination law. 
In some aspects, the influence of the pluralist model can be recognised as well: 
firstly, the ICERD imposes a positive duty on States Parties to eliminate discrimination 
and to take special action measures for groups or individuals who have suffered from 
past disadvantages. It thus recognises that there are groups that need and have a right to 
special measures; secondly, there is the Preamble's affirmation of the need to secure 
`understanding of and respect for the dignity of the human person'; thirdly, the 
Preamble reaffirms that racial discrimination is `an obstacle to friendly and peaceful 
relations among nations' which disturbs the `peace and security among peoples and the 
41 Supra note 2, at 156-7. 
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harmony of persons living side by side even within one and the same state'; and, 
fourthly, as Boyle and Baldaccini state, the recognition of `the need to accommodate 
diversity'. 
On the other hand, the ICERD provisions for special measures could be used by 
States Parties to promote the assimilation of certain racial and ethnic groups into 
society. The special measures could put pressure on these groups to adapt and conform 
to the dominant values of society. And once they have assimilated, the special measures 
are no longer necessary. In the words of Boyle and Baldaccini: 
Article 2(2) provides no safeguards against the use of measures that, in promoting the 
adequate development of racial groups, constitute assimilationist policies. The ICERD 
approach is integrationist, as reflected in the provision that the maintenance of separate 
rights for vulnerable groups is only admitted for a limited period ... 
42 
This assimilationist aim puts the ICERD back within the equal treatment model of anti 
discrimination law. 
Two more problems in relation to the ICERD need to be pointed out, because 
they affect its practical value, although they do not have any influence on what model of 
anti discrimination legislation the Convention follows. 
Firstly, there is the fact that Article 1(2) allows for distinctions between citizens 
and non-citizens. Article 1(3) recognises a State's sovereignty in matters of nationality, 
citizenship or naturalisation, but does put a proviso on this: such provisions should not 
discriminate against any particular nationality. CERD has brought out a General 
Recommendation on discrimination against non-citizens43 in which it affirms, firstly 
(point 1,2), that Article 1(2) should not be interpreted to detract in any way from the 
rights and freedoms recognised in particular in the UDHR, the ICECSR and the ICCPR. 
Secondly (point 1,3), that Article 5 ICERD incorporates the obligation of States Parties 
42 Ibid. at 158. 
43 CERD, General Recommendation 30, Discrimination against Non-Citizens, CERD/64/C/Misc. I l/rev. 
3,2004 <www. ohchr. ori/enelish/bodies/cerd/docs/CERD-GC30 doc. 
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to prohibit and eliminate discrimination in the enjoyment of a number of human rights, 
which are, in principle, to be enjoyed by all persons. States Parties are under an 
obligation to guarantee equality between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of 
these rights to the extent recognised in international law. And, thirdly (point 1,4), and 
most importantly, that: 
Under the Convention, differential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status will 
constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the 
objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and 
are not proportional to the achievement of this aim. Differentiation within the scope of 
Article 1, paragraph 4, of the Convention relating to special measures is not considered 
discriminatory. 
The CERD follows this with an enumeration of measures that it recommends the States 
Parties to adopt. Therefore, Article 1(2) must be construed narrowly and differential 
treatment of non-citizens will be considered to be discrimination, unless it is objectively 
justified. 
Secondly, like with other international instruments, there are problems with the 
enforcement of the ICERD. Despite Article 6 providing that States Parties shall assure 
`effective protection and remedies through the competent national tribunals and other 
state institutions' and that such tribunals should give `just and adequate reparation or 
satisfaction', in practice, as MacEwen44 writes, `the sanctions for non-compliance are 
largely ineffective' and there is no specific obligation for signatories `to demonstrate 
that individuals are provided with appropriate remedies for acts of discrimination, or 
that there are effective state systems for monitoring and review'. 
What are the obligations of the signatories? According to Article 9, States 
Parties undertake to submit periodic reports on the legislative, judicial, administrative or 
other measures they have adopted following the Convention for the consideration of the 
44 Supra note 27, at 51. 
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CERD. The CERD reports annually to the General Assembly of the UN on its activities 
and it may make suggestions and general recommendations based on the examination of 
the reports from the States Parties. The provisions on reporting are therefore rather 
vague. 5 Article 11 determines that if a State Party considers that another State Party is 
not giving effect to the provisions of the Convention, it may bring it to the attention of 
the Committee. However, this procedure has never been utilised. This could be because 
of the possible adverse diplomatic consequences or of the awareness that the Committee 
has `no power to legally adjudicate on a state's complaint. The Committee may only 
recommend a friendly settlement and has no enforcement powers'. 46 
There is also the - already mentioned - individual complaint procedure of Article 
14. However, this can only be used if a State Party has recognised the competence of 
the Committee to do so. This procedure also has the same problem that, as O'Flaherty 
notes, the CERD `is not a court, does not issue `judgements' and has no means to 
enforce any views it might adopt'. 7 The problem with enforcement is compounded by 
the fact that many States Parties have made reservations to the ICERD and/or have not 
recognised its individual complaints procedure. 
We can conclude that the ICERD, despite these limitations, can be a very useful 
convention in the fight against racial discrimination, firstly, because it is the only UN 
instrument specifically aimed at the elimination of such discrimination. Secondly, 
because it contains a clear and wide definition of race discrimination which 
encompasses both direct and indirect discrimination. Thirdly, because it puts a duty on 
States to take positive action measures. And, fourthly, because it provides for an 
individual complaints procedure as long as States Parties have agreed to be subject to it. 
We can also conclude that elements of all four models of anti discrimination legislation 
as For more information on the reporting procedure see Banton, supra note 24, and note 30, at 67-87. 
46 Boyle and Baldaccini, supra note 2, at 173. 
47 O'Flaherty, Michael, "The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination as an 
Implementation Agency" in MacEwen, Martin, (ed. ), Anti-Discrimination Law Enforcement: A 
Comparative Perspective (1997 Aldershot: Avebury), 209-33, at 221. 
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can be found in the Convention, although the emphasis appears to be on guaranteeing 
individual rights, with only a few references to groups and their rights. 
5 Council of Europe and the Fight against Discrimination 
The instruments discussed so far are global instruments adopted through the UN. In 
contrast, Article 14 ECHR and Protocol 12 to the ECHR are European measures 
adopted by the Council of Europe. The ECHR was agreed in 1950 and Protocol 12 was 
adopted in 2000. 
The Council of Europe, with its seat in Strasbourg, is an international 
organisation, established in 1949 in order to promote greater unity between its members 
and has, at present, 46 Member States, among which are all EU Member States. Any 
European State can become a member provided it accepts the principle of the rule of 
law and guarantees human rights and fundamental freedoms to everyone under its 
jurisdiction. The Council of Europe is thus an organisation specifically focusing on 
human rights in greater Europe. The Council has no legislative powers. 
In 1993, the Council established the European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI). This monitoring body has been given the task to `combat racism, 
xenophobia, antisemitism and intolerance at the level of greater Europe and from the 
perspective of the protection of human rights in the light of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, its additional protocols and related case law'. 48 ECRI's action covers 
`all necessary measures to combat violence, discrimination and prejudice faced by 
persons or groups of persons, notably on grounds of "race", colour, language, religion, 
nationality and national or ethnic origin'. 
49 Therefore, ECRI is a body specifically 
focusing on the fight against racism and racial discrimination in greater Europe. It is 
important to note that religious discrimination is included in its mandate. 
48 See Article I of the Statute of ECRI, < www. coe. int/ecri. 
49 ECRI and its Programme of Activities, CRI (1999) 53 rev. 6, at 1, < www. coe. int/ecri under 
`Presentation of ECRI'. 
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ECRI's programme, according to Article 10 of its Statute, shall include three 
aspects: country-by-country approach; work on general themes; and, activities in 
relation to civil society. Under the first aspect, ECRI makes up periodic (every four/five 
years) country reports in which it reviews a Member State's legislation, policies and 
other measures to combat racism, xenophobia, antisemitism and intolerance and its 
effectiveness, and proposes further action. These reports are published, unless the 
Member State expressly opposes such publication. Under the second aspect of its 
programme, ECRI adopts General Policy Recommendations and collects and 
disseminates examples of `good practices'. Under the third aspect, it aims to promote 
dialogue and mutual respect among the general public and it organises awareness 
raising and information activities. 
50 General Policy Recommendation 7, on national 
legislation to combat racism and racial discrimination, is of some interest for this 
Thesis. Adopted in December 2002, it recommends that the Governments of the 
Member States enact legislation against racism and racial discrimination, if such 
legislation does not already exist or is incomplete; and that they ensure that the key 
components set out in the Recommendation are included in such legislation. ECRI has 
taken account of, among other instruments, the EU Race Directive, and many of the key 
components set out in the Recommendation are similar to the provisions of the 
Directive. However, the Recommendation has no legally binding force, whereas the 
Directive is binding on the EU Member States, who are obliged to implement the 
Directive in their national legislations' 
so Articles 11,12 and 13 of the Statute, supra note 48. To date, ECRI has adopted 9 General Policy 
Recommendations. The first six can be found in: ECRI, Compilation of ECRI s General Policy 
Recommendations, CRI (2001) 7 (2001 Strasbourg: Council of Europe); the other three are: General 
Policy Recommendation 7, On National Legislation to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, 
CRI (2003) 8 (2003 Strasbourg: Council of Europe); General Policy Recommendation 8, On 
Combating Racism while Fighting Terrorism, CRI (2004) 26 (2004 Strasbourg: Council of Europe); 
General Policy Recommendation 9, On the Fight against Antisemitism, CRI (2004) 37 (2004 
Strasbourg: Council of Europe). 
s1 For a comparison between the EU Race Directive and ECRI Recommendation 7 see: Howard, Erica, 
"Anti Race Discrimination Measures in Europe: An Attack on Two Fronts" 11,4, European Law 
Journal 468-86 (2005). 
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The ECHR was adopted in Rome in 1950. Article 19 of the Convention 
established a European Court of Human Rights to ensure that contracting states observe 
their obligations under the Convention. Article 14 contains a prohibition of 
discrimination on an extensive number of grounds: 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status. 
The terms `any ground such as' and `or other status' indicate that the list is open-ended 
and can be extended through the case law. Feldman calls the list `illustrative, not 
exhaustive' and writes: 
The open-ended nature of the list of improper grounds for differentiation enables changing 
mores to be fed into the protection available under Article 14 without the need for further 
treaties or legislation, unlike the approach taken in UK and EC law. 52 
This implies that UK and EC law contain closed lists of grounds, which can only be 
added to via new legislation. For EC law this can be seen in Article 13 EC which allows 
`action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age and sexual orientation'. This leaves no room for any other grounds to be 
recognised except via a Treaty revision. 
Despite the extensive and open-ended list of prohibited grounds, Article 14 has 
one major drawback: it does not give an independent, freestanding right to non- 
discrimination. It only secures `the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention' without discrimination. Therefore, the right to non-discrimination is 
accessory or parasitic, and discrimination can only be challenged in relation to the other 
Convention rights. This situation has been criticised for falling short of the standard of 
52 Feldman, David, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2nd ed. 2002 Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), at 145. 
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protection provided in other international human rights instruments. 53 ECRI itself noted 
that the Convention was `lagging behind other international instruments in the matter of 
non-discrimination'. 54 O'Hare even called it a `prominent failure of the Convention 
system'. 55 To overcome this problem, the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers 
approved, following a proposal from ECRI, an Additional Protocol 12 to the ECHR. 
This Protocol, which opened for signature on 4 November 2000, provides an 
independent, freestanding right to non-discrimination in Article 1(1): `The enjoyment of 
any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any grounds such 
as ... ' and then 
it mentions the same grounds as Article 14 ECHR. Protocol 12 uses the 
same terms `any grounds such as' and `or other status' and thus the list of grounds is 
also open-ended. Many Member States appear reluctant to ratify the Protocol because, 
on the one hand, it is said to be too broad and to give too much discretion to the 
European Court of Human Rights to determine the obligations of States, and, on the 
other hand, it is criticised for not providing for positive measures. However, the 
Preamble makes it clear that positive measures are allowed. It states: 
Reaffirming that the principle of non-discrimination does not prevent States Parties from 
taking measures in order to promote full and effective equality, provided that there is an 
objective and reasonable justification for those measures. 
We will come back to this statement later. 
Another criticism of the ECHR, related to the criticism about its accessory 
character, is that it does not give a guarantee of equality before the law or a right to 
protection against discrimination, like Article 26 ICCPR does. Both Article 24 of the 
53 O'Hare, Ursula, "Enhancing European Equality Rights: A New Regional Framework" 8,2 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 133-65 (2001), at 133 and 135; Grief, Nicholas, "Non- 
Discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Critique of the United Kingdom 
Government's Refusal to Sign and Ratify Protocol 12" 27, European Law Review, Human Rights 
Survey, HR/3-HR/18 (2002), at HR/4. 
sa See Schokkenbroek, Jeroen, "Towards s Stronger European Protection Against Discrimination: The 
Preparation of a New Additional Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights" in: Moon, 
Gay, (ed. ), Race Discrimination. Developing and Using a New Legal Framework (2000 
Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing) 29-37, at 31. 
55 Supra note 53, at 135. 
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American Convention on Human Rights and Article 3 of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights contain such a guarantee. Protocol 12 does extend Article 14 
ECHR beyond the rights and freedoms of the Convention to `any right set forth by law, ' 
but it still does not contain a guarantee of equality before the law, although its Preamble 
mentions that the Member States are `having regard to the fundamental principle 
according to which all persons are equal before the law and entitled to equal protection 
of the law'. However, the principle is not explicitly stated in the operative part of the 
Protocol itself. Therefore, Protocol 12 can be seen as an improvement on Article 14 
ECHR by creating a freestanding right, but it would have been better if it had expressly 
stated the principle of equality before the law. 56 The Protocol entered into force on 
Ol/04/2005.57 As the Protocol has only been in force for a very short time and has been 
ratified only by a small number of States, there is no case law on it yet. 
What models of anti discrimination law do the ECHR and Protocol 12 follow? 
In Thlimmenos v Greece, the Court 58 stated clearly that the right under Article 14 not to 
be discriminated against was violated `when States treat differently persons in 
analogous situations without providing an objective and reasonable justification'. The 
Court then went on to consider that the right not to be discriminated against was also 
violated `when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat 
differently persons whose situations are significantly different'. 59 The first part is thus a 
clear statement of the equal treatment model: treating people in the same situation alike. 
Note that a difference in treatment is not considered to be discrimination if it is 
56 Whether an equality clause and a clause expressly allowing for positive action measures should be 
added to the provision of Protocol 12 or whether a mention in the Preamble was sufficient, was part of 
the discussions on the text of Protocol 12, see Schokkenbroek, Jeroen, "A New European Standard 
Against Discrimination: Negotiating Protocol No 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights" 
in: Niessen, Jan and Chopin, Isabelle, (eds. ), The Development of Legal Instruments to Combat 
Racism in a Diverse Europe (2004 Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 61-79, at 70-2. 
57 By June 2006, of the EU Member States, only Cyprus, Finland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg had 
ratified the Protocol. Romania, which has become a Member State on 01/01/2007, ratified the 
Protocol in July 2006. 
58 In this section of the Chapter, reference to `the Court' will mean the European Court of Human Rights 
in Strasbourg. 
59 Case Thlimmenos v Greece [2001] 31 EHRR 15, at para 44. 
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objectively and reasonably justified. This possibility of objective and reasonable 
justification has been expressed frequently by the Court. 60 This interpretation of the 
Court will, most probably, also apply to Protocol 12. 
But are there signs of any other models in the Convention and the Protocol? Do 
they allow for indirect discrimination? It seems that the Court recognises that Article 14 
covers indirect discrimination. In the Belgian Linguistics case, the Court referred to the 
`aim and effects' of the measures under consideration in the case. The use of the term 
`effects' appears to imply that indirect discrimination is covered as well as direct 
discrimination. However, in the Abdulaziz case, the Court seemed to implicitly reject 
the concept of indirect discrimination. In that case, the applicants argued that British 
immigration rules were discriminatory on the grounds of race because their effect was 
to prevent substantially more men from the New Commonwealth and Pakistan than 
from elsewhere from entering Britain. The Court did not accept this argument and did 
not find the rules racially discriminatory, although it did find them directly 
discriminatory on the grounds of sex. Small61 discusses this case and writes: 
... 
it was precisely because the generally applicable rules disproportionately affected these 
men that they should have been reviewed as indirectly discriminatory on the test in the 
Belgian Linguistics. 
In the Thlimmenos case the Court accepted that indirect discrimination was covered by 
Article 14 ECHR, as will be clear from the second part of the statement quoted above. 
As Small writes, that case `has finally settled the issue in favour of indirect 
discrimination under Article 14'. 62 Mr Thlimmenos, a Jehova's Witness, was convicted 
and served a prison sentence for refusing, on religious grounds, to wear a military 
60 See for example: the following cases: Case relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of 
Languages in Education in Belgium v Belgium (Belgian Linguistics case) [1979-1980] 1 EHRR 252, 
at para 10; Marckx v Belgium [1979-1980] 2 EHRR 330, at para 33; Rasmussen v Denmark [1985] 7 
EHRR 371, at para 36; Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v UK [1985] 7 EHRR 471, at para 72. 
61 Small, Joan, "Structure and Substance: Developing a Practical and Effective Prohibition on 
Discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights" 6,1, International Journal of 
Discrimination and the Law 45-67 (2003), at 60. 
62 Ibid. at 60-1; see also McColgan, supra note 35, at 169 and Grief, supra note 53, at HR/7. 
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uniform while performing his military service. About nine years later he was refused 
access to the chartered accountancy profession because he had a previous conviction for 
a serious criminal offence, and this barred him from access. He argued that this was a 
violation of Article 14 ECHR taken together with Article 9 (freedom of religion). The 
Court decided that the Greek Government had failed to treat Thlimmenos differently 
from other people convicted of a serious crime without an objective or reasonable 
justification. It considered that `a conviction for refusing on religious or philosophical 
grounds to wear the military uniform cannot imply any dishonesty or moral turpitude 
likely to undermine the offender's ability to exercise this profession'. 63 The State should 
have provided for appropriate exceptions to the rule barring persons convicted of a 
serious crime from the profession of chartered accountant. So, the Greek Government 
was held to be in violation of Article 14, because it had not taken into account that the 
rule for access to the chartered accountancy profession could have disproportionate 
adverse effects for people like Thlimmenos. The following passage of the Jordan v UK 
case64 also indicates that the Court has accepted that Article 14 ECHR covers both 
direct and indirect discrimination: 
Where a general policy or measure has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular 
group, it is not excluded that this may be considered as discriminatory notwithstanding that 
it is not specifically aimed or directed at that group. 
The interpretation of Protocol 12 will, very likely, follow the interpretation of Article 14 
ECHR in this, and we can conclude that both cover indirect discrimination as well and 
as such go some way towards a substantive model of anti discrimination law. Gerards65 
writes that the Court in the Thlimmenos case `explicitly accepted that not only formal 
63 Supra note 59, at para 47. 
64 Case Jordan v United Kingdom [2003] 37 EHRR 2, at para 154. This case was conducted together 
with three other cases, in each of which the same passage was quoted. Judgment in all four cases was 
given on 4/05/2001. See Cases McKerr v United Kingdom [2002] 34 EHRR 553, at para 165; Kelly 
and others v United Kingdom [2001] ECHR 40, at para 148; Shanaghan v United Kingdom App. No. 
37715/97, at para 129. 
65 Gerards, Janneke, "The Application of Article 14 ECHR by the European Court of Human Rights" in: 
Niessen and Chopin, supra note 56,3-60, at 13. 
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discrimination (unequal treatment of equal cases), but also substantive discrimination 
falls within the scope of Article 14 ECHR'. 
The next question is whether Article 14 and Protocol 12 allow for positive 
action, as that is another indication of a more substantive model. As mentioned, the 
Strasbourg Court allows justification for discrimination under Article 14 ECHR. This 
enables positive measures to be accepted as a justified form of differential treatment, 
provided that the justification is objective and reasonable, has a legitimate aim, and 
there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and 
the aims sought. The latter is the test for justification used by the Court. Feldman67 66 
points to the Belgian Linguistics case to support this, as it mentions that `certain legal 
inequalities tend only to correct factual inequalities'. 68 In the case of Lindsay v UK, 69 it 
was found `that the difference in treatment in the present case has an objective and 
reasonable justification in the aim of providing positive discrimination in favour of 
married women who work'. Small explains that the Court held that the failure to treat 
Mr. Thlimmenos differently from others convicted of a felony was without objective 
and reasonable justification. The specific failure in this case was the failure of the Greek 
law to provide for appropriate exceptions to the rule barring persons convicted of a 
felony from the profession of chartered accountant. In other words, Greek law should 
have provided for exceptions. From this, she then concludes that `it is implicit in the 
reasoning of Thlimmenos that positive discrimination may sometimes be required . 
70 
The above indicates that Article 14 ECHR allows for positive measures. As we 
have seen, Protocol 12 does not explicitly allow for positive measures in the Protocol 
itself, but the Preamble states that they are allowed, if there is an objective and 
reasonable justification. This confirms what has been said about Article 14. So both 
16 See the cases mentioned in note 60. 
67 Feldman, supra note 52, at 145-6. 
68 Belgian Linguistics case, supra note 60, para 10. 
69 Case Lindsay v UK [1987] 9 EHRR 555, at 559. 
70 Small, supra note 61, at 61-2. 
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measures allow for positive measures, but neither of them put a duty on states to take 
such measures. 
Article 32 ECHR determines that the jurisdiction of the Court extends to all 
matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the 
Protocols thereto. Under Article 33, any State Party may refer another State Party for 
any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols. Article 34 
gives `any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals' who claim to 
be the victim of a violation by a State Party of the rights of the Convention or its 
Protocols, the right to apply to the Court. These enforcement mechanisms are available 
for Protocol 12 as well, as the Articles mention both the Convention and its Protocols. 
So both Article 14 and Protocol 12 allow for actions by groups as well as by 
individuals. This is another indication of a more substantive model of anti 
discrimination law. 
Do Article 14 ECHR and Protocol 12 put positive duties on states to eliminate 
discrimination and to respect diversity and so go some way towards a pluralist model? 
Article 14 ECHR obliges States Parties to secure the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in the Convention without discrimination, while Article 1 obliges 
them `to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
Section 1 of this Convention'. Section 1 includes Article 14. This appears to put a 
positive duty on states to protect a person against discrimination in relation to his or her 
Convention rights. This is supported by the Report from the Commission in the Belgian 
Linguistics case. The Commission expresses its opinion that the word `secured' implies 
the placing of an obligation which is not simply negative on the Contracting States. 7' 
Article 1 of Protocol 12 has two paragraphs; according to the first one, the enjoyment of 
any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination; the second one states 
71 See Feldman, supra note 52, at 143 and 145-6; Belgian Linguistics case, supra note 60, para 10 
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that no one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any of the grounds 
mentioned in paragraph 1. The duty imposed on States by the first paragraph is 
formulated in the same way as Article 14 ECHR, although it covers `any right set forth 
by law', so the same reasoning can be used here: the state has a duty to protect a person 
against discrimination in any rights set forth by law. The second paragraph puts a 
(negative) duty on any public authority not to discriminate. However, neither instrument 
seems to require States to enact new legislation to guarantee non-discrimination. The 
Explanatory Report to Protocol 12 states that `while such positive obligations cannot be 
excluded altogether, the prime objective of Article 1 is to embody a negative obligation 
for the Parties: the obligation not to discriminate against individuals'. 72 It continues: 
On the other hand, it cannot be totally excluded that the duty to "secure" under the first 
paragraph of Article 1 might entail positive obligations. For example, this question could 
arise if there is a clear lacuna in domestic law protection from discrimination. 
73 
The latter suggests that a failure to act could be a violation of the Protocol. According to 
O'Hare, 74 `this approach is supported by the case law of the Court in the context of 
other Convention rights'. This therefore suggests that both Article 14 ECHR and Article 
1 Protocol 12 contain a very tentative positive duty to protect from and to prevent or 
remedy discrimination, 
75 but there is no duty to promote tolerance and respect for 
diversity, nor is there a duty to follow a policy of mainstreaming equality and/or 
diversity in either measure. 
The Court has considered that its `supervisory functions oblige it to pay the 
utmost attention to the principles characterising a "democratic society"`, and that these 
supervisory functions must be guided by the demands of `pluralism, tolerance and 
72 Protocol 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Explanatory Report, (ETS No. 177), at para 24 < 
www conventions. coe. int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/177. htm 
73 At Para 26. 
74 Supra note 53, at 140 and the cases mentioned there. 
'S See on the question whether Protocol 12 imposes positive obligations on states: Schokkenbroek, supra 
note 56, at 75-9. 
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broadmindedness without which there is no "democratic society"`. 76 The Court has also 
mentioned repeatedly that `the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are 
theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective'. 77 
In summary, both Article 14 ECHR and Protocol 12 mainly follow the equal 
treatment model of discrimination law, but there are also some elements of the more 
substantive models, in that both appear to cover indirect discrimination, both allow 
States to take positive measures and both allow groups to take action together. The fact 
that the rights guaranteed should be `practical and effective' also points to a more 
substantive model. There is even a small hint towards the pluralist model in that the 
Council of Europe was formed to promote greater unity between its members and that 
the Court interprets the Convention in a spirit of pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness. But, as with all international measures, this is more in the form of 
general statements than concrete provisions. The ECHR does guarantee individual 
rights and there appears to be no real recognition of group rights. 78 
The ECHR has been in force for more than 50 years but, because of the 
accessory character of Article 14, the Court has not all that often made a decision on 
that article. Article 14 can only be invoked together with one or more of the other rights 
in the ECHR. Often, if the Court has decided that there is a breach of the other 
article(s), it will find it unnecessary to consider if there was also a breach of Article 14. 
In fact, until 2004, the Court has never found a violation of Article 14 on the grounds of 
racial discrimination. Nachova and others v Bulgaria79 was the first case concerning 
76 Case Handyside v UK [1979-80] 1 EHRR 737, at para 49. 
n Cases Artico v Italy [1980] 3 EHRR 1, at para 33; Loizidou v Turkey [1995] 20 EHRR 99, at pars 72. 
78 See on minorities and the ECHR: Poulter 1994 and 1998, both supra note 24; Gilbert, Geoff, "The 
Protection of Minorities under the ECLIR" in: Dine and Watt, supra note 10,150-61; Malik, Maleiha, 
Minority Protection and Human Rights" in: Campbell, Tom, Ewing K. D. and Tomkins, Adam, (eds. ), 
Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (2001 Oxford: Oxford University Press) 277-94. 
79 Case Nachova and Others v Bulgaria [2004] ECHR 90. In this judgment a violation was found both 
concerning the lack of investigation into whether discriminatory attitudes played a role in the 
shootings of Roma people by police officers and concerning the shootings themselves. The Grand 
Chamber, in its judgment of 06/07/2005, [2005] ECHR 465, also found a violation of Article 14, but 
only concerning the lack of investigation, not concerning the shootings themselves. 
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racial discrimination in which a violation of Article 14 (in conjunction with Article 2) 
was found. This case involved the treatment of people of Roma origin. It was followed 
by two other cases in which racial discrimination was held to be a violation of Article 
14: Moldovan and others v Romania (No 2), 80 also involving Roma People, and 
Timishev v Russia , 
81 a case involving a Russian national of Chechen origin. However, 
the Court found no breach of Article 14 (in conjunction with Article 2, Protocol 1, 
which states the right to education), in D. H. and others v Czech Republic. 82 In this case, 
18 children of Roma origin complained that the decision to place them in special 
schools was discriminatory. This case has been referred to the Grand Chamber. 
There is another area of the Court's case law where racism and racial 
discrimination have played a role and that is in cases where the issue has been whether 
prohibitions on and limitations to the expression of racism and racial hatred are 
compatible with the rights of the Convention. In these cases there is often a clash 
between different human rights, like the right to freedom of expression, guaranteed in 
Article 10, or freedom of association, guaranteed in Article 11, and the right to be free 
from discrimination. 
The views in Europe with regard to interference with freedom of expression or 
association to ban expressions of racist hatred are in marked contrast to those in the US, 
where freedom of expression and the right to voice political dissent is afforded greater 
protection under the First Amendment of the US Constitution. In the US, racist 
propaganda is seen as part of the legitimate political discourse. 83 Here we will 
B0 Case Moldovan and Others v Romania [2005] ECHR 473. 
81 Case Timishev v Russia [2005] ECHR 858. 
82 Case D. H. and Others v Czech Republic [2006] ECHR 113. 
83 For more information on the situation in the US see, for example: Coliver, Sandra, (ed. ), Striking a 
Balance, Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-Discrimination (1992 London/Colchester: 
ARTICLE 19/Human Rights Centre University of Essex); Jacobs, James and Potter, Kimberly, Hate 
Crimes, Criminal Law and Identity Politics (1998 Oxford: Oxford University Press); Hepple, Bob, 
"Freedom of Expression and the Problem of Harassment" in: Beatson, Jack and Cripps, Yvonne, 
(eds. ), Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information (2000 Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
177-96; Iganski, Paul, "Hate Crimes Hurt More" 45,4, American Behavioral Scientist 626-38 (2001); 
Ibid. (ed. ), The Hate Debate Should Hate be Punished as a Crime (2002 London: Profile 
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concentrate on the position taken by the European Court of Human Rights, as this is 
relevant for the EU Member States. The Convention gives the right to freedom of 
expression in Article 10: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers.... 
However, the Convention itself states clearly that this right carries duties and 
responsibilities and is not absolute. Paragraph 2 of Article 10 states when interference is 
justified: 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
This right to freedom of expression as a fundamental human right which carries with it 
duties and responsibilities can also be found in the UDHR (Articles 19 and 29) and in 
the ICCPR (Article 19). 
In many of the cases, someone has been convicted for libel, defamation or 
incitement to racial hatred for what he or she has said or written. The person convicted 
then applied to the Strasbourg Court claiming that this was a violation of Article 10, a 
breach of his/her right to free expression. There are a number of points that can be made 
about the decisions of the Court. Firstly, the Court has often stressed that freedom of 
expression constitutes one of the basic conditions of a democratic society, and is 
Books/Institute for Jewish Policy Research); Gelber, Katherine, Speaking Back, The Free Speech 
versus Hate Speech Debate (2002 Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company); 
Nathwani, Niraj, "Atlantic Divide on Fight Against Racist Websites" 10, Equal Voices 11-9 (2002). 
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essential for its progress and for the development of every man. 84 Secondly, the Court 
has stressed the importance of freedom of the press and freedom of political debate for a 
democratic society and that the limits of acceptable criticism are wider with regard to a 
politician acting in his official capacity than in relation to a private individual. The 
protection of the reputation of a politician, acting in his public capacity, has to be 
weighed against the interests of open discussion of political issues. 85 Thirdly, the Court 
has held that freedom of expression under Article 10 may not be invoked in a sense 
contrary to Article 17. The latter article prohibits abuse of the rights of the Convention. 
Therefore, Article 10 cannot be invoked contrary to the text and the spirit of the 
Convention which would contribute to the destruction of the rights and freedoms set 
forth in the Convention. 86 Fourthly, the Court will take into account the medium and 
manner of the communication. For example, in the Jersild case, the Court considered 
that television would have more impact than an article in a paper. It also considered that 
the programme in that case was broadcast as part of a serious news programme and was 
intended for well-informed people. 87 In Lopez Gomes da Silva v Portugal, the Court 
considered that the applicant acted in accordance with the rules governing the 
journalistic profession by placing the editorial in question, which described a politician 
as being fascist and antisemitic, alongside the declarations of that politician. 88 
We can conclude that the Court will allow for interference with freedom of 
expression in case of racist expressions or incitement to acts of violence, but that these 
exceptions have to fulfil strict conditions: they have to be prescribed by law, be 
84 Handyside case, supra note 76, at para 49. 
85 See for example: Case Oberschlick v Austria [ 1994] 19 EHRR 389, at para 59. 
86 See Cases Glimmerveen and Haagenbeek v the Netherlands [1982] 4 EHRR 260; Kuhnen v Federal 
Republic of Germany App. No. 12194/86, Admissibility Decision 12/05/1988. Glimmerveen and 
Haagenbeek were convicted for distributing leaflets advocating racial discrimination and repatriation 
of all non-whites from Holland. Kuhnen had a leading position in an organisation attempting to 
reinstitute the National Socialist Party in Germany. They were all considered to invoke freedom of 
expression against the spirit of the Convention and therefore the interference with their right was 
considered justified. 
87 Case Jersild v Denmark [ 1994] 19 EHRR 1, at paras 31 and 34. 
88 Case Lopez Gomes da Silva v Portugal [2002] 34 EHRR 56, at para 35. 
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necessary in a democratic society to achieve a legitimate aim, which means that they 
have to fulfil a pressing social need, that the means used must be proportionate to the 
aim pursued and that the reasons given for the justification must be relevant and 
sufficient. The Court will thus accept (criminal or other) laws against hate speech and 
racist expressions, as does Article 4 ICERD. However, some States Parties see these 
laws as an infringement of freedom of expression rights, and have, therefore, made 
reservations against Article 4 when they signed the Convention. 
Within the EU it appears to be accepted that such laws are justified restrictions 
on a person's freedom of expression. For example, the Consultative Commission on 
Racism and Xenophobia wrote in its report of 1995: 
The legal systems of all EU Member States as well as the international human rights 
instruments to which the Member States are parties allow for such restrictions ... [i. e. 
criminal laws prohibiting incitement to racial hatred] of the freedom of expression and 
association, provided these are lawful and necessary to protect the rights of others. 
Moreover, various international human rights instruments to which most EU Member 
States are parties prohibit by law the advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence 89 
In the Charter of European Parties for a Non-Racist Society, 90 the democratic political 
parties of Europe express their awareness of the fact that according to the international 
human rights instruments signed and ratified by the EU Member States: 
one's political freedoms are not absolute in view of the equally fundamental right to be 
protected against racial discrimination and that therefore political freedoms cannot be 
allowed to be abused to exploit, cause or initiate prejudice on the grounds of race, colour, 
89 European Council Consultative Commission on Racism and Xenophobia, Final Report (April 1995), 
Brussels, 6906/1/95, RAXEN 24 REV 1 (1995), at 49, < http: //aei. pitt. edu/archive/00001588/. 
90 Charter of European Parties for a Non-Racist Society, adopted at Utrecht, 28/02/1998, < 
www. lbr. nl/intemationaal, 'charter%2ouk. html The relaunched Charter was supported in a Joint 
Declaration signed on 25/09/2003 by the President of the European Parliament and the President of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, see on this also: < 
http: //eumc. eurona. eu/eumc/index. php? fuseaction=content. dsn cat content&catid=3efm500f9e0c5&c 
ontentid=3 efO546396bb5 
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ethnic origin or nationality or for the purpose of seeking to gain the sympathy of the 
electorate for prejudice on such grounds. 
Another example is a Resolution91 in which the European Parliament mentions freedom 
of speech where it welcomes Member States equality laws which are `protective of the 
rule of law in setting the limit to freedom of speech at the point where it incites to racial 
hatred or violence'. 92 The Parliament goes on to call for, amongst other things, 
`adequate checks and balances on the role of the media, including the Internet, while 
avoiding the infringement of truthful reporting, free speech, and ability to counter 
extremist opinions'. 93 Further on in the Resolution, the Parliament `calls on the Member 
States and the Community institutions to ensure that rules restricting freedom of opinion 
and expression are not contrary or disproportionate to national, European and 
international rules on the subject'. 94 
In 2001, the EU Commission issued a Proposal for a Framework Decision on 
Combating Racism and Xenophobia, aimed at criminal law measures. 95 In the Proposal, 
the European Commission mentions the importance of respect for human rights, such as 
the right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. However, `the exercise of 
these freedoms has to be balanced with the prevention of disorder and crime and the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others'. 
These examples all suggest that, within the EU, restrictions on free expression to 
protect against racist speech and incitement to racial hatred are accepted. The general 
opinion appears to be that a balance needs to be found between the protection of 
freedom of expression on the one hand, and the right not to be discriminated against on 
91 European Parliament Resolution on Countering Racism and Xenophobia in the European Union 
(COM (1999) 268), A5-0049/2000. 
92 At QQ. 
93 At RR. 
94 At 25. 
95 COM (2001) 664, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Racism and 
Xenophobia, at 7. We will come back to this proposal in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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the other hand. States have a margin of appreciation in balancing these rights, but the 
Court will be the ultimate judge on whether the state has come to the right conclusion. 
Two more articles of the ECHR need to be mentioned as important to racial 
discrimination. Firstly, in the East African Asians Case, 96 it was found in the 
Commission's report that racial discrimination could amount to degrading treatment and 
thus be in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. Secondly, racial prejudice expressed 
by jurors injury trials have been held by the Court to impede the right of the accused to 
a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR. The Court held that the Convention imposes an 
obligation on national courts to check whether it is an impartial tribunal under Article 
6(1) when there are serious allegations about racist expressions by a juror. 97 
6 Conclusion 
In this Chapter we have discussed the anti discrimination clauses of the international 
human rights instruments that are influential in the EU. One reason for this influence is 
that all EU Member States have signed and ratified most of the international measures, 
and, protection against racial discrimination is part of the general principles of 
international law, or ius cogens. Another reason is that all institutions of the EU have 
put the fight against racial and ethnic discrimination firmly within an international 
human rights context, as is clear from, for example, the texts of Article 6(2) TEU, the 
Preamble of the Race Directive and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. The 
ECJ has also stressed the importance of the principle of equality and non-discrimination 
as a general principle of Community law. Within the EU, the ECHR and the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights are the most important and influential. These 
have, therefore, been discussed in more detail, together with Protocol 12, as that widens 
the protection against discrimination given in Article 14 ECHR to cover `any right set 
" Case East African Asians v UK [1973] 3 EHRR 76, paras 207-8. 
97 See Cases Remli v France [1996] 22 EHRR 253, at para 48; Gregory v UK [1998] 25 EHRR 577, at 
para 45; Sander v UK [2001] 31 EHRR 44, at para 34. 
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forth by law'. The other instrument discussed in detail is the ICERD, because it is the 
only international measure specifically aimed at the elimination of racial discrimination 
and because it is one of the most widely ratified UN Conventions. The ICERD is also 
useful because it gives a clear definition of racial discrimination. 
Looking at the different models of anti discrimination law, described in Chapter 
2, we can conclude that most (of the anti discrimination articles of) international 
instruments have mainly been following the equal treatment model, although there are 
aspects of the substantive models, as most prohibit indirect discrimination and allow for 
positive measures to make up for past disadvantage. This seems to be closer to the 
equality of opportunity model than to the equality of results model, as the positive 
measures are seen as temporary and should end when the objectives aimed at have been 
achieved. Most international measures recognise the importance of tolerance and 
understanding between people(s) in general statements in their preambles. This is the 
reason why they were adopted in the first place, especially those that were adopted just 
after the end of World War II. There was a general feeling at that time that such a 
disastrous event should never be allowed to happen again and that future generations 
should be saved from the ravages and sorrows of war. The world reacted against the use 
of theories of race to declare some races inferior, which justified their exclusion, 
subordination and extermination. This was to be avoided in future and, therefore, the 
United Nations was established, with its peoples determined `to practise tolerance and 
live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and, to unite our strength to 
maintain international peace and security'. 
98 A number of international treaties and 
declarations followed, proclaiming the equality of every person. The Council of Europe 
was also established with the aim of achieving greater unity between its members. In the 
sense that these instruments aim to create a sphere of mutual tolerance and 
98 Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations (1945). 
175 
understanding of and respect for diversity, they can be said to have a pluralist aim. 
However, the measures do not contain any specific duties on States Parties to promote 
tolerance and respect, nor do most of them contain any recognition of rights of groups. 
Therefore, these instruments cannot really be said to be following the pluralist model of 
anti discrimination legislation. 
The aim of this Chapter has been to provide the international human rights 
context for the anti race discrimination legislation of the EU. Boyle and Baldaccini end 
with a mixed verdict on the achievement of the international human rights approaches 
but conclude: 
The most important achievement of the international human rights approach to the 
elimination of racial discrimination has been to establish in international law a prohibition 
on racism as a state ideology and on the practice of all forms of racial and ethnic 
discrimination. Not only are these prohibitions part of international customary law but the 
majority of the world states that have ratified ICERD have embraced a range of duties 
obligating them to eliminate any such discrimination by legislative, educational and other 
means. " 
It is with this in mind that we will examine the EU measures against racial or ethnic 
origin discrimination against the background of the analyses made in Chapters 1 to 4. 
" Supra note 2, at 191. 
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CHAPTER 5- THE RACE DIRECTIVE: THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING 
RACE AND RACISM. 
1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, we examined a number of the key concepts used in the Thesis, including 
race, racism and racial discrimination. These concepts and their historical development 
have had a bearing on the legislative measures against racial discrimination which the 
Union has taken. However, despite extensive European discussions of the problems of 
racism and racial discrimination since the mid 1980s, the EU did not adopt a directive 
until 2000. A number of suggestions and proposals for a directive or for treaty 
amendment have been made over the years, but it was thought that the Union did not 
have the competence to adopt legislative measures. This competence was given by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force on 1 May 1999 and introduced Article 13 
into the EC Treaty. 
Once the competence was established, the Commission acted quickly and 
issued, in November 1999, three proposals based on Article 13: one for a General 
Framework Directive for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation; ' a second 
for a Directive on Equal Treatment irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin; 2 and a third 
for a Community Action Programme to Combat Discrimination. 3 In June 2000, the 
Race Directive was adopted, followed in November 2000 by the Framework Directive 
and the Action Programme. 
4 
In this Chapter, we examine the Race Directive with respect to the theoretical 
concepts of race, racism and racial discrimination analysed in Chapter 1. For a proper 
COM (1999) 565. 
2 COM (1999) 566. 
3 COM (1999) 567. 
° Council Decision 2000/750/EC of 27/11/2000 establishing a Community Action Programme to 
combat Discrimination (2001 to 2006) [2000] OJ L 303/23. Hereafter referred to as the Action 
Programme. 
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analysis of the Directive in relation to these concepts, it is essential not only to look at 
the measure itself, but also at the history of anti race discrimination measures in the EU, 
because this historical development has been influential in shaping the Directive. We 
will start with analysing why the EU, after years of discussions and general statements 
about the need to combat racism and xenophobia without the adoption of any specific 
measures, finally adopted a directive against racial or ethnic origin discrimination in 
record time, within seven months after a proposal was issued. What brought about this 
change of heart? 
The next part of this Chapter contains a discussion of the way the EU has dealt 
with the concepts of race, racism and racial discrimination in legislation specifically 
aimed at combating racism and xenophobia. From previous Chapters, it will be clear 
that measures against racism and racial discrimination vary in what exactly they cover 
under these terms. For example, the ICERD includes race, colour, descent and national 
or ethnic origin in its definitions of racial discrimination, while the British Race 
Relations Act 1976 covers colour, race, nationality and ethnic or national origin. Many 
national anti discrimination measures include race and ethnic origin as one of a number 
of grounds on which discrimination is prohibited in a general equality law. For example, 
the Irish Equal Status Act 2000 covers gender, marital status, family status, sexual 
orientation, religion, age, disability, race, colour, nationality, national or ethnic origin 
and membership of the Traveller community, 
5 while the Belgian Act against 
discrimination covers sex, a so-called race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin, 
sexual orientation, marital status, birth, fortune, age, religion or belief, current or future 
state of health, a disability or physical characteristic. 
6 
See Article 3(2), < www. irishstatutebook. ie/ZZAgY2000. html 
6 Article 2 Act of 23/02/2003 pertaining to the Combat of Discrimination and to the Amendment of the 
Act of 15/02/1993 pertaining to the Foundation of a Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to 
Racism, < www. diversiteit. be 
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The Race Directive prohibits discrimination between persons `irrespective of 
racial or ethnic origin'. The third part of this Chapter will analyse what `racial or ethnic 
origin' means. Does the Directive also protect a person against discrimination on the 
ground of his/her colour, descent or nationality? The question whether nationality as a 
ground for discrimination is covered by the Race Directive will be given special 
attention, together with the question, linked to this, whether all persons who find 
themselves in the EU are protected against racial or ethnic origin discrimination or only 
those who have the nationality of one of the Member States. We also discuss whether 
racial or ethnic origin should cover any other related concepts, like religion or belief. 
2 Taking Action against Racism and Racial Discrimination 
Racism and racial discrimination have been discussed within the EU since the mid- 
1980s. The European Parliament called repeatedly for Community action against racial 
discrimination. 7 In these calls it was supported by a number of NGOs. It can be said, 
that the Parliament and the NGOs were, until the early 1990s, the only major actors in 
the fight against racism within the EU. Until that time, neither the Member States, nor 
the other Institutions showed any real commitment towards taking Community action. 
Some general statements about the need to combat racism and xenophobia were made, 8 
but these can be said to be hollow, as they did not lead to any real action against racial 
discrimination. 
Therefore, the Member States appear to have been reluctant to take anti 
discrimination measures at EU level, despite repeated calls for such action. Bell, 9 
7 There were, for example, two Parliament Inquiries: European Parliament Committee of Inquiry on the 
Rise of Fascism and Racism in Europe, A2-0160/85, and European Parliament Committee of Inquiry 
on Racism and Xenophobia, A3-0195/90. There were also a number of European Parliament 
Resolutions: [1986] OJ C 36/142 and 36/143; [1987] OJ C 190/108; [1988] OJ C 187/117; [1990] OJ 
C 149/123, OJ C 284/57 and OJ C 324/219. 
8 See for example: Joint Declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
against Racism and Xenophobia [1986] OJ C 158/1; COM (1988) 318, Proposal for a Council 
Resolution on the Fight against Racism and Xenophobia; Resolution of the Council, 29/05/90, on the 
Fight against Racism and Xenophobia [1990] OJ C 157/1. 
9 Bell, Mark, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (2002 Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), at 62-3. 
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describing the evolution of EU law and policy in the field of racial discrimination, notes 
that, although racism entered into the debates in the mid-1980s, no significant progress 
was made because of opposition in the Council. He writes: 
Symbolic statements of commitment were not underpinned by a genuine desire to develop 
common measures against race discrimination. The Council relied on the absence of any 
specific EC Treaty provision on racism to insist that this was not within the Community's 
legal competence. In this way, the question of competence became a kind of filter 
mechanism, a device to keep off the agenda issues the Council did not wish to address. 
As Bell mentions, if the Member States really had wanted to take action, they could 
have amended the EC Treaty to give the Community legal competence in this field, but 
they did not do so in either the Single European Act (1986) or the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU 1992). Dummett1° writes: 
Legal opinion was divided on whether Article 235 was an adequate basis when there was 
no direct mention of racism or xenophobia in the Treaty. The problem was really quite as 
much political as legal: the basis for dealing with sex equality had been a very slender one. 
In other words, if the Member States had been committed enough to take legislative 
measures against racial discrimination they would have either found a basis in the 
existing Treaty or proposed changes to that Treaty. As MacEwen notes, I' there was `a 
lack of resolve, particularly by the Council of Ministers, to secure the promotion of 
Community legislation against racial discrimination'. 
These quotes show clearly that the statements by the Council of its commitment 
to fighting racism and xenophobia were, in the words used in Chapter 3, hollow 
statements, which were not followed up by concrete action. MacEwen suggests a 
possible reason for this reluctance: a Community directive could be argued to be 
10 Dummett, Ann, `British Race Relations in a European Context" in: Blackstone, Tessa, Parekh, 
Bhikhu and Sanders, Peter, (eds. ), Race Relations in Britain: A Developing Agenda (1998 
London/NewYork: Routledge) 204-20, at 218. 
11 MacEwen, Martin, Tackling Racism in Europe: An Examination of Anti-Discrimination Law in 
Practice (1995 Oxford /Washington: Berg), at 75. 
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superfluous, because of extensive membership of the ICERD and recognition of the 
ECHR by Member States and Community Institutions, or because of a growing body of 
legislation at national level. 12 Member States might also have considered that action 
against racial discrimination was a matter for national, rather than Community 
legislation. However, some other, more hidden reasons might also have played a role. 
Member States might have been reluctant to acknowledge that the problem of racism 
and racial discrimination existed within their borders and might have considered it a 
problem affecting other states. In Chapter 1, we mentioned that denial of racism occurs 
frequently and is seen as an obstacle to any progress in addressing it effectively, while 
in Chapter 4, we touched upon the fact that states see the problem of racism as affecting 
other states. The denial could have been exacerbated by the fact that, in some Member 
States, the subject of race and racism and the use of these terms with their negative 
connotations was (and still is) a sensitive issue. Taking action against racism and racial 
discrimination might also have been considered not politically beneficial, as it was not 
an issue that would win many votes. 
The mood within the EU started to change in the early 1990s, and support for 
community action grew in many different quarters, including in the European Council. 
Bell13 mentions three principal reasons for this: firstly, the development of cross-border 
racism and the realisation that this might affect the functioning of the internal market; 
secondly, the spill-over effects from EU immigration and asylum policies; and, thirdly, 
the establishment of an effective European lobby against racism. The EU immigration 
and asylum policies `galvanised national and European civil society into transnational 
action for anti-racism measures at the EU level, so as to ameliorate the effects of the 
immigration policies'. '4 
12 Ibid. 
13 Supra note 9, at 63-9. 
14 Ibid. at 67. 
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A clear indication of this change of mood within the EU in favour of taking 
legislative measures was the decision by the European Council at the 1994 Corfu 
Summit to set up a Consultative Commission on Racism and Xenophobia. 15 The final 
report of this Commission, called the Kahn Commission after its chair Jean Kahn, 16 
concluded that `amendment of the Treaty to provide explicitly for Community 
competence must be regarded as an essential element in any serious European strategy 
aimed at combating racism and xenophobia'. The Commission saw this as `the clearest 
expression of the European Union's real intention of combating, not merely protesting 
against, the rising tide of racism and xenophobia'. 17 In other words, the Kahn 
Commission saw Treaty amendment as doing something about racism and xenophobia, 
rather than making hollow statements. The Kahn Commission's Report is important 
because it was a report from a body appointed by the European Council and consisting 
of representatives of the Member States themselves. Many of the Report's 
recommendations were followed in the Race Directive and other measures and because 
of this, the Kahn Commission can be seen as the third major player in the development 
of EU anti race discrimination legislation. 
As we have mentioned, in the preceding years, doubt had been expressed as to 
whether the Community had the competence to act against racial discrimination. The 
clearest way of dealing with this was explicitly stating the Community competence to 
do so in the EC Treaty, as the European Parliament, 18 the Starting Line Group19 and the 
Kahn Commission had advocated. This was done by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
was adopted in 1997 and added Article 13 to the EC Treaty. This Article established the 
15 Corfu Summit Conclusions, < www. europarl. eu. int/summits/corl en. htm#justice 
16 European Council Consultative Commission on Racism and Xenophobia, Final Report (April 1995), 
Brussels, 6906/1/95, RAXEN 24 REV 1 (1995), < http: //aei. pitt. edu/archive/00001588/. 
17 Ibid. at 57. 
'g See, for example: the Resolutions in note 7; [1993] OJ C 150/127 and OJ C 342/19; [1994] OJ C 
323/154. 
19 The Group's proposal for amending the European Community Treaty was called `The Starting Point', 
see: Chopin, Isabelle, "The Starting Line Group: A Harmonized Approach to Fight Racism and to 
Promote Equal Treatment" 1, European Journal of Migration and Law 111-29 (1999), at 116. 
182 
competence of the Community to take action to combat discrimination based on sex, 
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam came into force on 1 May 1999 and led to the 
proposals for the Race and Framework Directives and the Action Programme. 20 But 
why was discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin singled out for special treatment 
in a separate Directive? Does this special treatment mean that the protection against 
discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin is stronger than the protection 
provided for the other grounds of Article 13 EC? The answer to this question is: yes, the 
protection provided by the Race Directive is stronger than that provided by the 
Framework Directive. There are three reasons for this: firstly, the Race Directive has a 
much wider material scope: both Directives cover access to employment; access to 
training; employment conditions; and, membership of professional organisations. But 
the Race Directive also covers social protection, including social security and health 
care; social advantages; education; and, access to and supply of goods and services 
which are available to the public, including housing. 
21 In other words, the scope of the 
Framework Directive is limited to the field of employment and occupation, while the 
Race Directive goes beyond that. 
Secondly, the Race Directive only allows for two specifically mentioned 
exceptions: for genuine and determining occupational requirements (Article 4) and for 
positive action measures (Article 5). Direct racial or ethnic origin discrimination cannot 
be justified under any other circumstances. The Framework Directive also allows for 
these exceptions (Articles 4(1) and 7, respectively), but it provides for a number of 
additional ones: Article 2(5) gives an additional general exception; Article 4(2) contains 
an exception for occupational activities of organisations with a religious ethos; Article 5 
prescribes that reasonable accommodation must be made for disabled persons; Article 6 
20 Supra notes 1,2 and 3. 
21 The material scope can be found in Article 3(1) of both Directives. 
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provides for a general justification and a number of exceptions in relation to age; and, 
Article 15 makes exceptions for the police service and for teachers in Northern Ireland. 
Thirdly, the Race Directive makes it easier for victims to bring a case for 
discrimination because of the enforcement support it provides. Both Directives put a 
duty on Member States to make judicial and/or administrative procedures available to 
all persons who feel discriminated against. Both also provide that associations and 
organisations can support victims in bringing actions. 
22 But only the Race Directive (in 
Article 13) puts a duty on Member States to `designate a body or bodies for the 
promotion of equal treatment of all persons without discrimination on the grounds of 
racial or ethnic origin'. 
23 
The protection against sex discrimination given by the Equal Treatment, the 
Equal Treatment (Amendment) and the Equal Treatment (Goods) Directives is also 
wider than that under the Framework Directive but not as extensive as that under the 
Race Directive. As far as the scope is concerned, the prohibition of sex discrimination 
now covers the same employment and occupation areas as the Race and Framework 
Directives and, additionally, it covers the provision of goods and services. With regard 
to the exceptions allowed, the Equal Treatment (Amendment) Directive allows for the 
same exceptions as the Race Directive but also contains some provisions for the 
protection of women as regards pregnancy and maternity. However, the Equal 
Treatment (Goods) Directive contains much broader exceptions. Article 4(5) allows for 
justification of direct discrimination, while Article 3(3) exempts the media, advertising 
and education and Article 5 allows for an exception in the insurance field. With regard 
to enforcement, Member States are also under a duty to designate a specialist body or 
bodies for the promotion of equal treatment between men and women. 
u See Articles 7 Race and 9 Framework Directives. 
23 This duty will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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Therefore, the scope of the prohibition of sex discrimination is not as wide as the 
scope under the Race Directive, and, in the provision of goods and services especially, 
much wider exceptions are allowed, while the duty to designate a specialist body exists 
for both sex and racial or ethnic origin. The protection provided by the Framework 
against discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief, disability, age and sexual 
orientation is weaker than that against discrimination on the grounds of sex or of racial 
or ethnic origin. 
So why is the protection against racial discrimination stronger than that against 
other forms of discrimination? In the Explanatory Memorandum to the proposal for the 
Race Directive, the Commission explained that it had chosen a broad scope for the Race 
Directive because `a comprehensive coverage is necessary to make a serious 
contribution to curbing racism and xenophobia in Europe'. 24 In the Communication 
accompanying the Article 13 EC proposals, the Commission explains that the proposal 
for the Race Directive has a scope that extends beyond the labour market, while the 
scope of the Framework Directive is limited to employment and occupation. This takes 
account of the `strong political will which exists to take action to combat as many 
aspects as possible of racial discrimination'. 
25 It is submitted that this strong political 
will also led to the speedy adoption of the Race Directive. Seven months between 
proposal and adoption is, as Tyson writes, `a record for the adoption of a piece of 
Community law requiring substantial legislative changes at national level 26 
Why was the political will to act against racial discrimination so strong at that 
time? A number of writers mention the influence of the results of the elections in 
24 Supra note 2, at IV. 
25 COM (1999) 564, Communication from the Commission on Certain Community Measures to Combat 
Discrimination, at 8. 
26 Tyson, Adam, "The Negotiation of the European Community Directive on Racial Discrimination" 3, 
European Journal of Migration and Law 199-229 (2001), at 201. 
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Austria in February 2000.27 For example, Goldston writes that the Race Directive was 
`given renewed political impetus by the electoral developments in Austria ... which 
prompted a number of EU member governments to offer tangible evidence of their 
commitment to combating racism'. 28 Bell explains that, in February 2000, Jorg Haider's 
Freedom Party, an extreme right-wing party, became part of the government of Austria. 
The other Member States protested against this and imposed bilateral diplomatic 
sanctions. This led the Portuguese Presidency to fast track the Race Directive as a sign 
of the Union's commitment to combating racism. It also pressurised the individual 
Member States to be more flexible in their negotiating positions - `with presumably no 
state wishing to be regarded as blocking new laws combating racism'. 29 Ellis30 also 
mentions the rise to power of the Freedom Party in Austria. She adds that: 
there was a perception among the Member States that some of the aspiring entrant states in 
central and eastern Europe posed serious problems in relation to racial, ethnic and religious 
tolerance, especially as far as the Roma were concerned. The Commission and the Member 
States took the view that it was vital to ensure that the `acquis communautaire' contained 
strong anti-discrimination legislation in good time before those states became members of 
the Union. 
The European Commission mentioned the importance of the Race Directive in relation 
to the enlargement of the EU as well. 
31 
Another factor that might have played a role in the quick adoption, again 
because the Member States wanted to show their genuine commitment to the fight 
27 Guild, Elspeth, "The EC Directive on Race Discrimination: Surprises, Possibilities and Limitations" 
29,4, Industrial Law Journal 416-23 (2000), at 416; Waddington, Lisa and Bell, Mark, "More Equal 
than Others: Distinguishing European Union Equality Directives" 38, Common Market Law Review 
587-611 (2001), at 610; Goldston, James, "European Law: New Possibilities in the Fight against 
Discrimination" 13,3 Interights Bulletin 127-9 (2001), at 127; Barnard, Catherine, "The Changing 
Scope of the Fundamental Principle of Equality? " 46,4, McGill Law Journal 955-77 (2001), at 966-7; 
Bell, supra note 9, at 74. 
28 Goldston, supra note 27. 
29 Bell, supra note 9, at 74. 
30 Ellis, Evelyn, "The Principle of Non-Discrimination in the Post-Nice Era" in: Arnull, Anthony and 
Wincott, Daniel, (eds. ), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (2002 Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 291-305, at 293-4. 
31 Supra note 2, at III. 
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against racism and racial discrimination, is the United Nations World Conference 
against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR), 
which took place in Durban in August/September 2001.32 Preparations for this 
Conference were well under way when the Race Directive was negotiated, with regional 
Conferences taking place in 2000. Not only were all EU Member States involved in the 
preparations for the European Regional Conference as States Parties to the Council of 
Europe, but the EU also contributed in its own capacity. 33 The latter is interesting as it 
shows once again the importance the EU attaches to the work of the Council of Europe. 
Therefore, the reason for the speedy adoption of EU legislation against racial 
discrimination with a wide scope beyond the employment field, is based on the desire of 
the Member States to show their genuine commitment to the fight against racism and 
racial discrimination, not only to the other Member States, and in particular Austria, but 
also to the (then) Candidate Countries and the rest of the world. 
3 Definitions 
3.1 Race and Racism 
In Chapter 1, we concluded that the terms race, racism and (racial) discrimination are 
far from easy to define and that their meaning is by no means uncontested. We also 
concluded that these terms are both historically specific and socially constructed, or, in 
other words, they have different meanings in different historical and societal settings. 
As mentioned, all three terms carry a negative connotation, but this is strongest for the 
term racism. This negative connotation is linked to the fact that theories of race and 
racism were used to justify suppression, persecution and extermination of people 
considered to be of inferior races. The memory of the Holocaust and the abuse of 
32 Declaration and Action Programme, WCAR, < www. un. ora/WCAR/coverage. htm 
33 Contribution from the Commission Services to the Regional European Conference "All Different - All 
Equal": From Theory to Practice, 17/04/2000, < 
htty //ec euroya. eu/comm/external relations/human rights/wcar/com04 00 en. ndf The European 
Regional Conference itself took place after the adoption of the Race Directive, in October 2000. 
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theories about race made under Nazism in Germany were casting long shadows over the 
debates in the EU and wider Europe and the use of the terms race and racism were and 
still are very sensitive for many Member States. The negotiations on the Race Directive 
show clearly that some Member States saw the use of the term race as `tantamount to 
accepting racist theories that alleged the existence of separate human races'. 34 As we 
saw in Chapter 1, Recital 6 states that the EU rejects theories which attempt to 
determine the existence of separate human races and that the use of the term racial 
origin does not imply acceptance of such theories. The Recital was added as a 
compromise between those Member States who had problems with the use of the term 
race and others, who did not want to rely solely on the term ethnic origin. 35 The 
problematic nature of these terms shows itself in the fact that the collection of data on 
racial or ethnic origin is prohibited in many Member States. According to Johansson, 36 
legislation which prohibits the collection and processing of data that refers to an 
individual's race or religion without that person's consent, exists in Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and 
Sweden. 
The problems about the wording during the negotiations might explain why 
there is no definition of the key terms race, racism and racial or ethnic origin. Article 13 
EC requires unanimity in the Council and it appears unlikely that agreement about 
definitions of these terms could have been reached. The Directive has, however, been 
widely criticised in the literature for this omission. 
37 According to Brown, the marked 
34 Supra note 26, at 201-2. 
35 See Chapter 1,2.2, and Tyson, supra note 26, at 201-2. 
36 Johansson, Per, "Comparing National and Community Anti-Discrimination Law" in: Niessen, Jan and 
Chopin, Isabelle, (eds. ), The Development of Legal Instruments to Combat Racism in a Diverse 
Europe (2004 Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 155-209, at 162. 
37 See for example: Guild, supra note 27, at 418; Barnard, supra note 27, at 968; Brown, Christopher, 
"The Race Directive: Towards Equality for All the Peoples of Europe? " 21, Yearbook of European 
Law 195-227 (2002), at 204; Brennan, Fernne, "The Race Directive: Recycling Racial Inequality" 5, 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 311-31 (2002/2003), at 320-4; Jones, Timothy, "The 
Race Directive: Redefining Protection from Discrimination in EU Law" 5, European Human Rights 
Law Review 515-26 (2003), at 517; Parmar, Sejal, "The European Court of Justice and Anti- 
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lack of key definitions `may create uncertainty and generate a fair amount of 
litigation'. 38 
However, other documents within the EU appear to show the same lack of 
definitions of key terms. In many of the Resolutions and Declarations issued by the EU, 
the term racism can be found together with the term xenophobia, 39 while the European 
Parliament also often used anti-Semitism. 0 The terms racism and xenophobia are also 
used together in Article 29 TEU, where `preventing and combating racism and 
xenophobia' is mentioned as one of the means by which the Union shall provide 
citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice. But 
no definitions of these terms are given in any these documents. 
As the Race Directive contains minimum requirements only, Member States 
could define race, racism, racial origin or ethnic origin in their national laws. In some 
language versions, the Directive uses `race or ethnic origin' rather than `racial or ethnic 
origin, ' which would suggest that race and racial origin have the same meaning. Are 
there any definitions of race/racial or ethnic origin which the Member States could 
follow if they want to define these concepts in their national law? An example can be 
found in the British Race Relations Act 1976, which defines `racial grounds' as to mean 
`colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins'. 41 However, the Regulations 
transposing the Race Directive into British law refer only to race, ethnic or national 
origin, which suggests that the Government held `racial or ethnic origin' in the 
Discrimination Law: Some Reflections on the Experience of Gender Equality Jurisprudence for the 
Future Interpretation of the Racial Equality Directive" in: Niessen, and Chopin, supra note 36,131-54, 
at 137; Liegl, Barbara, Perching, Bernhard and Weyss, Birgit, Combating Religious and Ethnic 
Discrimination in Employment from the EU and International Perspective (2004 Brussels: ENAR), at 
9. 
38 Brown, supra note 37. 
39 See, for example: the documents mentioned in notes 7 and 8 supra; Resolution of the Council on the 
Response of Educational Systems to the Problems of Racism and Xenophobia [1995] OJ C 312/1; 
Declaration by the Council on Respecting Diversity and Combating Racism and Xenophobia [1998] 
OJ C 1/1. 
40 See, for example: European Parliament Committee of Inquiry on the Rise of Fascism and Racism in 
Europe, supra note 7; and the following Resolutions on Racism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism: 
[1992] OJ C 305/590; [1994] OJ C 323/154; [1995] OJ C 126/75; [1997] OJ C 55/17; [1998] OJ C 
56/35. 
41 Section 3 Race Relations Act 1976. 
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Directive to mean race, ethnic or national origin, and not colour or nationality. 42 The 
exclusion of `nationality' is most likely the result of Article 3(2) of the Directive, which 
we will look at in the next section of this Chapter. Why the British Government also 
excluded colour is less easy to understand, although colour discrimination would likely 
qualify as race or ethnic or national origin discrimination. We will come back to colour 
as a ground for discrimination in the next section as well. 
Other Member States could follow the definition from the British Act or, 
alternatively, they could omit any definition of racial or ethnic origin and leave the 
interpretation to the ECJ. The ECJ might well look at the same British Race Relations 
Act 1976 and the case law for guidance, as this Act has been in place for thirty years. 
The leading decision which could help the interpretation of the term `ethnic origin' is 
the Mandla v Dowell Lee case, 43 where the House of Lords had to decide whether Sikhs 
were protected under the 1976 Act. As Sikhs could not be identified by colour, race, 
nationality or national origin, the question was whether Sikhs were covered by the term 
`ethnic group'. Lord Fraser set out two essential and five other relevant characteristics 
of an ethnic group. The essential characteristics are: 
(a) a long shared history of which the group is conscious as distinguishing it from 
other groups and the memory of which it keeps alive; 
(b) a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs and manners, 
often but not necessarily associated with religious observance; 
The other relevant characteristics are: 
(c) either a common geographical origin, or descent from a small number of 
common ancestors; 
(d) a common language, not necessarily peculiar to the group; 
42 See Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1626, Section 3. Note that this 
means that the amended Race Relations Act 1976 applies to discrimination based on race, ethnic or 
national origin, but that the un-amended 1976 Act applies to discrimination based on colour or 
nationality. 
43 Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548. 
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(e) a common literature, peculiar to the group; 
(f) a common religion different from that of neighbouring groups or from the 
general community surrounding it; 
(g) being a minority or being an oppressed or a dominant group within a larger 
community. 
Using these criteria, Sikhs were held to be an ethnic group. By applying the same test, 
gypsies or travellers were also held to be an ethnic group, but Muslims and Rastafarians 
were not. 44 The ECJ might well use this case as guidance in its interpretation of 
race/racial or ethnic origin. 
The Race Directive does not provide a definition of racism either, but, again, 
there are examples which the Member States could follow. Within the EU, `racism and 
xenophobia' are defined in the 2001 Proposal for a Framework Decision to combat 
racism and xenophobia. 
45 This Proposal, which aims at criminal law measures, has a 
twofold purpose: firstly, to ensure that racism and xenophobia are punishable in all 
Member States by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, which can 
give rise to extradition and surrender (approximation); and, secondly, to improve and 
encourage judicial cooperation by removing potential obstacles (cooperation). Article 
3(a) of the Proposal states: 
"racism and xenophobia" shall mean the belief in race, colour, descent, religion or belief, 
national or ethnic origin as a factor determining aversion to individuals or groups. 
It is interesting to note that this (EU) definition includes colour, descent, religion or 
belief, and national origin, while these are not mentioned in the Race Directive. It 
appears rather inconsistent that the two EU measures aimed at combating racism differ 
Jews had been held to be an ethnic group in an earlier case: Seide v Gillette [1980] IRLR 427. 
Gypsies: CRE v Dutton [1989] QB 783; Muslims: Nyazi v Rymans Ltd EAT 6/88 (unreported); 
Rastafarians: Dawkins v Department of the Environment 1[1993] 
ICR 517. See further McColgan, 
Aileen, Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2" ed. 2005 Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing), at 534-48. 
45 COM (2001) 664, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Racism and 
Xenophobia. 
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in these aspects. However, the Proposal has yet to be adopted as the EU Justice and 
Home Affairs Ministers have not been able to reach agreement. The German Presidency 
plans to resume the stalled negotiations and to drive the project forward. 46 
Another example of a definition of racism can be found in General Policy 
Recommendation 7 of the Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism 
and Intolerance (ECRI) which defines racism as: 
the belief that a ground such as race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or 
ethnic origin justifies contempt for a person or a group of persons, or the notion of 
superiority of a person or a group of persons. 
7 
This definition is provided for the purposes of the Recommendation and it is up to the 
States Parties to decide whether they want to include it in their national law. In contrast 
to this, the definition of racial discrimination has to be included. 48 Coomber49 makes an 
interesting point in relation to this ECRI definition where she writes that, in the drafting 
of other international instruments, such as the ICERD and the Race Directive, the 
drafters avoided defining racism. She continues: 
ECRI's attempt at a definition indicates why it is perhaps wiser to define unlawful conduct 
rather than ambiguous concepts such as "racism". Moreover, by linking such activities to 
an ambiguous standard based on the `belief' of the person, Recommendation No. 7 
introduces a concept that it is difficult for any legal system to prosecute. 
This suggests that it might be better for the legislator not to give a definition of racism, 
but to define racial discrimination only. It is submitted that prosecuting a person for 
his/her beliefs is problematic not only because it might be difficult to prove such beliefs, 
46 See "Europe - Succeeding Together" Presidency Programme 1 January to 30 June 2007, at 19, < 
www auswaertiges-amt. de/dinlo/de/EU-P/Programm-EU-P-en. nd 
47 ECRI, General Policy Recommendation 7, On National Legislation to Combat Racism and Racial 
Discrimination, CRI (2003) 8 (2003 Strasbourg: Council of Europe), para 1(a). The footnote added 
after race in this paragraph 
is interesting, as it states: `since all human beings belong to the same 
species, ECRI rejects theories based on the existence of 
different "races"`. Therefore, like the EU 
Member States, ECRI also found it necessary to state this explicitly. 
48 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, para 7. 
49 Coomber, Andrea, "The Council of Europe: Combating Racism and Xenophobia" in: Nickel, Rainer, 
Coomber, Andrea, Bell, Marc, Hutchinson, Tansy and Zahi, Karima, European Strategies to Combat 
Racism and Xenophobia as a Crime (2003 Brussels: ENAR) 17-26, at 23. 
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but, more importantly, because this would violate the fundamental human right to 
freedom of thought. As we mentioned in Chapter 1, legislation aims at the practical 
occurrences of racism, at the behaviour based on racist beliefs rather than at views and 
ideas. The Race Directive does not define racism, but it defines both direct and indirect 
discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin in its Article 2. We discuss these 
definitions in the next Chapter, where we look at which model(s) of anti discrimination 
law can be detected in the Race Directive. However, the inconsistency between the 
Directive and the 2001 Proposal remains an anomaly. We will come back to the 
definitions of both the Proposal and ECRI in the next section of this Chapter. 
3.2 What is included under Racial or Ethnic Origin? 
Can racial or ethnic origin be interpreted as including other grounds of discrimination? 
As mentioned the ICERD includes race, colour, descent and national or ethnic origin in 
its definitions of racial discrimination. Neither the Proposal for the Directive, 50 nor the 
Directive itself or its Preamble give any indication as to whether colour and descent are 
included, but all three mention discrimination based on nationality. In the following, we 
first discuss these grounds and then consider whether any of the other grounds 
mentioned in Article 13 EC should be included in the Race Directive. 
3.2.1 Colour and Descent 
Because `racial or ethnic origin' is not defined in the Directive, the exact grounds the 
Directive covers are not clear. Can `racial or ethnic origin' be taken to include colour, 
nationality or descent? Brennan mentions that `a series of reports on Northern Ireland 
consider that characteristically the principal trigger for racially discriminatory behaviour 
is `skin colour racism'. The reports show that `in Northern Ireland discriminators do not 
generally know the ethnic or national background of victims' but they tend to 
$0 Supra note 2. 
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`discriminate on the basis of `visible' characteristics'. 51 It could be argued that skin 
colour is included as a ground in the Race Directive, as it is used as an indication of a 
person's racial origin, and it is hoped that the ECJ will decide that this is so. The same 
can be said about descent: race/racial or ethnic origin appears to include descent (or 
ancestry), 52 but it would have been clearer if the Directive itself had mentioned both 
colour and descent as grounds on which discrimination is prohibited. 
As already mentioned, since the late 1980s, many NGOs and other organisations 
had been active in lobbying for EU legislation against racism. In 1991, a number of 
these groups formed the `Starting Line Group', an informal network of NGOs, semi- 
official organisations, trade unions, churches, independent experts and academics. The 
group's aim was to promote legal measures to combat racism and xenophobia in the EC. 
In 1993 this group launched the Starting Line, a proposal for a draft Council Directive 
concerning the elimination of racial discrimination, which covered race, colour, descent, 
nationality, national and ethnic origin. 
53 This proposal defined racial discrimination in 
the same way as the ICERD and covered the same grounds. So both include colour and 
descent. They also cover nationality, although, as we saw in Chapter 4, the ICERD 
qualifies this in Article 1(2) and (3). But does the Race Directive cover discrimination 
based on nationality? This is discussed in the next part of this Chapter. 
3.2.2 Nationality 
The personal scope of the Race Directive, in other words, which persons are covered 
can be found in Article 3. However, this Article is not very clear. On the one hand, 
Article 3(1) states that the Directive `shall apply to all persons' and Recital 3 explicitly 
mentions that `the right to equality before the law and protection against discrimination 
for all persons constitutes a universal right'. The words `shall apply to all persons' were 
51 Brennan, supra note 37, at 320-1. 
52 See the dictionary definition of race in Chapter 1: a group of people of common ancestry ... '. 53 The proposal can be found in Dummett, Ann, "The Starting Line: A Proposal for a Draft Council 
Directive Concerning the Elimination of Racial Discrimination" 20,3, New Community 530-8 (1994). 
Article 1 gives the definition. 
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not present in the Proposal54 or in any of the Council Proceedings. 55 The words suggest 
that, as Liegl et al write, `the protection against discrimination conferred by the [Race 
and Framework] directives applies to all persons that are on the territory of one of the 
EU Member States irrespective of their nationality'. 56 The European Parliament, 57 the 
Starting Line Group58 and the Kahn Commission59 all expressed the opinion that all 
people within the EU, `whether citizens of the EU or not' should be protected against 
racial discrimination. 
On the other hand, however, the Race Directive makes an explicit exception for 
nationality in Article 3(2) and also adds a further proviso: 
This Directive does not cover difference of treatment based on nationality and is without 
prejudice to provisions and conditions relating to the entry into and residence of third - 
country nationals and stateless persons on the territory of the Member States, and to any 
treatment which arises from the legal status of the third-country nationals and stateless 
persons concerned. 
Article 3(2) was not present in either the original or the amended proposals, but was 
added, together with Recital 13, after much discussion during the negotiations of the 
Directive. 60 Recital 13 determines that discrimination under the Directive `should be 
prohibited throughout the Community'. It then adds: 
This prohibition of discrimination should also apply to nationals of third countries, but does 
not cover differences of treatment based on nationality and is without prejudice to 
54 Supra note 2. 
ss Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings of the Social Questions Working Party, 
6435/00, Brussels, 01/03/2000; idem, 6942/00,31/03/2000; idem, 8454/00,16/05/2000. 
56 Liegl et al, supra note 37, at 10. 
57 For example: the 1990 European Parliament Committee of Inquiry on Racism and Xenophobia 
Report, supra note 5, recommended that a Community Directive cover all Community residents. 
ss See on the Starting Line: Dummett, supra 53, at 533; on the New Starting Line, the Group's amended 
proposal issued after the Treaty of Amsterdam was adopted: Chopin, supra note 19, at 123. Chopin 
writes that the New Starting Line would apply to `any person, regardless of nationality, status or 
country of origin or residence'. The New Starting Line can be found in Chopin, Isabelle and Niessen, 
Jan, (eds. ), Proposals for Legislative Measures to Combat Racism and to Promote Equal Rights in the 
European Union (1998 London: Belmont Press), at 23-32. 
59 See the Report, supra note 16, at 39: `all individuals' and at 59: `whether citizens of the European 
Union or not'. 
60 Tyson, supra note 26, at 209-10. See also Council Paper 6435/00, at 3 and Recital 10 in Council 
Papers 6435/00,6942/00 and 8454/00, all supra note 55. 
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provisions governing the entry and residence of third-country nationals and their access to 
employment and to occupation. 
Therefore, the first part of Article 3(2) makes an exception for discrimination on 
grounds of nationality. According to the Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal for 
the Race Directive, `the Directive does not prohibit differences in treatment based on 
nationality, which is dealt with by separate Articles of the Treaty (in particular Articles 
12 and 39) and by existing secondary legislation' 61 
However, there are two problems with the exclusion of nationality 
discrimination from the Directive. Firstly, it is not always easy to distinguish 
discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin from nationality discrimination. 
And, secondly, Article 12 does not apply to third-country nationals, so they are not 
protected against nationality discrimination. The second part of Article 3(2) of the Race 
Directive appears to limit the protection afforded to third-country nationals against 
racial discrimination even further. 
During the negotiations on the Directive, some Member States were concerned 
about preserving their immigration and asylum systems. The Commission argued that 
admission policies were not included in the material scope of the Directive, but this did 
not satisfy all Member States and in the end it was agreed that Article 3(2) and Recital 
13 would be added. 
62 The exception in Article 3(2) reflects the fact that it is up to a state 
to decide on whether to admit a person to its territory and whether to give him/her a 
residence or work permit, as this is a power of the Member State and not of the 
Community. The same reason lies behind Article 1(2) and 1(3) ICERD, which we will 
come back to later. Article 3(2) has been severely criticised in the literature and many 
writers have called for a narrow interpretation of this paragraph, because a broad 
interpretation would greatly reduce the effectiveness of the Directive for third-country 
61 Supra note 2, at 4. 
62 Ibid. 
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nationals, who are often the main target of discrimination. 63 According to Lord Lester, ' 
for example: 
The blanket exclusion of racially discriminatory provisions governing the entry, residence 
and treatment of third-country nationals and stateless persons is incompatible with the 
effective protection of human rights. 
A Report 65 from the European Commission discusses the Race and Framework 
Directives and the Action Programme. It states: 
The two directives outlawing discrimination cover everyone living or working in an EU 
country, whether they are officially resident there or not. Protection, therefore, is not 
confined to EU nationals but extends to people from outside the EU who might be visiting 
for a period, whatever their nationality. (The directives do not, however, affect rules on 
immigration and do not cover differences in treatment on grounds purely of nationality. ) 
All this suggests that the Race Directive applies to non-EU nationals and thus protects 
them against racial and ethnic origin discrimination, except in relation to immigration 
laws or other legal acts covering entry, residence and legal status. Or, as Ellis66 
concludes: 
63 See for example: Guild, supra note 27, at 421-2; Tyson, supra note 26, at 209; Lester, Anthony, "New 
European Equality Measures" Public Law 562-7 (2000), at 564-5; Toggenburg, Gabriel, "The Race 
Directive: A New Dimension in the Fight against Ethnic Discrimination in Europe" 1, European 
Yearbook of Minority Issues 231-44 (2001/2002), at 236-8; Goldston, supra note 27, at 128; Bell, 
Mark, "Meeting the Challenge? A Comparison between the EU Racial Equality Directive and the 
Starting Line" in: Chopin, Isabelle and Niessen, Jan, (eds. ) The Starting Line and the Incorporation of 
the Racial Equality Directive into the National Laws of the EU Member States and Accession States 
(2001 London/Brussels: Commission for Racial Equality/Migration Policy Group) 22-54, at 31-2; 
Skidmore, Paul, "EC Framework Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment: Towards a 
Comprehensive Community Anti-Discrimination Policy? " 30,1, Industrial Law Journal 126-32 
(2001), at 127-8; Bell (2002) supra note 9, at 76-7 and 182-3; Ellis, supra note 30, at 297; Sierra, 
Maria Miguel, (ed. ), Towards Equal Treatment Transposing the Directive -Analysis and Proposals 
(2002 Brussels: ENAR), at 23-9; Brennan, supra note 37, at 324-9; Brown, supra note 37, at 209-15; 
Jones, supra note 37, at 519-20; McInerney, Siobhan, "Legal Protection against Discrimination based 
on Racial or Ethnic Origin under European Union Law - Necessary but not Sufficient? " 6,1, 
International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 3-43 (2003), at 14; Hepple, Bob, "Race and Law 
in Fortress Europe" 67,1, Modern Law Review 1-15 (2004), at 6-7; Howard, Erica, "Anti Race 
Discrimination Measures in Europe: An Attack on Two Fronts" 11,4, European Law Journal 468-86 
(2005), at 477-9; Ellis, Evelyn, EUAnti-Discrimination Law (2005 Oxford: Oxford University Press), 
at 289-90. 
64 Lester, supra note 63, at 565. 
65 European Commission, DG for Employment and Social Affairs, Annual Report on Equality and Non- 
discrimination Towards Diversity, 2003, at 4. 
66 Ellis, supra note 63, at 289-90. 
197 
Nevertheless, one positive message which can be drawn from this provision is that, in 
situations other than those specified, the Race Directive (and its partner Framework 
Directive) is intended to apply to all persons within the EU irrespective of their nationality. 
Ellis continues, however, that: 
The breadth of the wording used is significant and regrettable; in particular, the final phrase 
of the provision permits `any' adverse treatment of third-country nationals and stateless 
persons which is based on their status. 
Therefore, there are significant gaps in the protection of third-country nationals against 
racial and nationality discrimination. Will the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
Union, which forms Part II of the Draft Constitution, bring any changes in this respect? 
Title III, entitled `Equality', starts in Article 11-80 with stating that `everyone is equal 
before the law'. The next Article, II-81, contains a clear prohibition of discrimination: 
(a) Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social 
origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual 
orientation shall be prohibited. 
(b) Within the scope of application of the Constitution and without prejudice to any of 
its specific provisions any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be 
prohibited. 
It will be clear from the words `any grounds such as' that paragraph 1 contains a non- 
exhaustive or open-ended list of grounds. Although this list is very extensive, it does not 
contain any reference to nationality or national origin, unlike Article 14 ECHR, upon 
which it draws. Discrimination on grounds of nationality is instead covered by the 
second paragraph, which according to the Explanatory Memorandum67 `corresponds to 
Article 1-4(2) of the Constitution and must be applied in compliance with that Article'. 
Article 1-4(2) echoes the present Article 12 EC, and, therefore, it is likely that the 
67 CONV 828/1/03, REV 1, Updated Explanations Relating to the Complete Text of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (as amended by the European Convention and 
incorporated as Part II of the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe), Brussels, 18/06/03. 
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Article 1-4(2) echoes the present Article 12 EC, and, therefore, it is likely that the 
interpretation of this article and Article 11-81(2) will follow the interpretation given to 
Article 12 EC. And, as that article has always been interpreted by the ECJ as covering 
only EU nationals, the Charter does not extend the protection against nationality 
discrimination to third-country nationals. Several authors68 have criticised this. 
According to Bell, this `places the Charter in a poor light when compared with Article 
14 ECHR'. 69 
Nevertheless, there are some other EU measures which provide protection for 
third-country nationals and these provisions alleviate somewhat the problems created by 
the exceptions in Article 3(2) of the Race Directive. Firstly, nationals from countries 
which have Association Agreements with the EU are protected against nationality 
discrimination as these Agreements state that the treatment accorded to workers (of 
Turkish, Romanian, Bulgarian, Tunisian, Moroccan, and Algerian nationality) 
employed on the territory of a Member State shall be free from any discrimination 
based on nationality, as regards working conditions, remuneration and dismissal, 
relative to the Member States own nationals. 
70 Some of these Agreements go further 
and also provide for security of residence or a right to establishment in a Member State. 
Secondly, in November 2003, a Directive on the status of third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents was adopted, 
7' which determines that third-country 
nationals who have been resident in a EU Member State for 5 years or more can acquire 
68 Bell, Mark, "The Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination" in: Hervey, Tamara and Kenner, Jeff, 
(eds. ), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights -A Legal 
Perspective (2003 Oxford/Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing) 91-110, at 98-9; Waddington, Lisa, The 
Expanding Role of the Equality Principle in European Union Law, Policy Paper, European University 
Institute, Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies, 2003, < www. iue. it/RSCAS? e-texts/CR2003- 
04. pdf, at 23-4; McInerney, supra note 63, at 20-3. 
69 Bell, supra note 68, at 99. 
70 See the Association Agreements: Turkey, Article 9 [1964] OJ 217/3685; Romania, Article 38(1) 
[1994] OJ L 357/2; Bulgaria, Article 38(1) [1994] OJ L 358/3; Tunisia, Article 64 [1998] OJ L 97/2; 
Morocco, Article 64 [2000] OJ L 70/2; Algeria, Article 67 COM (2002) 157. (Note that as of I 
January 2007, Romania and Bulgaria have joined the EU as Member States. ) 
71 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25/11/2003 Concerning the Status of Third-Country Nationals who 
are Long-term Residents 
[2004] OJ L 16/44. The deadline for transposition was 23/01/2006. 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK have opted out of this Directive. 
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long-term resident status. This status gives them the right to equal treatment with 
nationals in a large number of areas. 
Thirdly, Recital 8 of the Race Directive mentions that the Employment 
Guidelines 2000 `stress the need to foster conditions for a socially inclusive labour 
market by formulating a coherent set of policies aimed at combating discrimination 
against groups such as ethnic minorities'. The 1999 Guidelines consider, under the 
heading `promoting a labour market open to all', that `many groups and individuals 
experience particular difficulties in acquiring relevant skills and in gaining access to, 
and remaining in the labour market'. The guideline requires the Member States to: 
Give special attention to the needs of the disabled, ethnic minorities and other groups and 
individuals who may be disadvantaged, and develop appropriate forms of preventive and 
active policies to promote their integration into the labour market. 
72 
Promoting integration and labour market participation and combating discrimination 
against people at a disadvantage in that market has been part of the guidelines since 
then. 73 These employment guidelines thus include ethnic minority groups and they do 
not specify anywhere that these only include nationals of EU Member States. Therefore, 
it must be taken that third-country nationals are also included in the Employment 
Strategy. As Bell writes: `To the extent that the Employment Strategy is bringing third 
country nationals back into the picture, then it offers a valuable complement to the 
limits of the Race Directive'. 
74 The European Employment Strategy uses the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC) procedure. Under the Employment OMC, the Council 
adopts annual guidelines for employment and the Member States make up National 
72 Council Resolution on the 1999 Employment Guidelines [1999] OJ C 69/2, point 1-9. For information 
on the Employment Strategy in relation to the 
fight against racism see: Bell, Mark, "Combating Racial 
Discrimination Through the European Employment Strategy" in: Bell, John and Kilpatrick, Claire, 
(eds. ), 6, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2003-2004 (2005 Oxford/Portland, Oregon: 
Hart), 55-71. 
73 Employment Guidelines [2000] OJ L 72/15, Guideline 9; [2001] OJ L 22/18, Guideline 7; [2002] OJ 
L 60/60, Guideline 7. Both the 2001 and 2002 Guidelines mention `ethnic minorities and migrant 
workers'; while Employment 
Guidelines [2003] OJ L 197/13, Guideline 7, mentions `immigrants, and 
ethnic minorities'. 
74 Bell, supra note 72, at 64. 
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Action Plans to report on their progress towards these guidelines. The Council and the 
Commission then make up a joint Employment Report which monitors progress and 
sets priorities for the coming year. Therefore, the Guidelines depend on peer review and 
exchange of good practices in order to monitor progress towards agreed goals. So, 
although the Guidelines are not judicially enforceable, they could play an important role 
in the integration of ethnic minority people, including third-country nationals, at a 
disadvantage in the labour market. 
Article 6 of the Race Directive makes clear that the Directive contains minimum 
requirements that need to be implemented by the Member States and that `Member 
States may introduce or maintain provisions which are more favourable'. Therefore, the 
Member States could provide protection against racial discrimination to all persons on 
their territory irrespective of status or nationality without exceptions. But if they want to 
make exceptions, they could look to the ICERD for guidance - as all EU Member States 
have signed and ratified this Convention. As we discussed in Chapter 4, the ICERD also 
makes exceptions for distinctions between citizens and non-citizens (in Article 1(2)) and 
for legal decisions of States concerning nationality, citizenship and naturalisation (in 
Article 1(3)). However, according to the CERD, Article 1(2) must be constructed 
narrowly and differential treatment of non-citizens will be considered discrimination, 
unless it is objectively justified, while Article 1(3) contains a proviso to the exception: 
such provisions must not discriminate against any particular nationality. The EU 
Member States could not make any exceptions, or they could only allow the exceptions 
mentioned in Article 3(2) if they are objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the 
means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. A third alternative would be 
to add a proviso similar to the one in Article 1(3) ICERD. All three alternatives would 
provide more protection for third-country nationals than Article 3(2) of the Race 
Directive does. 
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3.2.3 Other Grounds ofArticle 13 EC 
3.2.3.1 Religion or Belief 
In this section, we discuss the question whether any of the other grounds mentioned in 
Article 13 EC should be included in the Race Directive. The Race Directive covers 
racial or ethnic origin discrimination, while the Framework Directive covers 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual 
orientation. Sex is covered by the Equal Treatment Directives. We have seen that the 
protection provided against racial or ethnic origin discrimination is more extensive than 
the protection provided against discrimination on the grounds in the Framework 
Directive. We also mentioned that this was the result of the political will to go further in 
the fight against racial and ethnic origin discrimination and suggested some factors that 
influenced this political will. The strong and sustained pressure by a large number of 
NGOs and by the European Parliament for action against racial discrimination 
mentioned before could also have influenced the stronger protection given to that form 
of discrimination. 
But are there differences in character between the grounds that could also have 
influenced the difference in protection provided? Is race/racial or ethnic origin in any 
way different from the other grounds? Bell and Waddington75 write that some grounds 
of discrimination can result in an individual being temporarily not available or not able 
to do a job or use a good or service. They make a distinction between grounds that are 
always irrelevant for the employment/access situation, like racial or ethnic origin, 
sexual orientation and gender; and, grounds that are sometimes relevant. The latter 
category is subdivided between grounds that limit the availability to do a job or use a 
good or service, like sex in relation to maternity and religion with regard to times of 
75 Bell, Mark and Waddington, Lisa, "Reflecting on Inequalities in European Equality Law" 28, 
European Law Review 349-69 (2003), at 359-63. 
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worship, religious holidays and periods of pilgrimage; and grounds that can limit both 
the availability and the ability to do so, like age and disability. 
Schiek76 makes a different distinction; she discerns, firstly, characteristics that 
`only exist as ascriptions - despite being construed as unchangeable'. The most obvious 
example here is race: `there is no scientific justification for describing different human 
groupings as races'. Race is an ascription because racist categorisation is beyond the 
control of the person affected. Other ascriptions are gender `(to be distinguished from 
sex)', and disability, but the latter only in part. Schiek's second category contains those 
characteristics `which are in some way or other referable to a biological basis' and 
reflect real biological differences, such as sex, age and, under different aspects, 
disability. These characteristics `may restrict the market value or employability of 
persons'. Or, in the words of Bell and Waddington above, they may affect the ability 
and/or availability of a person to do a job or use a good or service. The third category 
contains characteristics which reflect a chosen lifestyle or chosen difference in identity, 
like ethnicity or religion, sexual orientation or political conviction. This category 
presupposes that persons convey information about themselves, which allows 
categorisation. It is questionable whether religion and sexual orientation (and even 
ethnicity) is something that a person freely chooses and can control and, also, whether 
discrimination on these grounds only takes place when the person discriminated against 
conveys this information about him/herself. Discrimination will often take place 
because a person is perceived to be of a particular religion, ethnicity or sexual 
orientation, and then it would come closer to an ascription. Gerards mentions the 
`immutability of the personal characteristic used as a basis for the distinction' and 
suggests that `immutability' should be given a broad interpretation `as to mean all 
characteristics that cannot be changed without infringing the essence of an individual's 
76 Schick, Dagmar, "A New Framework on Equal Treatment of Persons in EC Law? " 8,2, European 
Law Journal 290-314 (2002), at 309-10. 
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identity'. 77 In this broad interpretation, religion and sexual orientation (and possibly also 
ethnicity) can be seen as immutable characteristics, which would come closer to 
characteristics that are beyond the control of the person affected. But they would still be 
different in character from race, because race is an ascription of something that does not 
exist, while different religions, ethnicities and sexual orientations do exist. 
Although the writers mentioned make slightly different distinctions, the above 
does suggest that there are differences in character between the grounds and these may 
justify treating race/racial or ethnic origin differently. We can conclude that race is an 
ascribed characteristic which is always irrelevant because it does not affect a person's 
ability or availability to do a job or use a good or service. Discrimination on racial 
grounds is thus particularly invidious. Of the Article 13 EC grounds, sex and religion 
can affect a person's availability, while disability and age can affect both a person's 
ability and the availability to a greater or lesser extent. Sexual orientation, like race, 
does not affect either, but there is a difference in character between the two, even if we 
take both to be ascriptions. This would lead to the conclusion that all the grounds 
covered by the Framework Directive are in some way different in character from racial 
or ethnic origin and this would thus be an argument for treating the latter ground 
differently. Or, to put it another way, it would be an argument for keeping the two 
Directives as they are and for not extending the Race Directive to cover any of the other 
grounds. 78 
Are there any other arguments for including any of the grounds covered by the 
Framework Directive in the Race Directive? We would argue that religion or belief 
should be covered in the same Directive as racial or ethnic origin. The Race Directive 
77 Gerards, Janneke, "Intensity of Judicial Review in Equal Treatment Cases" 51, Netherlands 
International Law Review 135-83 (2004), at 164-5. Gerards discusses the factors that influence the 
level of scrutiny a court uses when deciding equal treatment cases. The personal characteristic used as 
a basis for the distinction is one of those factors. 
78 The question whether the protection afforded under the Framework Directive should be extended goes 
beyond the subject of this Thesis. See on this: Howard, Erica, "The Case for a Considered Hierarchy 
of Discrimination Grounds in EU Law" 13,4, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 
443-68 (2006). 
204 
has been strongly criticised for omitting this ground from its protected grounds, 79 
because religion is often closely related to racial and ethnic origin, so it can be difficult 
to distinguish between the two. Racial discrimination may be interwoven with 
discrimination on grounds of a person's adherence to a (minority) religion or ethnicity. 
Therefore, it is often difficult to draw a clear and precise line between racial or ethnic 
origin and religion or belief. 
The following provide some illustrations of the problem. In 1993, the European 
Parliament called on the Council to adopt a Directive introducing national legislation 
designed to combat racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. 80 This Resolution does not 
contain definitions of these terms, but it mentions anti-Semitism and other forms of 
religious intolerance (my italics). 
81 This would suggest that the Parliament saw anti- 
Semitism as a form of religious intolerance. Does this mean that it considered Jews a 
religious group rather than a racial or ethnic group? The Resolution also mentions 
`racism, anti-Semitism, or religious intolerance', which would suggest that anti- 
Semitism is different from religious intolerance and from racism. 82 Therefore, the 
European Parliament appears to be unclear whether religious intolerance and anti- 
Semitism are forms of racism. 
The case law under the British Race Relations Act 1976 is another example. As 
we mentioned, under this Act, Jews, Sikhs and Gypsies are considered to be racial 
groups, while Muslims and Rastafarians are not. Although the regulation implementing 
the Framework Directive remedied this gap in protection in the employment sphere, the 
79 See for example: Guild, supra note 27, at 418; Fredman, Sandra, "Equality: A New Generation? " 30, 
2, industrial Law Journal 145-68 (2001), at 158-9; Niessen, Jan, "The Further Development of 
European Anti-Discrimination Policies" in: Chopin and Niessen, (2001) 7-21, supra note 63, at 9; 
Bell, Mark, "Combating Racism through European Laws: A Comparison of the Racial Equality 
Directive and Protocol 12" in: Chopin, Isabelle and Niessen, Jan, (eds. ), Combating Racial and Ethnic 
Discrimination: Taking the European Legislative Agenda Further (2002 London/Brussels: 
Commission for Racial Equality/ Migration Policy Group) 7-34, at 12; Brown, supra note 37, at 204- 
5; Sierra, supra note 63, at 16-7; McInerney, supra note 63, at 12; Liegl et al., supra note 37, at 9. 
80 Resolution [1993) OJ C 150/127, para 12. 
81 Ibid. para A. 
82 Ibid. para I. 
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exclusion of Muslims from protection against discrimination has proved to be especially 
problematic after the events of 11 September 2001 in the US and the Madrid and 
London bombings. However, the Equality Act 2006 will extend the protection against 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief to the provision of goods, facilities, 
services, the disposal and management of premises, education and the exercise of public 
functions. This part of the Act will come into force in April 2007. 
In their General Policy Paper on religious discrimination, 83 ENAR expresses the 
problem very well: 
Discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief and racism are inextricably linked. They 
can often be fused in the identification of the racialised `other'; or the line between these 
forms of prejudice can be blurred. 
Another reason why the omission of religion or belief in the Race Directive has been 
criticised is connected to the fact we have mentioned above, that the protection against 
discrimination on religious grounds under the Framework Directive is not as extensive 
as the protection against discrimination on racial or ethnic origin grounds under the 
Race Directive. This difference in protection, and especially the limitation of the 
material scope of the Framework Directive to the employment sphere, might create a 
loophole: perpetrators could claim that they discriminate against victims because of 
their religion rather than because of their racial or ethnic origin and so evade legal 
action. As the ENAR paper states: 
Religion or belief are often used to justify racial discrimination, and can be used to obscure 
racist motivations. This reality is compounded by the fact that the perpetrators of racist acts 
do not necessarily distinguish between nationality, culture or religious background. 
The European Parliament appears to have been aware of this problem as it suggested the 
following addition to Article 2 of the Race Directive: 
83 ENAR General Policy Paper No 1: Fighting Religious Discrimination, Nov 2005. 
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Discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin which is presented as a difference in 
treatment on the grounds of religion, conviction or nationality is deemed to be 
discrimination within the meaning of Article 1.84 
Both Bell85 and Brown86 suggest that discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief 
might be covered by indirect racial discrimination under the Directive, because religious 
discrimination will disproportionately affect people belonging to an ethnic minority. 
Whether this is indeed the case will ultimately be decided by the ECJ. Of course, the 
Member States are free to extend the protection against religious discrimination to some 
or all the areas covered by the Race Directive, as Britain does in the Equality Act 2006. 
The `Starting Line', the proposal for a draft Directive from the Starting Line 
Group, covered, as mentioned, race, colour, descent, nationality, national and ethnic 
origin. So it did not include religion as a protected ground. However, the `New Starting 
Line', the draft proposal the Group issued after the Treaty of Amsterdam inserted 
Article 13 into the EC Treaty, included religion or belief. 87 The Group declared that it 
had opted to cover racial or ethnic origin and religion or belief in one Directive because 
they had been mentioned together in a number of Declarations made at Community 
level and because they might arise from overlapping causes: 
against Jews, for example (are they being identified by the discriminator as a racial or a 
religious group? ) and even against Muslims in cases where hostility to north Africans and 
Turks may spring from one cause or the other, or perhaps both together. "A 
Both definitions of racism given above as examples - in ECRI Recommendation 7 and 
in the Proposal for a Framework Decision - also specifically include religion. The 
inclusion in the ECRI Recommendation shows that the Council of Europe does not 
differentiate between religious and racial discrimination, whereas the EU sends out 
84 Opinion European Parliament, 18/05/2000, on COM (1999) 566, A5-0136/2000, Amendment 29. It 
appears that the Parliament meant `Paragraph 
1' (of Article 2) rather than 'Article 1'. 
gs Bell, in Chopin and Niessen (2001), supra note 63, at 25. 
86 Brown, supra note 37, at 204-5. 
87 Supra note 58, at 19. 
88 Ibid. at 20. 
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mixed signals: the two Directives suggest that the EU makes a difference, but the 
definition in the Proposal suggests it does not. The difference between the grounds 
covered by the Race Directive and those covered by the Proposal, both EU measures 
aiming to combat racism, is likely to create confusion and lead to problems in 
interpretation. But this difference in definition appears to have been one of the 
stumbling blocks in the negotiations of the Proposal in the Council. As Be1189 writes: 
The breadth of this definition was significant, not least because it contrasts with the Racial 
Equality Directive, which only applies to discrimination on grounds of `racial or ethnic 
origin'. Most notably, the Commission sought to include prejudices linked to `religion or 
belief within the concept of racism and xenophobia, whereas discrimination on grounds of 
religion or belief has been treated as distinct from racial discrimination in the Directives 
adopted under Article 13EC.... It is not surprising then that this aspect of the proposal has 
proven highly contentious in the Council. 
It will be interesting to see whether the German presidency will succeed in reaching 
agreement on this Proposal. 
For the above reasons, it is argued here that religion or belief should be included 
in the grounds covered by the Race Directive. The only argument against treating 
discrimination on the ground of religion and belief the same as that on the ground of 
race would be that racial or ethnic origin and religion or belief as grounds are slightly 
different in character. If we take Bell and Waddington's distinction, 90 based on a 
person's ability or availability to do a job or use a good or service, then the two grounds 
are different: a person's race will not affect this, but his/her religion can affect his/her 
availability. The inclusion of a duty to make reasonable accommodation in case of 
religion would solve this problem. For example, providing a place and time for religious 
worship and adapting patterns of working time could prevent discrimination on 
89 Bell, Mark, "European Union Strategies to Combat Racism and Xenophobia as a Crime" in: Nickel, 
Coomber, Bell, Hutchinson, and Zahi, supra note 49,31-7, at 34. 
90 Bell and Waddington 2003, above note 75, at 359-63. 
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religious grounds. 91 If a duty to make reasonable accommodation is included, there 
appears to be no reason why the Race Directive could not also cover discrimination on 
the ground of religion or belief. 
Another point needs to be raised at this stage. From the above discussion, and 
especially from the Reports Brennan writes about (quoted above): `that discriminators 
do not generally know the ethnic or national background of the victim'; 92 from the 
quote from ENAR `that the perpetrators of racist acts do not necessarily distinguish 
between nationality, culture or religious background'; 93 and, from the quote from the 
Starting Line Group, 94 it will be clear that discriminators more often than not do not 
distinguish clearly between race, colour, descent, religion or nationality when they 
discriminate and that their behaviour may spring from any one or more or all of these 
causes. This would be another argument for including colour, descent, nationality and 
religion or belief in the grounds covered by the Race Directive. 
However, it might be difficult to reach unanimity on this. Religion or belief 
appears to be a more contentious issue in many Member States. Why is this so? It is 
suggested that, although there is a wide variety of traditions regarding the interaction 
between church and state, the Member States are all traditionally Christian States and, 
even in countries that have a strict separation, the Christian churches have played and 
are frequently still playing a major part in the daily life of the society. They often also 
have quite significant influence in the political process. 95 These churches and religious 
organisations see legislation against religious discrimination as limiting their freedom to 
91 See also: Waddington, Lisa, "Article 13 EC: Setting Priorities in the Proposal for a Horizontal 
Employment Directive" 29,2, Industrial Law Journal 176-81 (2000), at 178; Bell and Waddington 
2003, above note 75, at 360-1. 
92 Brennan, supra note 37, at 320-1. 
93 Supra note 83. 
94 Supra note 87. 
95 For more information on the 15 old Member States (Members before 1/05/2004) see European 
Commission, DG for Employment and Social Affairs, Anti-discrimination, Fundamental Rights and 
Civil Society, Experts Reports on the Implementation of EU Anti-Discrimination Laws regarding 
Race and Religion, June 2004, < 
httn //ec eurona. eu/emnlovment social/fundamental riehts/public/nubst en htm 
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employ only people with the same religion or religious ethos. This is also the likely 
reason behind the inclusion of Article 4(2) of the Framework Directive. 
Article 4(2) adds an extra genuine occupational requirement exception for 
occupational activities of churches and other organisations with an ethos based on 
religion or belief. This allows religious organisations to take religion and belief into 
account in recruitment decisions where national law or practice allows this already, but 
this `should not justify discrimination on any other ground'. Article 4(2) also determines 
that, in regard to existing employees, religious organisations can `require individuals 
working for them to act in good faith and with loyalty to the organisation's ethos'. 96 
During the negotiations, France and Sweden questioned the need for this second 
paragraph because it repeats the provision in Article 4(l). 97 Waddington98 and Ellis99 
both see Article 4(2) as unnecessary as well. However, the other Member States, 
probably influenced by pressure from churches and other religious organisations, did 
see the need for this extra paragraph. 
Religion is also a contentious issue because many Member States have seen an 
`influx of Islamic migrants who practise and promote their religion in a more prominent 
and public fashion, going against the general trend among the Christian denominations 
which is to see one's religion increasingly as a private, publicly less prominent issue', 
as Zwamborn writes. 
100 Although he writes specifically about the Netherlands, it is 
submitted that this process has taken/is taking place in many other Member States as 
well. Most are becoming more and more secularised in terms of traditional religious 
practices and church attendance in the Christian churches. On the other hand, the 
Christian values are still entrenched in society and the new migrants are seen as a threat 
96 Article 4(2) of the final text is considerably different from the proposal and was also changed during 
the negotiations. See the Framework Directive, the Proposal for this Directive (COM (1999) 565, 
supra note 1, and Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings of the Social Questions 
Working Party, 9423/00 of 20/06/2000, at 16. 
97 Council Paper 9423/00, supra note 96. 
9' Waddington, supra note 91, at 179. 
99 Ellis, supra note 63, at 283. 
100 See the Report on the Netherlands, supra note 95, at 1. 
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to these values. But they are not only seen as a threat to these Christian values, but also, 
and even more strongly, as a threat to the liberal value of tolerance. 
Because Muslims are often the biggest and most vociferous group amongst the 
new migrants and because of the events of 9/11 and bombings in Madrid and London, 
many Member States perceive especially Muslims as a threat to their liberal, tolerant, 
secular societies. Muslims are seen as putting religion and religious laws above these 
liberal values and above `the law of the land'. They are seen as a threat because they 
demand too much in terms of legal concessions in relation to their values, which are 
considered to clash with the values of the Member State. The debates in many Member 
States about the wearing by Muslim women of the hab, the niqab and the burga101 are 
illustrative of this. 
For example, in France, 102 government employees, including teachers at state 
schools, are prohibited from wearing religious symbols at work. In 2004, France 
adopted a law prohibiting the wearing of signs or dress by which pupils openly 
manifested a religious affiliation in state primary and secondary schools. In Germany, 
the Constitutional Court has held that the states could ban teachers from wearing hubs 
as long as they did this in specific legislation which complied with the Constitution. A 
number of German states have banned teachers and public servants from wearing 
h dabs. 
In Belgium and the Netherlands, the wearing of the hijab has been debated but 
the focus here seems to be more on the wearing of the burqa in public. In Belgium, a 
number of local councils have banned the wearing of the burqa in public places, while 
the Netherlands is considering a ban on the wearing of the burqa in public places such 
101 The hab is a scarf that covers the hair and neck, but leaves the face free. The niqab is a veil that 
covers the head and face with the exception of the eyes. The burqa is a loose robe that covers the 
female from head to toe with the exception of the hands and with gauze covering or a slit for the eyes. 
102 For more information on the way France and a number of other European countries have dealt with 
the wearing of Islamic headscarves, see McGoldrick, Dominic, Human Rights and Religion: the 
Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe (2006 Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing). 
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as schools, shops, public buildings, cinemas, train and bus stations and airports, for 
safety reasons, namely to deal with the threat of terrorism. '03 Those supporting a ban on 
the burqa and the niqab often use this argument. Another argument is that wearing the 
burqa and the niqab is a statement of separation and difference and a barrier to 
communication and to integration. The argument that it is a barrier to communication is 
used especially in relation to teachers and people looking after children. Some also see 
the burqa and the niqab as a suppression of women's rights and freedoms. 
In Britain, the Begum case brought the question of school uniforms and Islamic 
dress to the fore. Following her school's policy on uniforms, Ms. Begum had been 
wearing the shalwar kameeze104 for her first two years at the school. She then decided 
that she wanted to wear the f ilbab1 °5 because the shalwar kameeze did not, in her view, 
conform to Islamic dress requirements for mature women. The school refused to admit 
her unless she conformed to the uniform rules, which she refused. Two years later she 
went to another school where she was allowed to wear the jilbab. The case ended up in 
the House of Lords'°6 where the majority held that there was no interference with her 
freedom to manifest her religion under Article 9(1) ECHR because she had chosen the 
school fully aware of their uniform policy and because she could have gone to an 
alternative school. The Law Lords did consider the question of justification under 
Article 9(2) ECHR because of the minority view that there was an interference. They 
held that the school's interference was justified. In this, the Law Lords considered the 
extent of the school's effort to accommodate the religious manifestation. It had taken 
great pains in devising its uniform policy and, before it rejected Ms Begum's request to 
103 Ibid. at 212 and 214. On the proposed burqa ban in the Netherlands see Mardell, Mark, Dutch MPs to 
decide on Burqa Ban, 16/01/2006, < htti): //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/eurol2e/4616664. stm and 
Doward, Jamie, `Holland split over Burqa Ban', the Observer, 19/11/2006, < 
httn"//www. g iardian. co. uk/reliaion/Story/0,, 1951880.00. html 
104 Shalwar Kameeze: loose trousers and a sleeveless, smock-like dress. Nearly 80% of pupils at the 
school were Muslims and therefore the uniform policy allowed pupils to wear the shalwar kameeze 
and/or the hab in the school colours. 
los Jilbab is a long plain dress with sleeves covering arms and legs. 
106 R (Shabina Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UK11L 15. See 
also McGoldrick, supra note 102, at 180-203. 
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wear the jilbab, it had taken advice and was told that its uniform policy conformed to 
mainstream Muslim opinion. 
In their decision on justification in the Begum case, the House of Lords 
considered the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Leyla Sahin v 
Turkey case. 1°7 In this case, the Court held that a ban on wearing the hab at 
universities in Turkey was an interference with Ms Sahin's freedom to manifest her 
religion, but that this interference was justified because it had a legal basis and pursued 
the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and of protecting 
public order; and, because it was necessary in a democratic society as it was based on 
the principles of secularism and equality. Imposing limitations on the freedom to wear 
the hab could be regarded as meeting a pressing social need by seeking to achieve 
these two legitimate aims, especially since the religious symbol had taken on political 
significance in Turkey in recent years. Some extremist political movements in Turkey 
sought to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conceptions of a 
society founded on religious precepts. The regulations on the wearing of the hab were 
manifestly intended to preserve the secular nature of universities and the Court thus held 
that they were justified under Article 9 (2) ECHR. 
There is a difference between the examples from the EU Member States and the 
Sahin case, because Turkey is a state where 99% of the population is Muslim, 
108 while 
the EU Member States are mostly Christian. But Turkey has been a secular state since 
1923 and the hab ban at universities was seen as preserving and promoting secularism. 
However, what these examples of the problems with Islamic forms of dress in the EU 
Member States clearly show is that religion is a sensitive issue and, therefore, that it 
might be difficult to reach the required unanimity for extending the grounds covered by 
the Race Directive to include religion or belief. 
107 Leyla Sahin v Turkey [2005] 41 EHRR 8. See also McGoldrick, supra note 102,140- 67. 
'08 This is one of the reasons why many people see the accession of Turkey to the EU as problematic. 
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3.2.3.2 Sex, Disability, Age and Sexual Orientation 
Should any of the other grounds of Article 13 EC be included in the Race Directive? 
Having different instruments means that that there is a need to draw distinct lines 
between the different grounds, which, as we have mentioned, is not always easy. This is 
the reason why we have argued for an extension of the grounds covered by the Race 
Directive to include religion or belief. The other grounds of Article 13 EC are easier to 
distinguish from racial or ethnic origin and from religion or belief, so they do not need 
to be included under the grounds covered by the Race Directive for this reason. 
The different levels of protection provided do, however, lead to a problem in 
cases of multiple discrimination: where a person is discriminated against on two or 
more grounds, for example a woman is discriminated against because she is disabled, 
black and female. Any one of these might be the reason why she is discriminated 
against, or it might be because she is all three. If she is discriminated against in 
education, she could take action because of racial discrimination, but not on the other 
grounds. If a white disabled woman were treated in the same way, there would be no 
unfavourable treatment on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin. If a black disabled man 
or a black able-bodied woman or man were treated differently, there would be no 
action, because the Equal Treatment Directives and the Framework Directive do not 
cover education. Both the Race and Framework Directives explicitly recognise the 
possibility of multiple discrimination, of the possibility that sexual discrimination can 
go together with discrimination on any of the other grounds covered in the Directives. 
Recital 14 of the Preamble to the Race Directive states: 
In implementing the principle of equal treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, the 
Community should, in accordance with Article 3(2) of the EC Treaty, aim to eliminate 
inequalities, and to promote equality between men and women, especially since women are 
often the victims of multiple discrimination (my italics). 
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The Framework Directive contains the same in Recital 3, but the term `multiple 
discrimination' does not appear anywhere else in either of these Directives and no 
definition is given nor any indication as to how to deal with cases of multiple 
discrimination. And, as Fredman writes, `no concrete links are made as between the 
directives, and cumulative discrimination on other grounds ... is not dealt with'. 
109 
The Action Programme mentions multiple discrimination a number of times. 
Firstly, Recital 4 of the Action Programme is similar to Recital 14 of the Race 
Directive. Secondly, Recital 5 states that `the different forms of discrimination cannot 
be ranked; all are equally intolerable', and that the programme is intended, among other 
things, `to develop new practice and policy for combating discrimination, including 
multiple discrimination'. And, thirdly, Article 2 on the objectives of the Action 
Programme, mentions that `the Programme shall support and supplement the efforts at 
Community level and in the Member States to promote measures to prevent and combat 
discrimination whether based on one or on multiple' factors ... 
'. However, the 
Programme does not give any definition or any further explanation as to how to deal 
with multiple discrimination. 
In the proposed 2006 Work Plan under the Community Action Programme, the 
Commission announces that three new studies will be conducted to `improve the 
understanding of the concept of roots and causes of discrimination'. One will be a study 
on multiple discrimination, with among its objectives, `to raise awareness of the 
particular difficulties victims of multiple discrimination face'. 
110 Again there are no 
indications as to how to deal with cases of multiple discrimination, but the recognition 
'09 Fredman, Sandra, Discrimination Law (2002 Oxford: Oxford University Press), at 75. For more 
information on multiple discrimination see: Fredman, Sandra and Szyszczak, Erika, "The Interaction 
of Race and Gender" in: Hepple, Bob and Szyszczak, Erika, (eds. ), Discrimination: The Limits of Law 
(1992 London: Mansell) 214-26, at 221-2; Hannett, Sarah, "Equality at the Intersections: The 
Legislative and Judicial Failure to Tackle Multiple Discrimination" 23,1, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 65-86 (2003); Fredman, Sandra, "Double Trouble: Multiple Discrimination and EU Law" 2, 
European Anti-Discrimination Law Review 13-8 (2005); McColgan, supra note 44, at 32-7. 
110 Annual Plan of Work and Budget Breakdown, January-December 2006, at 2-3, < 
httn /%c eurona. eu/emnloyment social/fundamental rights/ndf/nroe/nlannrol; bud2006 en pdf 
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of the problems faced by victims is encouraging and it is to be hoped that the study 
itself will suggests ways of dealing with these problems. 
An interesting point is made in the Explanatory Memorandum to ECRI's 
General Policy Recommendation 7.111 Paragraph 13 reads: 
Discriminatory actions are rarely based solely on one or more of the enumerated grounds, 
but are rather based on a combination of these grounds with other factors. For 
discrimination to occur, it is therefore sufficient that one of the enumerated grounds 
constitutes one of the factors leading to differential treatment. The use of restrictive 
expressions such as `difference of treatment solely or exclusively based on grounds such as 
... ' should therefore 
be avoided. 
ECRI thus recommends that discrimination should be prohibited if it is based on one of 
the enumerated grounds, no matter whether this is the only factor leading to the 
discrimination or if it is one of a number of enumerated and other grounds. This 
suggests that ECRI favours a wide definition of discrimination, which includes multiple 
discrimination. If national legislation followed ECRI's Recommendation then unlawful 
discrimination would be found in the case mentioned above of the black disabled 
woman and it would not be necessary to provide proof that she was discriminated 
against because of race and sex and disability. Proof of discrimination of any one of 
these grounds would be sufficient. 
4 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we have analysed the Race Directive in the context of the concepts of 
race, racism and racial discrimination discussed in Chapter I. The negotiations on the 
Directives show that the terms race and racism are still very much linked to the negative 
use that was made of them in the past and are, therefore, still problematic for many 
Member States. 
I Supra note 47. 
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Despite discussions since the 1980s about the problems racism and racial 
discrimination posed for the EU, it was held that the Community did not have the 
competence to act against discrimination. However, this lack of competence was used 
as a `smokescreen' to hide behind: if the Council had wanted to take action, it would 
have found a way to do so. This is clear from the fact that, once the mood changed, 
action was taken very quickly and Article 13 was added to the EC Treaty, establishing 
the Community competence to act against discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. The Commission issued 
three proposals for legislation soon after this and within 7 months the Race Directive 
was adopted, followed 5 months later by the Framework Directive and the Action 
Programme. After the initial reluctance to take community action was overcome and the 
competence to take such action was established, the political will was strong enough to 
accept a Directive against racial and ethnic origin discrimination with a very wide 
scope. 
Our analysis has shown that the Race Directive and many national and 
international measures against race discrimination do not give a definition of race or 
racism, but only define racial discrimination. It was suggested that this omission might 
be preferable, because it is difficult to give a definition that would be useful in legal 
proceedings. However, some definitions exist and there is even a definition of `racism 
and xenophobia' in the EU: in the 2001 Proposal for a Framework Decision. 
112 The EU 
Member States are free to include a definition in their national law and could follow one 
of the examples we mentioned. If they do, the EU definition in the Proposal would be 
preferable because using the same definition in different EU measures aimed at 
combating racism and racial discrimination will avoid problems in interpretation. 
However, it is not clear if the Proposal will actually ever be adopted, as the political will 
112 Supra note 45. 
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to do so appears to be missing. But maybe the plans of the German Presidency to put 
the Proposal back on the agenda will lead to its adoption. 
A definition of race/racial or ethnic origin is also missing from the Race 
Directive, but we have suggested that it would be preferable if the terms include colour, 
descent, nationality and religion or belief, because it is very difficult to draw clear 
distinctions between any of these grounds and discriminators often do not make such 
distinctions anyway. Colour and descent are closely related to racial and ethnic origin 
and it is to be hoped that the ECJ will decide that the Directive implicitly covers these 
grounds. 
The exception for nationality and for provisions governing the entry, residence 
and treatment of third-country nationals and stateless persons made in Article 3(2) of 
the Directive has been strongly criticised for being overly broad and for not providing 
sufficient protection for third-country nationals. This is seen as one of the major 
problems with the Race Directive and hopefully the Member States will introduce 
legislation which gives more protection than the minimum standard provided by the 
Directive. 
We have argued for including religion or belief under the grounds covered by 
the Race Directive because it is difficult to distinguish between these grounds and 
perpetrators of discriminatory acts do not always do so; and, because the difference in 
protection might create a loophole to avoid prosecution. We do, however, foresee 
problems in reaching agreement of all the Member States on this, as religion is a very 
contentious issue in most Member States. 
Adding colour, descent, nationality and religion or belief to the grounds of 
discrimination covered by the Race Directive would deal with some of the major points 
of criticism levelled against it and bring it more in line with the definition of the 
proposed Framework Decision. The other grounds of Article 13 EC: sex, disability, age 
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and sexual orientation, do not necessarily need to be included in the Race Directive. 
However, there are differences in the levels of protection afforded by the different 
Equality Directives which mean that clear lines need to be drawn between the different 
discrimination grounds. This can lead to problems in cases of multiple discrimination. 
The EU Member States could provide the same protection against discrimination 
on all the grounds mentioned in Article 13 EC by extending the material scope of the 
Framework and the Equal Treatment Directives to include all the areas included in the 
Race Directive. This could be done either in one legislative instrument or in more than 
one. The Member States could also extend the number of grounds if they so wish. The 
Irish Equal Status Act 2000, mentioned in our introduction, is an example where all the 
grounds of Article 13 EC and some others are all provided for in the same law. The 
European Commission, in a Green Paper in 2004, expressed its approval that some 
Member States had gone beyond the minimum standards set out in Community 
legislation: some had extended the protection beyond employment to discrimination on 
the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation; some had opted 
for a single legislative framework addressing all grounds; and, many had established 
single equality bodies dealing with all the grounds of discrimination covered by the 
Directives-' 13 These equality bodies will be part of the discussion on the different 
models of equality that can be detected in the Race Directive in the next Chapter. 
113 COM (2004) 379, Green Paper on Equality and Non-discrimination in an Enlarged European Union 
(Green Papers are discussion papers on a specific policy area. ), at 7. 
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CHAPTER 6- THE RACE DIRECTIVE: CONCEPTS OF EQUALITY AND 
MODELS OF ANTI DISCRIMINATION LAW 
1 Introduction 
In the previous Chapter we analysed the Race Directive in relation to the concepts of 
race and racism. In Chapter 1, we discussed the term equality and established that four 
concepts of equality can be distinguished. In Chapter 2, we developed these concepts of 
equality into models of anti discrimination law, using the same terms to refer to each 
model to make clear that each model aims to establish the type of equality it 
corresponds with. We distinguished the following four models of anti discrimination 
law: the equal treatment model, the equality of opportunity model, the equality of 
results model and the pluralist model. Legislation in the equal treatment model aims to 
establish formal equality; it aims to prevent people in the same or similar situations 
being treated differently on the grounds of their racial or ethnic origin. Laws based on 
the equality of opportunity model aim to achieve equal opportunities for everyone; they 
aim to equalise the starting point so that historically disadvantaged groups can compete 
on an equal footing with people who did not suffer such disadvantage, by prescribing or 
permitting preferential treatment of these groups. Measures against discrimination based 
on the equality of results model aim for an equal outcome; aim for a fairer distribution 
of goods, resources and opportunities in society and for the equal participation of all. 
This also involves preferential treatment of the disadvantaged groups. The equality of 
opportunity and the equality of results models are together referred to as substantive 
models of anti discrimination law. Finally, legislation based on the pluralist model aims 
to create a society that welcomes and celebrates diversity and in which each person is 
respected equally. This Chapter assesses which models of anti discrimination law can be 
detected in the Race Directive. 
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The question what types of equality should be the aim of the equality legislation 
at the EU level did not appear to feature in any explicit form in the discussions and 
negotiations before the Directive was adopted, although there seems to have been a 
consensus that legislative prohibitions on discrimination should include both direct and 
indirect discrimination and that there should be room for positive action. I The concepts 
of indirect discrimination and positive action were familiar from the existing sex 
discrimination legislation and had been part of the proposals for a Community Directive 
made by the Starting Line Group. 2 As mentioned in the previous Chapter, this group, 
together with the European Parliament, played an important role in lobbying for action 
against racism and racial discrimination in the EU. The Kahn Commission also 
recommended that indirect discrimination should be prohibited in EU anti 
discrimination legislation and that this legislation should make provisions for positive 
action. 3 
At the time the Race Directive was proposed and during the negotiations, the 
main focus appears to have been on achieving the adoption of legislation at EU level in 
order to lay down minimum standards for all Member States. As the Commission itself 
stated in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for the Race Directive, that 
Directive would ensure `that people in all Member States enjoy a basic level of 
protection against discrimination' 
4 Once these minimum standards were laid down in 
EU legislation and the deadline for implementation of the Race and Framework 
Directives had passed, the language within the EU started to shift towards an awareness 
I The Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for the Race Directive does recognise that some 
groups suffered disadvantage because of discrimination. See COM (1999), 566, at 6. We discuss this 
further when we analyse the positive action provisions of the Race Directive. 
2 The Group's original proposal for a Directive was called `the Starting Line' and can be found in 
Dummett, Ann, "The Starting Line: A Proposal for a Draft Council Directive concerning the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination" 20,3, New Community 530-8 (1994). After the Treaty of 
Amsterdam was adopted, the Group issued 'The New Starting Line', which can be found in Chopin, 
Isabelle and Niessen, Jan, (eds. ), Proposals for Legislative Measures to Combat Racism and to 
Promote Equal Rights in the European Union (1998 London: Belmont Press), at 23-32. 
3 European Council Consultative Commission on Racism and Xenophobia, Final Report (April 1995), 
Brussels, 6906/1/95, RAXEN 24 REV 1 (1995), < httn: //aei. nitt. edu/archive/00001588/, at 39 and 59. 
4 Supra note 1, at 3. 
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of the limitations of formal equality and the need to go beyond this. This shift in 
language and the question whether this is translated into concrete measures will be part 
of the discussion in this Chapter. We first look at the Race Directive in relation to each 
model of anti discrimination law in turn. 
2 Formal Equality Model of Anti Discrimination Law 
Anti discrimination legislation of the formal equality model prohibits differential 
treatment. Can we detect the concept of formal equality in the Race Directive? 
According to Article 2(2)(a): 
direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably 
than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on grounds of racial 
or ethnic origin. 
This reflects clearly a formal notion of equality, prohibiting less favourable treatment 
than a person in the same circumstances. 
This definition of direct discrimination did not appear to cause particular 
difficulties in the negotiations of the Race Directives It is close to that used in the 
British Race Relations Act 19766 and what has been understood as direct discrimination 
by the ECJ in its case law on sex discrimination. This case law was the only guideline at 
EU level, as there have been no legislative measures containing a definition of direct 
discrimination until the Race Directive. The case law asks for a comparison to be made 
between a man and a woman in the same or a comparable situation. In Defrenne v 
Sabena No. 2,7 the ECJ held that direct discrimination may be `identified solely by 
reference to the criteria laid down by Article 119 (now 141) EC'. This Article prescribes 
equal pay for men and women doing equal work or work of equal value, which means 
s See Tyson, Adam, "The Negotiation of the European Community Directive on Racial Discrimination" 
3, European Journal of Migration and Law 199-229 (2001), at 202. Tyson writes, erroneously in my 
view, that the definition of direct discrimination was taken almost verbatim from the Burden of Proof 
Directive, but this Directive does not contain a definition of direct discrimination. It only defines 
indirect discrimination. 
6 Section 1(1)(a) RRA 1976. 
Case C-43/75 Defrenne v Sabena No. 2 [1976] ECR 455, at para 21. 
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that a comparison has to be made. The ECJ continues that these forms of discrimination 
`may be detected on the basis of a purely legal analysis of the situation. This applies 
even more in cases where men and women receive unequal pay for equal work carried 
out in the same establishment or service ... '. 
8 In Macarthys v Smith, 9 the ECJ used a 
comparative test; it considered that in a situation of direct discrimination, `the decisive 
test lies in establishing whether there is a difference in treatment between a man and a 
woman performing "equal work"". In para 15, the ECJ again mentions that 
`comparisons are confined to parallels which may be drawn on the basis of concrete 
appraisals of the work actually performed by employees of different sex within the same 
establishment or service'. 
Therefore, the definition makes it necessary to identify a `comparable situation', 
but there is no indication as to the meaning of this. The test has been used in sex 
discrimination cases, but not always without problems. In both Chapters 1 and 2, one of 
the problems identified in relation to the concept of formal equality and the formal 
equality model of anti discrimination law was the need to find someone in a comparable 
situation. But who is in a comparable situation? The choice of comparator is important 
because it can influence the result. The use of the words `would be' in the definition in 
the Race Directive suggests that a hypothetical comparator can be accepted, 1° although 
the ECJ has rejected such a comparator in sex discrimination cases. The ECJ has made 
an exception in cases of discrimination on grounds of pregnancy, where it has held that 
S Ibid. at paras 21 and 22. 
9 Case C-129/79 Macarthys Ltd v Wendy Smith [1980] ECR 1275, at paras 11 and 15. 
10 This opinion is also expressed by Waddington, Lisa and Bell, Mark, "More Equal than Others: 
Distinguishing European Union Equality Directives" 38, Common Market Law Review 587-611 
(2001), at 592; Bell, Mark, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (2002 Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), at 75; Schiek, Dagmar, "A New Framework on Equal Treatment of Persons in EC 
Law? " 8,2, European Law Journal 290-314 (2002), at 295-6; Parmar, Sejal, "The European Court of 
Justice and Anti-Discrimination Law: Some Reflections on the Experience of Gender Equality 
Jurisprudence for the Future Interpretation of the Racial Equality Directive" in: Niessen, Jan and 
Chopin, Isabelle, (eds. ), The Development of Legal Instruments to Combat Racism in a Diverse 
Europe (2004 Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 131-54, at 143; Liegl, Barbara, Perching, 
Bernhard and Weyss, Birgit, Combating Religious and Ethnic Discrimination in Employment from the 
EU and International Perspective (2004 Brussels: ENAR), at 9; Ellis, Evelyn, EU Anti- 
Discrimination Law (2005 Oxford: Oxford University Press), at 165. 
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no comparator is required. " However, it seems likely that the situation in sex 
discrimination cases will now change, because the two new Equal Treatment Directives 
contain the same definition, including the words `would be'. Ellis writes that as a result 
of the amendment of the Equal Treatment Directive, `this now defines discrimination so 
as to embrace hypothetical comparison'. She continues that `the Race Directive and the 
Framework Directive expressly permit hypothetical comparisons over the whole field of 
their respective application'. 12 In many cases of direct discrimination, it will be easier to 
find a hypothetical comparator and the possibility of using such a comparator in cases 
of discrimination on all Article 13 EC grounds including sex will alleviate one of the 
problems with the formal equality concept and model. 
In Chapter 2, we mentioned the three functions that are required by equality if it 
is to combat racism, distinguished by Fredman: 13 a means of redressing racist stigma, 
stereotyping and humiliation; the redistributive aim of breaking the cycle of 
disadvantage associated with groups defined by race or ethnicity; and, the positive 
affirmation and accommodation of difference. 
Following on from this, it is submitted that legislation against racial 
discrimination should aim to establish equality in all its four concepts, or, by the same 
token, should perform all three functions Fredman mentions. In other words, legislation 
based on all four models is needed in the fight against racism and racial discrimination. 
The prohibition of direct discrimination or of unequal or less favourable treatment on 
the grounds of racial or ethnic origin can be seen as performing the first function and is, 
therefore, important because it is the minimum first step to attack racial prejudice and 
prohibit behaviour based on such prejudice. 
11 In Case C-177/88 Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen (VJV Centrum) Plus 
[1990] ECR 1-3941, the ECJ held that discrimination on grounds of pregnancy contravenes the equal 
treatment principle and that there is no need for a comparator in such case (at para 12). See also Case 
C-32/93 Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd [1994] ECR 1-3567, at para 24 and 25. 
12 Ellis, supra note 10, at 165. 
13 See Introduction to Chapter 2 and Fredman, Sandra, "Combating Racism with Human Rights: The 
Right to Equality" in: Fredman, Sandra, (ed. ), Discrimination and Human Rights The Case of Racism 
(2001 Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1-44, at 15. 
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In Chapters 1 and 2, we also saw that both the notion and the model of formal 
equality were criticised for being relative principles which do not guarantee any 
particular outcome, as treating two people equally can mean treating them both equally 
well or equally badly. Article 6 of the Race Directive might remedy this problem to 
some extent. This article contains a so-called `non-regression clause': the 
implementation of the Directive shall under no circumstances constitute grounds for 
reducing the already existing level of protection. This can be seen as a `prohibition on 
levelling-down', 14 so equal treatment can no longer be achieved by limiting or taking 
away existing benefits. However, the Directive is addressed to the Member States, and 
therefore only binds these States. Article 6 does not prevent levelling-down by 
individual employers or service providers. 
The equal treatment concept and model can also be seen in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the Union (Part II of the Draft EU Constitution). Title III 
`Equality' starts in Article 11-80 with stating that `everyone is equal before the law'. The 
Explanatory Memorandum15 mentions that this `corresponds to a general principle of 
law which is included in all European constitutions and has also been recognised by the 
Court of Justice as a basic principle of Community law'. It corresponds to similar 
articles in many of the international human rights instruments we have discussed in 
Chapter 4. As we have seen there, it is an expression of the formal equality model of 
anti discrimination law. 
3 Substantive Equality Models of Anti Discrimination Legislation 
The Race Directive's title indicates that the aim of the Directive is `to implement the 
principle of equal treatment', while Article 1 states as its purpose: `to lay down a 
14 See McColgan, Aileen, Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd ed. 2005 
Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing), at 58; Waddington, Lisa, The Expanding Role of the 
Equality Principle in European Union Law, Policy Paper, European University Institute, Robert 
Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies, 2003, < www. iue. it/RSCAS? e-texts/CR2003-04. lDdf at 14-5. 
11 CONV 828/1/03, Updated Explanations Relating to the Complete Text of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (as amended by the European Convention and incorporated as Part II of 
the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe), Brussels, 18/06/03. 
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framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, with 
a view of putting into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment'. The 
Framework and the Equal Treatment (Goods) Directives contain the same purpose in 
their Article 1. In this, all three Directives follow the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive. 16 
The 2002 amendments did not change this purpose. So, the expressly stated aim of the 
EU legislative measures against discrimination is to put into effect or to implement the 
principle of equal treatment. This would suggest that their aim is to establish formal 
equality. However, the phrase `put into effect' can be read as meaning that the 
Directives aim at more than formal equality. As Schiek'7 writes: 
All of the directives have the purpose to put into effect' the principle of equal treatment 
(her italics). Thus they are not merely concerned with equality in law but also with equality 
in fact. 
The ECJ has also held that the objective of the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive is `to 
arrive at real equality of opportunity' for men and women. 
18 Moreover, Article 2 of the 
Race Directive explains that the principle of equal treatment means that `there shall be 
no direct or indirect discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin'. Therefore, the use 
of the words `put into effect', the opinion of the ECJ and the inclusion of a concept of 
indirect discrimination in the meaning of the principle of equal treatment all suggest that 
the purpose of the EU Equality Directives goes beyond the formal concept towards a 
more substantive concept of equality. We have distinguished two substantive models of 
anti discrimination law: the equality of opportunity and the equality of results model. 
Next, we discuss which substantive concept of equality can be detected in the Race 
Directive. 
16 The 1976 Equal Treatment Directive was followed by a number of Directives implementing the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women 
in different areas, see Council Directives 79/7/EEC, 
86/378/EEC, and 86/613/EEC. All these Directives state as their purpose: to implement the principle 
of equal treatment. 
17 Schiek, supra note 10, at 305. 
is See: Cases C-271/91 Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority No. 
2 [1993] ECR I-4367, at para 24; C-185/97 Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd [1998] ECR 1-5199, at 
para 27. 
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3.1 Indirect discrimination 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, legislation prohibiting indirect discrimination can be 
seen as a step away from formal equality towards a more substantive concept, which has 
elements of both the equality of opportunity and equality of results models. Article 
2(2)(b) of the Race Directive determines that: 
indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, 
criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular 
disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is 
objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary. 
The Race Directive follows the definition of indirect discrimination given by the ECJ in 
relation to the free movement of persons in the O'Flynn case. 19 The Court considered 
that: 
... unless objectively 
justified and proportionate to its aim, a provision of national law must 
be regarded as indirectly discriminatory if it is intrinsically liable to affect migrant workers 
more than national workers and if there is a consequent risk that it will place the former at a 
particular disadvantage. It is not necessary in this respect to find that the provision in 
question does in practice affect a substantially higher proportion of migrant workers. It is 
sufficient that it is liable to have such an effect. 
Tyson20 writes that the definition in the Directive did not follow the definition given in 
the Burden of Proof Directive and that it caused some concern to a number of Member 
States. 21 The Burden of Proof Directive defines indirect discrimination in Article 2(2): 
indirect discrimination shall exist where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or 
practice disadvantages a substantially higher proportion of the members of one sex unless 
19 Case C-237/94 O'Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR 1-2617, at paras 20 and 21. 
20 Supra note 5, at 202-4. 
Z' For the suggestions made by different Member States in relation to the definition of indirect 
discrimination see: Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings of the Social Questions 
Working Party, 6435/00, Brussels, 01/03/2000; idem, 6942/00,31/03/2000; idem, 8454/00, 
16/05/2000. 
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that provision, criterion or practice is appropriate and necessary and can be justified by 
objective factors unrelated to sex. 
Tyson explains that, for a finding of indirect sex discrimination, it is thus necessary to 
show that a greater proportion of one sex than the other is affected. This involves 
statistical evidence. Note, however, that this may have changed with the Equal 
Treatment (Amendment) Directive (see below). In the case of sex discrimination, 
obtaining statistical evidence is usually not a problem, because all Member States 
collect statistics on gender. However, as was mentioned in Chapter 5, statistics about 
racial or ethnic origin are not collected in all Member States. As a result of the misuse 
of racial and ethnic information in the 1930s and 1940s, there is widespread opposition 
to the collection of such data and in some Member States it is unlawful `as it is seen 
either to be an infringement of personal privacy or as a racist act in itself'. 22 
The definition in the Race Directive would thus remove the burden of providing 
statistical proof. This was the intention of the European Commission, as is clear from 
the negotiations. In answer to the remark from some of the Member States that the 
definition was broader than that in the Burden of Proof Directive, the Commission 
answered that this `takes new caselaw into account, which leaves out the reference to 
numbers'. 23 The same intention was clearly stated by the Commission's Director 
General for Employment and Social Affairs, Odile Quintin, in her evidence to the 
House of Lords Select Committee on European Union. 
24 She `defended the new 
definitions on the grounds that it removed the need to demonstrate statistically that 
indirect discrimination had in fact occurred', which would make the definition easier to 
use because the `statistical assessment is something which is extremely complicated to 
develop for other areas of discrimination'. But some Member States wanted to retain the 
22 Tyson, supra note 5, at 203. 
23 See Council paper 6435/00, supra note 21, in footnote 9. 
24 House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, EU Proposals to Combat Discrimination, 9th 
Report, 16/5/2000, < www. publications. parliament. uk/na/ldl99900/idselect/ideucom/68/6808 htm, at 
para 80. 
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definition of the Burden of Proof Directive, because they did not want a definition that 
made it apparently easier to win a case of racial discrimination than a case of sex 
discrimination. 25 Recital 15 was added to the Race Directive as a compromise. This 
Recital declares: 
The appreciation of the facts from which it may be inferred that there has been direct or 
indirect discrimination is a matter for national judicial or other competent bodies, in 
accordance with rules of national law or practice. Such rules may provide in particular for 
indirect discrimination to be established by any means including on the basis of statistical 
evidence. 
This allows, but does not oblige Member States to require statistical evidence. However, 
it means, as Tyson26 points out, that different tests for indirect discrimination could be 
applied in different Member States. This problem could be solved by removing the 
Recital, as the reason for the addition of the Recital now no longer exists, because the 
Equal Treatment (Amendment) Directive contains the same definition of indirect 
discrimination as the Race Directive, as do the Framework and Equal Treatment 
(Goods) Directives. 27 Support for the argument that the Recital (and a similar Recital 15 
in the Framework Directive) are no longer necessary can be found in the fact that the 
two Equality Directives adopted on the basis of Article 13 EC after the Race and 
Framework Directives - the Equal Treatment (Amendment) and the Equal Treatment 
(Goods) Directives - do not contain a reference to statistical evidence in their Preamble. 
According to the definition, indirect discrimination is not unlawful if it is 
`objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary'. The Burden of Proof Directive also allowed for 
25 See Council paper 8454/00, supra note 21, footnote 16. 
26 Supra note 5, at 204. 
27 See further on statistical evidence: Barnard, Catherine, "The Changing Scope of the Fundamental 
Principle of Equality? " 46,4, McGill Law Journal 955-77 (2001), at 969-70; Waddington and Bell, 
supra note 10, at 594; Bell, supra note 10, at 75; Brown, Christopher, "The Race Directive: Towards 
Equality for All the Peoples of Europe? " 21, Yearbook of European Law 195-227 (2002), at 206-7; 
Schiek, supra note 10, at 296; Liegl et al, supra note 10, at 10. 
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justification: indirect discrimination is not established where the `provision, criterion or 
practice is appropriate and necessary and can be justified by objective factors unrelated 
to sex'. Both these exceptions follow the case law of the ECJ. In the Bilka case, 28 the 
ECJ decided that it was for the national court to determine whether there was an 
objective justification, but it laid down a three-tier test: the measures chosen must, 
firstly, fulfil a real need on the part of the undertaking; secondly, be appropriate with a 
view of achieving the objectives pursued; and, thirdly, be necessary to that end. 
The Race Directive does not allow for justification of direct racial or ethnic 
origin discrimination, 
29 but it does allow for justification of indirect discrimination. As 
we saw in Chapter 4, most international instruments prohibit discrimination as such, and 
do not make a distinction between direct and indirect discrimination. Indirect 
discrimination is taken as falling under the instrument's prohibition of discrimination, 
usually via the case law or via advice or recommendations of the body designated to 
oversee the instrument. The international measures allow for justification of 
discrimination in general, so this includes both direct and indirect discrimination. The 
Race Directive did not follow the international measures in this, but instead it followed 
the then existing EU legislation on sex discrimination and thus gives definitions of both 
direct and indirect discrimination. 
So why does it only allow for justification of indirect discrimination? Perhaps it 
is because the EU legislators saw direct discrimination as `worse', as more offensive 
and repugnant than indirect discrimination. The EU legislator might have reasoned that 
direct discrimination is a more overt and noticeable form of making a difference in 
treatment. It can be seen as openly flouting the rule that one should not discriminate. 
Indirect discrimination, on the other hand, can be seen as not quite such an 
infringement, because it is a more `accidental' result of a rule or practice. The 
28 Case C-170/84 Bilka Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Harz [1986] ECR 1607, at paras 36-7. 
29 These exceptions are for genuine and determining occupational requirements (Article 4) and for 
positive action (Article 5). 
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prohibition of direct discrimination, of unequal or less favourable treatment, is the basic, 
most fundamental concept and the first requirement to fight racism and racial 
discrimination and, therefore, justifications should be strictly limited and prescribed by 
law. But, because indirect discrimination can be seen as a lesser infringement of the 
rules, it should not be prohibited in all situations, or, in other words, justification should 
be permitted, but only if it has a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary. In cases of indirect discrimination, other interests play a role 
as well and a balancing of interests must take place between prohibiting the indirectly 
discriminatory practices and business interests and policy and administrative 
considerations. These interests might be present in direct discrimination cases as well, 
but they should never be given priority in such cases, because that form of 
discrimination is so much more openly against the rules and offensive. This might be 
the reason why direct racial or ethnic origin discrimination under the Race Directive 
cannot be justified. 
Although the European Court of Human Rights allows for justification for both 
direct and indirect discrimination, in its determinations whether a difference of 
treatment contravenes the anti discrimination clause of article 14 ECHR it appears to 
deal with certain grounds of discrimination in a different way. As de Schutter3° 
explains: 
although, in most cases, a difference of treatment will pass the test of non-discrimination if 
it pursues a legitimate aim by means of presenting a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality with that aim, where differential treatment is based on a `suspect' ground, it 
will be required that it is justified by 'very weighty reasons' and that the difference in 
treatment appears both suited for realizing the legitimate aim pursued, and necessary (his 
italics). 
30 European Commission, DG for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, The Prohibition 
of Discrimination under European Human Rights Law Relevance for EU Racial and Employment 
Equality Directives, Olivier De Schutter, Feb 2005, at 14-5, < 
httn'//ec eurona. eu/emnlovment social/fundamental riehts/public/Hubst en. htm 
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The European Court of Human Rights thus requires `very weighty reasons' before it 
will consider that a difference in treatment on suspect grounds is justified. Gerards31 
writes that this Court will scrutinise the suspect classifications more carefully, while it 
will leave a wider margin of appreciation in the case of other classifications. In her own 
words, `if the right is fundamental in character, the Court will mostly apply a very strict 
But are not all Convention rights fundamental or core rights? Gerards deduces test' 32 
from the case law that `the Court seems to characterize aspects of Convention rights as 
core rights especially if they prove to be essential to the well functioning of a pluralistic 
and democratic society', and that, as a general rule, `political rights and rights that are 
closely linked to human dignity belong to the core rights protected by the 
Convention'. 33 Both de Schutter34 and Gerards35 write that the Human Rights Court 
appears to consider race a suspect ground. 
Even though the European Court of Human Rights allows for justification of 
both direct and indirect discrimination, it is suggested that the ECJ should use the 
distinction between suspect and non-suspect grounds when considering whether indirect 
discrimination is justified and scrutinise such justification more strictly when a suspect 
ground is involved. 
36 As mentioned, the Race and the Equal Treatment (Amendment) 
Directive only allow for justification of indirect discrimination but the Framework and 
the Equal Treatment (Goods) Directives contain more exceptions and both also allow 
for some justification of direct discrimination. From this, we could infer that the EU has 
made racial or ethnic origin into a suspect ground, while sex has also been made 
suspect, but only in relation to the employment fields. For this reason, we would argue 
31 Gerards, Janneke, "The Application of Article 14 ECHR by the European Court of Human Rights", 
in: Niessen and Chopin (eds. ), supra note 10,3-60, at 38-57. 
32 Ibid. at 44. 
33 Ibid. at 45 and 46. For more information and for the relevant case law the reader is referred to 
Gerards. 
34 Supra note 30, at 15. 
35 Supra note 31, at 26. 
36 See also Howard, Erica, "The Case for a Considered Hierarchy of Discrimination Grounds in EU 
Law" 13,4, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 443-68 (2006). 
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for a very strict scrutiny of all justifications put forward for indirect discrimination on 
racial or ethnic origin grounds. 
Another reason why we advocate that the ECJ applies a very exacting test to 
justifications for indirect discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin is that such 
justifications can be used in different ways. They can be used to support a multicultural 
approach as well as an approach supporting or reinforcing assimilation. For example, 
rules that hair must be covered in places where food is handled can be justified on the 
basis of health and safety requirements. But is an employer justified in requiring all 
employees to wear a specific type of headgear, or should he/she allow any headgear as 
long as it covers all hair? If he/she requires all employees to wear specific headgear, this 
could be indirectly discriminatory against Sikhs who wear turbans. Such a requirement 
would support an assimilationist approach. Allowing Sikh employees to wear turbans 
(and, if necessary also provide for surgical type masks to cover facial hair), would 
comply with health and safety rules, but at the same time would support a diverse and 
multicultural workforce. The requirement that all employees wear specific headgear 
should not pass the justification test under the Race Directive because, although the aim 
of the rule is legitimate (health and safety), the means of achieving that aim cannot be 
said to be appropriate and necessary, since the same aim could be achieved by different 
means which would not indirectly discriminate against Sikhs. Therefore, the court 
should conclude that the rule is not objectively justified and make a finding of indirect 
discrimination against the employer. 
Schiek writes that the objective justification test in the Race Directive stresses `a 
little more that a strict standard of proportionality is required', 37 and that, `as regards 
gender equality, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice has been contradictory 
in this respect'. In relation to gender discrimination, the ECJ has in most cases, 
37 Schiek, supra note 10, at 297. 
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according to Schiek, applied a strict proportionality test in relation to the practices of 
individual employers, while it has used a much less exacting test for Member States 
legislation. 38 Finlay39 argues the same, but Parmar seems to argue the opposite: `that the 
Court is applying a higher standard of scrutiny when the objective justification 
exception is raised by Member States'. 40 This shows clearly that there are contradictions 
in the case law and that the situation under the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive is far 
from transparent. This might change, as `these regrettable developments are now likely 
to be halted by the more concise wording, which will also be inserted into the Gender 
Equality Directive'. 41 The more concise wording should, therefore, lead the ECJ to 
scrutinise all justifications of indirect discriminatory measures, whether advanced by 
employers or by Member States, very closely. 
The definition of indirect discrimination in the Race Directive does recognise 
that an apparently neutral provision can have a disparate impact on some people 
because they have faced historical and structural impediments to equality and, in this 
aspect, it fits in a substantive model of equality. But does it fit in an equality of 
opportunity or an equality of results model of anti discrimination law? 
42 It focuses on 
results in that it takes account of the disparate impact of a seemingly neutral provision, 
criterion or practice, applied to all equally. By focusing on the impact, the Directive's 
aim appears to be equality of results. However, the end result of a finding of indirect 
discrimination under the definition of the Race Directive may well remain unequal 
because the Directive's aim is not redistributive. In other words, equality of results is 
not the end the Directive's provisions are aiming for. An unequal impact is not always 
discriminatory: if no exclusionary provision, practice or criterion can be shown or if the 
38 Ibid. 
39 Finlay, Mary, "Indirect Discrimination and the Article 13 Directives" in: Costello, Cathryn and Barry, 
Ellis, (eds. ), Equality in Diversity The New Equality Directives (2003 Dublin: Irish Centre for 
European Law/Irish Equality Authority/Ashfield Publishing) 135-50, at 143-4. 
40 pear, supra note 10, at 146-7. All three authors (Schiek, Finlay and Parmar) cite cases in support of 
their argument. For these cases, see these authors. 
41 Schiek, supra note 10, at 297. 
42 See also Chapter 2, under 3.1. 
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inequality can be objectively justified by reference to business needs or administrative 
interests, there will be no finding of indirect discrimination. So the Directive's 
prohibition of indirect discrimination cannot be said to fit fully within the equality of 
results model, it only fits in that model to the extent that it takes the result of a measure 
into account. 
Does the Directive's prohibition of indirect discrimination then fit in the equality 
of opportunity model because it makes the starting point equal for all? By prohibiting 
indirect discrimination, it makes the barriers certain people face unlawful. These 
barriers are, therefore, taken out of, for example, the recruitment process and, in this 
aspect, the prohibition makes the starting point more equal for everybody. In this way, 
the prohibition of indirect discrimination fits in the equality of opportunity model. 
However, the barriers are not unlawful if they are objectively justified by business or 
administrative interests. So indirect discrimination is not always unlawful. A finding 
that an employer has, in the recruitment process, indirectly discriminated against an 
individual or against the group he/she belongs to, does not necessarily lead to the 
individual obtaining the job after all; and, even if he/she would get the job, it does 
nothing about the disadvantaged position of the group to which he/she belongs. If the 
legal system of the Member State only allows individuals to complain about (indirect) 
discrimination, then the remedy, if the claim is successful, will only apply to that 
individual. Moreover, the remedy may well be individual compensation, rather than a 
duty to refrain from the discriminatory behaviour in future. So, there is no obligation on 
the employer to abstain from applying the discriminatory practice in future recruitment 
processes, although the risk of another court finding against him/her might stop him/her 
doing so. There is also no duty on the employer to create equality of opportunity by 
making sure that the members of the group can compete on an equal footing in that 
process. Therefore, here again, indirect discrimination is only partially about equality of 
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opportunity. On the other hand, we cannot deny that the concept does move away from 
a formal equality towards a substantive equality model, with some elements of both the 
equality of opportunity and the equality of results models. 
3.2 Positive Action 
The Race Directive allows, but does not require, Member States to take positive action 
measures. Article 5 of the Race Directive determines: 
With a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the principle of equal treatment shall not 
prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or 
compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin. 
Recital 17 expands on this: 
The prohibition of discrimination should be without prejudice to the maintenance or 
adoption of measures intended to prevent or compensate for disadvantages suffered by a 
group of persons of a particular racial or ethnic origin, and such measures may permit 
organisations of persons of a particular racial or ethnic origin where their main object is the 
promotion of the special needs of those persons. 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Race Directive's Proposal states with regard to 
`Article 5: Positive Action': 
Equal treatment by itself may not be enough if it does not overcome the weight of 
accumulated disadvantage suffered by discriminated groups. Article 4 allows Member 
States to authorise legislative or administrative measures which are necessary to prevent or 
correct situations of inequality. 
43 
Article 5, Recital 17 and the Memorandum thus all express a fairly clear idea of 
substantive equality: they recognise the accumulated disadvantage suffered by some 
groups and allow Member States to take measures to make up for this. That positive 
action measures aim at substantive equality 
is confirmed by the case law of the ECJ on 
Article 2(4) of the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive. This Article allowed Member States 
43 Supra note 1, at 6. In my view Article 4 in this quote should read Article 5, as the title above this 
passage suggests. 
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to take `measures to promote equal opportunity for men and women, in particular by 
removing existing inequalities which affect women's opportunities', in other words, to 
take positive action measures for women. The ECJ has recognised that Article 2(4) 
allows measures which `are intended to eliminate or reduce actual instances of 
inequality which may exist in the reality of social life'. 44 It has also held that `the result 
pursued by the Directive is substantive, not formal equality' 45 
By providing for positive action, Article 5 of the Race Directive thus moves 
towards a more substantive model of equality law but there is no indication in the 
article, the proposal or the recital, as to what type of positive action measures are 
allowed. Are only those measures allowed that fit in the equality of opportunity model 
or can the Member States take positive action that fits in the equality of results model? 
The original proposal for the Race Directive46 also allowed for positive action, but it 
was formulated in a different way. Under the Heading `Article 5 Positive Action' it 
determined: 
This Directive shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States to maintain or adopt 
measures intended to prevent or compensate for disadvantages suffered by a group of 
persons of a particular racial or ethnic origin. 
In the final text of the Race Directive `with a view to ensuring full equality in practice' 
is added. These opening words are the same as those of Article 141(4) EC, although 
Article 5 of the Race Directive does not follow this article fully. Article 141(4) EC was 
added to the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and was the first primary 
legislation to refer to positive action. Article 141(4) EC reads: 
44 Case C-312/86 Commission v France [1988] ECR 6315, at para 15. This is repeated in Cases C- 
450/93 Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] ECR 1-3051, at para 18; C-409/95 Marschall v 
Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] ECR 1-6363, at pars 26. 
45 Case C-136/95 CNAVTS v E. Thibault [1998] ECR 1-2011, at para 26. Cases C-158/97 Badeck's 
Application [2000] ECR 1-1875, at para 32; C-407/98 Abrahamsson and Anderson v Fogelgvist 
[2000] ECR 1-5539, at para 48, C-319/03 Serge Briheche v Mnistre de I7nterieur, Minisire de 
/'Education Nationale and Ministre de la Justice, judgment 30/09/04, at para 25, all combine what the 
ECJ held in Commission v France, supra note 44, and in Thibault. 
46 Supra note 1. 
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With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in working life, 
the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or 
adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the 
under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for 
disadvantages in professional careers. 
The fact that the final text of the Directive corresponds more closely to Article 141(4) 
EC could be an indication that the Commission and the Member States intend to give 
the same interpretation to the two positive action provisions. Does this help us in 
deciding what sort of positive action is allowed and how far this action can go? 
In Chapter 2, we mentioned that the ECJ, in its interpretation of Article 2(4) of 
the Equal Treatment Directive, has excluded programmes which involve automatic 
preferential treatment at the point of selection for employment, although it does seem to 
accept a wide range of measures prior to that point. The ECJ has also held that positive 
measures should be limited to the period necessary to overcome the disadvantage. 7 
And, the ECJ sees positive action as derogation from the principle of equal treatment 
and as such it should be interpreted strictly. 
48 In other words, in the sex discrimination 
field, the ECJ appears to hold that positive action within the equality of opportunity 
model is allowed, but that positive action which goes further and fits within the equality 
of results model is not. As Poiares Maduro writes: `the case law of the ECJ regarding 
affirmative action measures has therefore been framed largely by the notion of equality 
of opportunities' 
49 
This raises the question whether Article 141(4) EC is more extensive than 
Article 2(4) of the Equal Treatment Directive and whether it would allow for further- 
reaching positive action. The ECJ decided that the measures in the Abrahamsson caseso 
47 See Chapter 2, point 3.1 and the cases mentioned there. 
48 Case C-222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, at 
para 36. 
49 Poiares Maduro, Miguel, "The European Court of Justice and Anti-Discrimination Law" 2 European 
Anti-Discrimination Law Review 21-6 (2005), at 25. 
50 Supra note 45, para 55. 
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were not permitted under either Article 2(4) or Article 141(4). It considered Article 
141(4) EC separately and held: 
Even though Article 141(4) EC allows the Member States to maintain or adopt measures 
providing for special advantages intended to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in 
professional careers in order to ensure full equality between men and women in 
professional life, it cannot be inferred from this that it allows a selection method which 
appears on any view to be disproportionate to the aim pursued. 
This might mean that the ECJ sees Article 141(4) EC as going beyond Article 2(4) of 
the Equal Treatment Directive, but, unfortunately, it does not really give any indication 
as to whether Article 141(4) EC allows for broader positive action. Ellis writes that the 
language of the Race and Framework Directive appears to be more permissive than that 
of Article 2(4) of the Equal Treatment Directive, but weaker than that of Article 141(4) 
EC, 51 which suggests that Article 141(4) EC is more permissive than Article 2(4). We 
will come back to this later. 
Article 7(1) of the Framework Directive and Article 6 of the Equal Treatment 
(Goods) Directive contain the same provision as Article 5 of the Race Directive, while 
Article 2(8) of the Equal Treatment (Amendment) Directive replaces Article 2(4) Equal 
Treatment Directive and determines that `Member States may maintain or adopt 
measures within the meaning of Article 141(4) of the Treaty with a view to ensuring full 
equality in practice between men and women'. Will the ECJ use this same interpretation 
for positive action as it has done in gender equality cases under the new Equality 
Directives or will it allow for more far-reaching measures that come closer to the 
equality of results model? Will it make a distinction between the different Article 13 EC 
Directives in this area? This is yet to be decided. Some arguments can be advanced for 
allowing a broader interpretation in relation to all Article 13 EC grounds because, 
firstly, the Article 13 EC Directives allow for positive measures `with a view to 
5' Supra note 10, at 312. 
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ensuring full equality in practice' which, as Schiek52 argues, appears to indicate that 
these directives do go further and are aiming for equality of results. She writes: 
Neither of the directives thus uses the term `equal opportunity' from the old Gender 
Equality Directive, which led both Advocates General Tesauro and Jacobs in their 
conclusions on Marschall and Kalanke respectively to assume that positive action measures 
aiming at results are inadmissible. On the contrary, aiming to `ensure full equality in 
practice', the directives appear to envisage result-oriented as well as procedural measures. 
Secondly, the case law of the ECJ is partly based on its interpretation of Article 2(4) of 
the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive, but the Equal Treatment (Amendment) Directive 
has replaced this Article. Poiares Maduro uses the same argument where he writes that 
the scope of Article 141(4) EC and the Article 13 EC Directives might broaden the 
scope of admissibility of affirmative action measures. 
53 
Thirdly, there might be some room for a broader interpretation in the case of 
racial or ethnic origin discrimination because the scope of the Race Directive goes 
beyond the employment field. The ECJ might decide to allow broader positive action 
measures in the other areas covered. Support for this can be found in the Lommers 
case54 in which the ECJ upheld an employer's scheme that provided subsidised nursery 
places only for female employees (save in exceptional circumstances). This third 
argument can also be used in relation to the Equal Treatment (Goods) Directive. 
Finally, there might also be some, albeit tentative, support for a broader 
interpretation in relation to racial and ethnic origin discrimination in the opinion of the 
Commission in the Explanatory Memorandum, as quoted above. 
However, it can also be argued, as Ellis, 55 mentioned above, does, that the text 
of the Race and Framework Directives is weaker than Article 141(4) EC. Waddington 
52 Schiek, supra note 10, at 299. 
s; Supra note 49, at 26. 
sa Case C-476/99 Lommers v Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [2002] ECR 1-2891, at 
para 37. 
55 Ellis, supra note 10, at 312. Brown also expresses this view, see supra note 27, at 216. 
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and Bell write that the text of the Race Directive is more restrictive than Article 141(4) 
EC because `it omits the positive element of that Article, notably the possibility of 
conferring specific advantages to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue 
a vocational activity'. These authors anticipate `that the Court will seek to extend these 
general principles on positive action to the other grounds of discrimination enumerated 
in Article 13 EC', although they do admit that `there remains a variety of positive action 
schemes that have yet to be tested'. 56 
57 In another paper, Bell and Waddington write that `an assumption that such 
result-oriented measures [programmes involving preferential treatment at the point of 
selection] will be difficult to justify under the Article 13 Directives may be inferred 
from two derogations from the positive action clause'. These derogations are, firstly, an 
additional exception in Article 7(2) of the Framework Directive for disabled people, 
which `has been interpreted as permitting states to retain quota based schemes'; and, 
secondly, a specific exception in Article 15(1) of the Framework Directive `for 
recruitment into the Police Service of Northern Ireland, in order to protect legally the 
"50: 50" quota system introduced to increase Catholic participation'. 58 Therefore, Bell 
and Waddington argue that the fact that the Framework Directive makes exceptions for 
two cases where quotas are allowed would indicate that quotas are not allowed in any 
other cases. 
Therefore, there are arguments to be found both for and against an extension of 
the permitted positive action measures under the EU Equality Directives. It is suggested 
that the arguments for an extension are stronger for the Race Directive, because its field 
of application goes beyond the employment field and because the derogations 
mentioned by Bell and Waddington are both made in the Framework Directive and 
56 Waddington and Bell, supra note 10, at 602. 
57 Bell, Mark and Waddington, Lisa, "Reflecting on Inequalities in European Equality Law" 28, 
European Law Review 349-69 (2003), at 355. 
sa Section 46(1) of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 was mentioned in Chapter 2 as an example of 
legislation of the equality of results model, because it contains a quota system. 
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there are no such derogations in the Race Directive. The Race Directive generally 
contains less exceptions and derogations than the other Equality Directives. Are there 
any other arguments that could be used for allowing wider positive action for racial 
groups than for groups characterised by the other grounds in Article 13 EC? Is race in 
any way different from the other grounds? 
In Chapter 5, we discussed the difference in character between discrimination 
grounds. As we mentioned there, Bell and Waddington59 looked at the influence a 
ground could have on the ability or availability to do a job or use a good or service, 
while Schiek60 distinguished between characteristics which only exist as ascriptions, 
characteristics which reflect real biological differences and characteristics that reflect a 
chosen lifestyle or difference in identity. We concluded that race is an ascribed 
characteristic which is always irrelevant because it does not affect a person's ability or 
availability to do a job or use a good or service. Of the Article 13 EC grounds, sex and 
religion can affect a person's availability, while disability and age can affect both a 
person's ability and the availability to a greater or lesser extent. Sexual orientation, like 
race, does not affect either. Schiek put religion, ethnicity and sexual orientation in the 
third category, but, by following Gerards' suggestion that a characteristic should be 
considered as immutable if it `cannot be changed without infringing the essence of an 
individual's identity', 61 we argued that religion and sexual orientation - and possibly 
ethnicity - are immutable characteristics in this sense and so would come closer to the 
first category because they are beyond the control of the person affected. We could, 
therefore, argue that discrimination on the grounds of race/racial or ethnic origin, 
religion and sexual orientation is particularly repugnant and malicious, because these 
characteristics can be seen as being beyond the control of a person. 
59 Supra note 57, at 359-63. 
60 Supra note 10, at 309-10. 
61 Gerards, Janneke, "Intensity of Judicial Review in Equal Treatment Cases" 51, Netherlands 
International Law Review 135-83 (2004), at 164-5. 
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But does this justify allowing for different levels of acceptable positive action? 
In my view, the difference in character and the fact that discrimination is more 
repugnant on these grounds could well be used as an argument for allowing more far- 
reaching positive action in relation to racial, ethnic and religious groups, but not in 
relation to homosexual groups. As we have argued in Chapter 5, the Race Directive 
should be extended to cover religion or belief as well and, therefore, religion or belief 
should be treated in the same way as racial or ethnic origin. Positive action measures are 
taken to make up for structural disadvantages suffered by particular groups in society. 
In this sense, homosexual people cannot be said to have suffered such disadvantages as 
a group, but racial, ethnic and religious groups have. 
Other possible differences between the grounds that might justify the provision 
for broader positive action measures are the size of the group affected, the disadvantage 
suffered by this affected group and the extent of the discrimination. All these factors are 
difficult to assess accurately, but it might be the perception that these differences exist 
that influence the decision on how to deal with the different grounds. The perception 
may lead to the conclusion that some grounds need to be dealt with more urgently 
and/or more extensively than others. 
The perception that the number of people affected by racial discrimination in the 
EU was and is very large and that racial discrimination was and is particularly 
widespread and invidious appears to have played a role in the quick adoption of the 
Race Directive with its stronger protection. This perception - influenced no doubt by 
the strong lobbying by NGOs and the European Parliament for legislative action against 
racial discrimination - most likely strengthened the political willingness to take action 
to combat racism and racial discrimination in a wide area. Support for this can be found 
in the fact that the European Council mentioned the importance of the fight against 
racism and xenophobia at the Maastricht Summit in 1991, the Edinburgh Summit in 
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1992 and the Copenhagen Summit in 1993,62 while the Corfu Summit in 199463 resulted 
in the setting up of the Kahn Commission. The designation of 1997 as the European 
Year Against Racism" and the establishment of the European Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia65 also lend support to this view as does the already quoted (in 
Chapter 5) opinion of the European Commission that `a comprehensive coverage is 
necessary to make a serious contribution to curbing racism and xenophobia in 
Europe'. 66 Thus, the perception in the EU that racial discrimination affects a large 
number of people and that such discrimination is particularly widespread and invidious, 
could well be used as another argument for allowing broader positive action measures in 
relation to racial groups under Article 5 of the Race Directive. 
Therefore, a number of arguments can be advanced for a broader interpretation 
of Article 5 of the Race Directive, allowing for more result-oriented measures than what 
is allowed under the old Equal Treatment Directive and the other Equality Directives. 
Unfortunately, the European Commission, in its report on the application of the Race 
Directive under Article 17,67 states in respect of Article 5 that `it is worthwhile stressing 
the difference between positive action measures, which are allowed, and so-called 
"positive discrimination" measures, which are not compatible with the Directive'. It 
continues: 
On the one hand, positive action measures aim to ensure full equality in practice by 
preventing or compensating for disadvantages linked to having a certain racial or ethnic 
origin. These measures may include, for example, providing specific training to people 
belonging to groups that do not usually have access to such training, or taking particular 
62 See EC Bulletins, 12-1991,12-1992 and 6-1993. 
63 Corfu Summit Conclusions, < http: //www. euronarl. europa. eu/summits/corl en. htm#justice 
64 Resolution of the Council, 23/07/1996, concerning the European Year against Racism (1997) [1996] 
OJ C 237/1. 
65 Council Regulation 1035/97/EC of 2/06/1997 establishing a European Monitoring Centre on Racism 
and Xenophobia [1997] OJ L 
151/1. 
1 See Chapter 5 and the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for the Race Directive, supra note 1, 
at 3. 
67 COM (2006) 643, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. 
The Application of Directive 2000/43/EC of 29/06/2000 implementing the Principle of Equal 
Treatment Between Persons irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin. 
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steps to ensure that certain racial or ethnic groups are fully informed about job 
advertisements, including, for example, publishing adverts in publications targeting these 
groups. On the other hand, "positive discrimination" measures give automatic and absolute 
preference (for example in access to employment) to members of a particular group over 
others for no other reason than belonging to that group. 
68 
This suggests that the Commission does not want to accept broader positive action 
measures under Article 5 of the Race Directive, nor does it appear to want to go beyond 
the case law of the ECJ in sex discrimination cases. This is, in my view, an undesirable 
development and it would have been better if the Commission had pursued either of the 
following alternative paths. 
In the Report, the Commission itself points out that attitudes towards positive 
action vary hugely across the Member States. 
69 Ellis70 writes that the differences in 
wording of Article 5 of the Race Directive, Article 2(4) of the Equal Treatment 
Directive and Article 141(4) EC and the `notoriously inscrutable' case law of the ECJ 
on the equivalent sex discrimination provisions, are `evidence of deep political and 
philosophical tensions which surround the whole matter of positive action'. She argues 
that: 
because of the legitimate scope for a wide diversity of views on the role of positive action, 
this is an area where it is unacceptable to leave the resolution of the meaning of the law 
entirely in judicial hands. 
This suggests that Ellis is in favour of a path requiring more detailed guidance from the 
legislator on what measures are allowed. The Commission could have proposed an 
amendment to Article 5 with more guidance. 
68 Ibid. at 7-8 
69 Ibid. at 8. 
70 Ellis, Evelyn, "The Principle of Non-Discrimination in the Post-Nice Era" in: Arnull, Anthony and 
Wincott, Daniel (eds. ), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (2002 Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 291- 305, at 298. 
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In contrast, the existence of a wide variety of views in this area leads Caruso to 
argue for a path where more discretion is given to the Member States. She writes that 
the ECJ is likely to interpret the positive action clauses of the new directives `along the 
lines of its previous scrutiny of gender programs'. This is `a chapter of E. U. history that 
should not be written'. 71 Caruso argues strongly for a policy of restraint in the ECJ's 
scrutiny of positive action cases. Poiares Maduro72 also suggests giving the Member 
States a certain margin of discretion. He writes: 
It cannot be excluded that the reference in Article 141 EC to compensatory measures has as 
its aim providing a broader margin of discretion to Member States in adopting measures of 
positive discrimination. The issue here for the ECJ, and the decision that it has to take 
regarding admissibility of affirmative action and positive discrimination measures adopted 
by the Member States, is not actually whether affirmative action is the best way to fight 
discrimination and to reinstate equality in the labour market, but whether to give Member 
States a margin of discretion to decide what is compatible with the principle of equality.... 
In my view, in an area such as this that is subject to intense discussion and scrutiny, it may 
be appropriate for the court to allow for some diversity of national political choice 
regarding the extent to which Member States adopt affirmative action measures. 
As mentioned, the ECJ sees positive action as a derogation of the principle of equal 
treatment. In the Lommers case, 
73 the ECJ held that its case law on derogations from an 
individual right was applicable to positive action measures. This case law had 
introduced a proportionality test for such derogations. As the ECJ considered: 
According to settled case law, in determining the scope of any derogation from an 
individual right such as the equal treatment of men and women laid down by the Directive, 
due regard must be had to the principle of proportionality, which requires that derogations 
must remain within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the 
71 Caruso, Daniela, "Limits of the Classic Method: Positive Action in the European Union after the New 
Equality Directives" 44, Harvard International Law Journal 331-86 (2003), at 333. 
72 Supra note 49, at 26. 
73 Supra note 54, para 39, repeated in Briheche case, supra note 45. 
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aim in view and that the principle of equal treatment be reconciled as far as possible with 
the requirements of the aim thus pursued 
Therefore, a proportionality test is already applicable to positive action measures within 
the EU. Allowing the Member States a margin of discretion might lead to the 
development of some interesting and innovative measures that could be used as 
examples of good practice for other Member States. The proportionality test introduced 
by the ECJ would ensure that the Member States cannot take just any measure they see 
fit, because they must be able to objectively justify any positive action legislation. It is 
submitted that, rather than limiting positive action measures to what has thus far been 
permitted in the ECJ sex discrimination case law, like the Commission appears to do in 
the Report mentioned, or providing more guidance as to what measures are allowed in 
more detailed legislation at EU level, as Ellis seems to advocate, it is preferable to allow 
the Member States some discretion, provided this is subject to a proportionality test. 
More detailed legislation at this level is likely to limit, rather than expand, the measures 
permitted. 
One last point needs to be made in relation to positive action measures. Article 5 
allows, but does not require, Member States to take such action. This contrasts with the 
ICERD which requires, in Article 2(2), States Parties to take such measures. ECRI has 
also recommended that national law `should' provide for (temporary) positive action 
measures. 74 Under EU law there is no obligation on the Member States to do so and if 
they don't they are not contravening any EU legislation. This means that there could, 
and, because of the variety of attitudes towards positive action in the Member States, 
more than likely would, be significant differences between the individual Member 
States with some taking extensive positive action measures while others do not. Some 
74 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, General Policy Recommendation 7, On 
National Legislation to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, CRI (2003) 8 (2003 Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe), para 5. 
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calls for mandatory positive action in the EU Directives have been made. Cahn, 75 for 
example, writes: 
In light of the fact that both Article 1(4) and Article 2(2) [ICERD] comprise components of 
European Union Member States' obligations to end racial discrimination, the currently 
diminished EU standard will need to change, and the sooner the better, to end a situation in 
which states are faced with discord between requirements flowing from the EU acquis on 
the one hand, and their international obligations on the other. 
It could be argued that as all EU Member States are required to take positive action 
measures under the ICERD, the lower standard in the Directives does not matter, 
because the duty exists anyway. In Chapter 4, we have seen, however, that enforcement 
of a duty imposed by an international instrument is not easy. 
Another organisation that has advocated mandatory positive action under the 
Race Directive is the ENAR. 76 According to ENAR, `without mandatory positive action 
the anti-discrimination model espoused by the Directive will never be fully effective, 
particularly for the most vulnerable groups in society'. ENAR recommends that: `the 
Directive be enhanced through the promotion of mandatory positive action, which is 
responsive to the individual national contexts'. The latter part appears to indicate that 
ENAR is also in favour of allowing the Member States more discretion in what 
measures they take. 
The fact that the EU Equality Directives allow Member States to take positive 
action measures, but do not require them to do so, most likely reflects the diversity of 
views on the subject and the lack of unanimity between the Member States for 
mandatory positive action. 
Positive action is mentioned in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU in 
Article 11-83, which determines that `the principle of equality shall not prevent the 
75 Cahn, Claude, "Towards Realising a Right to Positive Action for Roma in Europe: Connors v UK" I 
Roma Rights Quarterly (2005), www. errc. org/cikk. php? cikk=2160 at 3. 
76 ENAR, Response of the European Network Against Racism on Council Directive implementing the 
Principle of Equal Treatment Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, 2003/43/EC, Oct 2005, at 4. 
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maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the 
under-represented sex'. This article appears to be a general statement which does not 
add anything to the provisions for positive action in Article 141(4) EC - this is verbatim 
repeated in Article 214(4) of the Draft Constitution - or Article 2(8) of the Equal 
Treatment (Amendment) Directive. The Charter does not mention positive action in 
relation to any of the other grounds of Article 13 EC. 
Therefore, the positive action provisions of the Race Directive move it towards a 
substantive model of anti discrimination law but it remains to be seen whether the 
Member States will be allowed to go beyond measures fitting in the equality of 
opportunity model and take positive action which fits in the equality of results model. 
4 Pluralist Model of Anti Discrimination Legislation 
In the previous Chapter, we saw that Recital 8 of the Race Directive mentions `a 
socially inclusive labour market' and `combating discrimination against groups such as 
ethnic minorities'. A socially inclusive labour market means a labour market in which 
all groups in society, including groups such as ethnic minorities, participate. The 
recognition of discrimination against groups and the stress on their participation in the 
labour market fit in the pluralist model of anti discrimination law. The same can be said 
for Recital 12 which explains that the scope of the Race Directive should go beyond the 
employment field and cover other areas `to ensure the development of democratic and 
tolerant societies which allow for the participation of all persons irrespective of racial or 
ethnic origin'. 
Article I1 and 12 of the Race Directive determine that the Member States should 
promote dialogue with the social partners (Article 11(1)) and with NGOs which have `a 
legitimate interest in contributing to the fight against discrimination on grounds of racial 
or ethnic origin' (Article 12) with a view to 
fostering and promoting equal treatment; or 
with a view `to address different 
forms of discrimination and to combat them', as 
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Recital 23 explains. Article 17 provides for Reports from the Commission on the 
application of the Directive, which `shall include, if necessary, proposals to revise and 
update this Directive'. According to Article 17(2), the Commission's report shall take 
into account, among other views, the viewpoints of the social partners and relevant 
NGOs. 
Dialogue with and considering the viewpoints of the social partners and NGOs 
involved in the fight against race discrimination gives these partners and organisations - 
and through them employers, employees and (groups of) victims -a chance to 
participate in the implementation of the Race Directive and in policy making in relation 
to the fight against race discrimination. Articles 11,12 and 17 and Recital 23 can thus 
be seen as promoting participation, which fits in the pluralist model of anti 
discrimination law. 
We have mentioned above, that ECRI recommends that Member States should 
provide for temporary special measures (or positive action). These measures should be 
allowed either `to prevent or compensate for disadvantages suffered by persons 
designated by the grounds enumerated in paragraph lb)' - the Recommendation uses 
the same wording as the Race Directive here - or `to facilitate their full participation in 
all fields of life'. 
77 Legislation providing for positive action measures aimed at 
participation would be of the pluralist model. 
The Draft Constitution of the European Union warrants a mention. Article I-2 
gives the Union's values: 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in 
which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail. 
77 Supra note 74, para 5. 
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Equality and respect for the rights of persons belonging to minorities are thus explicitly 
mentioned as values on which the Union is founded. It is interesting that Article 1-3 
determines, under the heading `The Union's Objectives', that the Union, among other 
things, `shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social 
justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between 
generations' and `solidarity among Member States'. It shall `respect its rich cultural and 
linguistic diversity' and `contribute to peace, ... solidarity and mutual respect among 
peoples'. Both these Articles have elements of the pluralist notion of equality: respect 
for human dignity and the rights of minorities; a pluralist and tolerant society; respect 
for diversity; and, the stress on solidarity and mutual respect between peoples. The 
placing of these Articles, right at the start of the Constitution, makes a clear statement 
that the Union values equality and diversity. 
Three articles in the Charter of Fundamental Rights in part II of the Draft 
Constitution also contain statements of intent to respect diversity: Articles 11-82 ('the 
Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity'), 11-85 ('the Union 
recognises and respects the rights of the elderly... '), and 11-86 ('the Union recognises 
and respects the rights of persons with disabilities... '). Therefore, there are elements of 
the pluralist concept of equality in the Draft Constitution, but both the statements in 
Articles 1-2 and 1-3 and those in the Charter are general statements without creating 
legal rights, so they could remain hollow statements. 
5 Other Provisions 
Some parts of the Race Directive and the Draft Constitution could fit in different 
models of anti discrimination law, depending on the way they are interpreted or 
implemented by the Member States or on the legal system of the Member State in 
question. We will discuss these parts in this section. 
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5.1 Enforcement Provisions of the Race Directive 
As the experience in the EU with sex discrimination had shown that enforcement is 
often problematic, the new Equality Directives give considerable attention to 
enforcement and contain a number of provisions to alleviate the problems experienced 
by victims in bringing cases. Article 7(1) of the Race Directive puts a duty on Member 
States to make `judicial and/or administrative procedures, including where they deem it 
appropriate conciliation procedures', available to all persons who feel discriminated 
against, even after the relationship in which the discrimination is alleged to have 
occurred has ended. The second paragraph provides victims with support in bringing 
actions. It determines that associations, organisations or other legal entities with a 
legitimate interest may bring enforcement actions, `either on behalf or in support of the 
complainant, with his or her approval'. Therefore, the Directive does not provide for 
organisations to bring cases in their own name, but, as it contains minimum 
requirements only, the Member States can give them the right to do so. 
Article 8 of the Race Directive shifts the burden of proof onto the respondent, 
once facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect 
discrimination have been established before a court or any other competent authority. 
This Article echoes Article 4 of the 1997 Burden of Proof Directive, which laid down in 
law the shift in the burden of proof developed by the ECJ. The reason for this shift is 
that in many discrimination cases, especially in employment related cases, it is the 
respondent (the discriminator) and not the victim who holds the relevant information. 
This provision is, again, a minimum requirement and Member States can introduce rules 
of evidence which are more favourable to the plaintiff. 
Article 9 of the Race Directive provides for protection against victimisation: 
Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems such measures as are 
necessary to protect individuals from any adverse treatment or adverse consequence as a 
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reaction to a complaint or to proceedings aimed at enforcing compliance with the principle 
of equal treatment. 
This Article protects not only victims of discrimination, but also others who support 
victims by reporting an act of discrimination or by acting as a witness. 78 The reason for 
including protection against victimisation is that the fear of retaliation often works as a 
real deterrent to making a complaint of discrimination. 
One of the problems for victims of discrimination has proved to be that they do 
not know about their rights to take action. To alleviate this problem, Article 10 of the 
Race Directive determines that the Member States should take care to disseminate 
information to all persons concerned on provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive or 
on provisions already in place. 
All the above provisions appear to be mainly aiming to make it easier for 
individual victims of discrimination to bring a case against a discriminator. In this 
sense, the provisions do not appear to go beyond the formal equality model of anti 
discrimination law. However, nothing in the Directive prevents or prohibits Member 
States to allow actions by groups of individuals as well, and the provisions above are 
equally applicable to such groups. Allowing for group actions would move towards a 
more substantive concept of equality. 
Article 13 of the Directive can be considered to go beyond the formal equality 
model, as it prescribes that: 
Member States shall designate a body or bodies for the promotion of equal treatment of all 
persons without discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin. These bodies may 
form part of agencies charged at the national level with the defence of human rights or the 
safeguarding of individuals' rights. 
78 See Tyson, supra note 5, at 214. 
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The use of the word `shall' means that it is compulsory for the Member States to 
designate such a body or bodies. 79 
Article 13(2) gives the competences of the body/bodies as: providing 
independent assistance to victims of discrimination in pursuing complaints about 
discrimination; conducting independent surveys concerning discrimination; and 
publishing independent reports and making recommendations on any issue relating to 
such discrimination. The Proposal for the Race Directive80 did include: `receiving and 
pursuing complaints from individuals' and `commencing investigations or surveys 
concerning discrimination', but this was dropped in the final text. According to Tyson, 81 
the EU Member States were concerned that `the proposal overstepped the line between 
setting objectives and telling Member States how to achieve them (so contravening the 
principle of subsidiarity)'. This suggests that the Member States preferred to leave the 
precise structure and tasks of the body/bodies to be decided at national level. 
The final text of the Race Directive is different from the Proposal in another 
aspect: in the latter, the Article was entitled: `independent bodies' and the first 
paragraph put a duty on Member States to provide for an independent body or bodies, 
which may form part of independent agencies. The second paragraph gives the tasks of 
these independent bodies (my italics). In the final text, the word independent is omitted 
from Article 13(1) and the opening part of Article 13(2), but then added to each task in 
the second paragraph. During the negotiations, the Member States expressed their 
concern about the independence of these bodies, but the Commission responded that the 
key point was to enshrine the existence of these bodies in legislation so that 
governments could not abolish them without consent of Parliament. Their independence 
could be ensured in different ways and was not incompatible with the obligation to 
79 See Council paper 6435/00, supra note 21, footnote 27. 
80 Supra note 1, Article 12(2). 
81 Supra note 5, at 216. 
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report to Ministers and/or financing by the State, according to the Commission. 82 The 
change in the text does not appear to make the situation with regards the independence 
of these bodies any clearer. 83 
Both the new Equal Treatment Directives prescribe the designation of `a body or 
bodies for the promotion, analysis, monitoring and support of equal treatment of all 
persons without discrimination on the grounds of sex' with the same competences as 
given in Article 13(2) of the Race Directive. The Framework Directive does not contain 
such duty and this omission has been criticised in the literature. 
84 There appears to be no 
sound reason why victims of sex and racial or ethnic origin discrimination need such a 
body more than victims of discrimination on the grounds covered by the Framework 
Directive. However, the practice in many Member States appears to be to designate a 
body or bodies with competence to deal with all the Article 13 EC grounds of 
discrimination. As Liegl et al write: 85 
Although the Employment Equality Directive does not provide for a similar obligation, the 
majority of Member States extended the competences of such bodies or established new 
institutions with similar mandates to also encompass the other grounds of discrimination. 
And the Commission's 2004 Green Paper86 notes the `trend towards the establishment 
of single equality bodies dealing with all of the grounds of discrimination covered by 
82 See Council Paper 6942/00, supra note 21, footnote 42. 
83 ECRI has composed basic principles concerning specialised bodies to combat racism, xenophobia, 
antisemitism and intolerance at national 
level. Principle 5 concerns the independence of such bodies. 
See appendix to ECRI, General Policy Recommendation 2, On Specialised Bodies to combat Racism, 
Xenophobia, Antisemitism and Intolerance at National Level (CRI (2001) 7 (2001 Strasbourg: Council 
of Europe), 15-22. See on this also: 
Cormack, Janet and Niessen, Jan, "The Independence of Equality 
Bodies" 1, European Anti-Discrimination Law Review 23-8 (2005). 
84 See for example: Skidmore, Paul, "EC Framework Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment: 
Towards a Comprehensive Community Anti-Discrimination Policy? " 30,1, Industrial Law Journal 
126-32 (2001), at 129; Waddington and Bell, supra note 10, at 608; Schiek, supra note 10, at 301; 
Higgins, Imelda, "Enforcement and the New Equality Directives" in: Costello and Barry, supra note 
39,391-409, at 401-2; Barry, Ellis, "Different Hierarchies - Enforcing Equality Law" in: ibid. 411-33, 
at 418. 
85 Liegl et al, supra note 10, at 12. 
86 COM (2004) 379, Green Paper on Equality and Non-discrimination in an Enlarged European Union, 
at 7. Some Member States 
have single equality bodies that deal with all the Article 13 EC grounds and 
cover other grounds as well. 
For more information see: European Commission, DG for Employment, 
Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Equality and Non-discrimination Annual Report 2006, < 
httn //ec eurona eu/emnloyment social/fundamental rights/public/pubst en. htm 
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the Directives'. But if the Commission finds this a positive development, it is curious 
that it has not proposed to provide a similar obligation in the Framework Directive. 
The Directives leave it to the Member States to decide whether they want to 
designate a single body covering one or more grounds or more than one body each 
covering a single ground. The advantages of having a single equality body, which deals 
with all the grounds of discrimination covered by the national legislation are, firstly, 
that a single body would provide a `one-stop-shop' for all victims of discrimination and 
for all persons who seek information about discrimination, thus making it easier for 
people to obtain information or help. Secondly, a single body could deal much better 
with cases of multiple discrimination. With single ground bodies, a victim of multiple 
discrimination will either have to decide which ground he/she wants to pursue or he/she 
will have to go to different bodies. Thirdly, a single body could keep an overview of all 
the grounds covered, while a number of single ground bodies would fragment the 
overall picture. Fourthly, a single body would also be better able to handle possible 
clashes between different grounds. And, finally, a single body would have the 
advantage of scale and could probably work more efficiently financially, because it 
would avoid possible overlap between objectives and tasks, including administrative 
tasks. However, having a number of smaller bodies for each specific ground has the 
advantage that each body only has to concentrate on a narrow area and thus it can 
quickly build up special expertise in this area. With a single body there is also a risk that 
some grounds of discrimination will be given more attention and that other grounds will 
be neglected, especially if resources are insufficient. 
The establishment of national bodies for the promotion of equal treatment is 
important because they provide independent assistance to victims of discrimination in 
pursuing complaints and so make 
it easier for the victims to pursue a claim. This 
assistance of victims can take the form of supporting cases in court, but many equality 
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bodies only support a small number of court cases and these are often chosen on the 
basis of the importance of the legal point at issue. 87 This is called `strategic litigation' 
and, through such litigation, the bodies can test or establish important legal issues, for 
example on the interpretation of key terms. The assistance to victims can also take the 
form of providing opinions or recommendations on complaints. Often these have strong 
persuasive value and will be followed but, if they are not followed, the victim can take 
legal action before the courts, which will take the opinions and recommendations of the 
body into account. Some bodies also provide mediation services. Some of the bodies 
established in the Member States can even provide legally binding recommendations on 
complaints submitted to them. 88 In this way, through opinions, recommendations or 
mediation, complaints are often solved before they reach the court or tribunal stage. 
Through the strategic litigation and through their opinions and recommendations, these 
bodies can influence and support the development of national and EU anti 
discrimination legislation. 
But the national bodies are also important because, through the other tasks 
mentioned in Article 13 (2) of the Race Directive, - conducting surveys, publishing 
reports and making recommendations - the bodies can influence policy making at both 
national and European level and play a part in the development of new legislative, but 
also non-legislative measures. The bodies in the Member States have been given a 
variety of tasks. The Dutch Equal Treatment Commission, for example, undertakes 
investigations on its own initiative and organises training sessions, lectures and 
conferences on the Equal Treatment Legislation. 
89 The British Commission for Racial 
Equality issues codes of practice which provide guidance on how to avoid unlawful 
discrimination and achieve equality. These codes aim at preventing discrimination as 
well as informing people about the legal steps they can take once discrimination has 
87 COM (2006) 643, supra note 67, at 5. 
88 See Annual Report 2006, supra note 86, at 21 
B9 See wwy"czb ni for more information. 
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taken place. 90 The work of these bodies can thus be said to go beyond establishing 
formal equality, because it is proactive and preventative and it aims at eliminating 
discrimination and at promoting and establishing factual equality. Whether these bodies 
work towards equality of opportunity, equality of results and/or pluralism depends on 
the competences given to them by the Member States. 
5.2 Mainstreaming Duty 
Under the `Provisions of General Application' in the Draft Constitution, there are a 
number of Articles that establish a strong legal basis for the mainstreaming approach in 
relation to all the grounds of discrimination mentioned in Article 13 EC, not just in 
relation to sex discrimination. In the latter area such a duty already exists under Articles 
2 and 3(2) EC and Article 1(1) Equal Treatment (Amendment) Directive. Article III-116 
echoes Article 3(2) EC and reads: 
In all the activities referred to in this Part, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and 
to promote equality between women and men. 
Article 111-118 extends the mainstreaming duty to all the grounds of Article 13 EC as it 
states: 
In defining and implementing the policies and activities referred to in this Part, the Union 
shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation. 
Bell91 points out the strength of these mainstreaming duties. He writes: 
the equality mainstreaming duties go beyond an obligation to `take into account', but 
instead integrate equality as an aim (his italics) of all policies. ... placing equality as an aim 
conveys the need for all policies to be actively engaged in achieving equality. 
90 The CRE has issued a Statutory Code of Practice in Employment, a Code of Practice for public 
authorities on their duty to promote racial equality; A Housing Code of Practice and a Health Care 
Code of Practice. For more information, see www. cre. gov. uk 
91 Bell, Mark, "Equality and the European Constitution" 33,3, Industrial Law Journal 242-60 (2004), at 
255. 
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He does mention that translating this duty into practice is not easy. But putting such a 
duty down in law is a positive step, because, rather than providing an individual victim 
with a means of redress, a mainstreaming duty is a more forward-looking, pro-active 
and positive mechanism, which moves beyond the need to identify an individual victim 
and perpetrator and thus beyond a formal equality model. Mainstreaming means that an 
authority has to assess the impact of each policy or decision on the fight against 
discrimination and for equality. But a mainstreaming strategy also assesses and 
evaluates the decision-making processes; it obliges the authority making decisions and 
policies to look at the way these are made. So a legislative mainstreaming duty can be 
seen as moving beyond the formal equality model of anti discrimination law, beyond 
the prohibition of unequal treatment, because it moves away from the focus on the 
individual and because it aims to prevent discrimination rather than acting after this has 
taken place. 
But does it aim to establish substantive equality (either equality of opportunity 
or equality of results) or pluralism? This is often not very clear for two reasons. The 
first reason is that it depends on what is being mainstreamed. Is it non-discrimination 
and equality or is it diversity? A duty to mainstream non-discrimination and equality, to 
assess the impact of all decisions and policies on non-discrimination and equality means 
that an authority must ask itself if its policy or decision promotes non-discrimination 
and equality. This could mean promoting equal treatment or equal opportunities or 
equal results. If it does no more than promote equal treatment, it would not really go 
much beyond the formal equality model of anti discrimination law, although it would go 
beyond just prohibiting discrimination and would be more preventative. If it promotes 
equal opportunities or if the duty imposed is to mainstream equality of opportunity, it 
would fit in the equality of opportunity model, while promoting equality of results 
would fit in the equality of results model. 
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On the other hand, if the duty is to mainstream diversity or social and political 
participation or social inclusion, it would fit in the pluralist model of anti discrimination 
law. For example, in the 1998 Action Plan against Racism, the Commission mentions 
that it will `actively develop a mainstreaming approach to combating racism and 
discrimination and promoting integration across all relevant sectors' (my italics). 92 
The second reason why it is not always clear what the aim of a legislative 
mainstreaming duty is, is that the concept itself, although it is a popular concept, is 
vague and open to a wide variety of interpretations and that it is not easy, to use Bell's 
words mentioned above, to translate the duty to mainstream into practice. What exactly 
does a duty to mainstream equality mean? We mentioned that it means that an authority 
must ask itself if its policy or decision promotes equality. But what happens if it 
doesn't? Does the mainstreaming duty include a duty to change the policy or decision in 
such a way that it does? Shaw93 points out that the 1998 Action Plan mentioned above 
lists many areas where the fight against racism should be incorporated into policy 
considerations - employment strategy; structural funds; education, training and youth; 
Justice and Home Affairs cooperation; information, communication, culture, 
audiovisual and sport; public procurement; research activities; external relations; and, 
Commission staff policy. On paper, this, according to Shaw, `amounts to a substantial 
commitment to a policy of mainstreaming'. She continues: `Yet, despite the rhetoric and 
these paper policies, there has been little solid action to bring the fight against racism to 
the forefront of the EU policy concerns'. This suggests that the commitment to a 
mainstreaming policy or even a mainstreaming duty imposed by law is not always as 
effective as it might at 
first appear. This very much depends on how this duty is 
interpreted and how or even whether it is put into practice. 
92 COM (1998) 183, Communication from the Commission An Action Plan against Racism, at 3. 
93 Shaw, Jo, mainstreaming Equality in European Union Law and Policymaking (2004 Brussels: 
ENAR), at 5. 
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However, if the duty in the Draft Constitution is interpreted, as Bell appears to 
do, as meaning that all policies need `to be actively engaged with achieving equality', 94 
then it could be useful to have such a duty as it would mean a greater focus on equality 
issues. It is, therefore, argued here that the addition of a mainstreaming duty for all the 
grounds of Article 13 EC is a positive development. But, as it is uncertain whether the 
Draft Constitution will be adopted in its present form, a legislative mainstreaming duty 
only exists in relation to gender equality. There does not seem to be any reason why the 
Race (and Framework) Directive could not follow Article 1(1) of the Equal Treatment 
(Amendment) Directive, which states: 
Member States shall actively take into account the objective of equality between men and 
women when formulating and implementing laws, regulations, administrative provisions, 
policies and activities in the areas referred to in paragraph 1. 
The Race and Framework Directives were influenced by the then existing sex 
discrimination legislation and, in turn, the Equal Treatment (Amendment) Directive was 
adopted in order to bring the equal treatment provisions in relation to sex discrimination 
more in line with those Directives. In other words, the Race and Framework Directives 
have been influenced by, but have also been influential upon, EU sex discrimination 
legislation. Parmar writes that `there now seems to be a reflexive cross fertilisation (her 
italics) process between EU race and gender equality law in particular, in which 
legislative definitions are borrowed, adapted and integrated'. 95 The Race Directive (and 
the Framework Directive) could, therefore, `borrow, adapt and integrate' Article 1(1) of 
the Equal Treatment (Amendment) Directive. The fact that the Draft Constitution 
extends the mainstreaming duty to those other grounds seems to indicate that extending 
the duty to all the Article 13 EC grounds would not meet with major objections. 
94 Supra note 91. 
95 Supra note 10, at 135. 
261 
6 EU Developments after Adoption of the Race Directive 
Recently, there appears to be a shift at the EU level in the language in relation to anti 
discrimination policies and the term `equal opportunities' is used more frequently. This 
shift in language concerns anti discrimination policies in general rather than specifically 
mentioning measures against racial or ethnic origin discrimination, but the shift is 
important because it can influence the interpretation of the Race Directive and the future 
development of new legislative or other measures against racial or ethnic origin 
discrimination. The Commission also refers a number of times to disadvantaged ethnic 
minorities. 
The shift can be seen, for example, in the fact that the new European 
Commission, installed in 2004, has a Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs 
and Equal Opportunities (Mr. Spidla). This is the first time that equal opportunities are 
specifically mentioned in the title of a Commissioner. A group of Commissioners 
responsible for fundamental rights, anti discrimination and equal opportunities has also 
been created. 96 
Commissioner Spidla himself mentioned equal opportunities and the need to 
tackle patterns of inequality on a number of occasions. In his opening address to the 
Dutch EU Presidency Conference on Anti-discrimination, he said: `I would like, above 
all, to push for the incorporation of equal opportunities in all policies - commonly 
referred to as "mainstreaming"`. 
97 Note that this mainstreaming duty would fit in the 
equality of opportunity model of anti discrimination 
law. And, in June 2005, at a 
Conference on `Mainstreaming Diversity', Spidla ended his speech with: `Europe 
96 Barroso, Jose, Speech to the European Parliament, 26/10/2004, SPEECH/04/47, < 
www europa eu/rapid/ 2ressReleasesAction. 
do? reference=SPEECH/04/474&format=PDF&aged=1 &la 
nýuaege EN&ggiLan uaQe=en 
97 Spidla, Vladimir, (Commissioner) Equality in the Europe of Tomorrow, Opening address to the EU 
Dutch Presidency Conference on Anti-Discrimination, Scheveningen, 22/11/2004, at 4, < 
httn//ec eurona. eu/emplovment social/speeches/2004 en. html 
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cannot be content with formal equality. It must work towards achieving genuine 
equality for everyone'. 98 
In an interview with `Equal Rights in Practice', 99 he said: 
But I think we can all agree that laws in themselves - even when fully implemented and 
enforced - are not enough to tackle some of the ingrained patterns of inequality in our 
society. 
This use of the `language of equal opportunities' in the Community anti discrimination 
context appears to be even stronger in the Commission's Communication on the 
Framework Strategy for Non-discrimination and Equal Opportunities for All, '00 and the 
Proposal to designate 2007 as the European Year of Equal Opportunities for All. 10' 
The introduction to the Communication describes the EU legislation against 
discrimination as `some of the most comprehensive and far-reaching anti-discrimination 
legislation to be found anywhere in the world'. The Commission emphasises that full 
and effective implementation and enforcement of this legal framework must be ensured. 
However, this is followed by the consideration that: 
It is clear that the implementation and enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation on an 
individual level is not enough to tackle the multifaceted and deep-rooted patterns of 
inequality experienced by some groups. There is a need to go beyond anti-discrimination 
policies designed to prevent unequal treatment of individuals. The EU should reinforce its 
efforts to promote equal opportunities for all, in order to tackle the structural barriers faced 
by migrants, ethnic minorities, the disabled, older and younger workers and other 
vulnerable groups. 
102 
91, Spilda, Vladimir, Mainstreaming Diversity, Opening Address to the EU Luxembourg Presidency 
Conference on Anti-Discrimination, Mondorf-les-Bains, 27/06/2005, available from the same website, 
supra note 97. 
99 4, Equal Rights in Practice (2005), at 2. (News Review of the Community Action Programme), < 
www. ec. eur2oVa. eu/comrfi/em nlovment sociaUfundamental rights/index en. htm 
100 COM (2005) 224, Communication from the Commission, Non-Discrimination and Equal 
Opportunities for All -A Framework Strategy. 
101 COM (2005) 225, Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
European Year of Equal Opportunities for All (2007) Towards a Just Society. In the following, the 
Year' will refer to the European Year of Equal Opportunities for All. 
102 Supra note 100, at 2. 
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Later in the Communication, the Commission states: 
... 
it is difficult for legislation alone to tackle the complex and deep-rooted patterns of 
inequality experienced by some groups. Positive measures may be necessary to compensate 
for long-standing inequalities suffered by groups of people who, historically, have not had 
access to equal opportunities. 
The EU experience in the field of gender equality strongly suggests that protection of 
individual rights must be backed up by accompanying measures in order to bring about 
lasting change and to promote genuine equal opportunities for all. 103 
The Commission suggests as one of the accompanying measures the promotion of 
mainstreaming of non-discrimination and equal opportunities for all in relevant EU 
policies. The Commission will also seek to promote exchanges of good practice, 
cooperation and networking between all stakeholders in the field of discrimination. 
The Communication then announces: 
In order to drive forward the agenda outlined in the Communication for a more positive 
approach to equality (my italics), the Commission is proposing to designate 2007 as the 
European Year of Equal Opportunities for All ... 
The Year will aim to: inform people of their rights to protection against discrimination 
under European and national law; celebrate diversity as an asset for the EU; and to promote 
equal opportunities for all in economic, social, political and cultural life. 
104 
The Commission recognises that `enlargement has increased the EU diversity in terms 
of culture, language and ethnicity' and that `one of the 
key challenges facing the 
enlarged EU is the need to develop a coherent and effective approach to the social and 
labour market integration of ethnic minorities'. To deal with this, the EU `needs to 
develop appropriate responses to the different needs of new migrants, established 
103 Ibid. at 6. 
104 Ibid. at 8-9. 
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minorities of immigrant origin and other minority groups'. 
105 The Commission thus 
stresses the need for the integration of established and new ethnic minority groups. 
The conclusion reiterates that `in addition to the legal protection of individual 
rights, this Communication sets out a strategy for the positive and active promotion of 
non-discrimination and equal opportunities for all'. 
106 However, `the Commission is not 
proposing to come forward at this stage with further legislative proposals based on 
Article 13 of the Treaty', but it `will undertake an in-depth study into the relevance and 
feasibility of possible new measures to complement the current legal framework'. The 
results of this study should have been available in Autumn 2006 but have, as yet 
(January 2007) not been published. The Commission will follow this study with a 
feasibility study on further legislation. 107 
Which concepts of equality can be detected in all this? The Communication 
recognises the need to go beyond the prevention of unequal treatment, in other words, 
beyond a mere formal concept of equality. It acknowledges that positive action may be 
necessary to compensate for the structural barriers and 
long-standing and deep-rooted 
inequalities that some groups experience which have denied these groups access to 
equal opportunities. This shows clearly a substantive notion of equality. The 
Commission itself calls the Communication an agenda for `a more positive approach to 
equality', and stresses the importance of the promotion of equal opportunities 
for all in 
economic, social, political and cultural 
life, which also suggests a substantive approach 
including positive action. The aims of the Year include the celebration of diversity as an 
asset for the Union. This and the 
focus on the social and labour market integration of 
ethnic minorities and the 
development of appropriate responses to their different needs, 
all fit in a pluralist approach to equality. 
los Ibid. at 9-10. 
106 Ibid. at 12. 
107 Ibid. at 6. 
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The Commission will aim to ensure that a range of EU funding instruments 
contribute to the promotion of non-discrimination and equal opportunities for all. The 
Commission also proposes an annual high-level Equality Summit to bring together key 
stakeholders. 108 If this leads to greater participation of disadvantaged groups, it would 
fit in the pluralist notion of equality. To support policy development to tackle 
discrimination and social exclusion faced by disadvantaged ethnic minorities, the 
Commission plans to establish a high-level advisory group on social and labour market 
integration of these disadvantaged ethnic minorities. 109 Here again, there is a focus on 
ethnic minorities, which shows that the Commission recognises that there are 
disadvantaged ethnic minorities. This fits in the substantive idea of equality, and if the 
recommendations of this group actually lead to policy development to create greater 
inclusion, then it would also fit in the pluralist notion of equality. Therefore, the 
Communication contains clear elements of both the substantive and the pluralist 
concepts of equality. Can we also detect such elements in the Proposal for the Year of 
Equal Opportunities for All? 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for the Year states: 
The global objective of the Year will be to raise awareness of the benefits of a just, 
cohesive society where there is equality of opportunity for all. This will require tackling 
barriers to participation in society and promoting a climate in which Europe's diversity is 
seen as a source of socio-economic vitality. 
' 10 
It considers that the Year `will provide an opportunity to promote a more cohesive 
society that celebrates differences within the framework of EU core values'. I II Article 2 
gives the specific objectives of the year: rights, representation, recognition and respect 
and tolerance. ' 12 `Rights' refers to the raising of awareness on the right to equality and 
108 Ibid. at 7-9. 
109 Ibid. at 10. 
110 Supra note 101, at 2. 
 Ibid. at 4. 
112 Ibid. at 20-5 and Article 2. 
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non-discrimination and of the existing anti discrimination legislation. `Representation' 
means the promotion of full and equal participation of all groups in society. `The 
disadvantages suffered by some communities ... are so wide-scale and embedded in the 
structure of society, that positive action may be necessary to remedy the nature of their 
exclusion'. `Recognition' indicates the celebration and accommodation of diversity. As 
Article 2(c) states: 
The European Year will highlight the positive contribution that people, irrespective of their 
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or beliefs, capacities, age and sexual orientation can 
make to society as a whole, in particular by accentuating the benefits of diversity. 
`Respect and tolerance' relates to the promotion of a more cohesive society. Key to this 
will be the promotion of good relations between different communities and building 
trust and understanding, and work to eliminate stereotypes and prejudices. ' 13 Under the 
heading `delivering change' it states that the Year: 
will target common barriers and inequalities affecting several communities ... It will seek 
to encourage the promotion of good relations among different communities, building trust 
and understanding that will contribute to a more cohesive society. "4 
There is also an interesting point in the legislative financial statement. Where this looks 
at the specific objectives, it mentions that `a key challenge will be to demonstrate that 
the notion of "equality" does not mean "sameness" but rather taking account of 
differences and diversity to ensure equal treatment'. It also states that `equal 
opportunities policy is not simply limited to the elimination of discrimination. It also 
requires equalising the opportunities to full and equal participation for all'. 5 
Therefore, the proposal also clearly contains elements of the concepts of 
substantive equality: a society where there is equal opportunity for all and where 
structural disadvantages, barriers and inequalities affecting several communities may 
13 Ibid. at 2-5 and Article 2. 
14 Ibid. at 5. 
115 Ibid. at 25. 
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necessitate positive action. Three elements fit in the pluralist approach to equality: the 
tackling of barriers to participation to aim at the full and equal participation of all 
groups in society; the celebration and accommodation of diversity; and, the promotion 
of good relations, trust and understanding between different communities. 
Thus elements of both the substantive and pluralist concepts of equality are 
appearing in the `equality' language of the EU. A recognition is emerging that the deep- 
rooted patterns of inequality experienced by some groups need to be tackled. But is this 
use of the `language of equal opportunities' translated into practical policies or are the 
statements made hollow? 
The Communication proposes the development of tools to promote 
mainstreaming of non-discrimination and equal opportunities for all in relevant EU 
policies, not only in relation to gender discrimination, but also in relation to 
discrimination on the other grounds of Article 13 EC. It mentions that the Commission 
does an `impact assessment': any proposal for legislation and any draft instrument to be 
adopted will, when being prepared under the normal decision-making procedures, be 
scrutinised for compatibility with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
' 16 As the 
Charter contains a right to equality before the law and a prohibition of discrimination on 
a large number of grounds, including all those mentioned 
in Article 13 EC, any draft 
instruments will be scrutinised for compatibility with the right to equality and non- 
discrimination. Thus, there appears to be a commitment to assess the impact of all 
proposals for legislation on non-discrimination and equal opportunities which fits in the 
equal opportunity model of anti discrimination 
law. This impact assessment suggests 
that the mainstreaming policy is more than mere rhetoric and paper policies. 
'" 
16 SEC (2001) 380, at 2. A methodology for systematic and rigorous monitoring, based on this SEC 
document has been set out in COM (2005) 172, Communication from the Commission, Compliance 
with the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in Commission Legislative Proposals. See also IP/05/494, 
President Barroso proposes a New Framework to `lock-in' a Culture of Fundamental Rights in EU 
Legislation, 27/04/2005. 
117 See Shaw, supra note 93. 
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Both the Communication and the Proposal mention repeatedly the need for 
positive action measures to tackle the inequalities and structural barriers suffered by 
some groups. However, these statements could remain hollow as there are no specific 
policies or measures requiring or promoting positive action. Because there will be no 
proposals for changes in the legislation in the near future, the current provisions 
allowing for, but not requiring, positive action, will, therefore, not be changed or 
strengthened. 
The Communication and the Proposal have been followed up by some action. 
The first action was specifically directed at ethnic minority groups. It was the 
establishment, in January 2006, of a High-level Advisory Group, 
118 with as task to 
analyse how to achieve better social integration of ethnic minorities and their full 
participation in the labour market within the EU. This Group should submit a report 
containing recommendations on the policies to be implemented in this area before the 
end of the 2007 `European Year of Equal Opportunities for All'. 
Secondly, in a Press Release on 01/06/2006,119 the Commission welcomed the 
Decision of the Council and the European Parliament to designate 2007 as `European 
Year of Equal Opportunities for All' and announced a new website for the Year. Equal 
opportunities for all continue to be stressed and a number of interesting points can be 
made about the website. Under `Why a European Year? ' we find the following 
consideration: `Calling for equal rights and adopting 
laws to try and guarantee them is 
not enough to ensure equal opportunities are available 
for all in practice'. Three 
suggestions as to how equal opportunities 
for all should be ensured are: giving 
incentives to bring about a change in behaviour and mentality; tackling patterns of 
inequality; and, meeting more effectively the challenges of ever-growing diversity. 
118 Commission Decision 2006/33/EC of 20/01/2006 establishing a High-level Advisory Group on Social 
Integration of Ethnic Minorities and their full Participation in the Labour Market [2006] O1 L 21/20. 
See also IP/06/149 of 13/02/2006. 
119 IP/06/712 of 01/06/2006, "2007 starts Today: 'European Year of Equal Opportunities for All, gets 
Green Light". 
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Under `The Year's four key themes', in relation to awareness-raising, it is 
stated: 
The idea will also be to show that being equal does not [mean] being identical. The 
implementation of the equality principle has to take into account differences and diversity 
so as to ensure that each individual genuinely enjoys equal treatment. 
Under `representation' it states that `an equal opportunities policy also has to try to 
provide all individuals with opportunities for becoming fully involved on the same 
footing in society'. 
The above suggests that the EU is moving towards a more substantive concept 
of equality. There is a realisation that prohibiting discrimination and prescribing equal 
treatment is not enough to tackle the patterns of inequality suffered by some groups in 
society and a recognition that there are structural barriers to full participation faced by 
vulnerable groups such as migrants, ethnic minorities, the disabled, older and younger 
people and others. Why has this shift taken place? In the discussions and negotiations 
before the adoption of the Article 13 EC Directives, questions about concepts of 
equality do not appear to have played any great role. It is submitted that the 
Commission wanted to establish a common minimum standard of protection against 
discrimination across the EU, and anti discrimination measures aiming at formal 
equality are seen as providing this minimum standard of protection, as a first step in the 
fight against discrimination. To a large extent, the Directives followed the existing 
legislation in the field of gender discrimination, where formal equality was the main 
aim, supplemented by provisions against 
indirect discrimination and for positive action. 
These minimum standards were set in 2000 (in the Race and Framework Directives). 
Now the Member States have become more familiar with anti discrimination rules, the 
idea of going beyond formal equality has started to crop up in the language of the 
Commission. This idea is not new: as we have seen, it was mentioned by the ECJ in a 
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number of cases. Similar discussions on what aims equality laws should pursue took 
and are taking place in many Member States. The shift in emphasis is based on the EU 
experience in the field of gender discrimination that formal equality is not enough to 
tackle existing inequalities. 
However, it appears that despite the emphasis on the need for positive action 
measures to tackle the inequalities and structural barriers suffered by some groups, this 
shift in language is not going to be reflected in the near future in any new legislative 
measures. Other, non-legislative measures and policies could and will, hopefully, go 
further towards substantive and pluralist notions of equality and in this way complement 
the formal equality idea in the EU legislation. The Open Method of Coordination, which 
we mentioned in Chapter 5 in relation to the Employment Guidelines, might be a useful 
process in this area by setting common objectives and benchmarks and providing for the 
exchange of good practices. 
The European Commission is, in its own words, looking for `a more positive 
approach to equality'. However, where do the Member States stand in this? Will the 
Year create enough political determination to take further action against discrimination? 
The Commission appears to be using the language of equal opportunities and to be 
emphasising the idea of equal opportunities for all more and more often. It is suggested 
that it is doing so with the idea that if this language of equal opportunities is used and 
repeated often enough, the terms might become so familiar to the Member States that 
they will accept more and stronger measures to tackle inequality and barriers in society. 
In this way the use of the language might act as a catalyst for more EU action, both 
legislative and non-legislative, against discrimination. 
7 Conclusion 
In this Chapter we have analysed which models of anti discrimination law can be 
detected in the Race Directive. The definition of direct discrimination is a clear example 
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of legislation of the formal equality or equal treatment model. However, the definition 
in the Directive goes some way towards remedying some of the problems identified in 
relation to the formal equality concept and model. Firstly, it allows for a hypothetical 
comparator and this will make it easier for victims to prove discrimination. Secondly, 
the non-regression clause of Article 6 prohibits Member States from complying with the 
principle of equal treatment by levelling-down the protection provided. Levelling-down 
by private actors, however, does not fall under this clause. 
Although its stated purpose seems to suggest that the Directive aims at equal 
treatment, there are indications that it goes in fact beyond the formal concept of equality 
towards a more substantive concept of equality 
The inclusion of a concept of indirect discrimination also moves the Race 
Directive towards a more substantive concept of equality as it does recognise that an 
apparently neutral provision can have a disparate effect on some people because they 
have faced historical and structural impediments to equality. The definition of indirect 
discrimination in the Directive is partly about equality of opportunity and partly about 
equality of results, but, even though it is a step away from the formal equality model of 
anti discrimination law, it does not quite fit in either model. 
The Directive allows for justification of indirect discrimination, but we have 
argued that such justification should only be allowed in very limited circumstances and, 
therefore, every justification must be subjected to a very strict scrutiny. 
It is clear from Article 5, Recital 17 and the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Proposal for the Race Directive on positive action, that these provisions fit it, a 
substantive equality model of anti discrimination law, as they recognise the 
accumulated disadvantage suffered by some groups and allow Member States to take 
measures to make up for this. This is confirmed by the case law on positive action under 
Article 2(4) of the Equal treatment Directive. However, the Directive itself does not 
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give any indication of how far such measures can go, and neither arc there any 
indications in the other Article 13 EC Equality Directives. 
The case law in the sex discrimination field suggests that positive measures 
which fit in the equality of opportunity model are allowed, but that positive action 
which goes further and fits in the equality of results model is not. We advanced a 
number of arguments for allowing a broader interpretation, especially in the case of 
positive measures permitted under the Race Directive, although there arc also 
arguments against this. However, the Commission's Report on the application of the 
Race Directive under Article 17,120 suggests that the Commission does not want to go 
beyond the case law in sex discrimination cases and accept broader positive action 
measures under Article 5 of the Race Directive. It was argued that it would have been 
better if the Commission had not commented on this and had left more discretion to the 
Member States, subject to a proportionality test, especially because the attitudes in the 
Member States towards positive action vary so widely. 
The pluralist model of anti discrimination law can be detected in Recitals 8 and 
12 of the Race Directive, which stress the importance of participation of all groups, and 
in Articles 11,12,17 and Recital 23, which can be seen as promoting participation. Tile 
pluralist model can also be found in the Draft EU Constitution in a number of articles 
stressing equality and respect for diversity, pluralism, tolerance and solidarity. [jut, 
these are all very general statements which could very well remain hollow. 
However, the mainstreaming duty in relation to all Article 13 EC grounds laid 
down in Articles 111-116 and III-118 could be useful, depending on how such a duty is 
interpreted and translated into practice. It is not certain whether the Draft Constitution 
in its present form will be adopted, although it has reappeared on the Agenda of the 
German Presidency for the first half of 2007. Because of the uncertainty, we proposed 
120 Supra note 67. 
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that such a duty should be laid down in the Race and Framework Directives in a similar 
way as it is in Article 1(1) of the Equal Treatment (Amendment) Directive. A 
mainstreaming duty could prove useful to make authorities focus on equality issues. If 
the duty is interpreted as an obligation to promote equality, diversity and tolerance in all 
policies and decisions then it would fit in the substantive and pluralist models of anti 
discrimination law. 
We showed that a shift is taking place in the EU in the language about equality 
and that the EU is moving towards a more substantive concept of equality. Prohibiting 
discrimination and prescribing equal treatment are no longer seen as sufficient to tackle 
patterns of inequality and disadvantage suffered by some groups. There is recognition 
that vulnerable groups face barriers to full participation in society. At the time of 
adoption of the Race Directive, the Commission's main concern appeared to be to 
create common minimum standards of protection in all Member States. Once these 
standards were laid down, the notion of different concepts of equality entered the 
discussion. The EU experience in the field of gender discrimination that formal equality 
is not enough to tackle existing inequalities influenced this development. 
Despite the fact that this shift in language is not likely to lead to an extension of 
the EU legislation against discrimination in the near future, it could be significant for 
two reasons. Firstly, it might influence non-legislative measures and Policies. We 
suggested that, for example, the Open Method of Coordination could be useful in the 
anti discrimination field, by setting common objectives and benchmarks and providing 
for the exchange of good practices. Secondly, by frequently using the language of equal 
opportunities and emphasising that patterns of disadvantage and barriers to participation 
of ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups need to be tackled, this language 
might become common currency in the Member States and their willingness to work 
towards a more substantive equality for all might grow. hie shift in the language might, 
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in this way, lead to stronger and more effective measures - both legislativc and non- 
legislative - against discrimination. 
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CHAPTER 7- CONCLUSION 
In this Thesis we have analysed and critiqued the Race Directive, the EU legislative 
measure against discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, with respect to the 
theoretical concepts of race and racism and models of anti discrimination law. The 
analysis has included questioning the need for and the effectiveness of laws against 
discrimination. Also, an evaluation of the anti discrimination clauses in international 
and European human rights treaties and specific human rights instruments against race 
discrimination has been made. These studies have provided the theoretical basis for the 
analysis of the Directive as well as a set of standards against which to measure it. This 
has enabled us to make an assessment in this Chapter of whether the Directive has 
improved the protection against racial or ethnic origin discrimination for people within 
the EU. 
In making this assessment it is important to bear in mind that the Race Directive 
cannot be seen as a completely separate entity which was adopted and exists in a 
vacuum. This is precisely the reason why the Race Directive has weaknesses and leaves 
gaps in the protection it provides. It is not a theoretical exercise to make the perfect 
legislation against racial or ethnic origin discrimination but it is a practical instrument. 
The Directive was the product of negotiations and required unanimity for its adoption. 
In the negotiations, developments in thinking about the concepts of rice and racism, 
existing national and EU measures against discrimination, like the sex discrimination 
provisions, and developments in international human rights law played a role. It must be 
stressed, not only that there is a degree of overlap between these areas but also that 
these areas have been both influenced by and influential on each other. 
The problems of racism and racial discrimination were seen as undermining the 
proper functioning of the EU and the achievement of its objectives. Action against 
racial discrimination was therefore considered necessary and the EU institutions saw a 
276 
combination of legislative and other measures as the best way to tackle the problem. 
The legislation aimed to establish minimum standards across the EU, protecting people 
against being treated worse than other people because of their racial or ethnic origin. 
This protection was explicitly given a basis in the international and European human 
rights instruments and was meant to complement and to enhance the protection given by 
these instruments. These international instruments have thus influenced the EU anti 
discrimination measures, but, in their turn, the EU measures have had an effect upon the 
measures adopted by the Council of Europe and the work of ECRI, as is clear from the 
ECRI General Policy Recommendation 7.1 The EU has also participated in the 
discussions at international level, as its contribution to the WCAR shows. 
1 Concepts of Race, Racism and Racial Discrimination 
In Chapter 1, we defined a number of key terms and concepts, including race, racism 
and racial discrimination, for use in the Thesis. These terms arc central to a discussion 
of the Race Directive, but their meaning, as used within the EU, is not always very clear 
or consistent. The terms race and racism are historically and socially specific and 
should, therefore, always be studied within the time and society in which they occur. 
Before the eighteenth century, the term race was not very commonly used, but if it was 
used it denoted a group of people with a common line of descent or a common anccstry. 
In the eighteenth century, race became a subject of the biological sciences, which saw 
the world's population as being made up of people of different races, each with their 
own biological characteristics. However, this biological distinction became linked to 
ideas that some races were superior to other races and that it was, therefore, justified to 
exclude, suppress or exterminate people of inferior races. The extermination of Jews 
ECRI, General Policy Recommendation 7. On National Lcgtrlation to Combat Racism an'l Racial 
Discrimination, CRI (2003) 8 (2003 Strasbourg: Council of Europe). 
2 Contribution from the Commission Services to the Regional European Confcrcnce'All Different, All 
Equal': From Theory to Practice, European Contribution to the World Conference Against Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, 17/04/2000, < 
www. eurona. eu. int'comm'ettcmat relationshuman rich tsIwcpr c mM no cn jiff 
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and Gypsies during World War II and the Apartheid regime in South Africa are clear 
examples. 
The term racism is used in two distinctive ways; either, to denote the belief that 
races have distinctive biological or cultural characteristics determined by hereditary 
factors and that this endows some races with intrinsic superiority; or, to indicate not 
only this belief but also the behaviour based on it. In this Thesis, we have used the term 
racism for beliefs, doctrines or ideologies only, while the term racial discrimination was 
used to denote the behaviour based on these views. However, we should keep in mind 
that, in practice, the terms racism and racial discrimination are oßen merged with little 
apparent difference between the two. 
In the 1930s, scientists disproved the theories about biological differences and it 
now appears to be generally accepted that there is no scientific evidence that supports 
theories that there are different, separate, biological races. Despite this, biological 
notions of race appear to persist in both political discourse and popular thinking. 
Because of the already mentioned abuse/misuse of theories of race, both the terms race 
and racism are negatively loaded. Ethnicity is, therefore, sometimes used instead of race 
and xenophobia instead of racism because these terms appear to have a less negative 
connotation. Ethnicity or ethnic (origin) is also used together with race, as in Article 13 
EC and the Race Directive. The term discrimination is also most commonly used in tt 
negative way as it is linked to a moral judgment that discrimination is unjustified and 
unlawful 
The terms race and racism arc usually not defined in legislation, while racial 
discrimination often is. If racism is defined, it appears more often to be used to indicate 
beliefs only, as in the definitions in ECRI Recommendation 73 and in the 2001 Proposal 
3 Supra note 1, at pars Ia. 
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for a Framework Decision to combat racism and xenophobia, 4 mentioned in Chapter 5. 
However, it is also sometimes employed to denote both the racist beliefs and the 
behaviour based on these beliefs, like in the term `institutional racism' in the definition 
of the MacPherson Report, 5 mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2. If it is used to indicate 
beliefs only, then racial discrimination is usually employed to denote the behaviour 
based on these beliefs. However, legislation can only prohibit behaviour or, in other 
words, it can only prohibit the practical occurrences of racism, because legislating 
against ideas and beliefs would violate the human right to freedom of thought. 
Many national and international measures against racism and race discrimination 
omit giving definitions of these terms. For example, the ICERD does not mention 
racism in either the text of the Convention or the Preamble. Article I ICERD only 
defines racial discrimination, while the Preamble rejects theories of superiority based on 
racial differentiation. 
2 Concepts of Equality and Models of Anti Discrimination Law 
In Chapter 1, we distinguished four concepts of equality, and these were developed into 
four models of anti discrimination law in Chapter 2. Anti race discrimination legislation 
based on the equal treatment model aims to establish formal cquality; it aims to prevent 
that people in the same or similar situations arc treated differently on the grounds of 
their racial or ethnic origin. Laws based on the equality of opportunity model aim to 
achieve equal opportunities for everyone; they aim to equalise the starting point so that 
historically disadvantaged groups can compete on an equal footing with people who did 
not suffer such disadvantage, by prescribing or permitting preferential treatment of 
these groups. Measures against discrimination based on the equality of results model 
aim for an equal outcome; aim for a fairer distribution of goods, resources and 
COM (2001) 664, Proposal for a Council framework Decision on Combating Racism and 
Xenophobia. 
The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Report of an Inquiry by Sir William MacPhcn. on of Cluny, CmnJ 
4262-1 (1999), para 6.34. 
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opportunities in society and for the equal participation of all. This also involves 
preferential treatment of the disadvantaged groups. The equality of opportunity and the 
equality of results models are together referred to as substantive models of anti 
discrimination law. Finally, legislation based on the pluralist model aims to create a 
society which welcomes and celebrates diversity and in which each person is respected 
equally. 
6 In Chapter 2, we mentioned that, according to Fredman, equality should 
perform at least three functions if it is to combat racism. These functions correspond 
with the concepts of equality we distinguished in Chapter I. Firstly, equality should 
redress racist stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence. This function corresponds 
with the concept of formal equality. Secondly, equality should aim to break the cycle of 
disadvantage associated with groups defined by race or ethnicity. This function 
corresponds with both concepts of substantive equality. And, thirdly, equality should 
affirm the accommodation of difference as a part of the right to equal concern and 
respect. This would fit in the pluralist notion of equality and the aim of creating an 
atmosphere of tolerance for others and respect for diversity. 
Following on from this, it is submitted that legislation against racial 
discrimination should aim to establish equality in all four concepts, or, by the sane 
token, should perform all three functions Fredman mentions. In other words, legislation 
based on all four models is needed in the fight against racism and racial discrimination. 
In this context, it is not important whether there are a number of different laws existing 
side by side or whether one piece of 
legislation contains measures based on one or more 
or all of the models. In my opinion, what 
is important is that anti discrimination 
legislation aims to work towards establishing all four concepts of equality. Therefore, I 
do not see the four models as being in conflict with each other but rather as 
6 Fredman, Sandra, "Combating Racism with Human Rights: The Right to Equality" in: Fredman, 
Sandra, (ed. ), Discrimination and Human Rights The Case of Racism (2001 Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 9-44, at 15. 
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complementing each other. This means that the equal treatment model should not be 
interpreted to mean that equal treatment is the ultimate goal in all cases. Legislation of 
this model performs the first of Fredman's functions and, as such, is the first step 
towards the end goal of a more equal society. But anti discrimination legislation of the 
equal treatment model alone cannot perform the other two functions and, therefore, it 
should leave room for positive action and measures aimed at greater participation or at 
creating tolerance and respect. The four models of equality law should be seen as part of 
a gradual process: equal treatment forms the basic minimum standard; equality of 
opportunity and equality of results are added to make up for existing disadvantage and 
inequality, while pluralism is added to affirm the accommodation of difference and to 
create a way of living together in tolerance, harmony and respect. 
3 Effectiveness of Anti Discrimination Law 
In Chapter 3, we examined the question whether legislative rules are useful, effective 
and/or necessary in the fight against discrimination; or, put in a different way, whether 
one can reduce or eliminate discrimination through legal measures. Opinions arc 
divided on this question, some people express the opinion that anti discrimination laws 
are ineffective and can even be harmful, while others support the enactment of such 
laws, often together with other non-legislative measures. 
The first argument discussed was that anti discrimination laws make a clcar 
statement of public policy and of a commitment to 
fight discrimination. however, this 
statement could very well remain a hollow statement 
if it is made to be seen to be doing 
something but is not followed up by any action. 
The European Commission itself 
expressed clearly that the adoption of the Race and 
Framework Directives constituted 
`an unequivocal statement' about the stance adopted by European society towards 
discriminatory practices. 7 This statement was, as we have seen, not only aimed at the 
7 COM (1999) 565, Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for the Framework Directive, at 5. 
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Member States and their people themselves, but also at the Candidate Member States 
and the rest of the world. As the Commission has taken action against those Member 
States that have not informed it about their transposition of the Race Directive 8 and is in 
the process of examining the implementing legislation for conformity, this appears to be 
a genuine statement, rather than just a hollow one. 
The 2005 Communication and the Proposal to designate 2007 as the European 
Year of Equal Opportunities for A1110 also appear to show a genuine commitment of the 
EU Commission to the fight against discrimination. On the other hand, agreement on 
the Framework Decision on criminal law measures against racism, proposed more than 
five years ago, has so far not been reached, despite the fact that the original proposal has 
already been watered down considerably. As Bell" writes: 
the negotiations of the Framework Decision have been protracted and difficult. This has 
resulted in significant departures form the original proposal, often in the direction of more 
limited offences, as well as additional exceptions. 
It remains to be seen whether the plans of the German Presidency to move this project 
forward will succeed in getting the Proposal adopted. 
The second argument for enacting anti discrimination legislation was that such 
laws protect people who suffer discrimination and provide them with a form of redress, 
a way of fighting back. However, such legislation could again be a hollow statement, if 
it is not implemented or enforced properly, if the redress provided is not sufficiently or 
easily available and/or the remedies given are not adequate. The Race Directive (and the 
other Equality Directives) have given considerable attention to enforcement provisions, 
8 See Cases C-320/04 Commission v Luxembourg, and C-327/04 Commission v Finland, judgment 
24/02/05; C-329/04 Commission v Germany, judgment 28/04/05; C-335/04, Commission v Austria 
judgment 04/05/2005. Similar action has been taken in relation to the Framework Directive. 
9 COM (2005) 224, Communication from the Commission, Non-Discrimination and Equal 
Opportunities for All -A Framework Strategy. 
10 COM (2005) 225, Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
European Year of Equal Opportunities for All (2007) Towards a Just Society. 
Bell, Mark, "European Union Strategies to Combat Racism and Xenophobia as a Crime" in: Nickel, 
Rainer, Coomber, Andrea, Bell, Marc, Hutchinson, Tansy and Zahi, Karima, European Strategies to 
Combat Racism and Xenophobia as a Crime (2003 Brussels: ENAR) 31-7, at 37. 
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as the experience with sex discrimination had shown that this was a problem area. This, 
together with the action taken against non-implementation, suggests that the Race 
Directive provides victims with a form of redress and is not, in this sense, a hollow 
statement. 
The third and probably most contested argument discussed, was that anti 
discrimination laws have a persuasive and educative function, transmitting the message 
that racism and racial discrimination are wrong; that they can reduce prejudice by 
prohibiting the behaviour in which prejudice finds expression; and, that they can act as a 
deterrent. Although not everyone believes that anti discrimination laws are effective in 
changing attitudes and behaviour, the Commission certainly seems to think they can as 
it states in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for the Race Directive that 
`the enforcement of anti-racist laws can have a significant effect on the shaping of 
attitudes'. 12 Some of the research findings, discussed in Chapter 3, support this view, 
although they also show that changes only happen over a long period of time. 
The fourth argument for enacting anti discrimination legislation was that this 
leads to a reduction in barriers to employment and thus it opens up more employment 
opportunities for disadvantaged groups. Again, this argument is contested, and the 
opposite view, that such laws do, in fact, create extra barriers to employment for 
disadvantaged people has been supported as well. In the latter view, the market should 
be left to regulate itself and this will lead voluntarily to a reduction in discrimination. 
However, it has been questioned whether changes in discriminatory practices will be 
brought about voluntarily and, therefore, many people argue that legislative measures 
are needed to back up voluntary activities. The absence, in the EU, of the competence to 
enact legislation against racial discrimination appears to have hindered the taking of 
voluntary initiatives. 
12 COM (1999) 566, at 1. 
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The fifth argument in support of enacting laws against discrimination was that 
this provides support for those people who do not want to discriminate against certain 
people but feel under social pressure to do so. This argument could be powerful in 
relation to EU legislation, as the social pressure to discriminate might be quite strong in 
some Member States and legislation in other Member States and at EU level would 
provide support to resist that pressure. 
A final argument for enacting anti discrimination laws was that these strengthen 
and underpin other measures and policies aimed at promoting equality and reducing 
discrimination. These other measures in turn support legislative measures. The EU 
Institutions obviously considered that both legislative and other measures were 
necessary, as the Race and Framework Directives were accompanied by the Community 
Action Programme to Combat Discrimination. In the Proposal for this Action 
Programme, the Commission states, as we have seen, that a coordinated and integrated 
strategy, using all the instruments available, is needed and that legislation is only one, 
albeit a key one, component of such a strategy. 13 
We looked at some research findings in relation to anti discrimination law and 
concluded that some moderate impact on discriminatory practices and, in the very long 
term, some impact on discriminatory attitudes can be detected. It is too early to say what 
the impact of the Race and the other Equality Directives will be on existing patterns of 
discrimination within the EU. Recital 28 of the Preamble to the Race Directive 
mentions that 
the objective of this Directive, namely ensuring a common high level of protection against 
discrimination in all Member States, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States 
and can therefore, by reason of the scale and impact of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community. 
13 COM (1999) 567, at 1. 
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The Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for the Race Directive mentions that its 
adoption `will lay down common protections against racial discrimination to be enjoyed 
by citizens all over the Union' and that it will ensure `that people in all Member States 
enjoy a basic level of protection against discrimination'. '4 
Therefore, the legislation at EU level aims to establish a common minimum 
standard of protection across all Member States. The Member States have to enact laws 
against discrimination which conform to the minimum standards set by the EU in the 
Equality Directives. This means that, wherever a person finds him/herself within the 
EU, he/she should, at a minimum, be protected against the discrimination prohibited by 
these Directives and lack of protection and fear of discrimination should not stop people 
from travelling or exercising their free movement rights. 
4 International Human Rights Instruments to Combat Discrimination 
In Chapter 4, we examined the anti discrimination clauses in international human rights 
instruments. The ravages of World War II with its abuse of theories of race and racism 
were to be avoided in future and to this end the UN and the Council of Europe were 
established. Fundamental human rights were seen as vitally important in achieving 
greater unity between all nations and, therefore, the UDHR, the ICCPR, the ICESCR 
and the ECHR were adopted. These measures can be seen as setting international 
standards of human rights. Because these fundamental human rights should be enjoyed 
by everyone without discrimination, anti discrimination clauses can be found in all these 
instruments. 
According to Article 6 TEU, one of the founding principles of the Union is 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Union shall respect the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR and the rights that result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States. As all Member States are 
14 Supra note 12, at III. 
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parties to most of the international instruments discussed in Chapter 4, the rights 
guaranteed in these measures can be said to be part of their common constitutional 
traditions. The EU institutions have always placed the right to equality and non- 
discrimination firmly within the wider European and international human rights 
standards. This explicit adherence to international human rights standards gives the EU 
anti discrimination legislation more legitimacy and improves the image of the EU in 
both the Member States - towards its own citizens - and on the international scene. And, 
as the prohibition of racial discrimination is part of `ius cogens', the EU shows, in 
legislating against such discrimination, that it respects international law. 
The ICERD has been signed and ratified by all Member States and has had an 
impact on their laws, because it prescribes in Article 2(d) that States Parties shall 
prohibit and bring to an end racial discrimination by any persons, groups or 
organisations, by all appropriate means, including legislation. The ICERD prohibits 
both direct and indirect discrimination, like the Race Directive, and it puts an obligation 
on State Parties to take positive action measures. On positive action the Convention, 
therefore, goes further than most legislative instruments against discrimination, 
including the Race Directive, which allow but do not require positive action. 
The ECHR is particularly important within the EU because both Article 6 TEU 
and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights specifically refer to it and because the 
EU would accede to this Convention if the Draft Constitution came into force. In 
Chapter 4, we discussed that the Charter determines that, when Charter rights 
correspond to the rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of the rights 
will be the same as that of the ECHR rights. According to the Memorandum, the 
reference to the ECHR covers not only the text of the Convention and the Protocols to 
it, but also the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and of the ECJ. The 
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Convention and its case law are, therefore, important aids in interpreting the Charter and 
the EU anti discrimination legislation. 
Like the Race Directive, all the international measures discussed in Chapter 4 
prohibit both direct and indirect discrimination and allow - in the case of the ICERD 
require - positive action measures. They thus have elements of the formal equality and 
the substantive equality models of anti discrimination law. Most also contain general 
statements about tolerance and respect which fit in the pluralist model. The big 
difference between these measures and the Directive lies in their enforcement. 
International measures are not strictly legally enforceable and sanctions for non- 
compliance are largely ineffective, but they have a more political and persuasive force. 
Many states sign and ratify them to improve their public image both at home and on the 
international stage, and they stick to them because they do not want to look `bad'. In 
contrast, the Race Directive is binding on the EU Member States, which have a legal 
duty to implement it. They can be taken to the ECJ when they do not (fully) comply 
with this duty or when Member States interpretations of substantive obligations under 
the Directive are challenged. 
The international human rights instruments are thus important for the Race 
Directive and for EU anti discrimination law because they are part of its historical 
foundation; because adherence to the international standards of human rights that they 
set provides the EU with legitimacy; and, because they can act as an aid to 
interpretation. 
5 The Race Directive: Problems of Defining Race and Racism 
The negotiations for the Race Directive show clearly that in many Member States 
racism and racial discrimination are still very sensitive issues because the term race is 
still very much associated with theories of race and the atrocities of World War II they 
gave rise to. This is confirmed by the explicit rejection, in Recital 6, of theories which 
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attempt to determine the existence of separate human races. And, it was not only the 
(then 15) EU Member States which felt the need for such an explicit statement as is 
clear from Recommendation 7 of ECRI. '5 
The fact that race and racism were and still are a sensitive subject might help 
explain, firstly, why it took the EU such a long time to take action against racism and 
racial discrimination. As we saw in Chapter 5, the discussion on this subject began in 
the 1980s, but the Race Directive was not adopted until 2000. And, secondly, it helps 
explain why a definition of the key terms race, racism and racial or ethnic origin is 
notably absent from the Directive. The problems during the negotiations suggest that it 
might have been too difficult to reach a consensus on the definitions of these terms. 
However, as the Race Directive contains minimum requirements only and the 
Member States can go beyond these if they wish to do so, they are free to define race 
and racism in their national laws. We suggested a number of examples that the Member 
States could follow and pointed out that there is a definition of `racism and xenophobia' 
within an EU measure: the Proposal for a Framework Decision. It seems anomalous that 
the two EU measures to combat racism and racial discrimination differ in what is 
included: the Race Directive covers racial or ethnic origin, while the Proposal covers 
race, colour, descent, religion or belief, and national or ethnic origin. This difference 
can only lead to problems in interpretation. However, as we have mentioned, the 
Proposal is yet to be adopted, although it is back on the agenda of the German 
Presidency (Jan-June 2007). 
We suggested that it might well be better for the legislator not to give a 
definition of racism, but to define racial discrimination only. The reason for this is that 
it is difficult to define an ambiguous and social constructed concept like racism in a way 
IS Supra note 1, in the footnote to para 1(a). 
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that would be useful in court proceedings. It might be better to define those acts which 
are based on racist beliefs as unlawful discrimination. 
The ECJ should, in our view, interpret `racial or ethnic origin' to include colour 
and descent, as these can both be seen as part of race. We concluded that Article 3(2) of 
the Race Directive means that there are gaps in the protection of third-country nationals 
against racial or ethnic origin discrimination and that these gaps are not remedied by the 
provisions of the European Charter of Human Rights. The EU Member States could, in 
implementing the Race Directive, improve the protection of third-country nationals 
against racial or ethnic origin discrimination in three possible ways. Firstly, they could 
not make any exceptions to the personal scope at all and include protection of all 
persons. Secondly, they could make an exception for the situation mentioned in Article 
3(2), but make this subject to an objective justification test, following the 
Recommendation of the CERD on Article 1(2) ICERD, mentioned in Chapter 4.16 
Thirdly, they could add a proviso like the one made in Article 1(3) ICERD. 
Within the EU, the protection against racial or ethnic origin discrimination is 
stronger than the protection provided by the Framework Directive against 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, 
because the Race Directive has a wider material scope, only allows for very limited 
exceptions and includes a duty to establish an equality body/bodies. We suggested that 
the stronger protection is partly the result of the strong political will to combat as many 
aspects of racial discrimination which existed at the time of adoption of the Directive. 
We discussed the difference in character between the discrimination grounds 
and concluded that race does not affect a person's ability or availability to do a job or 
use a good or service and it is an ascription of something that does not exist. This might 
16 CERD General Recommendation 30, Discrimination against Non-Citizens, CERD/64/C/Misc. 11/rev. 
3,2004 < www. ohchr. org/enelish/bodies/cerd/docs/CERD-GC30. doc. 
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make race particularly invidious as a ground for discrimination and this might be 
another reason for the stronger protection against racial discrimination. 
However, the difference in levels of protection could lead to problems because it 
necessitates clear distinctions between the grounds. This is especially problematic with 
the grounds of racial or ethnic origin and religion or belief, because these grounds are 
often very closely related and overlapping, especially in the mind of discriminators. For 
this reason, we suggested that religion or belief should be included in the grounds 
covered by the Race Directive, although it would be difficult to reach unanimity 
between all Member States on this, because religion is a contentious issue, as illustrated 
by the debates on the Islamic head scarves in many European countries. In my view, the 
other grounds of Article 13 EC do not need to be covered by the Race Directive, 
although the difference in the levels of protection provided will be problematic in cases 
of multiple discrimination. 
6 The Race Directive: Concepts of Equality and Models of Anti Discrimination 
Law 
Analysing the Race Directive using the concepts of equality and models of anti 
discrimination law, it can be said to follow the equal treatment model in its definition of 
direct discrimination as less favourable treatment of a person on the grounds of racial or 
ethnic origin. However, the Directive addresses some of the problems of the concept of 
formal equality and the equal treatment model identified in Chapters 1 and 2. Firstly, 
the Race Directive allows for a hypothetical comparator like all the Article 13 EC 
Equality Directives do, and this should make it easier for victims to find a comparator 
and to prove discrimination. Secondly, the non-regression clause in Article 6 of the 
Race Directive -a similar clause is found in the other Equality Directives - prevents 
levelling down by the Member States. Unfortunately, private actors are not covered by 
this prohibition. And, thirdly, the problem that the formal equality concept and model 
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ignore existing inequalities and social disadvantages created by past discrimination is 
partially addressed by the inclusion of a prohibition of indirect discrimination and a 
provision for positive action. 
The Directive does not appear to do anything to avoid the problem that both 
formal equality concept and model lead to strong conformist and assimilationist 
pressures nor does it create any room for respect for difference or for the recognition of 
its positive aspects. The Directive also does not appear to go beyond a focus on the 
individual in enforcement procedures and remedies, but the provisions leave the details 
of this to the Member States. 
Can the Race Directive be said to fit in a substantive model of anti 
discrimination legislation? And which substantive model does it follow, the equality of 
opportunity or the equality of results model or both? Its title and purpose both mention 
equal treatment, but the use of the words `put into effect' in Article 1, the opinion of the 
ECJ that the aim of Article 2(4) of the Equal Treatment Directive is to arrive at real 
equality of opportunity and the fact that Article 2 includes in the principle of equality 
both direct and indirect discrimination all suggest that the purpose of the EU Equality 
Directives goes beyond the formal concept towards a more substantive concept of 
equality. 
The Directive's prohibition of indirect discrimination takes account of 
differences and of the unequal impact of seemingly neutral provisions or measures, 
applied to all persons equally, and, therefore, it goes beyond formal equality and fits in 
the substantive models of equality, although it is not always clear whether the aim of the 
provisions against indirect discrimination is to establish equality of opportunity or 
equality of results. The move towards substantive equality is somewhat tempered by the 
possibility of justification: indirect discrimination is not unlawful if it is objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
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necessary. Therefore, business or administrative interests could objectively justify 
treatment that has an adverse impact on some people. We have argued that the national 
courts and the ECJ should always scrutinise justifications of indirect racial or ethnic 
origin discrimination very strictly because race can be seen as a suspect ground and 
because justifications can be used to promote either pluralism/multiculturalism or 
assimilation. 
The Race Directive can also be said to fit in the substantive models of anti 
discrimination law because it allows the Member States to take positive action measures 
`to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin'. It thus 
permits preferential treatment of historically disadvantaged groups. Whether this fits in 
an equality of opportunity model or an equality of results model will depend on what 
the ECJ is prepared to accept as permitted positive action. Our discussion in Chapters 2 
and 6 showed that there are arguments both for and against a broader interpretation than 
the ECJ has allowed in sex discrimination cases up to now, which would go further 
towards the equality of results model of anti discrimination law. However, the 
Commission's Report under Article 17 of the Directive indicates that the Commission is 
not prepared to allow for a broader interpretation. 
We suggested that this is unfortunate 
and that it would have been better to allow the 
Member States a wider margin of 
discretion in how far these measures should go because attitudes towards positive action 
vary hugely across the Member States. 
A proportionality test is already applicable to 
such measures within the EU and this would ensure 
that the Member States cannot take 
just any measure they see fit. Suggestions have also 
been made to make positive action 
mandatory, as it is under the ICERD, 
but it is unlikely that the Member States will reach 
a unanimous decision on this. 
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Some references in Recitals 8 and 12 of the Preamble to the Race Directive and 
Articles 11,12 and 17 and Recital 23, which can be seen as promoting participation, fit 
in the pluralist model of anti discrimination law. 
We discussed some provisions of the Race Directive that move it beyond an 
equal treatment model, like the duty imposed on the Member States by Article 13 of the 
Directive to designate a body or bodies for the promotion of equal treatment. The work 
of these bodies is proactive and preventative as they aim at promoting and establishing 
factual equality. These bodies can influence policy-making at national and EU level and 
can be involved in the development of new anti discrimination measures. We also 
mentioned that there appears to be no logical explanation for the omission of such a 
duty in the Framework Directive. 
We looked at the mainstreaming duty in relation to all Article 13 EC grounds 
laid down in the Draft EU Constitution and concluded that such a duty moves beyond 
formal equality. However, the question whether a mainstreaming obligation fits in an 
equality of opportunity, an equality of results or a pluralist model of anti discrimination 
law depends very much on how it is implemented and interpreted. Nevertheless, a 
mainstreaming duty laid down in legislation is a positive step which goes beyond formal 
equality and, therefore, we suggested that, as it is uncertain whether the Draft 
Constitution in its present form will come into force, a mainstreaming duty similar to 
the one in Article 1(1) of the Equal Treatment (Amendment) Directive should be added 
to the Race and Framework Directives. This would establish the same obligation to 
mainstream equality in relation to all Article 13 EC grounds of discrimination. 
When the Race Directive was adopted there appeared to be little consideration 
of the different concepts of equality. However, from the end of 2004, a shift in the 
language at EU level towards more substantive and pluralist ideas of equality can be 
detected, in that there is now a recognition of the need to go beyond the prevention of 
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unequal treatment and of the fact that positive action may be necessary to compensate 
for the structural barriers and long-standing and deep-rooted inequalities that some 
groups experience. The term equal opportunities has been mentioned more frequently 
and now appears in the mandate of the Employment Commissioner and in the 
responsibilities of a special group of Commissioners. 
There is also a greater emphasis on mainstreaming non-discrimination and equal 
opportunities in relation to all the grounds of Article 13 EC. The 2005 Communication 17 
and the Proposal for a European Year of Equal Opportunities for All, 18 stress the 
importance of social inclusion and of the promotion of the full and equal participation 
of all groups in society. The Communication and the Proposal appear to be more than 
hollow statements as they have been followed up by some action. Although it appears 
unlikely that this shift in language will lead to legislative changes in the near future, it 
might well lead to other measures and policies and so, in time, to further legislation. 
7 Conclusions on the Research Question 
This Thesis aimed to identify whether the Race Directive improves the protection 
against discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin for people within the 
EU. In order to answer this question, we have made an in-depth evaluation of the 
Directive based on the theoretical basis and the standards provided in the first four 
Chapters. We will now turn to the answer to the above question. 
In my opinion, the answer is: yes, the Race Directive has improved the 
protection of victims of racial or ethnic origin discrimination in the EU. It has 
established common minimum standards and has put the EU Member States under a 
legally enforceable duty to ensure that their national laws conform to this minimum 
standard. By doing so, it has taken the first significant step on the road to equality 
referred to in the title of this Thesis. 
17 Supra note 9. 
18 Supra note 10. 
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The Directive has added value to the protection against racial or ethnic origin 
discrimination provided for at both national and international level. At national level, all 
Member States had to adopt new legislation or amend existing legislation. 19 For some 
Member States, the transposition of the Directive meant that completely new legislation 
against discrimination had to be adopted. For example, Austria, Finland, Germany, 
Greece and Luxembourg did not have any specific anti discrimination legislation. 20 
Other countries already had laws in place, but these laws needed to be amended to bring 
them in line with the Directive. For example, Britain, where legislation against race 
discrimination existed since 1965, had to make a number of changes, including an 
amendment of its definition of indirect discrimination. 
21 
In its imposition of a legally enforceable obligation to adopt legislation the 
Directive goes beyond the international human rights instruments, because their 
enforcement is problematic. The ICERD also imposes duties on Member States, 
including an obligation to take positive action measures but, again, the enforcement 
provisions are vague and the sanctions provided are largely ineffective. Article 14 
ECHR is problematic because it is accessory in character and can only be used in 
conjunction with another article of the ECHR. To compound the problem, the European 
Court of Human Rights did not find a breach of Article 14 on the grounds of racial 
discrimination until 2004. Protocol 12 to the ECHR provides a freestanding right to 
non-discrimination, but it has only been ratified by a small number of EU Member 
States. 
19 For information on the different measures in existence in the 15 Member States which were Members 
when the Race Directive was adopted in 2000 see: Commission Report on Member States Legal 
Provisions to Combat Discrimination (2000 Luxembourg: OOPEC). 
20 See also Moraes, Claude, Claude Moraes MEP launches a 'Name and Shame' League Table of 
Failure to Implement New EU Race Laws (2003), < www. claudemoraes. net/articlel3transrose. html. 
These same countries have been taken to the ECJ for not complying with the Directive, see supra note 
8. The case against Greece was withdrawn, but the ECJ ordered Greece to pay the costs as it only 
adopted measures after the Commission had initiated infringement proceedings. 
21 For more information on this see: Hill, Henrietta, "New Regulations on Race Discrimination" 20,29--, 
Discrimination Law Association Briefings 3-6 (2003). 
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But what can a victim of discrimination, who should be protected by these 
minimum standards, do if a Member State does not fulfil its duty to implement the 
Directive? The Commission has taken action against those Member States that have not 
informed it of the implementation of the Race Directive in their national law under 
Article 226 and 228 EC22 but this is a long and slow process, which will not provide a 
very effective remedy for individual victims. However, under the general legal 
principles established by the ECJ, an individual can rely on directly effective provisions 
in Directives against organs of the State, where these provisions are sufficiently clear, 
precise and unconditional. Which provisions of the Race Directive are directly effective 
would ultimately be determined by the ECJ but, given the case law on sex 
discrimination provisions, it is likely, as the Commission writes, `that quite a lot of the 
provisions in the two Directives could be directly effective'. 
23 
However, this would not help the individual in cases where the discriminator is a 
private individual or organisation. But the individual might still succeed in his/her 
complaint of discrimination, because the national courts are under an obligation to 
interpret existing national law, as far as possible, in such a way that it implements the 
Directive's provisions. If that does not help either, the individual can directly sue the 
Member State itself for loss or damages suffered as a result of the failure to transpose a 
Directive on the conditions that the legal provision infringed is intended to confer rights 
on individuals; that the breach was sufficiently serious; and, that there is a direct causal 
link between the breach and the damages suffered by the individual. 24 
22 See on Article 226-228 EC: Steiner, Jo, Woods, Loma and Twigg-Felsner, Christian, Textbook on EC 
Law (8th ed. 2003 Oxford: Oxford University Press) 577-92. The ECJ has taken action under these 
provisions, supra note 8. 
23 European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs, Equality and Non-discrimination Annual 
Report 2004, at 15. See also: Jones, Timothy, "The Race Directive: Redefining Protection from 
Discrimination in EU Law" 5, European Human Rights Law Review 515-26 (2003), at 516. 
24 These are the principles of direct effect, indirect effect and state liability. For more information see the 
report, supra note 23, at 15; Ellis, Evelyn, EU Anti-Discrimination Law (2005 Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), at 47-76. 
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In my opinion, the value which the EU provisions add to the existing national 
and international measures against discrimination, lies, therefore, in the setting of 
minimum, enforceable standards of protection against racial and ethnic origin 
discrimination across the EU. The Race Directive must thus be seen as a very positive 
development in the fight against racism and racial or ethnic origin discrimination in the 
EU or, in other words, as a very positive and significant step on the road to equality. 
We suggested that equality in all its types is needed to fight racism and racial 
discrimination and that legislation following all four models is necessary to ensure real 
equality for all. The end goal of this road is, therefore, to reach equality in all four 
concepts: formal equality, or, in Fredman's words, equality which redresses racist 
stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence; and equality of opportunity and equality 
of results, which both aim to break the cycle of disadvantage associated with groups 
defined by race or ethnicity and pluralism, which affirms the accommodation of 
difference as a part of the right to equal concern and respect. 
If we see this as the end goal of our road, the Race Directive, although an 
important step, is `only the end of the beginning. Much has still to be done to ensure the 
right to non-discrimination for all the peoples of Europe'. 
25 It is a necessary first step 
towards fulfilling the first concept of formal equality or equal treatment. Such 
legislation is useful and indeed necessary as a minimum requirement. The Directive has 
made a step towards the second concept of equality of opportunity by permitting 
positive action, but, considering the Commission's Report on the Race Directive, it 
appears to be unlikely that this will go further towards a concept of equality of results. 
However, there will be no progress at all towards substantive equality in this respect if 
Member States do not take any positive action. The Directive has also made a cautious 
step towards substantive equality in prohibiting indirect discrimination. In a very 
ZS Brown, Christopher, "The Race Directive: Towards Equality for All the Peoples of Europe? " 21, 
Yearbook of European Law, 195-227 (2002), at 227. 
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tentative way, the Directive could also be said to go some way towards a pluralist 
concept of equality in that it contributes to a more tolerant society, because it fights 
discrimination and intolerance. However, it does not contain any provisions for positive 
duties or for a duty to mainstream equality and diversity. 
Whether the recent shift in the language about equality at EU level will lead to 
(legislative) measures which will move the EU further towards achieving equality of 
opportunity, equality of results and pluralism, will have to be seen. The emphasis on 
mainstreaming equal opportunities and the incorporation of a mainstreaming duty in 
relation to all Article 13 EC grounds in the Draft Constitution is encouraging in this 
respect. A study of the legislation on positive duties which exists in some of the 
Member States might also suggest possible future steps EU legislation could take. 
The Race Directive is `only the end of the beginning' because, at present, it does 
not yet ensure full, factual equality for `all the peoples in Europe'. Despite the fact that 
it is often difficult to draw a distinct line between religion or belief and racial or ethnic 
origin as grounds for discrimination and despite the fact that these are more often than 
not linked in the mind of perpetrators of discriminatory acts, people who are 
discriminated against outside the employment field because of their religion are not 
protected because of the omission of religion or belief from the grounds covered by the 
Race Directive. Despite the fact that third-country nationals are often the target of 
discriminatory acts, the Directive leaves a gap in their protection because of the 
exceptions in Article 3(2). Despite the fact that legislation of the formal equality model 
is considered not to be enough to tackle real inequalities, the absence of more proactive 
and preventive provisions also limits the protection afforded to disadvantaged groups in 
society. 
Therefore, the Race Directive is a significant step, but it should be seen as only 
the first step towards greater equality for all. It is important because it started the EU on 
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its journey to equality and, thereby, laid the foundation for the protection against racial 
or ethnic origin discrimination for everyone in the EU. The challenge is now to build on 
this foundation. From the shift in language within the EU it appears that the 
Commission is keen to progress further along the road. Whether the Member States are 
equally keen remains to be seen. But, perhaps the stricter immigration policies which 
many Member States and the EU are pursuing at present might make them more 
inclined to accept further measures against racial discrimination. As we have seen, 
measures against racial discrimination have often been taken to ameliorate the effects of 
stricter immigration policies and to show that the harsh immigration rules are not 
motivated by racism. The Commission's repeated emphasis on equal opportunities for 
all and on the need to go beyond equal treatment to make up for historical disadvantages 
suffered by some groups, might also lead to greater acceptance of these ideas among the 
Member States. This, in turn, could lead to more positive and proactive measures 
against racial or ethnic origin discrimination which would bring the EU further along 
the road to racial and ethnic equality. 
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